Fleet Arm Arm ORBs?

[Procopius]

I'm looking for March-May 1942 ORBs, if such things exist, for FAA squadrons 803, 806, 788, and the composite RAF/FAA 273 Squadron [edit: found it, but it was sparse], during their time at Ceylon. When I last went through the PRO about a decade ago, I had no joy -- would there be an alternate source for Royal Navy ORBs, or do they even exist?

[Grey Beema]

8 minutes ago, Procopius said:

I'm looking for March-May 1942 ORBs, if such things exist, for FAA squadrons 803, 806, 788, and the composite RAF/FAA 273 Squadron, during their time at Ceylon. When I last went through the PRO about a decade ago, I had no joy -- would there be an alternate source for Royal Navy ORBs, or do they even exist?

 

I think @iang @Lee Howard  @Graham Boak  Might be the best guys to help.  I have had very little success ploughing the digitised National Archives for record books from individual Squadrons.  Especially 806 who’s ORB would be useful to me from Mid 1940 to Mid 1941..

[iang]

Fleet Air Arm WW2 Squadron Diaries at TNA  are filed in ADM/207. You can search their catalogue to see which ones they hold and for what period. They hold 51 in total, but not 803, 806 or 788 for any period. The Fleet Air Arm Museum also hold 18 WW2 Diaries. Again, none of the squadrons you're interested in sadly.

[kitbasher2009]

On 9/20/2021 at 2:08 PM, Procopius said:

I'm looking for March-May 1942 ORBs, if such things exist, for FAA squadrons 803, 806, 788, and the composite RAF/FAA 273 Squadron [edit: found it, but it was sparse], during their time at Ceylon. When I last went through the PRO about a decade ago, I had no joy -- would there be an alternate source for Royal Navy ORBs, or do they even exist?

I've just been looking for the same and have drawn a blank (Googling 803 Sqn ORB threw up your post, btw).

 

If you're after some Easter Sunday Raid info I've been researching and can share findings if you wish.

 

EDIT: https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/FAA-Bases/Ratmalana.htm has got me thinking whether there's a War Diary for RNAS Dekheila (HMS Grebe) that could throw up some clues.  I suspect you may be after info concerning colours worn by Fulmars during the Easter Sunday and Trincomalee raids?

Edited August 6, 2023 by kitbasher2009
update post

[brewerjerry]

Hi

     this is from memory

 

but i was doing some correspondence research with a FAA researcher/ book writer, tying up codes and serials to WW2 FAA units 

  in the late 70's early 80's

 

 (before anyone asks ... i gave the info away when i left the UK ) 

 

   i seem to recall that he mentioned many FAA records and photos were disposed of in the late 60's or early 70's

 

   it sort of makes sense as to me the main interest in WW2 aircraft didn't seem to kick off until after the release of the BoB film

   

       jerry 

  

   

[Lee Howard]

@Procopius, As @iang said above. Sadly many Squadron Record Books, Diaries and Line Books failed to survive. Unlike their RAF counterparts, Naval Air Squadron records were susceptible to going down with ships, as was often the case with Flying Log Books. What is your particular interest, might I ask?

[Procopius]

35 minutes ago, Lee Howard said:

@Procopius, As @iang said above. Sadly many Squadron Record Books, Diaries and Line Books failed to survive. Unlike their RAF counterparts, Naval Air Squadron records were susceptible to going down with ships, as was often the case with Flying Log Books. What is your particular interest, might I ask?

 

Principally 803 and 806 Squadrons during their time on Ceylon, with my main focus being the Indian Ocean Raid.

[iang]

30 minutes ago, Procopius said:

 

Principally 803 and 806 Squadrons during their time on Ceylon, with my main focus being the Indian Ocean Raid.

 

Nothing survives for 1942 in the form of Squadron Diaries or Line books etc. You might find that the FAAM has the Flying Log Books for some of the Fulmar pilots and navigators for this period. You'd need to email them, then book a research visit to view. As you are based in Chicago they may send you copies of the relevant parts for a fee (I don't know how they operate these days).

[Lee Howard]

On 08/08/2023 at 16:54, iang said:

 

Nothing survives for 1942 in the form of Squadron Diaries or Line books etc. You might find that the FAAM has the Flying Log Books for some of the Fulmar pilots and navigators for this period. You'd need to email them, then book a research visit to view. As you are based in Chicago they may send you copies of the relevant parts for a fee (I don't know how they operate these days).

@iang 'navigators'? *cough* *splutter*!!

[Graham Boak]

Indeed.  But had the FAA adopted the term navigators earlier, there might not have been the obsession with observing the fall of shot that lead to the high wing which ruined the Barracuda design.  To be fair, however, I think this preceded even the RAF dropping the term.

[iang]

2 hours ago, Lee Howard said:

@iang 'navigators'? *cough* *splutter*!!

I suppose you are also going to tell me that the guy at the front isn't the driver?

[EwenS]

9 hours ago, Graham Boak said:

Indeed.  But had the FAA adopted the term navigators earlier, there might not have been the obsession with observing the fall of shot that lead to the high wing which ruined the Barracuda design.  To be fair, however, I think this preceded even the RAF dropping the term.

Probably not. Gunfire spotting wasn’t part of S.24/37 spec that led to the Barracuda or any of its competitors. Dive bomber / recce and torpedo bomber / recce were. Two things meant the RN favoured a high wing in a monoplane. It is enshrined in the first two parts of the Find, Fix, Strike approach.

 

Find

Both the enemy and the home carrier.

 

Navigating over the sea wasn't easy. Part of the observer’s job was to estimate windspeed periodically to ensure his navigation was as accurate as possible. That meant dropping a smoke float and observing it while the pilot flew a turn at a particular rate IIRC. So the observer still required sight of the ocean surface. And the clearer view of the surface he had the easier it was to spot an enemy in pre-radar days.

 

Fix

Once an enemy had been found the observer required to fix its position to allow the information to be passed back to the fleet. Again that required sight of the surface.

 

Around the time that the Albacore was selected, Fairey worked on a low winged monoplane proposal which did not find favour with the RN. One reason being the observers view. I don’t think it was therefore a coincidence that the various proposals to satisfy S.24/37 all had high mounted wings. Barracuda and Supermarine Type 322 Dumbo that appeared in the metal both did as did mockups from Bristol and Blackburn that occasionally turn up in photos. 

 

The importance of the observer’s view of the ocean was also evident in the bizarre Fleet Shadower designs from GAL and Airspeed to spec S.23/37 around the same period to shadow enemy fleets at night, and again nothing to do with gunfire spotting for the fleet.

 

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Aircraft_Fleet_Shadower

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airspeed_Fleet_Shadower

 

 

[Graham Boak]

Unlike every other carrier-operating nation who found means of doing this without the penalties of a high-wing design.  Or indeed all previous biplanes, operated by the FAA or others.  If I simplified the matter for the sake of a slight witticism, it remains true that the high wing was the prime cause of the Barracuda's design failings and that this was at the insistence of the Admiralty.  This insistence was clearly unnecessary.

 

The Barracuda was also underpowered, perhaps thanks to the cancellation of the Exe, or overweight from another point of view.  At least for tropical operation, where the replacement was the Avenger, a  mid-wing aircraft which could meet neither of the Admiralty's key requirements of  vertical dive bombing and carrying the British torpedo.  At the same time the more powerful Griffon was retained for the very average Firefly.

 

The value of hindsight?  Somewhat, but identifying the reason for failures is what hindsight is for.

[EwenS]

2 hours ago, Graham Boak said:

Unlike every other carrier-operating nation who found means of doing this without the penalties of a high-wing design.  Or indeed all previous biplanes, operated by the FAA or others.  If I simplified the matter for the sake of a slight witticism, it remains true that the high wing was the prime cause of the Barracuda's design failings and that this was at the insistence of the Admiralty.  This insistence was clearly unnecessary.

 

The Barracuda was also underpowered, perhaps thanks to the cancellation of the Exe, or overweight from another point of view.  At least for tropical operation, where the replacement was the Avenger, a  mid-wing aircraft which could meet neither of the Admiralty's key requirements of  vertical dive bombing and carrying the British torpedo.  At the same time the more powerful Griffon was retained for the very average Firefly.

 

The value of hindsight?  Somewhat, but identifying the reason for failures is what hindsight is for.

The Barracuda’s power deficit was not the real source of its problems. If it was the Griffon engined Mk.V would have been the answer. It wasn’t. Look at all the other changes made that combined still didn’t make much of an improvement.

 

 

[Graham Boak]

There we can agree, if not on the "true source".  However, the Mk.V is irrelevant, being too late and thus never properly tested.  Had the Griffon been made available earlier, there'd have been enough power for tropical operations and even getting off the deck of Furious.  However, I think this has strayed too far from the purpose of the thread - do contact me offboard if you want to take it further.

[Dervish]

On 8/10/2023 at 8:22 AM, EwenS said:

Probably not. Gunfire spotting wasn’t part of S.24/37 spec that led to the Barracuda or any of its competitors. Dive bomber / recce and torpedo bomber / recce were. Two things meant the RN favoured a high wing in a monoplane. It is enshrined in the first two parts of the Find, Fix, Strike approach.

 

Find

Both the enemy and the home carrier.

 

Navigating over the sea wasn't easy. Part of the observer’s job was to estimate windspeed periodically to ensure his navigation was as accurate as possible. That meant dropping a smoke float and observing it while the pilot flew a turn at a particular rate IIRC. So the observer still required sight of the ocean surface. And the clearer view of the surface he had the easier it was to spot an enemy in pre-radar days.

 

Fix

Once an enemy had been found the observer required to fix its position to allow the information to be passed back to the fleet. Again that required sight of the surface.

 

Around the time that the Albacore was selected, Fairey worked on a low winged monoplane proposal which did not find favour with the RN. One reason being the observers view. I don’t think it was therefore a coincidence that the various proposals to satisfy S.24/37 all had high mounted wings. Barracuda and Supermarine Type 322 Dumbo that appeared in the metal both did as did mockups from Bristol and Blackburn that occasionally turn up in photos. 

 

The importance of the observer’s view of the ocean was also evident in the bizarre Fleet Shadower designs from GAL and Airspeed to spec S.23/37 around the same period to shadow enemy fleets at night, and again nothing to do with gunfire spotting for the fleet.

 

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Aircraft_Fleet_Shadower

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airspeed_Fleet_Shadower

 

 

Also the Hawker and Westland designs to S.24/37.