In Sept. 1938, How Capable Of Bombing England Was the Luftwaffe?

[Old Man]

Recent discussion of the 'Turret Demon' here has called to mind the many biplane fighters still employed by the RAF at the time of the Munich Crisis. While the time brought by appeasement greatly improved RAF equipment, it improved German equipment as well. I know a little of Luftwaffe single seat fighters in this period, having some particular interest in the Spanish Civil War, but know next to nothing about the capabilities of early models of the Luftwaffe's chief twin-engine bombers, and of the early stages of the Bf 110.

 

For the first year or so of WWII, at least in the west Hitler more or less abode by the rules, the most important of which in this matter is respect for neutral air space. From bases on Germany's North Sea coast, it remains a good haul to reach England, about 600 kilometers (400-ish miles) from Wilhelmshafen to London as the crow flies, and on a course avoiding neutral airspace, the distance would be closer to 700 kilometers. A machine would need to be able to cover at least twice that, with some allowance above this for contingencies, and do so carrying an appreciable load.

 

So one question is, were the early marques of wartime Luftwaffe stalwarts like the He111 and the Do17 in service at the time of the Munich Crisis capable of such range with a useful .bomb load, and if so, at what operating speed, and at what height?

 

Another question is, was there anything which could escort bombers from Germany? Was that something the early marques of the Bf110 could do over such a distance? Certainly no single-seat machine possessed by the Luftwaffe could manage it.

 

The Japanese experience in China is instructive. Fast modern twin-engined Japanese bombers, when un-escorted, were on occasion severely handled by obsolescent biplane fighters whose performance was equivalent to that of a Gloster Gauntlet. To do this such fighters needed to be already aloft at a higher altitude than the bombers when these arrived and approached their target. Observers on the ground, often in sight of Japanese airfields, generally gave adequate warning of the bombers' course and speed to enable the fighters to do this. A system of picket boats in the North Sea would certainly be within Royal Navy wit and capabilities, and substitute well for the Chinese network of observers, often operating clandestinely.

 

 

[alt-92]

To illustrate the range problem:

A decidedly pre-war German-made diagram showing both offensive and defensive ranges from airfields in the Netherlands - the assumption made is that either British or German use of airfields affects the coverage of both.

 

I should say that the Dutch High Command was definitely aware of this, and considered it very likely our eastern neighbours would disregard that neutrality (as proved to be the case later).

[bjohns5]

As best as I can figure the only bombers in the Luftwaffe inventory in 1938 with the range to fly from German territory to London and back with any sort of useful bomb load would have been the Junkers Ju-86 and the Heinkel 111. Even if extra fuel tanks were necessary to gain a safety margin on the maximum range, either aircraft should have been able to deliver at least 2000 lbs of ordinance on targets in the eastern half of England. But the Luftwaffe had no fighters capable of flying escort over such a distance. The BF-109D was barely capable of reaching England from Germany. The Bf-110 and the Heinkel 112 had the range to reach England and engage in combat, but not to return.

Edited February 25, 2023 by bjohns5
Clarity

[dov]

The technology at this time was far away of making a devestating air war. The enormous will and acceleration in technology,  radar, navigation, optics etc. and enormous mass of military equipment gave a chance of a brutal air war. None of these was thetr 1938. As well on the German or any one elses side! Germany could never recruit and train enough aircrews too. 

Not to forget: Germany never switched to war ecconomy!

Happy modelling 

[JohnT]

The short answer is not very which is the same answer as how capable were the RAF of bombing Germany in 1938?   The Luftwaffe was created and developed as a tactical air force to support the Wehrmacht and not with long range strategic bombing in mind. In one sense Britain at least had theoretical development and some capability even if found lacking in practice until maturely developed some years later. 
 

In 1938 Germany had Poland at her back. That together with Nazi strategy meant no war in 1938 until Poland had been taken off the board. Stalins Russia also was an unknown until the Molotov Ribbentrop pact. 
 

in my view none of the belligerents were ready for a full on war in 1938 and the country that profited best from another year of peace was the British. At least they made best use of the 12 months - arguably anyway. 
 

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/research-enquiries/history-of-aviation-timeline/british-military-aviation/1938-2/

 

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/research-enquiries/history-of-aviation-timeline/british-military-aviation/1939-2/

 

[Old Man]

Thank you all, Gentlemen!

 

I found one source for He111E performance giving 'cruising speed' with a one ton bomb-load as a hair under 200mph, while the maximum speed of the Ju86 was about that as well. It would seem that these bombers in practice could well have been vulnerable to much obsolescent RAF equipment. They would be without escort, likely operating at speeds even a Fury biplane might manage in level flight, and if down low enough for accuracy, might be engaged at least briefly by a Demon with the speed and zoom of a good dive.

 

The question is a narrow one, namely: Was the RAF as mis-matched to the Luftwaffe during the Munich Crisis as it is popularly conceived to be, particularly when comparing first-line fighter equipments? Had war broken out over Munich, I expect German Messerschmidt fighters would have handily dealt with the Avia biplane fighters of Czechoslovakia, as well as with the standard French fighter at the time, the open cockpit D.510 monoplane. Either of these could have done great harm to unescorted bombers. I don't know if Luftwaffe doctrine called for bombers to receive escort, but if it didn't the lesson would probably have been learned quick enough. Flying bombers to England without escort, over the North Sea or even over Holland, might well have proved a costly and futile gesture, even against RAF fighter strength as it stood at the time.

 

It is instructive to encounter popular entertainments from the pre-war period. There was something of a mania for speculation on the horrors of attack from the air. It was imagined occurring on a titanic scale, causing colossal damage in mere hours, and hectacombs of dead. The vision is as similar to those employed after the war in describing potential atomic warfare as is the sight of people grouped around a radio with faces towards it to listen is to that of people watching a teevee screen. In England civil defense preparations, and the needs of a political campaign to secure greater funds for expanding and improving the RAF, seem to have left a popular impression of awful, immediate threat from the air to England at the time which lingers still today.

Edited March 5, 2023 by Old Man

[Graham Boak]

The question of how ready the RAF was in 1938 is perhaps better, or certainly also,  addressed by considering the ground organisation,  How ready were the radar sites?  (Not very.)  Was the control system established by then?  What about the Observer Corps?  What were the connections to other sources such as the police who were expected to report on enemy aircraft.  Remember radar only faced out to sea.  How trained were the personnel involved?  The Battle of Britain was fought almost two years later, and this system had improved immensely in this time.  How was the AA establishment - it was not yet up to planned resources even in mid-1940.    The very important  edge the RAF had, narrow though it was, was the command and control system that ensured fighters were generally brought to the right place (if not always at the right height) at the right time.  This can of course be extended by the repair and resupply organisation that ensured that lost fighters were replaced in the squadron by the following morning.

 

All these things that take planning and preparation, but are generally lost in discussions of the relative performances of the aircraft.  All summed up in the too-often dismissed "bureaucracy", something that we were very good at and generally still are, despite the moaners.  Obviously it helped that money was effectively unlimited.  but how much of it was in place in September 1939? 

[JohnT]

45 minutes ago, Old Man said:

Thank you all, Gentlemen!

 

I found one source for He111E performance giving 'cruising speed' with a one ton bomb-load as a hair under 200mph, while the maximum speed of the Ju86 was about that as well. It would seem that these bombers in practice could well have been vulnerable to much obsolescent RAF equipment. They would be without escort, likely operating at speeds even a Fury biplane might manage in level flight, and if down low enough for accuracy, might be engaged at least briefly by a Demon with the speed and zoom of a good dive.

 

 

 

The scenario where the Boulton Paul Defiant would come into its own though and the role it was designed for  - not mixing it with single seat fighters or even 110's for that matter.  It would not have been available in 1938 though arriving in numbers by Jan 1940

 

@Graham Boak makes a point above that goes to the heart of matters.  In looking at world events and outcomes 1938 versus 1939/1940 you have to look at the big picture.  Would France have collapsed giving the Luftwaffe access to airfields near the French and Belgian coasts?  If not the Luftwaffe have the problem of range Germany to Britain while the RAF could use French airfields to hit Germany.  

[alt-92]

On 2/25/2023 at 10:20 PM, dov said:

Not to forget: Germany never switched to war ecconomy!

They did, just not in the full measure as from 1941 onwards (42 according to others - but that discounts planning).

 

[Graham Boak]

However, their military spending in "peace time" exceeded that of their opponents until very late days.

 

The RAF assumed that they could use French airfields to bomb the Ruhr (with Battles - honestly) but the French actually proved to be very reluctant to approve any such raids on civilian targets, as reported with attempted Wellington missions.  This is one of those prewar assumptions that was just plain wrong.

[Giorgio N]

16 hours ago, Old Man said:

Thank you all, Gentlemen!

 

I found one source for He111E performance giving 'cruising speed' with a one ton bomb-load as a hair under 200mph, while the maximum speed of the Ju86 was about that as well. It would seem that these bombers in practice could well have been vulnerable to much obsolescent RAF equipment. They would be without escort, likely operating at speeds even a Fury biplane might manage in level flight, and if down low enough for accuracy, might be engaged at least briefly by a Demon with the speed and zoom of a good dive.

 

The question is a narrow one, namely: Was the RAF as mis-matched to the Luftwaffe during the Munich Crisis as it is popularly conceived to be, particularly when comparing first-line fighter equipments? Had war broken out over Munich, I expect German Messerschmidt fighters would have handily dealt with the Avia biplane fighters of Czechoslovakia, as well as with the standard French fighter at the time, the open cockpit D.510 monoplane. Either of these could have done great harm to unescorted bombers. I don't know if Luftwaffe doctrine called for bombers to receive escort, but if it didn't the lesson would probably have been learned quick enough. Flying bombers to England without escort, over the North Sea or even over Holland, might well have proved a costly and futile gesture, even against RAF fighter strength as it stood at the time.

 

It is instructive to encounter popular entertainments from the pre-war period. There was something of a mania for speculation on the horrors of attack from the air. It was imagined occurring on a titanic scale, causing colossal damage in mere hours, and hectacombs of dead. The vision is as similar to those employed after the war in describing potential atomic warfare as is the sight of people grouped around a radio with faces towards it to listen is to that of people watching a teevee screen. In England civil defense preparations, and the needs of a political campaign to secure greater funds for expanding and improving the RAF, seem to have left a popular impression of awful, immediate threat from the air to England at the time which lingers still today.

 

The fighter however must have a certain speed advantage over the bomber to be able to gurantee the success of an interception, meaning that the He.111 with their 200 mph cruise speed would have been a problem for older RAF biplanes.

Italian CR.32s in Spain used the dive technique against the faster SB-2 bombers with some success but this required keeping large enough units constantly in the air in the areas likely to be attacked, good if defending specific targets but harder to do if having to defend a wide area.  Even in Spain the success was however limited and the Republicans quickly adopted tactics that made the Italian approach useless.

The CR.32s suffered similar problems against the SM.79s, aircraft that had a maximum cruise speed similar to the biplane maximum speed: the fighters could do very little in exercises and it was not until the advent of monoplane fighters with higher speed that Italian fighter units could hope to catch their own bombers.

Against a bomber flying at a cruise speed of 200 mph only the Hurricanes and the first Spitfires would have been capable of defending the British cities with confidence

[Old Man]

 

3 hours ago, Giorgio N said:

 

The fighter however must have a certain speed advantage over the bomber to be able to gurantee the success of an interception, meaning that the He.111 with their 200 mph cruise speed would have been a problem for older RAF biplanes.

Italian CR.32s in Spain used the dive technique against the faster SB-2 bombers with some success but this required keeping large enough units constantly in the air in the areas likely to be attacked, good if defending specific targets but harder to do if having to defend a wide area.  Even in Spain the success was however limited and the Republicans quickly adopted tactics that made the Italian approach useless.

The CR.32s suffered similar problems against the SM.79s, aircraft that had a maximum cruise speed similar to the biplane maximum speed: the fighters could do very little in exercises and it was not until the advent of monoplane fighters with higher speed that Italian fighter units could hope to catch their own bombers.

Against a bomber flying at a cruise speed of 200 mph only the Hurricanes and the first Spitfires would have been capable of defending the British cities with confidence

 

 

 

That the fighters must be handled properly is certainly so.

 

Most important they must be a good deal higher than the bombers.

 

Certainly there must be advance warning, so the machines can reach such a height.

 

In China, advance warning was supplied by a network of observers, some of whom were operating clandestinely in proximity to Japanese airfields. Warning generally did arrive in time, as the bases were hundreds of miles from their targets. The Japanese counter was feint attacks, with Chinese airfields and air activity at the target monitored by fast reconnaissance machines operating at high altitude well in advance of the bombers. The approaching bombers, tracked moving towards their target, would on nearing it stooge about for a bit, until interceptors scrambled to meet them were reported going down to refuel by the reconnaissance crews. The raid would go in then against the airfields, and the city targeted struck on the heels of this. In the circumstances, the trick only had to work a few times, and it did not always.

 

Bombers flying from Germany to England, even if cutting through Dutch airspace, would spend a good deal of time over water. Further, the bombers' endurance aloft would dictate a relatively predictable course towards their target. I expect the Royal Navy could manage improvising, with small craft, some sort of picket line with a good chance of observing the enemy aloft en route, at least in weather good enough a raid could be conducted with some hope of hitting more than countryside and haystacks. On occasions when the picket worked, at least, the interceptors would be able to climb high as they needed to be to engage with some chance of success.

 

Distances in Spain were quite short by compare to those involved in flying over China or the North Sea. A lot was learned in Spain that weren't quite so, as things turned out, as well as the many useful lessons emerging from that unhappy conflict. The speed of the SM.79 was daunting enough in 1935 to have some influence in English policy during the Abyssinian Crisis, when most RAF first-line fighters could not come close to 200mph in level flight. Collishaw, commanding the RAF in Egypt, pinned his (forlorn) hopes on Vincents making night raids on Italian airfields in Libya, should war commence.

[Jure Miljevic]

Hello,

by the end of September 1938 enough Bf 110 B-1s had been produced to arm a Staffel or two. These aircraft had been powered by JuMo engines with lower power and thus lower fuel consumption. Over Poland they had been used as escort fighters. Bf 110 B-1 had about 1000 miles maximum range so could probably reach Eastern Anglia and return back to Germany, but type's loiter and combat time over target area would have been severely limited. Cheers

Jure

[Old Man]

Thank you, Jure.

 

Were these in service, or still part of the trial run batch? Not that such would not be pressed into use if war had broken out.

[Old Man]

22 hours ago, Graham Boak said:

The question of how ready the RAF was in 1938 is perhaps better, or certainly also,  addressed by considering the ground organisation,  How ready were the radar sites?  (Not very.)  Was the control system established by then?  What about the Observer Corps?  What were the connections to other sources such as the police who were expected to report on enemy aircraft.  Remember radar only faced out to sea.  How trained were the personnel involved?  The Battle of Britain was fought almost two years later, and this system had improved immensely in this time.  How was the AA establishment - it was not yet up to planned resources even in mid-1940.    The very important  edge the RAF had, narrow though it was, was the command and control system that ensured fighters were generally brought to the right place (if not always at the right height) at the right time.  This can of course be extended by the repair and resupply organization that ensured that lost fighters were replaced in the squadron by the following morning.

 

All these things that take planning and preparation, but are generally lost in discussions of the relative performances of the aircraft.  All summed up in the too-often dismissed "bureaucracy", something that we were very good at and generally still are, despite the moaners.  Obviously it helped that money was effectively unlimited.  but how much of it was in place in September 1939? 

 

I agree completely, Graham. What the RAF faced in 1940, or even something approaching that, the RAF of the Munich period could not have withstood. That's not what it would have met then. I expect the most likely 'counterfactual' here is that attacking Czechoslovakia in September of 1938 would play out in a manner similar to the invasion of Poland a year later. Germany hadn't sufficient ground forces for engaging on two fronts, France would sit tight in the Maginot forts, England would be no more eager for battle on the ground. So a period of 'phony war' in the West while Czechoslovakia was reduced, with the bulk of German air strength devoted to this. Posturing, at least, for some diplomatic settlement once the prey was swallowed by Hitler, which would have been met with much enthusiasm by some circles in both English and French political life. The lure to such a settlement would be the prospect of some grand European crusade against Bolshevism, for which Germany would provide the muscle and England the money.

 

A good deal of the impetus for conciliation at Munich was fear of attack from the air, the dangers of which were greatly exaggerated in both the popular mind and the military councils of England and France. How German air power was employed, and performed, in reducing Czechoslovakia would effect the reputation of the instrument. I expect German air attacks would be aimed at assisting ground operations, and any displays of frightfulness would be presented as unavoidable consequences of breaking resistance in Prague or some other big city. In dealing with France and England, at least at the start, policies of legality would likely have been followed, as they were before the spring offensive of 1940: attacks by German bombers, like those of England and France, would be directed first at military installations. It is in this situation I expect the fighters equipping the RAF would have done a better job than expected of defending against.

 

Munich gained both sides time. The dramatic improvement of Fighter Command tends to eclipse improvements in German equipment over the same period, and not just in the air. Czech tanks and artillery were important assets in the early going of the war which actually occurred.

[Work In Progress]

On 2/22/2023 at 6:54 PM, Old Man said:

Fast modern twin-engined Japanese bombers, when un-escorted, were on occasion severely handled by obsolescent biplane fighters whose performance was equivalent to that of a Gloster Gauntlet. To do this such fighters needed to be already aloft at a higher altitude than the bombers when these arrived and approached their target.

True, and a similar scenario played out on some days in Malta

[Work In Progress]

On 2/25/2023 at 10:16 PM, JohnT said:

he short answer is not very which is the same answer as how capable were the RAF of bombing Germany in 1938

Absolutely right. The RAF bomber force as reflected Air Ministry specification procurement decisions in the first half of the 1930s was, after all, never envisioned to need to bomb Germany from UK bases. It was specified to be able to bomb France from domestic bases, France being assumed to be the traditional mainland European threat

Edited March 6, 2023 by Work In Progress

[JohnT]

6 hours ago, Old Man said:

 

 

Bombers flying from Germany to England, even if cutting through Dutch airspace, would spend a good deal of time over water. Further, the bombers' endurance aloft would dictate a relatively predictable course towards their target. I expect the Royal Navy could manage improvising, with small craft, some sort of picket line with a good chance of observing the enemy aloft en route, at least in weather good enough a raid could be conducted with some hope of hitting more than countryside and haystacks. On occasions when the picket worked, at least, the interceptors would be able to climb high as they needed to be to engage with some chance of success.

sounds familiar.  Falklands?

 

2 hours ago, Old Man said:

 

I agree completely, Graham. What the RAF faced in 1940, or even something approaching that, the RAF of the Munich period could not have withstood. That's not what it would have met then. I expect the most likely 'counterfactual' here is that attacking Czechoslovakia in September of 1938 would play out in a manner similar to the invasion of Poland a year later. Germany hadn't sufficient ground forces for engaging on two fronts, France would sit tight in the Maginot forts, England would be no more eager for battle on the ground. So a period of 'phony war' in the West while Czechoslovakia was reduced, with the bulk of German air strength devoted to this. Posturing, at least, for some diplomatic settlement once the prey was swallowed by Hitler, which would have been met with much enthusiasm by some circles in both English and French political life. The lure to such a settlement would be the prospect of some grand European crusade against Bolshevism, for which Germany would provide the muscle and England the money.

 

 

An interesting “What If?” is say Munich had not produced a settlement but had gone very badly. Germany attacks Czechoslovakia but Britain and France declare war. What does Poland do then? Do they decide to move against Germany given the other distractions Germany has and get their retaliation in first?  Based on history with no Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the USSR sits on the sidelines but offers clandestine support and Italy stays neutral unless Germany starts to prevail. 
Or what??  Who knows?  It never happened!

[Jure Miljevic]

Hello, Old Man

According to William Green's book Warplanes of the Third Reich they used ten pre-series unarmed Bf 110 B-0 for various trials. The first Bf 110 B-1s went to combat evaluation unit I(schweren Jagdgruppe)/Lehrgeschwader 1. By the time French general Vuillemin visited Germany on 22th August 1938 four Bf 110 B-1 had been produced and the production rate was two planes per week, so by the end of September there were probably 12 or 14 planes in service. At least some of the pre-series aircraft would have been armed and pushed into service in emergency, so I think one can assume that if the hostilities started on 30th September 1938, Luftwaffe would have had about 20 heavy fighters, capable of (barely) reaching England on bomber escort missions. Cheers

Jure

[Killingholme]

I'm not sure it is useful to consider a potential European war in 1938 as analogous to the situation that played out in 1940. I think it's fair to say that all European powers in 1938 were considering a short continental conflict rather similar to that of 1914.

[JWM]

The another interesting subject is why the German four engines  heavy bombers were never developed  (I mean Do 19, Ju 89...) in a scale like it happened in UK and USA with mass production of Lancaster, Halifax, B 17 or B24 and even B 29. To be more precise, none of other countries - Japan, France and even USSR did not developed such projects at the scale larger than few squadrons (the most massively produced were in USSR Pe 8 - ie. below 100 and in  Italy Piaggio P108 similar). It this field the equipment gap between Allies and Axies was the biggest... In 1938 nothing was suggesting this difference...

J-W

Edited March 7, 2023 by JWM

[Graham Boak]

11 minutes ago, JWM said:

. In 1938 nothing was suggesting this difference...

J-W

The German economy was.  I can recommend The Wages of Destruction By Adam Toze.  What is very impressive is how the Germans actually managed to achieve the production levels they did prewar, but they were coming up against severe constraints without the war.

[alt-92]

27 minutes ago, JWM said:

another interesting subject is why the German four engines  heavy bombers were never developed

The great proponent of 'strategic' airpower was Wever.

After his death*, the sycophants took over and argued that the LW was supposed to support the Heer anyway, and you could get 3 111s for the cost of 1-2 Ju-89s  Also, bigger numbers make for good boasting material, so that was the end of that...

 

 

 

*ironically, he died due to the same cause that led to the crash of the Boeing 299 - the prototype for what would become the strategic asset for the 8th AF in the war.

[Graham Boak]

I suspect that for "sycophants" above you can read "realists".    Bigger numbers are not only good boasting material but effective in war.  Germany had no immediate strategic aims that would have benefitted from a small force of strategic bombers that would have significantly weakened the Luftwaffe as a whole.  For the planned war the He.111 was perfectly adequate and the real struggle wasn't intended until 1942 - or 1946 in the case of the Navy's inflated plans.  By 1942 both of Wever's bombers would have been obsolete - the Dornier was looking that already.

 

However, it simply isn't true that Germany completely abandoned the strategic bomber.  Had it worked as and when planned, the He.177 would have been at least as effective as the equivalent Allied types, and would have been the backbone of the Luftwaffe in 1942.  That it didn't work is not the fault of the planners, and they can't be blamed for Hitler "jumping the gun",  However, given the state of the Germany economy and the rearmament programmes elsewhere, waiting for 1942 may not have been a good plan anyway.  As he is reported to have said "My generals do not understand economics."

[alt-92]

57 minutes ago, Graham Boak said:

Germany had no immediate strategic aims that would have benefitted from a small force of strategic bombers

*cough* The entire plan for starting the war was to move east, if you remember. 

The things were even called Ural bombers. 

 

As for obsolescence, I suspect that had the strategic force been taken up and Wever survived, you would have seen the planned replacements like the 177  but in a more conservative 4 engine B-type approach instead of the long-range Stuka with it's cursed 606.

 

And I call them sycophants, because Udet and Jeschonnek were - just like Goring - fighter jockeys with a disregard for the strategic bits.