B-17 - Overrated?

[dfqweofekwpeweiop4]

The B-17 first flew in July 1935, the Lancaster in January 1941 and the B-29 in Sept 42. If we're comparing the Lanc to anything it should be the B-29, a six year gap in development was a lifetime then, meaning the B-17 was a generation out of date.

I did say that the B-29 was the best heavy bomber in WW2. By your logic we shouldn't compare the B-29 to the Lancaster as someone rightly pointed out the Lancaster is essentially a 4 engine Manchester, which first flew in 1939 and was designed pre war. Of course newer and more advanced planes should be better at their primary role, there would be something wrong if they weren't. I was trying to give a simple and consistent way of measuring which was the best 4 engine bomber. To me the most obvious is which could carry the most bombs the furthest. That way it doesn't matter if they operated at day or night, or which carried the most guns etc.

Incidently, here's a list of bombers I was thinking of when I was thinking of which was best. B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, B-29 Superfortress, Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling, Peltyakov Pe-8 and the He177. All of which have 4 engines (He177's are coupled though), all designed or adapted for use as heavy bombers in WW2.

thanks

Mike

[wellsprop]

Sorry, but the fork and knife comparison is a bit misledaing IMHO: they are both fighters, sure designed to different specifications, but they are both fighters. The main mission of both is the destruction of enemy aircrafts in air-to-air combat, as such they don't do very different jobs and this is shown by the fact that the P-51 was used as a short range interceptor when needed and the Spitfire was used as an escort to bombers when needed. The Mustang did well as an interceptor, the Spitfire did well enough as an escort as long as the range required was not excessive for its design limits.We may say they are both knives but with different blade designs. Now the question here is which aircrafts would have been selected if both had been available at the same time to a user that didn't already have them in service... and the answer here is that probably 70% of the users would have got the Mustang.

In any case, the two aircrafts are separated by half a generation at least. Looking at both from an engineering point of view, there's no doubt that the Mustang is the better design. Unsurprisingly since it's a newer design, a design that is more modern in every aspect, including one that in wartime is of supreme importance: the reproducibility in large numbers at limited cost. The Mustang is the flying son of the Ford Model T, something designed for mass production at the lowest possible cost. This is something that the UK aero industry never really grasped in the same way as the Americans did and this also had an effect on the post war designs.

Another aspect of the Mustang modernity was that ergonomics played a role in the design of the cockpit, something that can't be said of most British aircrafts of the day.. and again, this aspect in the UK was often neglected after the war. Now it should also be said that US designs in general gave more importance to aspects like the pilot comfort compared to others, and this from well before the war.

Ok my metaphor was a bit rubbish

Curious where that 70% figure came from, though it seems reasonable. The Mustang was WAY more advanced in just about every way, the laminar flow wing being possibly the most significant. It's cockpit had an unholy amount of switches too (Tom Neil wrote about this!).

With regards to production it isn't just as simple as taking the final output as it is all relative. There were over 15,000 P-51s built from a country with popn of 130 million. There were 20,000 Spitfires built from a country with a popn of only 48 million. Unit cost of a P-51 was around $50,000 and of a Spitfire was around $20,000 making the Spitfire more expensive per unit with regards to the countries GDP.

Interesting stats behind it, that to get a meaningful comparison needs an awful lot of number crunching.

While I'd agree with you that "probably 70% of the users would have got the Mustang" -- an assertion that's borne out by postwar purchases, I would contend that for Mustangs and Spitfires of the same production year, the only leg up that a Mustang really has is range and the somewhat more intangible ones of cockpit layout and potentially cost (I can't readily find a source on how expensive a P-51D and a Spitfire XIV were in comparison). I don't believe, however, that in actual combat the Mustang had any real advantage over the Spitfire XIV, being slower and slower climbing, less maneuverable, and less well-armed.

That 70% figure doesn't necessarily mean a lot though. It would be true if you got a group of pilots all of whom have flown the Spitfire and the Mustang. Also, there would have to be an equal amount of pilots from the UK and US in order to prevent national bias from both sides.

The XIV and IX/XVI way out performed the P-51 with regards to guns, manoeuvrability and climb rate. The XIV had WAY more power than the P-51D.

Now back to the bombers;

The Lancaster - more than 7000 built, thats 1.5x10^-4 per person. Cost of £50k per unit for cheaper with regards to GDP than the 17.

The B-17 - more 12000 built, thats 9x10^-5 per person. Cost of $238k per unit.

However, as with the Mustang, the B-17 was far more advanced in certain areas, hydraulics and electrical system.

Ben

Edited January 16, 2014 by wellsprop

[Gary C]

I did say that the B-29 was the best heavy bomber in WW2. By your logic we shouldn't compare the B-29 to the Lancaster as someone rightly pointed out the Lancaster is essentially a 4 engine Manchester, which first flew in 1939 and was designed pre war.

The Manchester was more like an unfinished Lancaster, a part of the Lancasters long development. It was the best of 1939 technology but it was poor with the engines being the big problem. The Lancaster had 4 new engines but also a bigger redesigned wing, different tail surfaces, a new dorsal turret, redesigned undercarriage and so on. About the only bit that survived was the basic fuselage. It was different enough for Avro to give it a different type no and for Roy Chadwick to want it to have a different name. The two aren't the same aircraft, with the Lancaster representing another 18 months of design and technological improvement. The difference can be seen in the performance and service records.

[Procopius]

The B-29 also underwent similar changes during the 1944 "Battle of Kansas" to make them combat-worthy, including new engines, new tires, new rudder, strengthened main gear, strengthened wings, modified cowls, and new distortion-free glazing.

[Vickers McFunbus]

However, as with the Mustang, the B-17 was far more advanced in every way.

Far more advanced in every way apart from those areas where it wasn't...

[wellsprop]

Far more advanced in every way apart from those areas where it wasn't...

Oops, I should have worded this differently

[Max Headroom]

The only way to decide this surely is to go back to the specifications to which they were built and to compare and contrast each one accordingly as my science teachers said.

Don't think we'd get an answer though........

Let's be grateful that they were good as to what they ended up doing.

Trevor

[-Neu-]

I have to be honest, I find comparisons of X vs Y a bit misleading. Fighters don't really easily match up on the western side, due to different roles and production date.

I think a better question is which aircraft provided the most value. The P-51D (and to a lesser extent the B/C model) entered into service against a horribly depleted Luftwaffe: it racked up kills because there was a pretty significant disparity in pilot training, not peformance. It was critical for facilitating additional daylight raids in 1944, which may have helped to shorten the war. It probably wasn't "necessary" however given by 1944 the war's outcome wasn't really in doubt.

Really much of the heavy lifting was done by lesser types earlier in the war: Hurricane, Warhawk, Aeracobra, Lagg-3, I-16 and the Yak-1. Those aircraft suffered tremendous losses, but they also attired the Luftwaffe with a lagging training system that could not afford any combat losses. By the time the P-51 entered into service, many of the Luftwaffe's recruits were a greater enemy to themselves due to accidents than the Mustang. By comparison the Allies training approach was much more robust and could regularly replace those losses with good quality pilots. So If I was to give a value award, it would be to those aircraft, and probably the P-40 in particular for the west: Without them, air superiority in North Africa, SEAC and South Pacific would not have been possible. The Yak-1 was possibly the most valuable of them all, being the most prolific Russian combat type.

In the comparison of utility, the Spitfire could be an an exception, it bore the brunt of operations throughout the war and probably was the single most important aircraft for the Western Allies. It was the only aircraft that regularly matched the top end of Luftwaffe fighters (Even during the FW-190/Spit V "emergency"). However here to it is tough to make a comparison: The British industrial approach in WWII was to apply updates to the fighter that would have minimal production disruptions. The Americans, with a much less centralized industrial approach, were much more inclined to create clean-sheet designs and produce them. So where the USAF produced eight major prop fighter types to varying degrees (P-36, P-38, P-39, P-40, P-43, P-47, P-51 and the P-75), the RAF had four major types. However three of them (Hurricane, Typhoon, Tempest,) basically followed an evolutionary approach within Hawker. EDIT: I forgot the Defiant... so five. Moreover that's not even counting US naval fighter development: F2A, F4F, F6F, F8F and the F4U, where the FAA really just used adaptations of RAF designs (with the exception of the Roc/Skua). If you were to compare the amounts of prototypes produced... the disparity would be even more pronounced. So saying that the "spitfire" was more valuable because it operated throughout the war, is a bit misleading, because the USAAF chose to spend its money regularly updating its aircraft.

Sorry for being long-winded... I might write some stuff about bomber development later.

Edited January 16, 2014 by -Neu-

[dfqweofekwpeweiop4]

My posts never really addressed the original question directly, only that given simple criteria as to what could carry the most bombs the furthest, the best heavy bombers in WW2 were the Lancaster and B-29.

I'm not sure you can give a definite answer to the original question. What I would say is that, if anyone says it was the best bomber of WW2, or indeed best aircraft, then they are overrating it. It does seem to get more of the 'glory' than other types and whoever is responsible for that, is overrating it. It's entirely fair (and not overrating it) to say it was a good aircraft and a good bomber and made a valuable contribution to the war effort.

thanks

Mike

I have to be honest, I find comparisons of X vs Y a bit misleading. Fighters don't really easily match up on the western side, due to different roles and production date.

I think a better question is which aircraft provided the most value. The P-51D (and to a lesser extent the B/C model) entered into service against a horribly depleted Luftwaffe: it racked up kills because there was a pretty significant disparity in pilot training, not peformance. It was critical for facilitating additional daylight raids in 1944, which may have helped to shorten the war. It probably wasn't "necessary."

Really much of the "heavy lifting" was done by lesser types earlier in the war: Hurricane, Warhawk, Aeracobra, Lagg-3, I-16 and the Yak-1. Those aircraft suffered tremendous losses, but they also attired the Luftwaffe with a lagging training system that could not afford any combat losses. By the time the P-51 entered into service, many of the Luftwaffe's recruits were a greater enemy to themselves due to accidents than the Mustang. By comparison the Allies training approach was much more robust and could regularly replace those losses with good quality pilots. So If I was to give a value award, it would be to those aircraft, and probably the P-40 in particular for the west: Without them, air superiority in North Africa, SEAC and South Pacific would not have been possible. The Yak-1 was possibly the most valuable of them all, being the most prolific Russian combat type.

In the comparison of utility, the Spitfire could be an an exception, it bore the brunt of operations throughout the war and probably was the single most important aircraft for the Western Allies. It was the only aircraft that regularly matched the top end of Luftwaffe fighters (Even during the FW-190/Spit V "emergency"). However here to it is tough to make a comparison: The British industrial approach in WWII was to apply updates to the fighter that would have minimal production disruptions. The Americans, with a much less centralized industrial approach, were much more inclined to create clean-sheet designs and produce them. So where the USAF produced eight major prop fighter types to varying degrees (P-36, P-38, P-39, P-40, P-43, P-47, P-51 and the P-75), the RAF had four major types. However three of them (Hurricane, Typhoon, Tempest,) basically followed an evolutionary approach within Hawker. EDIT: I forgot the Defiant... so five. Moreover that's not even counting US naval fighter development: F2A, F4F, F6F, F8F and the F4U, where the FAA really just used adaptations of RAF designs (with the exception of the Roc/Skua). If you were to compare the amounts of prototypes produced... the disparity would be even more pronounced. So saying that the "spitfire" was more valuable because it operated throughout the war, is a bit misleading, because the USAAF chose to spend its money regularly updating its aircraft.

Sorry for being long-winded... I might write some stuff about bomber development later.

I think a fighter comparison would be better served with it's own thread!

thanks
Mike

[-Neu-]

Ah there might not be that much more ground to cover. I think training approaches might be a bit of an area to explore further. If someone wants to contest it on the value grounds, then it might warrant more discussions. However that would get into a lot of minutia which doesn't really add much to the broad thrust of the argument.

Bombers are a different area. There has long been a major point of departure on the efficacy of strategic bombing, ever since the Strategic Bombing Survey report. Its no longer even a revisionist view that it was ineffective. From there you can go into individual aircrafts' contribution, which might be worth the time spent in this thread.

Edited January 16, 2014 by -Neu-

[dfqweofekwpeweiop4]

Ah there might not be that much more ground to cover. I think training approaches might be a bit of an area to explore further. If someone wants to contest it on the value grounds, then it might warrant more discussions. However that would get into a lot of minutia which doesn't really add much to the broad thrust of the argument.

Bombers are a different area. There has long been a major point of departure on the efficacy of strategic bombing, ever since the Strategic Bombing Survey report. Its no longer even a revisionist view that it was ineffective. From there you can go into individual aircrafts' contribution, which might be worth the time spent in this thread.

I agree, strategic bombing ww2 was not as effective as you might think. I also think there's no need to over-analyse things. The primary mission of the 4 engine heavy bomber was to carry as many bombs as far as possible to drop on the enemy, anything after that is secondry. To me it doesn't matter whether they flew at night or day, a Lancaster would still carry more bombs than a B-17 and further. Yes the B-17 might have more machine guns and of a heavier calibre but they still couldn't protect it against well enough against Luftwaffe fighters. You could take off the radar and other aids off the Lancaster, give it more machine guns and it would survive or get shot down as well as a B-17, only it had more bombs when it got to the target. You could do the opposite with the B-17 and use it for bombing at night but the Lancaster would still carry more bombs further.

If you start to analyse contributions to the war effort then clearly the Lancaster, B-17, B-24 and possibly Halifax might eclipse the B-29 but the B-29 was still the superior bomber. So I stand by what I said, the best WW2 heavy bomber was the B-29 followed by the Lancaster but the B-17, B-24 and Halifax still proved to be able bombers and made valuable contributions to the war effort.

As for the other bombers, the Stirling was clearly vastly inferior to the Halifax and Lancaster and there's little point in having a 3rd and inferior type. The Pe-8 wasn't a bad plane but less than 100 were made, not really enough for a telling contribution. The He177 had great potential to be a very good heavy bomber but as we all know it was hampered by less than reliable engines and really came too late for the Germans, they needed it in 1940!

thanks

Mike

[-Neu-]

I actually think that the B-29 provided more clear value than any of the other aircraft. It was a crucial instrument for knocking Japan out of the war; first by firebombing, then with the atom bomb. I'm paraphrasing but in Lawrence Freeman's work on Nuclear Power, he basically said that the atom bomb rescued strategic bombing from being discredited after the war. And that would not have been possible without the B-29. That's not to demean the other contributions, but they have to be considered as part of a much more dynamic and larger war effort.

More later.

[Vicarage Vee]

The Combined Bomber Offensive was "Ineffective"? Seriously? Albert Speer didn't think so.

The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that strategic bombing HAD made a significant contribution to victory especially in areas such as the disruption of oil production and crucially, submarine production - an area that could well have altered the shape of the final outcome.

Did strategic bombing win the war on its own? No, of course it didn't. Nor did any other single factor (although the atomic bomb is arguable) but it certainly contributed to the outcome.

Again, the bomber offensive was part of a war waged on many fronts with combined arms. There is no single wonder weapon that won the war. What use was the Mustang in The Battle of Britain? What use the T34 at El Alamein? Everything has to be viewed in the context of its circumstances AND in the wider ones of the whole course of the war.

Why is it important that one plane be seen as 'the best'? I genuinely don't understand. It was the men that used what was given to them that were the most important and I don't want to lose sight of that.

Sorry.

[Giorgio N]

I'll reply later to expand some of the aspects I've mentioned, especially cost and the relative productions of the various types, but for now let me say that I fully agree with Neu on the role of the B-29. It was probably the single combat type that had the largest impact on the war. The B-29 alone by dropping the A-bombs cut the war short by a good few months. I can't think of any other type that has such an impact.

And we should not forget that while the B-29 was undoubtedly the most modern bomber of the war, from many aspects it was not a great aircraft! The B-29 suffered from reliability problems for quite a while before these were sorted. Problems with overheating engines were only solved after the war was over and the type was considered underpowered, so much that there were several plans to increase the power that finally resulted in the B-50.

For the reasons above, I would not consider the B-29 the best bomber of the war, while it sure had the largest impact. As said in the beginning of the thread, being the best and having the largest impact are two very different thing.

Edited January 16, 2014 by Giorgio N

[-Neu-]

The Combined Bomber Offensive was "Ineffective"? Seriously? Albert Speer didn't think so.

The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that strategic bombing HAD made a significant contribution to victory especially in areas such as the disruption of oil production and crucially, submarine production - an area that could well have altered the shape of the final outcome.

I'd rather you not portray me as a straw man. I'm fully cognizant that there are several sides to the strategic bombing debate, and my last post made it pretty clear that I believe it had a major, but different, contribution. I just wanted to acknowledge there are significant differences in the debate.

In short I believe that strategic bombing had three major effects.

#1: Crippling the transportation network in France Prior to Overlord.

#2: Curtailing POL production in late 1944.

#3 Forcing the Luftwaffe into divert critical resources to defend the Reich.

I would argue that the last one probably had a greater effect than anything else, robbing the Wehrmacht of one of its largest force multipliers during several crucial battles (Kursk, Bagration and Normandy.)

The rest of it was middling in performance. It was only in 1944 that strategic bombing really made a bite into POL production, but by that point the war's outcome was pretty much assured. I'd probably give a bit more credence to the transportation networks view if the Wehrmacht actually undertook a large scale movement in June/July 1944 to counter the Allied landings. They really didn't. I'd also point out that many of these strikes occurred in conjunction with 9th AF operations, which makes me question whether this is a true "Strategic bombing" effort. I'd take Speer's word with a big grain of salt: I personally think he was willing to say what he needed to in order to curry favour.

I'm somewhat sanguine about Strategic bombing because of the promises made by its proponents before the War. Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard and others promised that it alone could would win the war. That really didn't happen. Instead it led to horrendous casualties for very little direct gain, particularly early on. The only benefit was that it basically forced the Luftwaffe to divert their combat strength away from places where it might have actually done more good.

Edited January 17, 2014 by -Neu-

[Potato Pete]

I think that's an pretty good summary Neu. Churchill got it about right when he said "The most we can say [about Bomber Command] is that it will be a heavy and I trust a seriously increasing annoyance [to Germany]." By mid 1944 when the bomber offensive finally got into its stride, it was a very serious annoyance indeed, but by then, the course of the war was set.

The airman constantly overstated both what strategic bonbing could and was doing.

Pete

[JohnT]

There are two ways to look at the strategic bombing offensive. The first is in accordance with the claims that were made for it at the time by its proponents who were really putting their faith in an untried strategy which was that by itself bombing could win the war and was inflicting crippling damage on Germany. That clearly was an overstatement by a considerable margin. There was a complete failure to understand the issues as regards navigation and target finding until the Butt Report was accepted. Latterly in the late stages of the war the bombing campaign began to show some of the effects that the proponents of it had expected but not until quite late when electronic target finding aids started to come of age. The B-29 campaign over Japan was later and more effective (once LeMay got them stripped down, switched bomb loads from HE to incendiary and flew at low/medium level at night) which shows that the bomber perhaps was still in its adolescence if not infancy during 1939-1944

On the other hand there is another way to consider the campaign. By bombing Germany in the way the RAF and USAAF did with increasing violence the Germans were forced to expend a huge amount of resources to dealing with it. Fighters had to be built for both night and day operations. That means airfields, ground staff, construction workers, concrete, training schools and more of the aforesaid airfields etc. It means oil for aviation fuel and lots of it. That all means transport and infrastructure to service it all. Then you have to set up radar and flak and that's yet more concrete transport training and man/woman power required. Then once the USAAF start hitting factories they had to disperse manufacturing. That costs again as does the new requirement for transport and that means yet more oil, coal etc. The RAF are destroying housing and that means more civil defence, firemen, civil servants to find housing for those bombed out. And all those targets, those actually attacked and those not, still have to be protected by flak guns and huge stockpiles of ammunition that on those days the bombers don't come, are sitting idle and unused instead on equipping the Wermacht on the Eastern Front

The point is we think just off the fact that the bombing campaign lead to the destruction of the Luftwaffe but the whole holistic effect on Germany was far more than that and it was truly debilitating.

As for the B-17? Nice looking plane, ahead of its time when first built, did great service and while the bomb load carried could have been greater she more or less did the job she was designed for with the caveat her losses would have been her downfall if the P-51 had not arrived with the sound of the cavalry coming to the rescue. The US 7th cavalry had their bugles to sound and the Mighty 8th arrived to the glorious accompaniment of the RR Merlin which made her the great escort fighter she was.

[Brews]

I saw someone say that the B-24 was better than the B-17. Maybe, but a lot of people still remember the B-17 as being the better bomber - one that would take damage and come home.

Looking at what Neu wrote, I would add that the Defence of the Reich was really the 2nd Front that Stalin had been asking for - he just didn't want to acknowledge it. It wasn't just the aircraft that were robbed from the East, it was the diversion of 88mm Flak, and even 20mm Flak, 37mm Flak (bombers didn't always come in at high level, and even Lancasters were shot down by 20mm Flak).

[NPL]

It took some time, but the people WHO voted for the B-29 are of course right, if we think of the quality of the aircraft. Its importance for the war in Europe was -- was it ever used over here?

As to the Mosquito, Göring said what should be said.

And finally the Spitfire versus the Mustang, which became a great aircraft with Merlin motors: This was probably a decision made in Britain to limits its use to close-up support. Oberst Gustav Lundquist showed that with a copple of wing tanks of the same type as the Mustang carried, the Spitfire could with one stop (as far as I remember) take the trip from the states to England (this is the plane that was zapped with "Tolly" saying hello!). Then when it comes to the Spitfire we Again have to talk about marks. A Mk.XIV is a very different beast from a Mk.V, and the Germans had Little that could stop it. I also love the anecdote about the German instructor WHO told his students that if they found them side aside a Mustang, they could be calm: They were in good Company, but if it was a Spirfire the advice was to get the hell out of here.

In one of the Ventura books about American Spitfires, the USAAF pilots in Italy WHO were to trade their Spirfires for Mustangs made it very clear. Quote from memory: Maybe the Mustang is the best American fighter... but the Spitfire is just the best...

But it is much too simple to ask: Which was the best plane, e.g., in daytime probably not a Lancaster, as Escort fighter probably not the Spitfire, and so on.

NPL

[Potato Pete]

On the other hand there is another way to consider the campaign. By bombing Germany in the way the RAF and USAAF did with increasing violence the Germans were forced to expend a huge amount of resources to dealing with it.

The problem with this argument is that it also took up a huge amount of Allied resources too, and if we are to rely on these secondary benefits of the strategic air offensive, it is worth considering whether these resources, both capital and human, could have been better used elsewhere. Obviously this has to be largely a retrospective judgement, as policy cannot be altered overnight, and we only fought the one war, so any we have no way of judging the alternative options (although it's worth pointing out that the USSR managed perfectly well with strategic bombing).

However, regardless of that, I am continually surprised by how, in 1939, the RAF had no clear idea of how to carry out a strategic bombing offensive. It had its plans but no realistic idea of how to achieve them, and the challenges involved. Given that strategic bombing was its raison d'etre as an independent service, its failure to have developed a clearer understanding idea of what this would take seems to me a major failure.

Pete

[Andrew Jones]

It's easy for us as "armchair historians " to comment on the events of seventy years ago, but the fact remains that at the time the bomber offensive was the only means availible to Britain to take the war to the Germans . We were being beaten in N.Africa , beaten in the Far East and all in all things looked pretty grim. The idea of striking at our enemy in some way must have been pretty appealing.

As the war progressed and the tide began to turn the bomber war tied up over a million German troops and airmen in the defence of Germany , how might things have differed if these personnel had been availible for other fronts, how would an extra million or fiv hundred thousand men in Normandy made a difference for example ?.

This is without the effects on German production of war materials , yes , I know people will point out the numbers of fighters , tanks etc that were being producing despite the bombing , as an example of the inneffectiveness of the raids. But, what would production levels have been without the round the clock attacks ?,much , much higher I suspect.

I don't think you can pick out any one fighter/bomber as a war winner on it's own as they were all part of a team and all had their place.

Andrew

[Procopius]

However, regardless of that, I am continually surprised by how, in 1939, the RAF had no clear idea of how to carry out a strategic bombing offensive. It had its plans but no realistic idea of how to achieve them, and the challenges involved. Given that strategic bombing was its raison d'etre as an independent service, its failure to have developed a clearer understanding idea of what this would take seems to me a major failure.

I don't think anyone really correctly appreciated what a modern, total war would require. Not the Germans, not the USA, not the Japanese, and not the British. If you read prewar British planning for naval war with Japan, it seems to come from another universe than the one World War I was fought in, and this isn't because of stupidity on the part of the planners (although IMO "main fleet to Singapore was always unrealistic") who by and large were experiences officers who had served with distinction in the First World War, but because the ways war could be waged were and would change very dramatically. They're accused of preparing to fight the last war, but to a certain extent you have to base your planning on the available evidence. The RAF knew the panic that bombing London had caused during the war, and the resources it took away from the Western Front. One has to remember that the idea that the bombers could even be stopped during daylight bombing was a notion accepted only in 1937 and pushed through by Inskip for reasons that were as much political and financial (single-engined fighters are smaller and cheaper than bombers, and you can have a lot more of them a lot faster for the numbers game) as they were practical military thinking.

[Pielstick]

Haha I only made an observation that perhaps the B-17 is overrated as a bomber.... and we're now on page 4 of what was the best bomber or fighter!

I'm sure everybody here knows about Eric Brown (in fact I know at least one member in this thread has even met him, lucky git!). In Wings On My Sleeve I seem to remember he stated every American fighter with the exception of the P-51 was inferior to its German contemporaries.

I've also got another book about aerial combat tactics/techniques as they relate to flight simulation, it was published a few year ago. In it is an interview the author did with Eric Brown. He made a direct comparison between the Spitfire and Mustang, I forget the details now. What I do remember is when asked "If you could pick any WW2 fighter to to into a dogfight with what would it be?" Brown replied "The best dogfighters of WW2 were the Spitfire XIV and Fw190D, so I would choose either of those, unless the dogfight were over Berlin in which case I would choose the P-51 as it would be the only one with enough fuel to get me home!"

Edited January 18, 2014 by Pielstick

[Selwyn]

Much like asking the question... "Which was the best fighter of WWII?"

The P-51D Mustang was !!

As a fighter is an aircraft type specifically designed to shoot down other aircraft, without being shot down itself, the best measure would be to find the WW2 fighter type that posted the best kill to loss ratio. A good measure of its effectiveness.

So that settles it, as the best kill to loss ratio posted in WW2 was by the Finnish Air Force Buffalo F2A!

Great things statistics arn't they?

Selwyn

[Pielstick]

Ah, then I'd say to be fair you'd have to factor in all the other air forces that flew the Buffalo and not just the Finnish!

I think the fighter with the best kill:loss ratio was the Corsair, I may be wrong but the figure of 20:1 comes to mind. I'm sure someone will correct me.

Edited January 19, 2014 by Pielstick