FAA Brewster Buffalo's

[Jagan]

59 minutes ago, jimmaas said:

AX815 survived for quite a while, until it was SOC October 24, 1943...as a result of a forced landing at 307 MU in Lahore, India!

 

Slight Correction Jim.  AX815 lost West of Delhi , not Lahore.  The ac was being ferried by 21FC from Lahore to Karachi and was on the Delhi-Jodhpur leg.. details below.

http://www.rafcommands.com/database/serials/details.php?uniq=AX815

 

[jimmaas]

On 10/2/2021 at 10:30 AM, Graham Boak said:

The AX810-820 batch are simply described in Air britain's RAF Serials as "from Belgian contract to Admiralty" so no previous RAF service.

 

If I may divert somewhat, does anyone know which Buffalos were sent to the Eagle squadrons for trials, and did they ever get unit codes?  I suspect not.

Britmodeller had a thread here and the only serials I've been able to find are AS414 and AS421.  So one is missing.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

RAF Serial Registers, Brewster Buffalo, 71 Sqn mentions, AS414, 416, 421, 423.

 

AS410, AMAS? 12 Jul 40, AAEE "D" 9 Feb 41
AS411, 37 MU, 4 MU CRE 9 Sep 40, Instructional 2852M?
AS412, AMAS? 10 Jul 40, 39 MU 8 Aug 40 then 4MU CRE "B" same day, Cat E 10 Apr 42
AS413, 37 MU 24 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, Admiralty 20 Oct or Dec 40
AS414, 37 MU 19 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, 71 Sqn 26 Oct 40, SAS CRU 10 Nov 40, instructional 2855M
AS415, 37 MU 19 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40
AS416, 37 MU 19 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, 71 Sqn 24 Oct 40, 37 MU 20 Nov 40, to FAA 21 Nov? 40
AS417, 18 MU 18 Oct 40, 37 MU 30 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, 37 MU 1 Sep 40, (Unreadable) 4 Sep 40, SAS CRE (Mods) 1 Dec 40, Instructional A37
AS418, 37 MU 10? Jul 40, (Unreadable) CRE 20 Aug 40
AS419, 37 MU 11 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, SOC 2 Jul 43
AS420, 37 MU 10 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40
AS421, 8? MU 18 Jul 40, 37 MU 20 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 21 Aug 40, 71 Sqn 26 Oct 40, 37 MU 16 Nov 40, to FAA 21 Nov 40
AS422, 5 MU 18 Jul 40, Hatstone? RNAS 24 Jul 40, (Sundry Units), CAT E 22 Apr 42.
AS423, 5 MU 14? Jul 40, 71 Sqn 20 Oct 40, to FAA 21 Nov 40
AS424, 5 MU 16 Jul 40, 37 MU 2 Sep 40, 4 MU CRE 9 Sep 40, 37 MU 13 Sep 40, To FAA 21 Nov 40
AS425, 5 MU 19 Jul 40, AAEE 31 Jul 40, 37 MU 11 Aug 40, 4 MU CRE "B" 21 Aug 40, SOC 1 Jul 43
AS426, 5 MU 19 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 23 Aug 40, To FAA 21 Nov 40, Instructional A39
AS427, 5 MU 23 Jul 40, SAS CRE 12 Nov 40, to FAA 21 Nov 40, Instructional A38
AS428, 5 MU 23 Jul 40, 4 MU CRE 25 Aug 40, To FAA 21 Nov 40, SOC 2 Jun 43
AS429, 5 MU, 4 MU CRE "B" 2 Sep 40, Instructional 2857M
AS430, 5 MU 19 Jul 20, 2 MAE? 10 Aug 40, Instructional 2859M

AX810 to AX820 All to Admiralty 31 October 1940.
BB450 To Admiralty 31 January 1941

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The official aircraft import and export reports do not count aircraft moving as part of units, since they are not in the reports it appears all the Buffalo exported from Britain officially moved as part of units.  Unlike for example 24 Fulmars sent via Takoradi.  Unfortunately some reports treat Takoradi and Egypt as the same destination, Middle East.  This carried through on reports to Churchill and provoked a complaint by Middle East command that newly arrived aircraft sitting in crates at at Takoradi should not be counted as front line aircraft in Egypt.

 

Note the individual reports I have do not reconcile well at times. 

 

Most short range aircraft exported from the UK to the Middle East were via Takoradi but the route took a while to set up and Hurricanes were being exported from April 1940 on, with gaps in May 1940 and January 1941, with 245 exported by end 1940,  of which it looks like 144 were sent to Takoradi.  As of 4 July 1941 433 Hurricane exports to Takoradi of which 358 had arrived, Sea/Air via Mediterranean had 273 Hurricanes sent of which 232 arrived Malta of which 164 arrived Middle East, 71 Hurricanes has been sent via the Cape of which 23 had arrived in the Middle East, this became 34 week ending 11 July, 64 week ending 23 August.

 

As of 4 July 1941 113 Blenheims had been sent by air, 4 by sea via the Mediterranean, and 357 by sea to Takoradi.  The first Beaufighters arrived in Takoradi in April 1942, nearly a year after exports via Gibraltar commenced, a similar story for Beauforts.

[Seahawk]

12 hours ago, Geoffrey Sinclair said:

AS422, 5 MU 18 Jul 40, Hatstone? RNAS 24 Jul 40, (Sundry Units), CAT E 22 Apr 42.

 

Geofffrey, 

 

Is there any more detail on the "sundry units" (presumably FAA) AS422 served with between moving to Hatston in Jan 40 and Cat E in Ap 42?  Thanks.

 

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

48 minutes ago, Seahawk said:

Is there any more detail on the "sundry units" (presumably FAA) AS422 served with between moving to Hatston in Jan 40 and Cat E in Ap 42?  Thanks.

Unfortunately no more details, the post was a full copy of all the entries.  The RAF did not track FAA aircraft.

[EwenS]

1 hour ago, Seahawk said:

 

Geofffrey, 

 

Is there any more detail on the "sundry units" (presumably FAA) AS422 served with between moving to Hatston in Jan 40 and Cat E in Ap 42?  Thanks.

 

 

 

From FAA Aircraft 1939-1945

 

TOC 804 Sqn Hatston, tested 25/7/40-9/40; 759 Sqn Yeovilton 7/41.

 

And that is it.

Edited October 4, 2021 by EwenS

[ClaudioN]

19 hours ago, Geoffrey Sinclair said:

The official aircraft import and export reports do not count aircraft moving as part of units, since they are not in the reports it appears all the Buffalo exported from Britain officially moved as part of units.

Just a feeling that they could have moved as part of 805 Sqn.

Members of No. 805 Squadron left Britain around October 1940 with 12 Fulmars. 805 was to be formed as the second Fulmar squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, I assume to reinforce 806 on Illustrious and provide a more credible fighter complement to Eagle. However, defence of the naval base at Alexandria might have been considered as well. For this task, reasonably high-performance monoplanes like the Brewsters might suffice, considering their opposition would be Fiat C.R.42s and G.50s (no trace of the Luftwaffe was seen in that theatre until January 1941).

 

Already having 804 Sqn defending Scapa with land-based Martlets, the provision of a flight equipped with Brewsters for the defence of Alexandria does not sound like a bad idea.

At least two aircraft of the "Brewster flight" deployed to Maleme in March 1941 bore squadron codes, '7Y' and '7Z', that suggests they had been an intergral part of 805 Sqn.

 

Just my thought.

[ClaudioN]

19 hours ago, Geoffrey Sinclair said:

Unlike for example 24 Fulmars sent via Takoradi.

If I may, do you have any details on these? Fulmar logistics seems to have been hard to the Mediterranean Fleet.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

9 hours ago, ClaudioN said:

If I may, do you have any details on these? Fulmar logistics seems to have been hard to the Mediterranean Fleet.

I have no details on serials and such, only numbers of aircraft.  And the monthly reports treat Takoradi and Egypt as the same destination, Middle East.  Also the Middle East was not always prompt in reporting arrivals.  Mediterranean would mean Gibraltar and Malta.

 

Takoradi

Looks like the first Fulmars arrived at Takoradi on the fortnight ending 1 November 1940.  With 7 en route, 4 arrivals in the time period, with 6 currently being uncrated. In the next week 5 were sent to the Middle East. The reports change format on 22 November and then become cumulative totals on 6 December, by which time Takoradi had 19
Fulmars shipped to it, 4 of which were en route 2 had been received in the previous week, bringing the received total to 15, 6 were on hand and serviceable, 9 had been sent to the Middle East of which 4 were en route.

 

For week ending 20 December the reports settle into reporting both new and cumulative totals. 24 shipped, 15 arrived, 4 on hand, 11 departed, 4 of which en route to Middle East

 

The 9 arrivals in week ending 10 January 1941 came from HMS Furious.

As of 31 January 1941 the totals were 31 shipped, 24 arrived, 1 on hand, 23 departed, 10 en route to Middle East
As of 28 February 1941 the totals were 34 shipped, 31 arrived, 11 on hand, 23 departed, 4 en route to Middle East which does not add up, week ending 7 March totals are 8 on hand, rest unchanged.

 

As of 21 March 1941, 48 Fulmars shipped, 34 arrived, 27 departed Takoradi, 19 arrived in Middle East
As of 28 March 1941, 48, 46, 31, 24.

However by 9 May 1941 the shipped and arrived figures are revised to 36, 31 departed Takoradi, 30 arrived.
Week ending 13 June reports 1 Fulmar written off at Takoradi.
No more Fulmars arrive to 22 August when the reports end, 2 left Takoradi week ending 6 June, 1 w/e 8 August, 1 w/e 15 August.  Arrivals in the Middle East to 32 w/e 13 June and stay that way.

 

The monthly figures.

Month    \    Mediterranean    \    Middle East
Oct-40    \        \    11
Nov-40    \        \    1
Dec-40    \        \    9
Jan-41    \        \    7
Feb-41    \    4    \    3
Mar-41    \        \    26
Apr-41    \        \    16
May-41    \    6    \    12
Jun-41    \    6    \    24
Jul-41    \    6    \    23
Aug-41    \    4    \    10
Sep-41    \    7    \    18
Oct-41    \    4    \    2
Nov-41    \    3    \    
Dec-41    \        \    
Jan-42    \    10    \    
Feb-42    \    3    \    1
Mar-42    \    1    \    
Apr-42    \    2    \    
May-42    \    2    \    3
Total    \    58    \    166

 

So it seems all the early exports went via Takoradi, but then switched to by sea around the cape.

 

With the plan to have a carrier operating around Singapore exports of Fulmars to Ceylon and the Far East began in October 1941, more followed, by end 1942 totals were 27 Ceylon, 12 Far East, 3 India, 15 Kenya, 25 South Africa.  Another 9 were exported to Trinidad between August 1943 and February 1944.

[detail is everything]

My thoughts on the matter are that where aircraft have the original 8" serial number, probably the camouflage scheme they were delivered to the squadron in, where they have the 4" ROYAL NAVY and serial below, possibly TSS as would suggest a re-paint in an FAA maintenance unit.  Just an assumption on my part....

[Spitfires Forever]

It's always an adventure trying to figure out proper paint schemes from black and white photos 80 years ago. Your assumption is a very strong possibility. I am torn between a bleached out Belgian cammo with the 4" RN code and serial numbers. The Buffalo is a much maligned airplane which performed well for the Finnish, just not a match for the nimble Japanese fighters. There is just something very cool about the Brewster, always liked the plane. Maybe that's why ai have 6 Tamiya's in my stash.

Cheers

[LDSModeller]

1 hour ago, Spitfires Forever said:

not a match for the nimble Japanese fighters.

 

Given that the RAF/Dominion Aircrews in Singapore had a number of Aces,

it was more the Japanese had overwhelming numbers, which won the day.

If the Buffalo Pilots could get sufficient height against the IJAAF aircraft then

the fight was pretty even.

When The IJN Zeros turned up in Jan 1942, then different ball game, but the

IJN pilots didn't have it all their own way then either.

 

Regards

 

Alan

[Graham Boak]

The results show that, despite the affection of a few (and only a few) of the pilots who flew it, and one successful claim for a Zero (not sure whether it was really an Oscar, not that it matters) it is pretty clear that the Buffalo was pretty comprehensively out-flown by the Japanese.  Not just by the Oscar but the Ki.27 Nate, although the more experienced Japanese pilots had a lot to do with that.  Managing to get to altitude before the raid arrived certainly helped, as it always does, but was rarely achieved despite the raids' timetable-like regularity.  The Hurricane was only slightly more successful, but it should be added that those RAF pilots who managed to fly a Dutch Buffalo found them considerably superior to the RAF version.

[mhaselden]

12 minutes ago, Graham Boak said:

The results show that, despite the affection of a few (and only a few) of the pilots who flew it, and one successful claim for a Zero (not sure whether it was really an Oscar, not that it matters) it is pretty clear that the Buffalo was pretty comprehensively out-flown by the Japanese.  Not just by the Oscar but the Ki.27 Nate, although the more experienced Japanese pilots had a lot to do with that.  Managing to get to altitude before the raid arrived certainly helped, as it always does, but was rarely achieved despite the raids' timetable-like regularity.  The Hurricane was only slightly more successful, but it should be added that those RAF pilots who managed to fly a Dutch Buffalo found them considerably superior to the RAF version.

 

I'd be interested to know how many former Buffalo pilots you've directly communicated with on this topic? 

 

The lack of early warning in Malaya was critical.  Replace all the Buffalos with the latest Spitfires and the results in Malaya and Singapore would still be the same because, without early warning, you're forced into standing patrols over airfields, which is expensive in airframes, or responding when an attack is seen, which inevitably means engaging at a tactical disadvantage.  

 

The Buffalo wasn't a great aircraft but it also wasn't the pig that is so often portrayed.  Operational environment is key and Far East Command was simply not prepared to be a warfighting command in 1941.  

Edited October 5, 2021 by mhaselden

[Graham Boak]

I haven't, Mark, but there are plenty of pilots' comments in print.  I do wonder whether those pilots who did like it were perhaps those less experienced in other fighters than those who tested in it the UK and in the Middle East.  I haven't said, and don't hold, that the Buffalo was an absolute pig, but the RAF version was overweight compared to the Finnish ones and underpowered compared to the Dutch.  However, even the Dutch ones didn't do dramatically better in combat.

 

I wholeheartedly agree about the situation in the Far East, and that no Allied fighter was going to excel in Singapore; but the Buffalo was the poorest climber of those available, which didn't help.  In a similar (but never identical) environment lacking in early warning, the Hurricanes also suffered in India/Burma but the superior climb rate of the Spitfires made all the difference in being above the incoming raids.  As I recall, the Japanese raids were regularly over Singapore at the same time(s) each day - a situation which perhaps makes the lack of warning redundant.  So why were the defending fighters (all variants) so regularly caught out of position?

 

Re the quality of the training, I've long felt that the experience against the Germans had biased the RAF in favour of training for the turning battle rather than high energy combat, something which was fatal against the agile Japanese types.  Again, not specifically the fault of the Buffalo.

 

 

[Spitfires Forever]

I remember reading about US Navy pilots, maybe Jimmy Thatch, don't rightly remember who but he mentioned that he was briefing some British Spitfire pilots who had arrived in theater perhaps in Australia who were also B of B veterans with kills under their belts. He recalled that as he briefed them on the performance capabilities of the Zero they were quite cocky and dismissive of the intelligence he was imparting to them. On their first mission 7 out of 12 Spits we're promptly shot down. The point being that even with an aircraft clearly superior to the Buffalo with experienced pilots the tactical demands in that theater of operations proved that a better airplane flown by experienced pilots does not necessarily translate into parity, but in defense of the Buffalo pilots who went up  bravely against a numerically and technically superior enemy even P-39 pilots had reasonable success against the Japanese in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. I guess it all comes down to having the right tool for the job but even a screwdriver can be used as a drill or a hammer under the right circumstances!

Cheers

[Ed Russell]

5 hours ago, Spitfires Forever said:

maybe Jimmy Thatch, don't rightly remember who but he mentioned that he was briefing some British Spitfire pilots who had arrived in theater perhaps in Australia who were also B of B veterans with kills under their belts. He recalled that as he briefed them on the performance capabilities of the Zero they were quite cocky and dismissive of the intelligence he was imparting to them. On their first mission 7 out of 12 Spits we're promptly shot down

There's no record I can find of Thach ever being in Australia and no Australian based squadron appears to have had 7 out of 12 Spifires shot down. Possibly conflated with (inflated from?) an incident over northern Australia where multiple Spitfires were lost with engine and constant speed propeller drives failing or perhaps an incident in some other country.

[Spitfires Forever]

I read this quote a long time ago but recall it was in two separate books and am only guessing that it was Thatch and Australia where he briefed the Spitfire pilots but ai stand by what ai read. I wish I could accurately recall which books I read it in which was many years ago. I will go through my library and try to nail it down.

Cheers

[ClaudioN]

8 hours ago, Graham Boak said:

I wholeheartedly agree about the situation in the Far East, and that no Allied fighter was going to excel in Singapore; but the Buffalo was the poorest climber of those available, which didn't help.  In a similar (but never identical) environment lacking in early warning, the Hurricanes also suffered in India/Burma but the superior climb rate of the Spitfires made all the difference in being above the incoming raids.

The Buffalo is always going to stir discussion, eh?

 

I am keen to consider the "when and why" of historical facts, which is all the more important in the rather short time between the start of WWII in Europe and the initial months of 1942.

Hurricane vs Buffalo means early 1942, Spitfire vs Buffalo means late 1943.

 

There was hardly any other chance to field four fighter squadrons in Singapore and one in Malaya, than purchasing the Brewster Buffalo in 1940. Production of the Curtiss Hawk had already been taken up by France from 1939, other American fighters that would fight in 1941 were still under development.

Some of the modifications that weighted down the B-339E were specified by the RAF, whereas underpowered engines were a consequence of a booming military market that forced the use of reconditioned, ex-airliner Wright Cyclones for the Buffalo foreign orders.

 

In mid-1940 the RAF tested the ex-Belgian B-339Bs and found them unsuitable for combat in the European theatre (that is, RAF vs Luftwaffe). However, handling and other general features were found to be good, suggesting the Brewster could be a good fighter trainer. This is the use the FAA found for the few B-339Bs that remained in Britain and were sent to the RN Fighter School (759/760 Sqn.).

Arguably, there might still be some use for the B-339B as a fighter against a "second rate" air force. Perhaps this was implied in the transfer of most B-339Bs to the Middle East: if the Brewster might be seen as a "modernised Gloster Gladiator", then it would be able to hold its own against the Regia Aeronautica.

 

As to the Far East, what was the feeling about the IJAAF and IJNAF? In spite of reports from the Sino-Japanese war that had been going on in earnest for some years, where the Japanese had fielded most of their new aircraft, I suspect overconfidence, possibly tinted with a slight shade of perceived "racial superiority", induced to consider Japanese air forces "second rate". The RAF in the Far East had had a few months of peacetime to assess its new fighter and possibly draw up plans to fight the Japanese on fair terms. Using what they had, that is, the Buffalo.

 

Now back to FAA Brewsters: usually, their roundels were centred over the previous Belgian roundels, resulting in different positions compared to the RAF Buffalos.

AX815:G is an exception and its fuselage roundels are in the same position as any RAF Buffalo.

I'll have a look at other Buffalo pictures and come up with a summary if I can.

[Ed Russell]

1 hour ago, Spitfires Forever said:

guessing that it was Thatch

Maybe searching for Thach rather than Thatch might work?

And........... starting thread drift is becoming frowned upon. Perhaps put your findings in a new thread?

[EwenS]

Comment in “Air Arsenal North America” about RAF procurement of the Buffalo in late 1939 (order placed cDec that year) with my emphasis.  “....The main driver for its purchase was the need to provide more modern equipment for the RAF in areas not directly involved in the war; this need could not be met from existing production lines, which were more than fully committed to equipping and supporting front-line units in combat areas.”

 

The RAF assessed both the P-35 and the Buffalo for the role but selected the Buffalo as it was thought Seversky would be too busy fulfilling a Swedish order they had just picked up, while at the same time ignoring rumours of internal management problems at Brewster.

 

So an underestimation of the likely enemy aircraft they would face 2 years later. But how much information was there on the Oscar? (First flight Jan 1939, service entry Oct 1941). How much on the Zero (first flight April 1939, service entry July 1940)? There was some on the latter from China but everyone, British and American, chose to ignore that.

 

There was an air warning system in Malaya. It began to be built up from March 1941, around the same time as the Buffalos began arriving. And it had been successfully used in exercises in Aug/Sept 1941. By 8/12/41 there were 5 operational radar sets (the northernmost one at Mersing on the east coast) of the Chain Overseas type (overseas version of Chain Home) and a system capable of giving Singapore 30 mins notice of an attack coming in. More radars had been planned but priorities were greater elsewhere. GCI was for example due to be installed early spring 1942.

 

But the problems in setting up such a system should not be overlooked when compared to the U.K. The telephone system into which RAF secure lines were plugged in the U.K. was nowhere near so extensive in Malaya necessitating more line laying to get it up and running. Weather interfered with radar signals to a much greater extent. Setting up an Observer Corps also began in 1941 but encountered the problem of locating sites on jungle clad hill tops and telephones again. There is even a story from Burma of reliance on heliographs!

 

And as for the Buffalo squadrons. 2 RAF formed in March 1941 in Singapore from personnel sent from U.K. 2 Australian recently formed that arrived in Aug and only completed their Buffalo outfit in Oct/Nov, and a New Zealand squadron formed in NZ in Sept which arrived in Singapore in Oct and for which the Buffalo was its very first aircraft. Just how many of those pilots were straight out of OTUs? And what tactics were they being taught there? Because what was appropriate against an Me109 was no good against a Japanese fighter with its experienced pilot.

 

So not a very good starting point to take on the IJAAF in Dec 1941.

[ClaudioN]

As promised, I'm back with a summary of notes I made, based on the photos I was able to observe and merged with additional information provided so far in this thread.

 

First batch (21 aircraft) AS410-AS430, arrived aboard HMS Furious July 1940

• roundels on all aircraft in this batch appear to be centred over the previous Belgian roundels
• initially the tailwheel tyre was of the solid rubber type used on carriers by the US Navy, but this was very soon replaced by a larger pneumatic tyre
• AS412 and AS430 appear in photos with red-white-blue fin stripes, each seemingly 8-inch wide and extending the full fin height, this also appears to have been soon modified into the standard rectangular fin flash
• serials were applied in 8-inch characters

to Royal Navy (date from FAA Aircraft 1939-1945):

AS422     to FAA 24 July 40, taken on Charge 804 Sqn Hatston, tested from 25 July 40 to Sep 40, to 759 Sqn Yeovilton July 41
AS418     taken on charge RN Aug 40

 

AS413    Admiralty 20 Oct or Dec 40 - taken on charge RN Oct 40 - to Middle East, 805 Sqn Dekheila/Eagle March 41, crashed on landing Dekheila 16 May 41
AS415     to MIddle East, tested Abu Sueir 16 Dec 41 (perhaps 40?), then to Dekheila
AS419     to Middle East, 805 Sqn Maleme, engine failed, forced landing, overturned 16 March 41
AS420     to Middle East, 805 Sqn Maleme (?)

AS412     760 Sqn Yeovilton, overshot landing 24 Dec 41,  Cat E Apr 42

AS416     to FAA 21 Nov? 40 - taken on charge RN 21 Nov 40

AS421     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - 37 MU Burtonwood to 759 Sqn. Yeovilton 10 Feb 41
AS423     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - 37 MU Burtonwood to 759 Sqn. Yeovilton 21 Feb 41 - 804 Sqn from 25 Nov 41
AS424     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - taken on charge RN Nov. 40
AS425     taken on charge RN Nov. 40
AS426     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - A&AEE to Arbroath June 41, Instructional A39
AS427     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - taken on charge RN Nov. 40, Instructional A38
AS428     to FAA 21 Nov 40 - no information in "FAA Aircraft 1939-1945"
AS417     759 Sqn Yeovilton May 41, Instructional A37

 

Second batch (11 aircraft) AX810-AX820, arrived in August 1940, all to Admiralty 31 Oct 1940

• fuselage roundels on all aircraft in this batch appear to be positioned further forward than in the AS batch
• pneumatic tyre on the tailwheel
• serials were initially applied in 8-inch characters (photo of 7Y:AXxxx, abandoned in Crete). The presentation was later changed to 4/6-inch characters with ROYAL NAVY title above. Photos of AXxxx-serialled aircraft with 4-inch titles appear to be taken at Dekheila and seem to date from June 1941 on.

AX810     805 Sqn Dekheila Feb 41

AX811     805 Sqn Dekheila Mar 41

AX812     Abu Sueir to 805 Sqn Dekheila 9 Jan 41

AX813     805 Sqn Dekheila - shot down by Bf 109 17 June 41

AX814     805 Sqn Dekheila Feb 41

AX815     805 Sqn

AX816     no information

AX817     805 Sqn Dekheila - flew into ground 11 June 41

AX818     805 Sqn June 41

AX819     no information

AX820     805 Sqn

 

Both '7Y' and '7Z', abandoned in Crete (pictures), have fuselage roundels in the forward position. I suppose both belonged to the AX811-AX820 batch.

 

Single aircraft BB450, arrived in September 1940

BB450    to Admiralty 31 January 1941 - delivered 759 Sqn Yeovilton 25 Sep 40, until Nov 40 - to Admiralty 31 January 1941 - 761 Sqn Yeovilton Sep 41 - 804 Sqn Nov 41

Summary for 805 Sqn

• 15 Brewster B-339Bs sent to the Middle East
• 3 aircraft lost in Crete between March and May 1941 (AS419, AXxxx, AXxxx - seemingly, NOT another in the ASxxx range)
• 3 aircraft lost between 16 May and 17 June 1941 (AS413, AX813, AX817)
• 5 aircraft discarded when 805 Sqn moved to the Western Desert in August 1941 (AX813, AX814, AX817, AX818 and AX820) - these appear to be aircaft the unit had on strength at the time

Seemingly 9 aircraft remained in the Middle East, possibly later flown by 775 Sqn pilots. AX815:G might be one of these.

When No 805 Sqn moved to the Western Desert in August 1941, it had re-equipped with Martlet Mk. IIIs.

 

[jimmaas]

I'm offering the following not because it will help anyone build a better model, but because it can help us understand what actually was going on with these ex-Belgian aircraft - and a lot of others - in the autumn of 1940.  It is part of a report by a US Navy Ensign assigned to liaison duties in the UK, and was attached to an extensive report by Squadron Leader Churchill about the various faults and imperfections of the Brewster fighters that landed on his doorstep.  The Ensign's report sought to explain British practices that might not have been familiar to Americans (like a disinclination, at the time, to pressurize fuel tanks).  The excerpt that follows is a more general observation; there is some cultural chauvinism evident, but also insight into the position the UK found itself in at the time.  

 

Report of Ensign George Gibson, USNR to Commander Doyle, Reserve Section, BuAer

6 November 1940

Subject: Sq/L Churchill's Report to the Air Ministry re Brewsters, with Explanatory and Auxiliary Remarks

 

[Section from Page 7-8]

 

Situation at Speke Aerodrome -

 

Mr. H. H. Ogden, Lockheed representative, has taken over most of the hangers at this airport, where he is assembling the majority of the American planes.  Crew of about 25 picked Americans.  Has the only stock of chrome-moly steel tubing, dural and alclad sheeting of American gauges, stock on AN bolts, nuts, etc. and welding equipment for almost any job.  The English do not have any welding equipment for aircraft work.  There is a total lack of blueprints for any American planes in the United Kingdom.  With his crew he has put together practically all the American production sent here, whereas a group of about 200 Englishmen in a nearby factory are still struggling, since 15 May, to put together the first of 5 Douglasses.  He normally gets very good service on orders being sent from America. If that supply stops, we are completely stuck.  The Admiralty is still in a very dense fog regarding why American planes fly, and the Air Ministry is just beginning to find out.  It might not be a bad idea if the Army and Navy sent a group of good mechanics over here to help out in the various places where work is being done on American aircraft.  Frankly these people don't know what the hell the score is, and they are too hard up to pay for anyone coming.  Nobody except Ogdam can do anything about assembly and repair (he does not get much in line of repair) without blueprints.  If the services are at all interested in getting these planes in the air, and finding out how much or little good they are, it would pay you to send some mechs, armament chiefs, VF manuals, handbooks on the guns, and make the manufacturers send over about a dozen copies of each blueprint as soon as possible.  I have been through the Air Ministry, the armaments experts in the Admiralty (here is one handbook on the MG335 or some such number), through most of the key points from Scotland to the south, and there is no one who knows anything about these guns or synchronizing gears, and there is no literature on the subject.  Until they find out what makes the guns work they will be loathe to put the planes in combat.  Maybe they are kidding me, but I don't think so, and it would be very good experience for the men you might send over, to find out how primitive one becomes about repairs in such a crisis. 

 

Burtonwood Repair Depot - Situation At

 

The following history is hearsay.  Station started about three months ago with five new Martins in crates, about 200 wrecked American planes from everywhere, the bosses were the cast-offs of factories already operating (and you have to be pretty sad to be a cast-off now) and a mixture of refugee Slavs, Belgians, French and Poles, local farm boys and garage hands.  There were no tools, no blueprints, nothing but wrecks.  After a couple of weeks of everyone cooling their heels around the place, five Belgians ventures to break into one of the Martins and put it in flying condition.  It actually flew. That started operations.  The factory force was then divided into those who could speak understandable French, and those who spoke understandable English.  The gang working on Brewsters, four men, spoke French, I guess, and the boss of the shop spoke about 20 words in English.  Their clothes were clean, but an American hobo would turn his nose up otherwise.  It was cold, muddy and drizzly, and those men were cold.  They hadn't eaten for a couple of days because the cops could not figure out whether they were aliens and thus did or did not deserve ration cards (I picked this up from a telephone conversion between their sort of factory manager and the local police).  Anyway, they were working on a plane that had come in wheels up.  Their tools consisted of one block of wood about 3" by 4"  by 8" and a piece of broom handle about 12 inches long (this was the rivet buckers equipment), a ball-peen hammer with a 14" handle (this was the riveters equipment), ad hack-saw made evidently by borrowing someone else's hack-saw and cutting out a piece of 3/16 sheet to roughly the correct shape, then adding gadgets to hold the blade, and a rasp (this was the sheet metal workers equipment), and another hammer for the other sheet metal worker who must have been the forming and bending department.  The tail of the plane was supported off the deck by a couple of 2' x 3' x 4' boxes, upon which there was a pyramid of three 2-bladed prop boxes, and on that five or six 1" x 8" planks.  They were having a little trouble because they didn't have any blueprints and had to get all the dimensions by trial and error.  I don't know how they drilled the holes.  There was not a forge in the whole place.  Yet they were doing a very neat smooth job, and every few days they turn out a plane that flies.

[ClaudioN]

Thank you very much @jimmaas for the report. Although it may not help (directly) build models, it shows how hard it was to manage complex activities, as the assembly and testing of American aircraft was. After a full year of war, lack of skilled labour had probably become a big problem throughout the aeronautical industry in Britain, and this report seems to confirm it.