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On ‎9‎/‎27‎/‎2019 at 2:48 PM, NoSG0 said:

How are you supposed to recognize the activation of a system that you were not told about? 

Exactly Its unbelievable . What I said on post 37 back in March

 

"From what I've read there doesn't seem to be any info passed to crews that the software will do things their previous 737 didn't , flick switch on checklist and forget . So what were the pilots expected to do when everything they did produced a different reaction to the 737 NG or any other planes they'd flown ? It's unbelievable what Boeing has done , it's so far away from flight safety for a manufacturer as you can get. "

 

Add a second sensor ( and I think an MCAS operating warning light) as an $80,000 option to go with that .

If it was in a film we'd all be moaning about the lack of accuracy

Edited by bzn20

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On ‎9‎/‎29‎/‎2019 at 6:44 PM, NoSG0 said:

Long article. You can read or listen

Thank you NoSGO . Good insight , if not downright scary way to carry on . Running that company by the seat of their collective Silk suit trousers ......…

 

and hope it doesn't rain

 

I actually found enough time to read all of it. What a bunch of ************ . Very hard to see a way out of this whole MAX / MCAS thing .

 

I came across the new way of aircraft building .

First was the Lockheed Tristar. Components farmed out to tiny companies and fed in to the Factory Hub for the production line . I was on a 10 ship BA Tristar refit and D check at Marshalls , Cambridge  . I had stacks of extrusions L  and T sections mostly . They bought in the basic extrusion and then milled it to Lockheed drawing specs. I had items with the radius cut into, deep swirls where the cutter started to pick up . In other words sudden change in cross section that wasn't on the drawing . I had the run of a complete Lockheed Tristar drawing bank to check the bits I had off against what Lockheed designed . I was scrapping quite a bit of the stock coming in . I asked the Lockheed rep , Canadian and really good bloke , what the hell was going on with this bad workmanship and still passed by Quality Control back in California ? He told me that some were no more than Mom and Pop shops with a couple of other people . Some were Mexican "Wet backs" ( his words AKA Illegal immigrants) in glorified garages , sheds kind of thing with no more than a miller  pillar drill and a couple of benches . Looking at what you're holding there (some extrusion ) and seeing that drawing , QA has gone out the window ! 

And even over here ...

BAe .. I was on a BAe management course and my manager took a few classes . He was going on about bidding for work , winning the contract and then farm it out for less money than we are getting paid . Make a profit for doing nothing more than working on a bid ! What about the workforce ? What do they do if you sub contract it ? They could be out of a job . He told me You're not getting it . We are here to make money . How we make it doesn't matter ! We were sub contracting VC10 bits down in Surrey and not back at the BAe factory at Woodford or Chadderton . The BAe workforce were getting nothing .

 

Hope it doesn't rain ? It's a full on Monsoon now . no Umbrella in sight .

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Like you @bzn20 I found that down right scary, the contrast between the 777 done before the ex Lockheed management & production practices were introduced & the 787 done afterwards was chilling, I think I'd rather fly on someones A350s than the local airlines 787s after reading that, but then, what do we know of what goes into the A350s? :unsure:

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Posted (edited)

My post 40 in March

It should have a back up sensor ,maybe 3 in total would be better . Then like some Autopilot systems that have 3 streams of info and if one drops it's out voted by the  other 2 all done automatically . Hope that's not confusing ,bit difficult to describe . have 2 out of action would be unusual ,3 is belts and braces 

 

VC10 from  design and not a knee jerk to everything going wrong . This was before the 1962 first flight , it has  3 streams and agreement between the three give the system a decision , voting for the correct action ,dropping one stream if it doesn't agree with the other 2 . This was/is the correct way to do things and not hide a complete system because they used "smoke and mirrors" to contrive a non system .  The deeper they dig or find complaints inside Boeing the dirtier it all looks .

 

Then the US hit Europe with a trade tariff ,some of it landing in Airbus laps , mainly for the EU subsidies . Probably is but Boeing can't get orders for the MAX . They'll pay extra for the Airbus NEo that is the threat to the MAX .

Europe his going to counter this by claiming there are US subsidies to the US Aircraft industry . Which has been going on in some way or another forever . If the USAF hadn't gone in for the C-135 family to the tune of 800 airframes …. How much would the unit cost of a 707 and 720 be ?  The early development work was all done for the USAF with a 700 + 707 programme . Albeit a different aeroplane to the 135 family  ,the basics are the same ,saved time and heartache =MONEY . It could be looked on as being sharp and nothing else but a 707 would have been more expensive without the -135s .

The earl/mid 60s CX competition that the C-5 Galaxy won .  Boeing (and Douglas  BTW ) had a design with not much hope of winning but all that development money and big jet design experience was the leap they needed to start the 747 programme . Paid for by the US tax payers , not a subsidy ?

Source  . The Boeing 747 instructors on the first BOAC courses at Boeing in Seattle were telling the "classes" in 1969 , my dad was on the 747 course . 

 

Dodgy dealings with Southwest is something else

 

Part of that link that NoSG0 put up

The story of the secrecy begins with the universally beloved, unusually labor-friendly, strangely not-evil Southwest Airlines. (When the carrier’s beloved co-founder Herb Kelleher died in January, Ralph Nader wrote a fawning obituary about the old friend, a “many splendored human being,” who had founded his favorite airline; Nader would soon lose a grandniece to MCAS.) On something of a lark, Boeing had given Kelleher a sweet no-money-down deal on his first four 737s in 1971, and Kelleher repaid the favor by buying more than 1,000 737s over the next 50 years—and zero of any other plane. According to a recent lawsuit against Southwest and Boeing, the airline had rewarded this loyalty with an unwritten but zealously enforced “handshake” agreement, dating back to the 1990s, that Boeing would not sell any planes for less than Southwest was paying, or Boeing would send Southwest a rebate check. And in exchange for that guarantee, Southwest reliably swooped in with big orders and/or accelerated payments after accidents, stock price plunges, or both; the same lawsuit claims that, after September 11, the airline formed an off–balance-sheet slush fund to bail out Boeing during unanticipated shortfalls, and lent other airlines its own planes when Boeing production fell behind, all while it waited patiently for its order deliveries to be filled at a time when it was convenient for Boeing. As the carriers became more profitable in the twenty-first century, more of them followed Southwest’s lead and helped Boeing make its numbers, with United Airlines and Alaska Airlines pitching in during fourth-quarter 2015, alongside Southwest, to make payments not due until 2016. Those partnerships were but one numbers-smoothing mechanism in a diversified tool kit Boeing had assembled over the previous generation for making its complex and volatile business more palatable to Wall Street, and while not entirely kosher and not at all sustainable, they were by far the least destructive tool in the kit—until Southwest called in the favor on its orders for the MAX.


Southwest always had a lot to say about projected modifications to the 737, and Kelleher’s team mostly wanted as few technical modifications as possible. With the MAX, they upped the ante: According to Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing employee, Boeing agreed to rebate Southwest $1 million for every MAX it bought, if the FAA required level-D simulator training for the carrier’s pilots.


To whoever agreed to this, the rebate probably seemed like a predictably quixotic demand of the airline that had quixotically chosen to fly just one plane model, exclusively and eternally, where every other airline flew ten. Simulator training for Southwest’s 9,000 pilots would have been a pain, but hardly ruinous; aviation industry analyst Kit Darby said it would cost about $2,000 a head. It was also unlikely: The FAA had three levels of “differences” training that wouldn’t have necessarily required simulators. But the No Sim Edict would haunt the program; it basically required any change significant enough for designers to worry about to be concealed, suppressed, or relegated to a footnote that would then be redacted from the final version of the MAX. And that was a predicament, because for every other airline buying the MAX, the selling point was a major difference from the last generation of 737: unprecedented fuel efficiency in line with the new Airbus A320neo.

 

What is this ? Not subsidies but a technical bribe to buy and the start of a horror show . You put in a big order , nobody will pay less than your good and loyal selves and we'll give you a  $1Million per MAX airframe cashback and keep it simple for you . The rest of the world is following like sheep and not a clue what they're signing up for and getting themselves into .

Neither did the Pilots

 

Edited by bzn20

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Posted (edited)

Dunno if this should be it's own topic:

 

Cracks found in 737NG pickle forks. AD issued for inspections, hopefully nothing serious.  I think I understand that the fix is a crack stop/drilled hole.

 

https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10585675

 

Edit: I thought the approved fix was drilled hole, but I think I misread.  Approved repair, whatever that is. v I'd be curious to see what they have to do.

 

Edited by NoSG0

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Posted (edited)
16 hours ago, NoSG0 said:

pickle forks

These are the at the wing join up to fuselage and must be Primary structure . Stop drilling ? Not sure about that but nothing would surprise me . Thing is , you have to drill just after the crack end ( so small and hard to see and probably catch the crack ) And predict the path it's going to take . I've seen stop drill attempts where the crack has run off at an angle and bypassed the stop drill ! Subsequent stop drill failures as the crack wouldn't play ball again and again ending up with 5 or 6 stop drills and a longer crack on a meander like the Thames in London . Stop drills are as small as 1/16th" (1.6 mm) so not much leeway in getting it right or wrong . Too big and the structure is weaker .

As I said this must be Primary structure as it's tying the wing root to the fuselage so a dodgy way to carry on , can't afford a failure of primary structure .

 

I just read that piece . Changing machined Billet for forged to save waste Alu alloy is a cop out . Machined Billet is as strong as you can get as opposed to forged . VC10 , BAC 1-11 and Boeings first (747) used Billet and the waste at Boeings was moved along a "river" of oil ( much like Boeing's original logging business and the way they moved logs through water ) The swarf is then collected and goes for recycling . They got money from it . Vickers who used weird alloys did nothing like that system but went to the smelters . Probably got money from that too.

When I say waste its up to 90% waste on some structure but left with a stronger component .

 

The VC10 has a massive amount of  Billet , Wing box, Torque Box , Fin and fuse Primary structure . On the other hand 707/720 - 737 wing skins were sheet Alu and riveted stringers. fuse is thin skinned sheet, could push the skin in with a finger.

Edited by bzn20

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Posted (edited)

I remember a friend in the paper industry telling me about pre consumer and post consumer recycling.  If a huge roll of paper broke/snapped/tore before whatever they were making was completed the remainder went back for processing.

 

I think that when this first started they found 3 out of 15 inspected aircraft with a crack or cracks?  I wonder what the failure rate is between machined and forging is?

 

This post is interesting. The poster is involved in cracked forging inspection, but not on the 737.  So what IS the *Approved Repair*?

https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10588544

 

Edit: I wonder if we will ever see 3D printed parts like this? Typos.

Edited by NoSG0

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3 hours ago, NoSG0 said:

I wonder if we will ever see 3D printed parts like this?

Parts like a primary structure piece are probably some way off but 3D printed parts are already in existence and development. At the Farnborough Air Show last year I was totally fascinated by GE’s additive manufacturing machine in their chalet. 

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On ‎10‎/‎7‎/‎2019 at 2:16 PM, NoSG0 said:

So what IS the *Approved Repair*?

Can't imagine . It's Primary Structure so in the most important structure group . Any repair is going to be around the outside  of it so what's happening inside the "fork" ? Looks like it's going to need a replacement "fork" and a "fork" re design and / or possible new material spec or it comes back at you again and again . As a general rule …. in Primary not allowed cracking  , worn beyond limits, corrosion removed beyond limits , damage beyond limits as laid down in the aircraft's repair manual in any structure . That manual also has repair schemes and methods .

Further to that if info isn't in the repair manual for that particular part /area/item , go to the Aircraft ( In this case Boeing) company Rep for further instructions. They liaise with company direct for any repair schemes and advice . That all filters down to Eng control through the magic of a switched on industry .

 

Although I'm having doubts about how switched on it is now with this MAX disaster .

 

Two other types of structure … Secondary and Tertiary . Primary is shown as Red on structure diagrams , Secondary is Yellow and Tertiary ,Green .

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Posted (edited)

As per a post on on PPRUNE, the AD is preliminary.  It will help identify the numbers of affected aircraft.  So far 25.  There go the picklefork spares that were in stock.

 

Leeham news article: Perhaps the winglets may have been a cause as well?

 

https://leehamnews.com/2019/10/08/boeings-737-in-another-pickle-part-2/#more-31313

 

Edited by NoSG0

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56 minutes ago, NoSG0 said:

There go the picklefork spares that were in stock

Spares in stock? Ha! Not in the lean mean supply machine that is modern aerospace. I would expect the lead times for a part like this to be ridiculously long, even for a minor part lead times can often be in excess of six months - at least in my field.  

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4 hours ago, Rickoshea52 said:

six months

That's a bit heavy . In 1991 the VC10 Y beam (20 feet ish long and 4-5 inches wide like a T section but a bit Y shaped as the nick name implies ) that had never been changed on any VC10 anywhere  and had a Mat Spec change as original Mat Spec wasn't made anymore anywhere was only 6 months for the Billet material ( in Scotland of all places) and the milling another month ish (depending on Haggis and single malt supplies we joked at the time) . Can't believe an in service prolific seller has that lead time .

 

But nothing would surprise me on this thread , not anymore .

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JATR report 70+ pages.

https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submittal_to_FAA_Oct_2019.pdf  

 

FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet's anti-stall system: JATR findings

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-report-idUSKBN1WQ0H8

 

The back and forth on PPRune and  A.net is as expected.

 

 

Edited by NoSG0

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MH,

 

I believe that they are still being built at a slower pace.

 

Forkner is also the fellow that wrote to the FAA and asked that mention of MCAS NOT be included in the manuals.  And we all know that (Sarcasm alert) He would have chosen to do that on his own without upper management approval.

 

https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10598096

 

So what has grandfathered on the new 777 coming out?  Any "Oh we do not need to include that in the manual cause it will just confuse the poor dears" ?

Edited by NoSG0

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This should be followed up for accuracy.  I can not believe what I read just now.

 

https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&sid=419afe8a61224a5266b869c9853d70c6&start=1050#p21734807

 

"FAA representatives were present during a test flight when an MCAS problem occurred, according to a regulatory source, but approved the MAX without independently studying or testing the flight system.

Instead, regulators deferred on key aspects of certification to Boeing, allowed under a congressionally-mandated program begun in 2005 while the FAA faced budget pressure."

 

Someone from the FAA saw this and gave the ball back to Boeing?!?!?!?!

 

 

 

Edited by NoSG0

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54 minutes ago, bentwaters81tfw said:

Boeing kick out chief exec.

Kick?? 

Oh I think he's gonna be comfortable enough on landing. 

I wouldn't expect him to be down the Jobcentre next week. 

 

There's going to be more smirking white executive-class hi-rollers evicted before this is over, but they'll be as hard up as Tony Blair or Hilary Clinton 

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The more that is revealed of this story, the worse the story becomes. If it was the plot line in an aviation based novel, "The High & the Mighty"?, we'd be tempted to dismiss it as unrealistic with overdrawn characterisations. :(

Speaking of books, this whole sorry saga will make an interesting read when it is done & dusted. I imagine there will be a number to choose from.

Steve.

Edited by stevehnz

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Agreed, rob Lyttle. Seven or eight digit golden parachute makes such proceedings considerably less painful. Oh well, even being a scapegoat is not what it used to be. I am not sharing your optimism about a high casualty rate among CEOs over this case, though.

Steve, I would chuck a book with such a silly plot in a bin immediately. I just cannot swallow a new normal that is being shoved down our throats. However, I suspect many would read it with interest. Cheers

Jure

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The plot reminds me more of Neville Shute's "No Highway".

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Can we please be careful with our words in this thread as some bad taste is creeping in.

 

Thx

 

Julien

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