This site uses cookies! Learn More
Maritime Content
Showing topics in Historic Vessels to 1914, WWI to 1939, WWII, Cold War to 1990, Modern, Work in Progress - Maritime, Ready for Inspection - Maritime, General Maritime modelling chat, Kits, Aftermarket and Reference Material posted in for the last 365 days.
This stream auto-updates
- Past hour
-
OOW, OST, BOST, OFSTED, FOST ??????? Please. I'm not ex Navy, but still find this thread hugely interesting till I reach a post like yours that becomes gibberish because of all the acronyms, which might mean something to ex Navy personal but nowt to us full time civilians. No doubt there is an acronym for us too, uncomplementary all in likelihood too I'd guess. Steve.
- Yesterday
-
Absolutely, ok round the fresh water tanks, engine room spaces and fuel tanks all are double bottomed with crawl spaces. All other compartments are single skinned and the thickness of the ships sides would shock you. Hence why the TA Leanders, 22's and 23's all eventually cracked. the stress on the hull from the tail when its wet is huge, there is so much torsional twist throughout the length of the ship. Simulators, yes at the RN Maritime Ops School HMS Collingwood, full mock ups of weapon systems (Xbox on steroids) also all the ops room for PWO and ops room training for all warfare operators. For Signal Staff (Was going to put men there) there are the fleetwork trainers, these rooms enable you to run simulations for Sector Screening, OOW mans, ras'ing, convoy work, working with RFA and STUFT ships, transiting in formation. Conning the ship, used to have all the kit at HMS Raleigh and Collingwood. The RN puts great store and effort in ship handling from the Skipper down to the second officer of the watch and the whole ships company, evolutions for OST, BOST are intense and it really is pass or fail in relation to operational readiness, think that is why I do not flap now I am a Deputy Head teacher when OFSTED rock up, after FOST staff (The green wreckers) have rinsed the hell out of you for six weeks. OFSTED for 2 days or 4 days if you are gash are a cake walk Its amazing what you remember from your youth! Have to agree with all that has been said re our colonial cousins, their kit is second to none, but be it 80's 90's 2000's or today, there preparedness is out weighed (pun not intended) by their over zealous "Anchors Aweigh Boys" attitude. Nice to have all the whistles and bells but you have to be able to use it. Question re the impact point, yep I would say a mess deck, bloody awful. Would all be racked out, then the oggin would have poured in as the DDG bounced back off the tanker, the crew in their racks would have then been sucked out the hole, would not wish that on anyone. All of us on here must have done the DRIU at Whale Island or if you are elderly like me, the Fire School and Damage Control Unit at Raleigh as a sprog as well. Either way, when the ship is rolling and toppers with Oggin, it is truly scary, pitch black, alarms going no red lighting as the circuit would have been tripped for everything ship dead in the water with no steerage way. Jesus I feel for those kids on the McCain. What has gripped my Gorilla are the You Tube American conspiracy theorists, clueless. I was on Glamorgan in 86, we had just done DTS out in the Windies prior to JMC 866, we were coming back over the pond and RV'd with RFA Fort Grange to ammunition ship as we had used a lot of 4.5, 3", 20mm and 40mm. We took up our RAS course and started to Jack Stay across all the ammunition and stores, we were running down sea as it was roughers, I was in my pit, as I had done the long morning. 3pm the MOTHER of all bangs! woke us all up, as we got out of our pits, all the hatches shut down to 1 Zulu from 3 Yankee, basically we were locked in to put it in civilian speak. Could hear the six short blasts of the siren 3 decks down, and feel the ship heel over to Stbd. The skipper was carrying out Emergency Six and a Corpen November (Emergency breakaway with a wheel of unspecified amount). Broke away, all lines gone and we slowed down. The pipe was to reduce to 3 yankee and check for damage, the Counties were tough ships, Glam proved that in 82. I had both the dogs (4-8pm) got ready to go on watch, being a nosey sod I went up through the AX hatch past the Slug launcher and up on to the flight deck. Where the guard rails should have been next to the flight deck nets... holey moley all gone/bent and nosing over the side where the CBM and the Chief Ship Wright were hanging over the side, a whopping great dent and a split in the ships side. That was just from a bounce off the RFA, what the crew on the McCain had to deal with must have been terrifying. Dit spun, Albert moment over. Nothing to see move along chaps
-
I understood newer build warships have double bottoms around fuel tanks. In any event, warships rely primarily on extensive subdivision of the ship into many watertight compartments so that the effects of any damage are contained as far as possible. I presume the impact point on the McCain was a messdeck but the alarm was raised too late (if at all) meaning not all the occupants at the moment of collision were able to get out before being overcome and the compartment had to be sealed off. I did visit one of this class about 12 years ago and noted the escape arrangements in the main machinery spaces which involved a vertical escape chute with ladders going up several deck levels. I don't remember the same in the messdecks which seemed to hold quite a large number of occupants compared with RN practice.
-
The RN certainly has bridge and Ops room simulators - training at sea cost a lot more.
-
According to DM today the commander of the US 7th fleet has been relieved of duty following these incidents. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4815504/The-Latest-Navy-dismisses-7th-Fleet-commander.html Scenario: Arabian Gulf, Gulf War 1. Hostilities over. HMS London in port at Bahrain after dark. US CBG sailing past, heading North. HMS London slips moorings and leaves port: Skipper: Lights off, radars off, radio silence, 8 kts. Lets see how close we can get before the yanks spot us. London makes like cargo vessel and approaches CBG from port quarter. No reaction from CBG. London penetrates outer perimeter of CBG and approaches to within 1/2 nm of carrier. Skipper: OK, turn on the main radar............... The entire CBG lit up like a Christmas tree. This direct from my neighbour who was ASW rating on the London. Poor watch keeping is no stranger to the USN..........an ENTIRE CBG, and nobody saw a Type 42 coming.
-
Another 'stupid' question. Oil tankers are double skinned, I take it warships are not? Would it make any difference? Trevor
-
Learning a lot from this thread. So I might as well ask a few questions about modern ship handling. Do modern navies use simulators to train their crews like airlines?
-
I missed it as well, I think LaurieS must have posted whilst I was writing my post. I was on the Tor Bay up the gulf shortly after that incident, we did a couple of crew exchanges with one of the 42's (can't rememember which one), half a dozen RN types came over to us for an hour or so on a rib for a look around, and a few of our boys went over there for the grand tour whilst we steamed in company.
-
Rgr that
-
Impressive job. beefy
-
Hobby matchstick side trawler
Bandsaw Steve replied to kpnuts's topic in Work in Progress - Maritime
I'm fascinated - but I do think there are much easier ways to make a hull. It'd be tricky cutting all those matchsticks with a bandsaw! 😀 -
Training it does work and repays. Procedures are essential Navy or any business. Neglect them and pay.
-
Excellent work, most inspiring!
-
Paul absolutely, she should have been closed up to their equivalent of 3 Yankee, tiller flat closed up and same with the SSP, if she was in difficulties standard drill must surely be that she was on emergency steering, also if the skipper was worth his salt he would be steering on engines at the time and on the bridge, calling up the Merchant man stating his intentions and that he was in difficulties, my other question is; were their RAMS lights not lit and no shapes hoisted, the Yanks love all that Buntingery vis signalling stuff? I would say it all comes down to poor seamanship, lack of experience and now my opinion of working with them over 25 years on and off, all the kit in the world yet they still seem to struggle to use it effectively. Their ratings are never a patch on ours and cannot for the love of a wet think on their own two feet and act independently. The OOW, and Bridge team must have been supremely gash! Or am I wrong? Flame away! The saddest thing is that this incident needlessly cost the lives of young sailors who were below decks. My heart goes out to the families of those who tragically crossed the bar, time to raise a glass
-
Dave, an old oppo of mine was on the Southampton Ro1(T) Andy "Scouse" Rice, not on watch when it happened, in his pit (Standard Drills for him, flat back sod) I was on the Glamorgan with him, we met up for a wet in Pompey said it was bloody horrendous (Clean version for our readers)
-
I had missed this post earlier. And if true it is a damning statement. Because the steering system is dual redundant plus the ship has two prop shafts. So if the wheel on the bridge fails the fall back is to close up the emergency team in the tiller flat as fast as possible and switch to independent shaft operation. In the Royal Navy when steaming in close company with other ships or in closed waters (say the Malacca Straits) then the watertight integrity of the ship is increased and personnel (Special Sea Duty Men) are closed up at the emergency steering position should such an event occur. It seems that the USN (or this particular ship) are very lax at such things. I am gob smacked!
-
Hi Sailors! This is the mighty "Chokai" at the terrible battle of Savo on the night of the 8th of August 42. Enjoy. DSC_0004 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0003_2 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0002_2 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0001 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0015 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0014 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0013 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0012 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0011 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0010 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0009 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0007 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0004 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0003 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0002 by jean Barby, sur Flickr DSC_0001 by jean Barby, sur Flickr
-
In 1988 my old ship HMS Southampton was in the Gulf when MV Tor Bay rammed her. She was lucky not to be sunk. That incident was caused by an inexperienced OOW onboard HMS Southampton miscalculating his manouevres when taking up station alongside MV Tor Bay. The CO, PWO and NO were also culpable. Board of Inquiry report here. Dave
-
It should, Paul, but unfortunately it can also generate complacency/bravado - it's routine, or we know exactly what we're doing here. There's a difference between RASing on the open sea where both vessels have room to manoeuvre, and overtaking at close quarters in a conjested TSS. If the McCain was overtaking slower traffic (Alnic MC was travelling at 9 knots) at a much faster speed, good seamanship would have put her in the much clearer northern part of the TSS lane, rather than dodging in and out of the slower traffic. There were several other ships overtaking the Alnic MC at circa 11 knots, McCain appears to have come between them and the Alnic MC.
-
Laurie, I am aware of that fact, I am merely pointing out that there would have likely been limitations on the propulsion system at the time of the incident. By the way reversing a prop on a Gas Turbine ship is achieved by reversing the pitch of the propeller. Dave, Your explanation seems more than plausible, but even so a bridge team which would have had experience of close ship interaction from RAS and OOW manoeuvres should have been aware of such risks.
-
Judging by the track of the Alnic MC from LaurieS's post, and photo's of the damage to the USS John S. McCain, one distinct possibilty that hasn't been mentioned is the McCain was affected by wake interaction after overtaking the Alnic MC too close down the Alnic MC's starboard side. If this was the case, Alnic MC had little room to manoeuvre to port without violating TSS rules (the purple section in the link is a no go "central reservation"), and no room to manoeuvre to Starboard due to the overtaking McCain. Alnic MC would be the stand on vessel, McCain should have kept well clear to starboard. From:- http://www.splashmaritime.com.au/Marops/data/text/Manotex/Vesshantex.htm Interaction between Vessels The pressure fields of two vessels in close proximity on the same or opposite headings will Interact and require corrective action to maintain course. The large suction zone around the longer of the two vessels may be the dominating factor in Interaction between vessels of significantly different size. This may present a very dangerous situation for the smaller vessel, particularly if it is overtaking. Factors that increase the risk of interaction are, high speed, large size vessel, narrow channel and shallow water. The pressure waves that create Interaction are proportional to the square of the vessel speed, thus the effects of all forms of interaction can be instantly reduced by reducing speed. In some cases consideration will have to be given to the loss of steering control associated with speed reduction. And a rather dramatic video of the effects of this when a small cargo ship overtakes a large bulker, also in the Singapore straits.
-
Latest from a US naval man. That puts all our theories to the test ? But then do they not practice steerage with their props. Assume they have two. Do they have bow thrusters ? The USS John McCain suffered a steering malfunction when it collided with an oil tanker near Singapore on Monday, according to a US Navy official who spoke to CNN. The crew was unable to utilize the warship’s backup steering systems as it approached the Strait of Malacca, although steering was recovered after the collision, another Navy official told the network.
-
Paul, From my own experience in a small cruiser, which I am sure is replicated on the size of the boat or ship, manoeuvrability is not dictated by speed but by the configuration of the ship's hull plus the rudders and the effectiveness of the reversing of one prop. Looking at the ship turning you notice that when it (she) has turned to 90 degrees (top of hair pin) she (it) lengthens the head of the hairpin due to her speed. Slow down and the hair pin is sharp and the boat turns more quickly to complete that hair pin. At speed she is shifting more water and is inclined on the starboard bringing the hull side on to the water giving drag. This also makes the port prop less effective. Slower speed the hull is doing all the work and both props are at their most efficient
-
Spot on assessment.
-
The bottom line is that the BRIDGE WATCH failed to SEE AVOID the other vessel/s No matter how many radars/sensors you have at the end of the day their was a failing at the human end Bridge watch should have seen OTHER VESSEL asked radar for report/acted on radar reports The bridge officer is rated capable to Command the ship/watch (if not a senior officer monitors him /her) and take action while waiting for Captain /officers join him Basic watchkeeping ship command function has failed twice
-
Forum Statistics
146,539
Total Topics2,198,065
Total Posts -
Member Statistics
-
Who's Online 33 Members, 1 Anonymous, 152 Guests (See full list)
- skuhravy
- Min
- Mike Esposito
- dalea
- UKguyInUSA
- jpk
- Corsairfoxfouruncle
- LeVi Tophatter
- Aerobat
- Pappy
- littoralcombat
- Jb65rams
- RJP
- magman2
- GrantGoodale
- stevehnz
- PWJ
- RZP
- old thumper
- Pierpaolo
- Centollaman
- Builder
- Val_Ukraine
- Romeo Alpha Yankee
- AlexN
- Ade H
- Lightningboy2000
- SeaVenom
- aircooled
- Venelin
- Beardie
- Cookenbacher
- Thomas V.
