KevinK

I'll wait for the Eduard "Bighorn-Edition"

Yes, but what shade of violet, and what matches are there in Humbrol, AK, Gunze....?

If it's any help, my Spring 1996 Aeroclub catalogue lists it as K033, with the Gamecock (K034), Gauntlet (K035) and Woodcock (K036) also listed as latest available.

Please think, before posting an asinine political comment. Do you really think that the US President and the CEO of several tech companies are in any way involved in your problems of copyright violation?

Fixed that for you!

Possibly the Berna Multi-Clamp? I have used them since the late 1970's and highly recommend.

I don't have my Lysander references to hand, but from Wikipedia, while the inboard automatic slats are linked to the automatic flaps (therefore indirectly deployable by the pilot), the outboard ones are fully-automatic Handley Page type slats. From Wikipedia: The inboard slats were connected to the flaps and to an air damper in the port wing which governed the speed at which the slats operated. The outboard slats operated independently and were not connected and each was fitted with an air damper. I recall (I think it may have been in H A Taylor's book) a description of what he called the Lysander's "rocking horse game" where as trim and power were varied it was possible to see all the advanced automatic aerodynamic features working together.

Well, there's also the Avro Ashton, based on the Tudor and originally known as the Tudor 9, so there's a pure-jet derivative of the Manchester!

Well, that's an obvious giveaway: it's a Fairey Seal!

A 1/72nd Beverley would complement the Superfreighter re-release!

Well, not a chorus of dissent but a technicality: the Mks I & II were - as you know - recce & night fighter respectively, so one could argue that the aircraft's initial-build role was a success and the day bomber role less so. Having said that, the day bombers were the first in full squadron service, after some initial PR ops had taken place a few months before. It all depends on how the question about "repurposed...failed...succeeded" is defined. The Air Ministry was lukewarm about the fast day bomber concept in 1938-40 but wanted a multi-role aircraft instead: it was de Havilland who kept pushing the day bomber role. The compromise was "build them all" but it seems that the Air Ministry was right all along.

You could add the Hawker Typhoon - originally intended as an interceptor, and the Avro Anson, while perhaps not exactly a failure in its original maritime role, was quickly withdrawn but was the Commonwealth's most-used multi-engined trainer, with over 11 000 built and serving in the light transport / communications role until 1968.

Oh, yes!! My favourite sitcom of all - my personal all-time best-loved quote being the Sir Humphrey monologue on the EU - British foreign policy remaining unchanged for 500 years....

Matt, Thanks for your thoughtful response. That was the way it developed historically, yes, and I don't disagree. There was no commercial market so the existing aircraft industry didn't pursue it. However, all the underlying technical capability was in industry: the government customers formed their own agencies to manage their programs and some were successful (early NASA with Mercury, Gemini & Apollo/Saturn), some were not. It all comes down in the end to requirements and markets. The USAF and early NASA had clear requirements to specify to achieve objectives. That was clearly not the case for Shuttle, which was why I described it as I did. Additionally, we had the Air Force wanting an operational delivery system while NASA saw it as a way to (i) develop technologies even if they weren't needed and (ii) feed the NASA field centers, a closely related task. In other words, NASA had to justify its existence by lobbying for just the right number and types of programs to keep every existing technology group employed, those groups having been built up to serve previous programs. Incidentally, this led to some near-criminal behavior in the case of the SRB: after the Challenger accident, Congress mandated NASA to study developing a liquid-propellant replacement. To preserve some sensibilities, I will not go into too much detail, but certain high officials deliberately sabotaged the studies with the sole aim of retaining the dangerously-unsuitable SRB. Further, the near-useless SLS has been under development in one way or another for some 44 years now (as SDV, Shuttle-C, Ares V, etc) and has flown only once. Government has lost any recipe it once had. The underlying problem is that, while a private industry can succeed or fail in the marketplace, with the incentive that failure can mean extinction, Government has no motive to succeed or fail with a product and no penalty for failure: it sees its primary job as keeping everything going. This is a good thing in some areas (emergency services, health, social security, etc) but not for novel commercial developments. The era of government direction of the space industry is rapidly coming to a natural end. In effect, SpaceX is creating its own new markets. It's perhaps more relevant to compare this with, say, automobile development pre-1914: all-commercial, no government involvement and technologies developed to meet market needs. If government wants to buy those space services, as it does, it's very welcome as a customer, just as with any other product.

Forgive me if I'm misinterpreting what you're saying, Graham, but the first four Starship flights weren't failures at all. Each one was a test flight with specific incremental objectives and an integral part of the development program: it's just that "normally" we do these sort of tests on the ground with specifically-built test hardware. The SpaceX approach is to build many prototypes and accept that not everything will work in-flight the first time out but limits will be found and modifications made: culturally they are using a Silicon Valley software-type-approach rather than the traditional aircraft industry way. On Saturn and Shuttle, we built enormous expensive ground test facilities just to test the engines operating together at full power//full duration. SpaceX decided it was preferable to spend that money on extra throw-away prototypes. Which is right? I don't know, but it's clearly a rational & viable approach.