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Why did the RAF order/receive over 300 nuclear bombers?


FalkeEins

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Recall that at the time the decisions were being made on what numbers of aircraft to purchase, the 'normal' peacetime service loss rates were very high. So purchases had to allow for normal wastage and unserviceabilities - or routine deep maintenance as well as likely operational losses in the event of action. A minimum loss rate of 5%  per annum for advanced machines of this type would not be unreasonable. The RAF lost several hundred Meteors per year in the Fifties, and they were simple aeroplanes compared to the V bombers.

 

 

The Sperrin was the back up to the V bombers, The Valiant was a true V bomber.  It had the advantage of more conventional design so was a lower risk option and hence entered service much earlier than the more advanced other two machines - of which the Victor was the most advanced. The Valiant was the only V bomber which dropped a live H bomb and also saw action as  a conventional bomber in numbers.  A shame the MoS (I think it was) insisted  on the use of a new alloy which proved so fatigue prone.

 

 

John B

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2 hours ago, georgeusa said:

Two items worth mentioning.  (As an aside, does anyone else remember nuclear bomb air raid drills where you would hide underneath your school classroom desk for protection.)  The U. S. played chicken with the Japanese.  The offer of surrender was based upon the mistaken belief by the Japanese the U. S. had a sizeable stash of nuclear bombs and enough to completely eliminate Japan from the face of the earth.  History reveals there was only two available and the Japanese gave up to prevent total devastation of their land.

 

The threat was not as empty as you portray.

 

The third bomb would have been ready for dropping by about 19 Aug. Components were awaiting being flown to Tinian. After that monthly production from Sept would have been as follows:-

Sept - 3 or 4

Oct - 3 or 4 (depends on Sept production)

Nov - 5+

Dec - 7+

Further increases were expected in 1946.

 

All set out in a memo by Gen Groves on 30 July 1945

http://www.dannen.com/decision/bomb-rate.html

 

When news of the Hiroshima Bomb was publically released, the planners for Operation Olympic even began to think in terms of using the atomic bombs tactically. The war ended before those plans could be developed.

 

Bomb components were being flown out from the US to Tinian by the 509th CG. So no long delays with sending components by sea.

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23 hours ago, EwenS said:

 

The threat was not as empty as you portray.

 

The third bomb would have been ready for dropping by about 19 Aug. Components were awaiting being flown to Tinian. After that monthly production from Sept would have been as follows:-

Sept - 3 or 4

Oct - 3 or 4 (depends on Sept production)

Nov - 5+

Dec - 7+

Further increases were expected in 1946.

.

First time I see this

Was it realistic?

Definitely not an empty threat at all..... but most likely  no further bomb on August.

How many bombs actually existed by Dec.? Any info out there?

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Some historians claim that the Japanese feared the prospect of being invaded and occupied by Russia even more than they feared the prospect of more atomic bombs. Maybe capitulation to the US was the lesser of two evils for them?

 

How true is this perspective? To be honest, I have no idea. An interesting concept, nonetheless.

 

I strongly believe that, if America had invaded Japan using conventional forces, it could have prolonged the war by a number of years and resulted in enormous loss-of-life on both sides. 

 

Cheers. 

 

Chris. 

 

  

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A third bomb in August was not just possible, it was a certainty. You need to understand the background to their use. Following the lack of a Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration, at least formally, Truman authorised the use of atomic weapons after 3 Aug. But he effectively passed control of the selection of targets and timing to the military. He did not authorise the use of each individual bomb. Under these orders, as more bombs became available it was up to the military as to how they should be used. 

 

On 12th Aug, once the Japanese had begun negotiations, Truman changed the rules. He took control of the use of atomic weapons away from the military. Thereafter he personally would have to sanction further missions. 

 

On 9 Aug the 509th CG sent two aircraft from Tinian to their US base at Wendover AFB, Utah to collect the components for the third bomb which was ready. Following Truman’s change of instructions these aircraft and the bomb components remained in the USA. The bomb core itself was used for experiments in late 1945 and into 1946, that resulted in two accidents that resulted in the death of a scientist each time.

https://sofrep.com/news/demon-core-the-third-atomic-bomb-intended-for-japan-proved-deadly-to-it-own-creators/

 

The figures provided in that memo by Gen Groves are entirely believable. He had been in charge of the whole Manhattan Project since 1942 and knew what was possible and what was not. He was an engineer to trade and not someone prone to exaggeration or promising something that could not be delivered.

 

Atom bomb availability in 1946 cannot corroborate his figures because, with the end of the war, there was no need to continue maximising production. The US was the sole nuclear power and peace was expected. Attention turned to improving them and simplifying manufacture. Figures for 1946 vary, possibly depending on the date chosen. Figures of 6-11 appear in various places. Two Mk3 Fat Man bombs were expended in Operation Crossroads at Bikini Atoll in June/July 1946. Various features for the Mk4 Bomb were tested in 3 nuclear tests in 1948, before mass production of that weapon between 1949 and 1951 (some 550 produced). The US stockpile in 1950 was 300-400, again sources differ.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_nuclear_weapons_stockpiles_and_nuclear_tests_by_country

 

As for what finally persuaded the Japanese to surrender, who knows exactly what tipped the balance. But 9 Aug was a terrible day for them. Stalin kept his promises from Tehran in Nov 1943 and Yalta in Feb 1945. Considering that the Japanese had been trying to use them as intermediaries in an effort to seek a negotiated way out of the war, this was a huge shock. The Soviets rolled into Manchuria with overwhelming force just after midnight. The speed of their advance was something to behold. Then 11 hours later Nagasaki. That on top of their being pushed back in every theatre in which they were fighting, including southern China itself. The decision was not easy and did not go down well in certain quarters leading to a coup attempt.

 

It has always struck me that it was the cumulative effects of all these things rather than any single one that changed their minds. They finally realised there was no way out. Efforts then shifted to how to keep the Emperor.

 

The whole question of the invasion of Japan fascinates me. I’d recommend this if you want to know more

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hell-Pay-D-M-Giangreco/dp/1591143160/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3NXY0WJQYZXL8&keywords=Hell+to+pay&qid=1668736167&s=books&sprefix=hell+to+pay%2Cstripbooks%2C162&sr=1-1

 

As a teaser here is the air order of battle for the Kyushu Operation Olympic.

https://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/Downfall/OOB/OOB_Allied.htm

 

Operation Olympic to capture the southern half of Kyushu for space for airfields to support later operations was scheduled for 1 Nov 1945 but inevitably would have been pushed back due to the damage inflicted on staging areas on Okinawa at the end of Sept by a typhoon. Beyond that, planning focussed on Operation Coronet, scheduled for 1 March 1946 on the Tokyo Plain. But no plans had been developed for what would happen if, at that point, the Japanese still did not surrender and the whole of Japan had to be conquered. By the end of 1945 the Soviets would have been well placed to invade the northernmost island Hokkaidō.

 

There are loads of fascinating aspects. Like Ironhorse. A Mulberry style artificial harbour for Operation Coronet. Given a high priority, work on it was only beginning when the war ended. Various elements would have to be sailed/towed across the Pacific!

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3 hours ago, EwenS said:

 

As for what finally persuaded the Japanese to surrender, who knows exactly what tipped the balance. But 9 Aug was a terrible day for them. Stalin kept his promises from Tehran in Nov 1943 and Yalta in Feb 1945. Considering that the Japanese had been trying to use them as intermediaries in an effort to seek a negotiated way out of the war, this was a huge shock. The Soviets rolled into Manchuria with overwhelming force just after midnight. The speed of their advance was something to behold. Then 11 hours later Nagasaki. That on top of their being pushed back in every theatre in which they were fighting, including southern China itself. The decision was not easy and did not go down well in certain quarters leading to a coup attempt.

 

It has always struck me that it was the cumulative effects of all these things rather than any single one that changed their minds. They finally realised there was no way out. Efforts then shifted to how to keep the Emperor.

 

 

 

What a great summary.
 

I am always slightly miffed when when the narrative goes ‘The USA dropped the atom bombs and so Japan surrendered’. There was a lot more than just that going on, and such a simplistic summary essentially dismisses the importance of Commonwealth, Chinese, Soviet and other nation’s efforts as well as the enormous power & importance of US conventional forces.

 

I have read that at the time the Emperor did not fully understand the impact of America’s ‘new bomb’ but fully and immediately understood what war with the Soviet Union meant! 
 

 

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On 11/16/2022 at 8:14 PM, georgeusa said:

Two items worth mentioning.  (As an aside, does anyone else remember nuclear bomb air raid drills where you would hide underneath your school classroom desk for protection.)  The U. S. played chicken with the Japanese.  The offer of surrender was based upon the mistaken belief by the Japanese the U. S. had a sizeable stash of nuclear bombs and enough to completely eliminate Japan from the face of the earth.  History reveals there was only two available and the Japanese gave up to prevent total devastation of their land.

 

The Cold War was a race between the super powers as who had the biggest stick.  There was always comparisons to the number of bombers vs. the number of nuclear weapons, etc.  With Britain having a large stash of nuclear weapons, the United States could flex its muscles that it could destroy a large amount of the Soviet Union with the stocks in Europe before the first wave of Soviet bombers came across the Bering straights and even reach the American mainland.

 

Russia, in World War II and also the United States, to a degree, showed how superior numbers could easily overwhelm more sophisticated weapons.  If there are 300 bombs coming from England, several hundred more from the U. S. stockpile scattered throughout Europe, hundreds more flying across the Bering Straight from Alaska and the U.S. mainland and finally the stockpiles held in the Pacific coming from that direction, how massive did a defensive system need to be for the Soviets.  The United States has an immense span of ocean on either side of the mainland that acts as a natural defensive deterrent in regards to the distance that needs to be travelled along with the length of response time favoring the U.S.

 

The amount of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom was just one part of the "Our Stick is Much Bigger Than Yours" propaganda designed to keep the Cold War cold as nobody wins in a nuclear war.  That is why I often wonder who came up with the term tactical use of nuclear weapons.    Okay soap box gone and hope this is treated as more of a historical perspective than the rant of some lunatic political idiot.  (I'm okay with being a lunatic historian.) 

 

All true but the part I higlighted should be put in some context: at its largest at the end of the '60s the total stockpile of British nuclear warheads totalled around 500.

In those same years the US stockpile amounted to over 30,000 warheads !

As important the British warheads may have been, their number was negligible compared to the size of the US arsenal. Britain having nuclear weapons was more important from a political point of view than from a military one in the overall scheme of the cold war.

The US were always of course very favourable towards the existence of a separate British nuclear deterrent (something that can't be said about their view toward France) and all British nuclear weapons benefit widely from US technical support. However had Britain decided not to field nuclear weapons, the US could have filled those numbers with little effort.

 

Speaking of tactical nuclear weapons, I served in the Army of my country at the very end of the Cold War, a time when tension had eased but most of the plans developed for the confrontation with the USSR were still in place. Among the units that my training battalion served was a Lance missile regiment and talking to the guys who served in this unit told a very scary story: these missiles were supposed to be used against areas where it eas expected to be able to concentrate as many Soviet tanks as possible... and all these areas were in our same country ! Yes, nuking our own country was part of the defence plan....

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2 hours ago, Giorgio N said:

The US were always of course very favourable towards the existence of a separate British nuclear deterrent (something that can't be said about their view toward France) and all British nuclear weapons benefit widely from US technical support.

I don't think that's true, Giorgio. Britain expected that they would have full access to the Manhattan project data and continue to develop nuclear weapons jointly with the US after the war ended, but the US refused point blank to give any access to the nuclear program, which is why Britain had to have an independent nuclear program after the war. Whilst there was a lot more co-operation later on, there wasn't any on the nuclear front at the start of the Cold War.

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4 hours ago, Dave Swindell said:

I don't think that's true, Giorgio. Britain expected that they would have full access to the Manhattan project data and continue to develop nuclear weapons jointly with the US after the war ended, but the US refused point blank to give any access to the nuclear program, which is why Britain had to have an independent nuclear program after the war. Whilst there was a lot more co-operation later on, there wasn't any on the nuclear front at the start of the Cold War.

 

Ture for the immediate postwar years, but it's undeniable that after the 1958 cooperation agreement was signed most British nuclear programs did benefit from US assistance and a number of warheads were developed starting from US designs. The same can be said for the propulsion systems used by British nuclear submarines

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The US attitude to providing us with nuclear weapons changed from mid-1954. At that point the Americans advised that they were willing to offer assistance to modify RAF aircraft to carry US nuclear bombs in the event of war, something which did not depend on changes to the Atomic Energy Act. That led to talks in early 1955 about co-ordinating both countries strike plans.

 

The causes of American attitudes towards nuclear co-operation changing, seem to have arisen due to:-

1. Britain having its own bomb (first British test was Oct 1952); and

2. An effective means of delivering it becoming a reality (first Valiant delivery was 8 Feb 1955).

 

Clearly, the horse had bolted so the Americans had concluded there was no longer any point in trying to shut the stable door. Better to co-ordinate the effort and work to change US legislation.

 

I recommend “RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces” by Humphrey Wynn of MoD Air Historical Branch for the full history of the RAF’s involvement in Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

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