Pilot roster and fighter a/c strength 1939

[JackG]

Was looking through 111 Squadron records for the month of October 1939, and I arrive at 21pilots ( plus two that transferred to other squadrons), and 20 Hurricanes:

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D8386262

 

SERIALS

L1548     L1564    L1581     L1589
L1605
L1720    L1730    L1733   L1740    L1741   L1748    L1774
L1820    L1821    L1822 K    L1823    L1889
L1973 L
L2001 B  
N2340 

 

PILOTS
Broadhurst(S/L),  Brown,  Bradford,  Bruce,  Button,  Bury,
Carnall,  Connors,  Copeman,  Craig,
Darwood,  Day,  Dibden**,  Dutton,  Dymon,
Ede,
Ferriss,  
Gunn,
Powell,
Robinson,
Sanders*
Walker,  Wilson

*4th October 1939 Sanders joined 615 Squadron

** shot down while with 73 Sqn 14/05/1940

 

Was this standard for a fighter squadron for the period, or something just peculiar to 111?   I have saved from elsewhere, the norm for 1940 would be 15-20 pilots with 12 operational aircraft plus 2-4 spares?

 

regards,

Jack

 

[Hornet133]

Standard unit establishment for an RAF fighter Squadron throughout the war was 18 aircraft in two flights.  In the RAAF in the Pacific it was 24.

 

But of course there were many cases where there were variations, especially being under 18 in times of heavy action.

Edited January 9, 2020 by Hornet133
more info

[JackG]

Thank you sir, so the standard 12 (two flights of six, further divided into two sections composed of 2-3 aircraft per section) was due to the circumstances of 1940.

 

regards,

Jack

Edited January 10, 2020 by JackG

[Hornet133]

You are correct, it was based on sections of 3 and never modified. 

 

 

[mhaselden]

IIRC the "standard" aircraft complement for fighter squadrons was 12 "Initial Equipment" and 6 "Immediate Reserve" airframes.  The number of pilots is driven by the need to provide squadron-level strength while allowing for leave, rest days etc....plus it's easier to replace aircraft than pilots.

[Work In Progress]

Correct: you were supposed to be able to put up 12, but you can never do that on a sustained basis if 12 is all you have on strength, you always plan on the basis that some of your squadron strength will be off the line for maintenance or repair at any given time, or just spare.

[gingerbob]

I thought standard was more like 16 and 2, but there were times when the "standard" complement for certain types was temporarily increased- one example is spring '41 for cannon-equipped Spitfires, because they were having so much trouble with cannon reliability.  At any rate, some fluctuation around a total of about 20 is fairly typical.  As for pilots, can't say- I think rather more than the number of aircraft, usually.

[Smithy]

At the beginning of the war so the period you are interested in the number of aircraft for a fighter squadron within Fighter Command was set at 14 to 16 aircraft. This had been mandated under Expansion Scheme L approved by the Cabinet on 27th April 1938.

[Graham Boak]

If you fly with 3 aircraft sections, then 12 aircraft makes sense.  Once switching to 4 aircraft sections, then 16 is required.  Either way, 2 spares will cover those in overhaul etc, but will not be enough to cover the normal run of unserviceability.  I seem to recall that 80% can be considered a useful guide there.  Which suggests a total of 18 to support operations with 12.  This is perhaps including an element of realism lacking in prewar planning.

 

Not known to me is whether the actual operations at squadron strength ( by no means every mission) would require 3 sections of four aircraft later in the war or four sections.  The latter would require a larger establishment.  That various comments suggest that both flights were not necessarily on duty simultaneously suggest that 12 operational aircraft may have been considered normal despite an apparent mismatch between ground organisation (2x2x4) and operational (3x4).  However the increase in size of the squadrons later in the war may suggest that more than 12 was expected at times.

 

In practice, and across theatres and years, actual practice probably did vary considerably even away from times of high stress and material shortage.

 

I would agree that pilot strength would need to be 150% of aircraft strength.

[JackG]

Thank you everyone for the replies, really appreciate the knowledge presented here.   The question was posed to confirm numbers for the period of 1939, but also to act as a backdrop on how to figure out a particular individual fuselage code.

 

Looking at air frame N2340, it appears to have been the 20th Hurricane delivered to 111 Squadron.  Possibly, though not definite, it may have been assigned the twentieth letter of the alphabet - 'T' ?  

 

I think the above is probably the most straight forward of guesses, it certainly may not have been the 20th aircraft either.   The online source providing serials only starts with October 1939,  but 111 Sqn. began receiving Hurricanes in January of 1938.   So what are the odds during the course of 22 months, that not a single one of it's inventory of 20 Hurricanes were ever replaced?

 

regards,

Jack

[Work In Progress]

Zero. Their 1938 Hurricane write-offs were (excluding any I haven't found) -

 

L1556 destroyed 1 Feb 1938

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/14914

 

L1551, destroyed 19 May 1938

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/14909

 

L1550, destroyed 14 July 1938

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/14908

 

L1549, destroyed 20 July 1938

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/14907

 

L1553, destroyed 6 Oct 1938

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/14911

Edited January 10, 2020 by Work In Progress

[FatFlyHalf]

8 hours ago, Smithy said:

At the beginning of the war so the period you are interested in the number of aircraft for a fighter squadron within Fighter Command was set at 14 to 16 aircraft. This had been mandated under Expansion Scheme L approved by the Cabinet on 27th April 1938.

Do you have some any faith that what a UK government cabinet said should be, would actually be done?

But that was then, this is now.

 

[Smithy]

13 minutes ago, FatFlyHalf said:

Do you have some any faith that what a UK government cabinet said should be, would actually be done?

But that was then, this is now.

 

 

Yes because the outcomes of the Expansion Schemes were things that the AM wanted to have happen and implemented into their regulations. The Expansion Schemes were not external to the AM (they were developed by the AM) but unlike things such as camouflage development, tactical revisions, etc which could be passed internally and put into AM regulations without wider governmental approval, all things pertaining to the Expansion Schemes had to be passed by Cabinet first (for the simple fact that these recommendations required extra government funding and monies).

[Peter Roberts]

In 1939 RAF Squadrons were operating as four sections of 3 aircraft, typically split into two Flights, hence 12 aircraft would be standard commitment.

 

As pointed out above, the Squadron would also have spare aircraft to cover routine maintenance or unexpected repairs. Full strength would vary based on crashes and write-offs and speed of replenishment.

 

 

[Graham Boak]

During the Battle of Britain, replenishment was overnight.  Except perhaps for squadrons withdrawn from the frontline to rebuild.

[vildebeest]

I was by chance reading Michael Bowyer, Interceptor Fighters of the RAF last night and he gives the following figures as at 3 September 1939

 

30 single seat fighter squadrons

Mandated strength per squadron, 16 Initial Equipment, 5 reserve, so 21/squadron

Actual numbers, 570, so 19/sqn on average

Pilots - 659, so 22/sqn average.

 

Paul