Whirlwind vs Me 109 during B of B

[Adam Maas]

The Ki-45 seems to have suffered from the same set of limitations as the other multi-seat heavy fighters, not enough speed or manoeverability, plus the usual issues with light build and not enough armour that were common for earlier Japanese designs.

I suspect the verdict on heavy fighters in WW2 would have been somewhat different if the designs had overall resembled the P-38 (and Whirlwind), and been about using a second engine to provide a faster platform with a central, heavy armament at the cost of some manoeverability, recall the P-38's problems in Europe were as much about its winterization issues (which were never really solved, the P-38 continued to have problems in the cold for the duration of its service) as any problems engaging German fighters. The choice to go with multi-seat designs simply produced a fighter that was twice as heavy as the single-seat version and that eliminated most of the potential advantages of having twice the horsepower.

Note I'm specifically refering to day combat against fighters, there's no doubt that the multi-seat twins did quite well as nightfighters and strike aircraft.

[Miggers]

I think it'd come down plain and simply to bums on seats.

In other words,who was flying it and could they use it's performance and armament to their advantage.

During the B of B,the'109 in the hands of experienced pilots using the right tactics was deadly,

as was the Spit and Hurri.

With the P40 and Buff,once they were used correctly(i.e tactically)they proved deadly against

their particular opposition.

Boom and zoom,the classic "Bounce",requires a rock steady dive,good armament,a good rate of climb

and not least,a good pilot with good gunnery skills.

Things that most of the German pilots in 1940 had with the '109E.

[gingerbob]

Bums on seats? Makes me think of Boyington's comment: 'Just name a hero and I'll prove he's a bum.'

Yeah, good (well trained) pilots can make all the difference, but well trained pilots in superior airplanes will do a lot better than well trained pilots in inferior airplanes, regardless of whether they're evil Nazi (or capitalist, or...) scoundrels or heroic, apple-pie eating, Mom-loving boys.

Before we give too much credit to the Buffalo when flown by Finns, we should examine what types of aircraft comprised the bulk of their claims. As I recall, there are quite a few things like I-16s, bombers, and so on.

bob

Edited March 31, 2013 by gingerbob

[Spitfires Forever]

Just as an aside before getting back on track, since we are discussing twin engined fighter aircraft and the Pacific, had the war gone on a bit longer it would have been interesting to see how well the F- 82 would have done vs a conventional twin engined fighter against the single engined opposition. The F-82 was truly unique despite the fact that the Germans had already experimented with the twin 109, but back to the Whirlwind. After the B of B would the Whirlwind have been further developed as an escort fighter or would it have been scrapped in favor of single engined types? Perhaps it would have met the same fate as the Me 110? With the exception of the night fighter role in general, I think the Whirlwind, as well as most twin engined fighters of the various belligerents would have been relegated to second line duties, going the way of the dinosaurs.

Cheers

[Adam Maas]

Bums on seats? Makes me think of Boyington's comment: 'Just name a hero and I'll prove he's a bum.'

Yeah, good (well trained) pilots can make all the difference, but well trained pilots in superior airplanes will do a lot better than well trained pilots in inferior airplanes, regardless of whether they're evil Nazi (or capitalist, or...) scoundrels or heroic, apple-pie eating, Mom-loving boys.

Before we give too much credit to the Buffalo when flown by Finns, we should examine what types of aircraft comprised the bulk of their claims. As I recall, there are quite a few things like I-16s, bombers, and so on.

bob

There were two fundamental problems with the Buffalo. The first was Brewster and the second was the US Navy. Brewster was a disaster, good engineers but absolutely and utterly incompetent management, so much so that it ended up shut down during the middle of a war, primarily due to the problems with F3A production. There was essentially no way the US Navy was going to keep Brewster around even if they had fixed the Buffalo. The second problem was the Navy's procurement at the time. They spec'd the competition at a particular equipment fit, the Buffalo did very well with that fit (which is very close to the fit that the Finns used) and then loaded it up with hundreds of pounds of extra kit with the F2A-2 and especially F2A-3 and complained when that made it a dog. Note the Wildcat was even more of a pig with the smaller engine used in the F2A-1 and the export Buffalo's (that was the XF4F-2). It's likely that if the F2A-2 had been merely an F2A-1 with the improved engine and a mild increase in self-protection that it would have remained preferable to the Wildcat, which it was more manoeverable than, but also slower than. By all acounts the F2A-1 probably could hold its own against a Zero, the Dutch B339C/D's almost could despite being heavier than the F2A-1 and gave a good account of themselves against both Oscars and Zeros. The Dutch Buffalo's were the closest Buffalo's to the F2A-1 in performance to see service in the Pacific.

The Finns ended up with a large chunk of the F2A-1 production (in fact all but 11 of the F2A-1's produced went to Finland) and proved that a good aircraft. The export examples were generally either slightly lightened F2A-2 variants with the F2A-1 engine or the RAF examples which shared the less powerful engine but actually weighed more than the F2A-2, they performed OK if stripped down but as delivered the performance was atrocious due to the extra weight and lousy engines (many were powered by rebuilt DC-3 engines). And then there was the F2A-3, which was a complete pig, but oddly useful for reconnaissance due to the large fuel load (it carried some 500lbs more fuel than an F2A-2) and efficient cruise performance. Unfortunately for the USMC, virtually all the Buffalo's to see action in US colours were F2A-3's.

Edited March 31, 2013 by Adam Maas

[Adam Maas]

Just as an aside before getting back on track, since we are discussing twin engined fighter aircraft and the Pacific, had the war gone on a bit longer it would have been interesting to see how well the F- 82 would have done vs a conventional twin engined fighter against the single engined opposition. The F-82 was truly unique despite the fact that the Germans had already experimented with the twin 109, but back to the Whirlwind. After the B of B would the Whirlwind have been further developed as an escort fighter or would it have been scrapped in favor of single engined types? Perhaps it would have met the same fate as the Me 110? With the exception of the night fighter role in general, I think the Whirlwind, as well as most twin engined fighters of the various belligerents would have been relegated to second line duties, going the way of the dinosaurs.

Cheers

Even more interesting would have been the service entry of the F7F Tigercat, which would have occurred well before the F-82 and in an arguably higher-performance airframe (the F-82 was designed for long-range work and thus was configured to carry a huge fuel load). Both were notably faster than most single-engined fighters of the time (the F7F would have a side career as a racer post-war) and the F7F at least was quite manoeverable. Both were 2-seat fighters, but configured to minimize the aerodynamic penalties and weight penalty of the second seat, unlike many of the earlier 2-engine designs.

[gingerbob]

After the B of B would the Whirlwind have been further developed as an escort fighter or would it have been scrapped in favor of single engined types? Perhaps it would have met the same fate as the Me 110?

Well, Westland was following it (not necessarily "succeeding" it) with the Welkin, as Messerschmitt was supposed to do with the 210/410. Had it been established in production, and proven to be useful (which I think it would have), it probably would have continued to be built, and developed to whatever degree it could be, until something came along that was a clear enough improvement on its utility to justify interrupting Westland production long enough to get going on something else. Probably Westland would not have built Spitfires, and subsequently Seafires, though they might have built Barracudas as they were at one time intended to do.

Even more interesting would have been the service entry of the F7F Tigercat, which would have occurred well before the F-82 and in an arguably higher-performance airframe (the F-82 was designed for long-range work and thus was configured to carry a huge fuel load). Both were notably faster than most single-engined fighters of the time (the F7F would have a side career as a racer post-war) and the F7F at least was quite manoeverable. Both were 2-seat fighters, but configured to minimize the aerodynamic penalties and weight penalty of the second seat, unlike many of the earlier 2-engine designs.

I don't know that the F7F's performance was superior to contemporary single-engined types (but it's one of my favorites, so don't think I'm criticising it!) It also wasn't exclusively a two-seater, though the decision was made early on that most would be. The F-82 configuration, of course, evolved partly because of the express desire to have a second pilot.

bob

Edited March 31, 2013 by gingerbob

[Truro Model Builder]

Very poorly, I suspect. An immature engine in adverse conditions at the end of long supply lines? Doesn't sound a recipe for good serviceability.

And, before moving on to Japanese twins, what about another British "what-if" single-seat twin-engined fighter, the Gloster P.9/37?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_F.9/37

That had its own problems with the Taurus engine but OTOH it looks as if it could have taken re-engining more easily than the Whirlwind, whose fortunes were closely bound up with the Peregrine.

If the Whirlwind was available in greater numbers the engine would not have been so immature, having itself been operated for a much longer length of time. This would have enabled a lot of the problems to have been rectified.

And whoever it was who mentioned a Whirlwind with J79s and a Vulcan cannon, I feel a whif on its way.

Lastly, and briefly mentioning the missile v. guns argument, it surely says it all that the gunless F-4C/D was superseded by the F-4E with an internal gun?

[Adam Maas]

Lastly, and briefly mentioning the missile v. guns argument, it surely says it all that the gunless F-4C/D was superseded by the F-4E with an internal gun?

Note that the gunless F-4B was superseded by more gunless Phantom's in the USN (and while the F-14 did have a gun, it also was the F-8 replacement). Mission is a major determinant. The F-4 as designed for the Navy had much less need for a gun as a Fleet Defence Interceptor with a secondary strike role, the USAF got stuck shoehorning the gunless F-4 design into a offensive strikefighter role to which it wasn't entirely suited until it got the gun. If the F-4 had been used to replace the ADC Interceptors which had a similer original mission profile to the Navy design, it likely never would have acquired a gun.

[brewerjerry]

Also wonder what the Whirlwind would have done out in the Middle and Far East theatres

Hi,

Not as mad an idea as you might think,many years ago one of my many request for info on the whirlwind brought back a letter from an erk who seved in singapore, who stated that for some reason, recognition leaflets were sent out to the far east

cheers

Jerry

[Spitfires Forever]

Note that the gunless F-4B was superseded by more gunless Phantom's in the USN (and while the F-14 did have a gun, it also was the F-8 replacement). Mission is a major determinant. The F-4 as designed for the Navy had much less need for a gun as a Fleet Defence Interceptor with a secondary strike role, the USAF got stuck shoehorning the gunless F-4 design into a offensive strikefighter role to which it wasn't entirely suited until it got the gun. If the F-4 had been used to replace the ADC Interceptors which had a similer original mission profile to the Navy design, it likely never would have acquired a gun.

As you know the J and other versions were just upgraded B airframes with the commencerate avionics, all keeping within the missile doctrine of the time. By the time the J came around the F-14 (as a replacement for the horrid TFX F-111B) was already on the way. Interestingly enough, the F-111b would have been the worse choice of the three aircraft, a classic case of the military/industrial complex ramming an aircraft (with the help of some well bribed admirals) down the Navy's throat that would have had marginal performance and no gun.

cheers

[Procopius]

The F-111B could carry a gun, as could the other versions of the F-111.

[-Neu-]

As you know the J and other versions were just upgraded B airframes with the commencerate avionics, all keeping within the missile doctrine of the time. By the time the J came around the F-14 (as a replacement for the horrid TFX F-111B) was already on the way. Interestingly enough, the F-111b would have been the worse choice of the three aircraft, a classic case of the military/industrial complex ramming an aircraft (with the help of some well bribed admirals) down the Navy's throat that would have had marginal performance and no gun.

cheers

Actually the F-111B wasn't nearly as bad as people now make it out to be. Much of the current commentary is based on a Navy-revisionist history. The aircraft met most of the things the Navy was asking for. It would have been a great fleet air defence fighter, probably better than the F-14. It had lower take off speeds, larger bring back capability (including fuel), better loitering time on station, and was only 5% heavier when fully loaded. It wasn't as good at maneuvering, but that was not the specifications that the Navy wanted: the F-111B was basically a supersonic missileer. Also, the Navy's replacement, the F-14 was nowhere near as good as people remember it. It was an extremely unreliable maintenance hog, that killed a lot of good people in its first two decades of service. Its capabilities were good, when they worked... which was not too often before the 1990s.

Yet the Navy Brass did not want to go with a common plane, so they started claiming the aircraft that was meeting the specifications they identified, was not actually the specifications they needed. Changing requirements or citing spurious "special considerations" to get a program killed is a pretty common trend with the Navy. Same thing occurred with regards to the F-16 vs F-18 in the late seventies, F-14 vs Super Hornet in the early 1990s and now with the JSF. The Navy complains about it until it gets into service, then loves the aircraft.

(alot of this information came from Tommy Thomason's excellent blog post on the subject which can be found here: http://thanlont.blogspot.ca/2011/01/f-111b-versus-f-14a-one-more-time.html )

[Adam Maas]

Actually the F-111B wasn't nearly as bad as people now make it out to be. Much of the current commentary is based on a Navy-revisionist history. The aircraft met most of the things the Navy was asking for. It would have been a great fleet air defence fighter, probably better than the F-14. It had lower take off speeds, larger bring back capability (including fuel), better loitering time on station, and was only 5% heavier when fully loaded. It wasn't as good at maneuvering, but that was not the specifications that the Navy wanted: the F-111B was basically a supersonic missileer. Also, the Navy's replacement, the F-14 was nowhere near as good as people remember it. It was an extremely unreliable maintenance hog, that killed a lot of good people in its first two decades of service. Its capabilities were good, when they worked... which was not too often before the 1990s.

(alot of this information came from Tommy Thomason's excellent blog post on the subject which can be found here: http://thanlont.blogspot.ca/2011/01/f-111b-versus-f-14a-one-more-time.html )

Note that the main problem with the F-14 early in its service was the TF-30 engines, ie the main component it shared with the F-111B. And the F-111 was every bit as much of a maintenance hog (or more of one) than the F-14 during its service. The F-111B most likely would have been less successful than the F-14 by a fair margin, it had good range but was a pig otherwise, completely unsuited to be an F-8 replacement although it could do the F-4's fleet defence role.

[Adam Maas]

As you know the J and other versions were just upgraded B airframes with the commencerate avionics, all keeping within the missile doctrine of the time. By the time the J came around the F-14 (as a replacement for the horrid TFX F-111B) was already on the way. Interestingly enough, the F-111b would have been the worse choice of the three aircraft, a classic case of the military/industrial complex ramming an aircraft (with the help of some well bribed admirals) down the Navy's throat that would have had marginal performance and no gun.

cheers

The J's were new-build airframes which evolved the shortnose design, the upgraded B's were the N's, which got some but not all of the changes in the J's (mostly the new engines and control surface mods) but not the new avionics suite. Note that the E was developed in a very similar space to the J, as the F-15 program and F-111 program were already underway and would replace the F-4's then current roles.

[-Neu-]

Note that the main problem with the F-14 early in its service was the TF-30 engines, ie the main component it shared with the F-111B. And the F-111 was every bit as much of a maintenance hog (or more of one) than the F-14 during its service. The F-111B most likely would have been less successful than the F-14 by a fair margin, it had good range but was a pig otherwise, completely unsuited to be an F-8 replacement although it could do the F-4's fleet defence role.

While they shared the TF-30, the planform design of the F-14 vs F-111 had some significant difference. Certainly the engine's propensity to throw a disk could be a catastrophic issue, but the wide spacing of the F-14's engines often made the loss of one engine at level flight unrecoverable. Even then, landing an aircraft was extremely difficult, which meant many losses occurred. It was thought that the F-111's close spacing was much easier to control, and required mission may not have subjected the engine to stresses it was not designed for in the way that the F-14 had. Basically the Navy took an engine that was not really designed for fast throttle changes and stuck it into an aircraft that did a lot of that.

The F-111 was not a replacement for the F-8. It had no exact precedent program, though the F-4 was probably the closest. The US Navy wanted a Bomber/Cruise missile interceptor which utilized Douglas Misslleer's systems (Eagle/Phoenix missile, the APQ-81/AWG-9, and the TF-30). It was not supposed to be super maneuverable; it was more to loiter and fire stand off missiles. High speed allowed it to undertake barcap, but it wasn't supposed to be an "super maneuverable" aircraft like the F-15 or F-16. But it wasn't unmanueverable as well. Again ALOT of the "F-111 is a pig" stuff was trumpeted by the navy to get them out of a joint program. They set the requirements, not DoD, then bailed on them later. Alot of their subsequent claims weren't all true, which is what Thomason use of primary source documentation set about to correct. Yet they've continued to be cited since.

If you wanted an F-8 replacement, the best aircraft was probably VFX/VFAX that emerged in the 1970s, which resulted in F/A-18A.

[Giorgio N]

The TF30 on the Tomcat was however always considered a temporary measure, as the definitive aircrafts were supposed to have another engine. Had the Vietnam war kept going, it is possible that the replacement engine would have been pushed faster, while we all know that in the end the definitive engine only arrived many years later.

The concept behind the F6D first and the F-111B later can interestingly be related to other aircrafts that appeared in the thread: the 2-seat FAA fighters (Fulmar and Firefly). Both concepts assumed that the carrier borne aircraft's sole role was the defence of the carrier from enemy large bombers/maritime recce aircrafts. None was supposed to have to mix it up with land based high performance fighters, a result of the assumption that a carrier would not have to come close to enemy shores. Big mistake IMHO.

Twin Mustang, Tigercat and Hornet would have only served in the far east had the war kept going for another 2 years. There was no point in using them over Europe (the Mustang had enough range already) and in Europe their performances would have not been superior to an opposition that would have consisted of Me.262, He.162 and Ta.152. All superior on paper to the multi-engined aircrafts mentioned.

Over the far east they would have been more useful, but as I know little about Japanese fighters, can't comment on what the likely opposition would have been like.

[MilneBay]

Over the far east they would have been more useful, but as I know little about Japanese fighters, can't comment on what the likely opposition would have been like.

Easy they would have been glowing in the dark from radiation.

[-Neu-]

The TF30 on the Tomcat was however always considered a temporary measure, as the definitive aircrafts were supposed to have another engine. Had the Vietnam war kept going, it is possible that the replacement engine would have been pushed faster, while we all know that in the end the definitive engine only arrived many years later.

The concept behind the F6D first and the F-111B later can interestingly be related to other aircrafts that appeared in the thread: the 2-seat FAA fighters (Fulmar and Firefly). Both concepts assumed that the carrier borne aircraft's sole role was the defence of the carrier from enemy large bombers/maritime recce aircrafts. None was supposed to have to mix it up with land based high performance fighters, a result of the assumption that a carrier would not have to come close to enemy shores. Big mistake IMHO.

Ah I think the Navy was much more nuanced about their situation. The F-111 was not going to undertake offensive operations; it was purely designed to be a fleet air defender with its heavy missile load and powerful radar. By 1966 the Navy had a very good understanding of the need for an more well rounded fighter. While this role was currently being undertaken by the F-4, it would eventually be replaced by the VFAX. Instead the F-111B was cancelled, and replaced by a repurposed VFAX program that became the F-14. In order to justify the F-111B's cancellation, the navy tried to shoehorn the air superiority role into the cat's design. The result was an aircraft that was neither very capable in either mission.

[gingerbob]

But anyone who saw Top Gun at an impressionable age, not to mention saw an F-14 demonstrated well at an airshow, knows that it is the coolest thing around! But then, I still think of the F-18 as one of the "new" generation...

bob

Edited April 2, 2013 by gingerbob

[Nick Millman]

Very interesting! Some questions:

What was it about the pilot's seat that needed attention?

Was the Ki-84 in some other role, or was it just not yet considered officially "operational"?

You say the IJNAF and IJAAF- did they have different doctrines from each other about "energy vs maneuver", or did they have a similar philosophy (or shared conflict between philosophies) in this regard?

bob

Re pilot's seat - don't know. Can only imagine it was something arising from the violent manoeuvres the aircraft were subjected to in their first battle. Perhaps the pilot was not held securely enough or the seat itself was not secure enough.

This is by necessity a condensed reply regarding the Ki-84. It was originally conceived as a "heavy fighter" like the Ki-44 intended to achieve air superiority in order to prosecute the IJAAF doctrine of 'aerial exterminating action', which the JSDAF now refer to as 'offensive counterair’, but with improved range and combining the best elements of manoeuvre vs energy. It is not entirely clear at what point these decisions were made or exactly how the Ki-84 relates to the introduction to service of the Ki-44 but I surmise that there was a certain amount of bet hedging going on and the final decision was settled when the Ki-44 was judged (after lukewarm combat evaluation by the 47th DHC from Dec 41 to March 42) to be more suitable to combat enemy bombers in the air defence role than for 'offensive counterair'. Ironically, Ki-44 units sent to China and intended primarily for this defensive role used their aircraft mostly for 'offensive counterair' and pioneered energy tactics embracing the best qualities of the fighter! So there are questions there about both the decision to limit production of the Ki-44 and the indoctrination/expectations of pilots which made it so generally unpopular. The speed of the Ki-84 introduction to service once its extended development was finally completed has been exaggerated in most references which make the error of assuming that initial delivery was tantamount to being fully equipped and fully operational on type. In reality because of supply, attrition and ongoing maintenance and mechanical issues (including issues with formation keeping altitude performance) some units operated the Ki-84 as a supplemental type for extended periods. For example, by November 1944 the 85th Sentai had 10 Ki-84 and 17 Ki-44 on strength but in some accounts the impression is given that they had wholly re-equipped with Hayate and their sorties were being made exclusively with that type. This extended introduction to service, intended to make the Ki-84 the IJAAF's standard offensive fighter (to replace the Ki-43), was also beset by changing circumstances and plans as the war situation "developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage". For example Ki-84 units were urgently committed to reinforcing the Philippines defence, arguably when they were not fully capable on type and the scale of attrition there meant that volunteer ferry pilots were being required to take the aircraft into combat.

Although the Ki-84 had also begun to equip units designated in the air defence role by early 1945 there was a major revision in organisation that saw a brief period of husbanding fighter resources and the Ki-84 was subsequently allocated only to those units designated in the new mobile air defence role, which became essentially a reaction force against US naval task force incursions and to suppress task force fighter defences in co-operation with special attack sorties against projected invasion forces. This developed to the point where Hayate units were being designated as special attackers themselves which led to bitter controversy between the IJAAF staff and fighter leaders who felt the potential of the aircraft and training of pilots was being wasted. There were also some one-off units like the 520th Rinji Boju Sentai (temporary or emergency interception regiment) formed from the 1st Rensei Hikotai (Operational Training Air Group) that operated the Ki-84 briefly in the air defence role (and against the B-29) before being re-assigned to special attack operations from March 1945. This unit deployed experienced flying instructors as flight leaders with pilots selected from the most promising NCO student pilots. There will be much more detail on all this in a forthcoming book about the Army air defence of Japan - if I last long enough to complete it!

On the IJAAF vs IJNAF doctrines - how long have you got? To provide a crude answer they both pursued tactical changes resulting from combat experience and theoretical influences but in both services this was more often unit motivated rather than doctrinally imposed. The IJNAF were restricted by their continued use of the Zero and tried to introduce improved energy capability by developing the design technically - a bit like the Spitfire. They were arguably more successful in improving their co-ordinated tactical flying than the IJAAF but the latter introduced the standard flight of four with two pairs at an earlier stage, influenced by Army leaders who had been seconded to the Luftwaffe or served as air attachés in Europe. With the Shiden-kai the IJAAF finally embraced tightly co-ordinated and effective energy tactics whereas the IJAAF, whilst pioneering those tactics (for example in the 85th Sentai) always had a tendency to revert to reliance on manoeuvre and individual flying once formations broke up in combat. Again attrition had an effect on this as units did not have enough experienced pilots or time for sufficient training on type to develop the co-ordinated teamwork - by mid-war their numbers in the face of growing Allied air strength requiring them to be shunted rapidly around almost in a firefighting role. Both services suffered from a pre-war dogma that stressed manoeuvrability and aerobatics skill as a primary requirement for aircraft and pilots but it would be wrong to think of those as exclusively pursued throughout the war. The change influences that challenged this dogma were already working in 1942 in both the services and aircraft design field but never totally prevailed.

Nick

[UKscalemodeller]

But anyone who saw Top Gun at an impressionable age, not to mention saw an F-14 demonstrated well at an airshow, knows that it is the coolest thing around! But then, I still think of the F-18 as one of the "new" generation...

bob

Sorry I have to disagree, having experienced both up close I must say that the F15 gives me shivvers more than the 14. It looks . . . . . . . . . . angryer, somehow, I think maybe iths the shape of the wings

[mhaselden]

Hi Nick,

Per your post #146, according to at least one Japanese historian, Ki-43s were employed in the 'aerial exterminating action' role during the Malayan Campaign. Indeed, the Ki-43 continued to be used in that role during operations in Burma throughout 1942 and onwards. Was this simply making best use of what was available or do you think the doctrine was developing at the same time as newer airframes, like the Ki-44, were becoming available? I suppose it's also possible that the Ki-44 wasn't deemed a sufficient capability advance over the Ki-43-Is that were used in Malaya for that specific role.

Any thoughts?

KR
Mark

[SkippyBing]

Both concepts assumed that the carrier borne aircraft's sole role was the defence of the carrier from enemy large bombers/maritime recce aircrafts. None was supposed to have to mix it up with land based high performance fighters, a result of the assumption that a carrier would not have to come close to enemy shores. Big mistake IMHO.

Not true in the case of the RN, who assumed they would at some point being operating near land, then assumed naval fighters wouldn't be able to hold back the high performance land based fighters, then decided making the flight deck armoured would be a suitable defence. Considering the beating Illustrious took post the Taranto raid it's reasonable to assume this strategy worked, certainly she survived a scenario which it's questionable the Enterprise would have.

[Procopius]

Not true in the case of the RN, who assumed they would at some point being operating near land, then assumed naval fighters wouldn't be able to hold back the high performance land based fighters, then decided making the flight deck armoured would be a suitable defence. Considering the beating Illustrious took post the Taranto raid it's reasonable to assume this strategy worked, certainly she survived a scenario which it's questionable the Enterprise would have.

None of those bombs hit the armor deck.