The 'Stuff You Wouldn't Want To Go To War In' GB

[SleeperService]

I think the Whitley suffered from the same issue the Blenheim did. At a time when the RAF fighter Squadrons were re-equipping with biplanes barely faster than the previous model the specs were written and the designs offered without considering the Bf109 and similar elsewhere. Once they were ordered and the Hurricane and Spitfire were on the horizon a sane individual would have got a more realistic specification issued for a replacement and instigated a search for ways to make the best of what they were going to get in the meantime. When this did happen it was far too late.

 

I think either aircraft in early war bomber service would be acceptable, the Wellington was a near-contemporary design but it's immense strength meant it was more likely to survive events the other two couldn't, it was also a little more capable because of being a bit later. In Coastal Command service the Whitley was generally regarded well as was the B-17. Using Blenheims as nuisance raiders may have been a better idea.    

[vppelt68]

Finnish AF used Blenheims as front line photo recce a/c as late as 1944... Talk about obsolete compared to La-5:s and Yak:s!

[Churchill]

From the Backroom Boys book mentioned by @Pete in Lincs :

 

"airmen still speak highly of the Wellington and even the Stirling, but the Whitley appears to have had few friends." 

"He flew the Whitley bomber, which had a crew of five. Crews called it ‘the flying coffin’, because of its shape and its peculiar flying attitude, nose down. When it was flown in action the losses it suffered gave the nickname a bitter flavour." 

"In fact on my operational sorties on Whitley aircraft I only had one trip that worked perfectly, where I had no problems at all." 

"[The Halifaxes] were much better than the Whitley which was a slow old thing, flew along with its nose down. You felt very exposed because you were going so slowly. You could see the flak following you up and think that’s bound to catch you – you see it start behind and keep bursting nearer and nearer. That’s going to get me soon!"

 

 

[Pete in Lincs]

Thanks for the invite, but I have a stack of builds already in the pipeline and not enough hours in the day!

[Churchill]

So Bomber Harris said that the Halifax was a "deplorable product [not] worthy for war or fit to meet those jeopardies which confront our gallant crews" but one airman who flew both said that the Whitley was worse. 

 

I think Mr @Jabba's Whitley is in. 

[Giorgio N]

There's no doubt that the Whitley and the Blenheim were obsolescent at the start of WW2, not necessarily because of design faults but the fast progress of those days made them easy targets for the enemy fighters. The losses suffered by these types confirm it... but looking at statistics we must be very cautious.

The Lancaster suffered less losses than older types by a very good margin but it would be interesting to compare these losses in the same timeframe. Missions conducted in 1941 with German defences starting over France were different from missions in 1945 when the bombers had relatively short sections of their routes over enemy territory. One thing is being spotted not far from the target, one find is being tracked all the way from the Channel.

Really there was only one aircraft serving in Bomber Command that I'd have been relatively happy to fly in: the Mosquito ! This suffered very light losses compared to all heavier types, thanks in part to the kind of mission profiles used and in part to the fact of being a very, very good aircraft

 

PS to be honest I'd not rely on any comment made by Harris to determine if a type was good or not... the man had many merits but was known to happily twist facts to suit whatever his agenda of the moment was

Edited March 11, 2019 by Giorgio N

[Giorgio N]

On 3/10/2019 at 8:13 AM, Peter Lloyd said:

 

 

 

An additional tidbit on the F-104G, from Bill Gunston's Supersonic Fighters of the West:

 

"(Loss rates of up to 139 aircraft per 100,000 hours are) unacceptable in peacetime, though it may be encountered when a nation is in the final phases of losing a war.  The F-104G, Germany's double key to military strength and reborn industrial capability. became known as the Flying Coffin, the Widow Maker, and other unkind names. An American rival published a brochure picturing the families of all the dead F-104G pilots.  Sick jokes arose by the score- for example, the Luftwaffe's definition of an optimist was 'a Starfighter pilot who gives up smoking because he is afraid of dying of lung cancer'.  Pilots were found taking sedative drugs, and others were court-martialled for refusing to fly.  After his court martial one former F-104 jock sued the defence minister, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, for wrongful dismissal.  Von Hassel became personally identified with the Starfighter in a way that Strauss, who was the minister responsible for buying it, had avoided.  By 1967 von Hassel had become the object of bitter attack by millions of Germans; in 1970 he lost his own son in a Starfighter crash".

 

It may be worth looking at a few other figures to understand the matter of the 139 losses per 100,000 hours, for example here:

 

http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_fighters/f104_17.html

 

Regarding losses in general, here are some statistics for USAAF WW2 fighters

P-38: 75

P-39: 109

P-40: 51

P-47: 47

P-51: 46

P-63: 57

 

These are accidents that led to the total loss of the aircraft "measured" in losses per 100,000 hours. They are for aircraft in the Continental US only, so none of these accidents had anything to do with any enemy action. They include accidents caused by pilots during training and other activities and accidents caused by mechanical problems. They are the average of all years in WW2 but when looking at yearly accident rates it's clear how during the fast expansion of the USAAF the accident rates were higher for most types, with rates then decreasing toward the end of the war. All data comes from official USAF sources, in particular the USAAF Statistical Digest WW2 published by Controller of the Air Force

 

Same statistics for a few more USAAF types, again all in CONUS and over the same period:

B-29: 17.5

B-17: 9

B-24: 15

B-25: 16

B-26: 30.4

A-20: 60

A-26: 15.7

A-36: 83.7

C-46: 7.8

C-47: 6

C-54: 4.1

 

Now some of the above were aircraft with a bad reputation, for example the B-26 Marauder and this is evident from a loss rate that was almost twice that of the similar B-25. Interestingly when in combat the Marauder didn't fare as bad, showing that while being a difficult aircraft to fly resulted in more accidents, this didn't make it necessarily more vulnerable to enemy action. The B-24 is also often mentioned as a difficult aircraft and the numbers clearly show how the older B-17 was a much safer type. The B-29 developed a reputation as a troublesome aircraft, particularly when it came to engine problems. Of course having 4 engines meant that the loss of one didn't necessarily lead to the loss of the aircraft, and the losses rate was not much higher than the B-24.

What may sound unexpected is the high loss ratio of the A-20, a type that is generally considered a good aircraft much loved by the crews. On the contrary the more complicated A-26 did well for a two-engine type.

Transport types unsurprisingly did pretty well but what can we say about the A-36 apart from the fact that putting a Merlin in place of the Allison was really the best thing to do with the Mustang ?

 

Taking these figures into the scope of the GB, it's clear that some types were safer than others and a pilot would have sure preferred to go to war in a P-51D rather than in a P-39. Many would have also not liked going to war with the dreaded Marauder... even if the service career of these types was overall good ! The P-39 suffered a terrible accident rate but in Soviet hands was a very effective fighter while the Marauder did quite well in service. Should we include any of these types because of their reputation when the reputation is afterall confirmed by these numbers ? Or should we look at the effectiveness as combat machines ?
Not giving answers here, just offering points of discussion

 

[Procopius]

1 hour ago, Giorgio N said:

PS to be honest I'd not rely on any comment made by Harris to determine if a type was good or not... the man had many merits but was known to happily twist facts to suit whatever his agenda of the moment was

I would say the Halifax I, II, and V's flaws were such as to need no hyperbole on the part of Harris. If you read "No Moon Tonight", the antipathy on the part of their crews is quite evident, or one can look at their loss rates compared to the Lancaster (between October-December 1943, the loss rate for Lancasters was 3.5%, as opposed to 5.1% for the Halifax), or the many other unflattering statistics that Bomber Command's Operational Research section compiled on them. In Middlebrook's The Berlin Raids, he notes the abort rate for Lancaster crews was significantly higher when Halifaxes, which generally flew lower and were easier targets for the Nachtjagd, were not present in the bomber stream. However, I understand the interior was quite roomy.

[Peter Lloyd]

This is great stuff Giorgio, I love your posts.  Gunston does use the F-104G story (and the 139/100,000 was for the worst year of service) to highlight how complicated it can get, and he notes the safety of the F-104 in other circumstances.  Another of his books (I don't get a commission!), Plane Talking, discusses the B-26 and the massive training loss rates when new pilots were being encouraged to handle the plane gently.  Apparently they changed the training regime so pilots were shown how to get out of control and then recover, rather than merely trying to avoid trouble.  And that reminds me of the same thing being applied in the Royal Flying Corps from about 1917!

 

All of which highlights your discussion point: when is it the machine itself, rather than the many other factors that might be applicable, training standards being an obvious one?  I would hope for this group build the mods will apply a generous spirit, as at the very least we will not be seeing too many of the 'usual types' in this group build (but aren't Bf109s supposed to have killed over 10,000 pilots or something?).  I hope not just the machine itself, but the time and place might be taken into account.  An Fw190D sounds like a good plane to be in, unless it's one of the many novice pilots lining up for Operation Bodenplatte.  A Hurricane would have been a popular machine in 1940, but to be launched from a CAM ship in the mid-Atlantic... stones like coconuts I reckon.

[JasonC]

1 hour ago, Giorgio N said:

but what can we say about the A-36 apart from the fact that putting a Merlin in place of the Allison was really the best thing to do with the Mustang ?

 

But also possibly due to the mission and training profiles that were being flown by the A-36. One might imagine ground attack and dive bombing practice to be somewhat more dangerous compared with fighter training.

[Churchill]

5 hours ago, Peter Lloyd said:

I would hope for this group build the mods will apply a generous spirit, as at the very least we will not be seeing too many of the 'usual types' in this group build

For the time being I am The Mods, although if this gets through the vote I will most definitely be in need of an experienced co-host or two. 

 

The GB is not an open invitation to build whatever you like, and a couple of ideas have been rejected or asked for further development. But I don't see what purpose would be served by being overly stringent about proposals. As I I've indicated in a post above, I expect buulders to be able to present a reasonably cogent case why they think their proposal is something they wouldn't want to go to war in. I don't expect it to be uncontroversial: this GB, uniquely, involves damning every vehicle presented and there will be those who are willing to defend some of them. That is very welcome too and it's made the thread one of the most informative, entertaining, and sometimes thought-provoking that I've read. 

 

We have already a wonderfully diverse range of proposals, not just in terms of subjects but of modelling techniques and materials too (see the updated post #1). I can't wait to see some of these built. We're here to learn, to give and receive advice and support, and above all to have fun, and in service to those aims I do indeed intend to apply a generous spirit. 

 

KBO, 

 

Churchill. 

[Foxbat]

I could fancy  this with another T-60 (scale to be decided).  Under powered, under armoured, under gunned and with a two man crew which meant the man in the turret was commander/gunner/loader there wasn't much to recommend them to the Russians who had to use them. They were quite popular with the Germans though, maybe because they used them as gun tractors and munitions carriers.

 

Much, much more on this truly terrible tank here: T-60

 

Andy

[Churchill]

42 minutes ago, Foxbat said:

I could fancy  this with another T-60 (scale to be decided).  Under powered, under armoured, under gunned and with a two man crew which meant the man in the turret was commander/gunner/loader there wasn't much to recommend them to the Russians who had to use them. They were quite popular with the Germans though, maybe because they used them as gun tractors and munitions carriers.

 

Much, much more on this truly terrible tank here: T-60

 

Andy

" it was hated by all who had to deal with it – all except the Germans, who found it to be a substandard and underwhelming opponent, and a rather nice ammunition carrier or gun towing tractor, once captured. As a result of its poor armor, substandard armament and sluggish performance, it was more dangerous to its crews than anybody else, earning it the title Bratskaya Mogila na Dovoikh, literally: “a brother’s grave for two.”"

 

" The T-60 was simply dreadful. As a result of the combination of inferior armor, a sub-standard main gun, poor mobility and a two-man crew, it was universally hated by the Soviets. In a meeting with Stalin in 1942, Major-General M.E. Katukov said: “It has only a 20mm gun. In serious combat with armored forces, it just does not have it … To attack in mud or snow is a deadly affair. In the battles around Moscow, we continually had to drag them in tow.”"

 

And then they tried to stick wings on it. 

 

You're in at number 17, Mr Foxbat. 

 

[Peter Lloyd]

The brilliant David Fletcher called his book on British World War II armour (actually I think it just covered the first half of the the war) The Great Tank Scandal, the 'scandal' being that having invented them and deployed the first armoured, combined-arms force, the British went to war with such terrible tanks and failed to improve them.  Of course, in the 1930s parsimony affected many nations, so there were all sorts of 'tankettes' and puny things sent out in 1939.

 

[Churchill]

2 hours ago, Peter Lloyd said:

The brilliant David Fletcher called his book on British World War II armour (actually I think it just covered the first half of the the war) The Great Tank Scandal, the 'scandal' being that having invented them and deployed the first armoured, combined-arms force, the British went to war with such terrible tanks and failed to improve them.  Of course, in the 1930s parsimony affected many nations, so there were all sorts of 'tankettes' and puny things sent out in 1939.

 

I have the impression that in addition to fielding some very mediocre armour, the British were very behind in terms of training, equipping, and organising infantry to work effectively in concert with the tanks. 

[Troy Smith]

15 minutes ago, Churchill said:

I have the impression that in addition to fielding some very mediocre armour, the British were very behind in terms of training, equipping, and organising infantry to work effectively in concert with the tanks. 

well, that can be said for everyone apart from the Germans, if the French had any idea of how to use what they had in 1940,  WW2 would not have happened in the way it did, the Germans gambled on French inertia and command incompetence,  and very successfully so as it turned out.

 

And it took the Soviets some time to use armour effectively.    The US had some shock when first in combat in North Africa.

2 hours ago, Peter Lloyd said:

the British went to war with such terrible tanks and failed to improve them. 

Hmm,  also the ideas of what tanks were for were flawed as well,  infantry and cruiser tanks, the British did improve their tanks,  though painfully slowly,   and the big problem is if what you ask for is wrong....

The US were not much better,  with the tank destroyer concept and tanks.  

In the end British and US armour did improve, and there was a lot of it,  and it should be noted that the Centurion was developed during the war, about to enter service (some were tested in Germany  in 1945) was one of the most successful tanks of the next 30 years.

 

It has been noted that on Youtube there is a 5 worst British tanks,  the Covananter is an interesting example, but there is also the 5 worst foreign tanks, which includes the Jagdtiger.

The deficiencies of German armour are not usually mentioned either...  

 

One aspect of WW2 I find very fascinating is what the ideas were to start with, and what actually worked in practice,   the rise of the fighter-bomber,  the fact that "the bomber did always get through", the obsolescence of the battleship in the face of airpower are a few that spring to mind.

 

In the end it's of note how similar the methods used by all the combatant powers became by the wars end. 

 

 

[Churchill]

1 hour ago, Troy Smith said:

well, that can be said for everyone apart from the Germans, if the French had any idea of how to use what they had in 1940,  WW2 would not have happened in the way it did, the Germans gambled on French inertia and command incompetence,  and very successfully so as it turned out.

 

And it took the Soviets some time to use armour effectively.    The US had some shock when first in combat in North Africa.

Hmm,  also the ideas of what tanks were for were flawed as well,  infantry and cruiser tanks, the British did improve their tanks,  though painfully slowly,   and the big problem is if what you ask for is wrong....

The US were not much better,  with the tank destroyer concept and tanks.  

In the end British and US armour did improve, and there was a lot of it,  and it should be noted that the Centurion was developed during the war, about to enter service (some were tested in Germany  in 1945) was one of the most successful tanks of the next 30 years.

 

It has been noted that on Youtube there is a 5 worst British tanks,  the Covananter is an interesting example, but there is also the 5 worst foreign tanks, which includes the Jagdtiger.

The deficiencies of German armour are not usually mentioned either...  

 

One aspect of WW2 I find very fascinating is what the ideas were to start with, and what actually worked in practice,   the rise of the fighter-bomber,  the fact that "the bomber did always get through", the obsolescence of the battleship in the face of airpower are a few that spring to mind.

 

In the end it's of note how similar the methods used by all the combatant powers became by the wars end. 

 

I've just read that the Covenanter was designed by the LMS railway, who had no experience whatever in armoured vehicles. Perhaps we should be grateful it wasn't steam powered. 

 

I'm not sure that the tank destroyer is such a terrible idea. If an anti-tank gun makes sense, then what's wrong with a self-propelled anti-tank gun with improved protection for the crew? Generally speaking the rationale for individual tank destroyers was often that they could get a bigger and more effective gun in a casemate or similar than they could fit in a rotating turret* and they were a little cheaper, which meant you could put more of them on the battlefield. Wasn't one of the Stugs responsible for more kills than any German tank? And given the choice of taking potshots at a Tiger from a well dug in and camouflaged Achilles with a 17pdr gun or going head-to-head with it in a Churchill, I know which I'd choose. 

 

What does surprise me is how little the opposing sides copied each other's weapons. It's said that at one point Goering, frustrated at the lack of a heavy bomber, threatened to force the German aircraft manufacturers to build Lancasters if they didn't come up with their own design soon - but why didn't he just do it? And why didn't we just build Panzer IV's and Tigers? Was it just national pride? 

 

*I believe one such tank destroyer became obsolete when they did work out how to fit the gun in a rotating turret on the same chassis, so they upgraded it to a tank. Russian, I think, but I can't remember which one. 

[Troy Smith]

3 hours ago, Churchill said:

Perhaps we should be grateful it wasn't steam powered. 

it had a very weird radiator system from the brief watch of the worst tanks video....  so it was nearly steam powered..

 

3 hours ago, Churchill said:

I'm not sure that the tank destroyer is such a terrible idea. If an anti-tank gun makes sense, then what's wrong with a self-propelled anti-tank gun with improved protection for the crew? Generally speaking the rationale for individual tank destroyers was often that they could get a bigger and more effective gun in a casemate or similar than they could fit in a rotating turret* and they were a little cheaper, which meant you could put more of them on the battlefield. Wasn't one of the Stugs responsible for more kills than any German tank? And given the choice of taking potshots at a Tiger from a well dug in and camouflaged Achilles with a 17pdr gun or going head-to-head with it in a Churchill, I know which I'd choose. 

What I meant was the US tank destroyers, like a an M-10, thin armour, open topped fighting compartment,  not a StuG, which IIRC were built in massive numbers,  partly because you could build 3 StuG's  for 2 PZ.IV's and were very effective, but partly because the Germans by then were fighting a defensive battle

 

Fuuny you should mention the Tiger, another book from a similar era to the Great British Tank Scandal (both were in the university library) which detailed the psychological impact of the Tiger, though worth remembering Wittman was killed by a Sherman Firefly. 

this one

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Tiger-Tank-British-View/dp/0112904262

While were are talking about the Fletcher Tank Scandal book, the 2nd book is this one

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Universal-Tank-British-Armour-Second/dp/011290534X

I use the Amazon links as they often have reviews which are useful BTW.

 

a member who seems very up on armour in general is @Das Abteilung  and he maybe able to pitch in some details.

 

I have not read the entire thread very carefully, has the Boulton Paul Defiant been mentioned yet?   That would be a contender I think for this GB criteria?

[Churchill]

17 minutes ago, Troy Smith said:

 

I have not read the entire thread very carefully, has the Boulton Paul Defiant been mentioned yet?   That would be a contender I think for this GB criteria?

I don't believe it has. Were you proposing to build one? 

[Kingsman]

1 hour ago, Troy Smith said:

a member who seems very up on armour in general is @Das Abteilung  and he maybe able to pitch in some details.

Well it's nice to be thought of thus, but this debate is very wide-ranging as regards armour and the answer is neither short nor simple.

 

Covenanter was a poor design in many respects.  By the MkIV, most of the faults had been fixed but by then it was truly obsolete.  But without it, 1800 Crusaders would have been held back from the desert to equip home units and training schools.  So it served a valuable and overlooked purpose.  As did 500 of the equally useless Cavalier and 900 of the slightly less useless Centaur.

 

Yes, the StuG was the most effective tank killer the Germans had once the L/48 gun derived from the PaK 40 was fitted.  Pz III production was curtailed in favour of the StuG III, and when production of the III series stopped the StuG IV appeared.  The StuG IV mounted the same gun as the later PzIV but, as noted, was quicker and cheaper to build.  Such vehicles are less useful in an attack because of the limited traverse but can provide an overwatch fire support capability.  They are suited to the defensive battle operating from prepared positions but must be careful of being outflanked and engaged from beyond their arc of fire.

 

The Archer was an overwatch vehicle in the attack, and the British regarded tank destroyers as an Artillery rather than an Armour asset: a mobile anti-tank gun.  In defence it would be deployed as an anti-tank gun from fixed positions.  The US were really muddled with their tank destroyer concept and it did not survive the war.  Arguments between the Tank Destroyers and Armour stifled the development of more effective tank weapons, although neither deployed the 76mm gun until some time after D Day.  You could not rely on having the right asset available or on call when you needed it, remembering von Moltke's adage that no plan survives contact with the enemy - and that incoming fire always has priority.  Tank destroyers were too lightly protected to be used as tanks, but they often were and suffered badly as a result.  Tanks were too poorly armed to tangle with later German armour but had to anyway.  You didn't stop the battle while you called up the tank destroyers.  That was why the British ended up with the first real MBT in 1945 in Centurion, having finally realised that the Infantry and Cruiser concept was flawed.   The US had one too in the M26 but didn't realise it at the time: they still thought of it as a heavy tank.  But its progeny in the shape of the M60, via M48, M47 and M46, is still in front-line service today as an MBT.

 

There were only about 1350 Tiger Is and less than 2000 Tigers of all species.  Many Allied tank crews who claimed attack by Tigers had actually met Panthers, of which there were about 6500 plus Jagdpanthers.  The Panther's 75mm L/70 gun was just as effective as the Tiger I's gun out to 1000m.  Yet they still planned to put an 88 on it.  The Tiger I could be taken out frontally by the 76mm up to 500m and by the 17pdr at longer ranges.  So the Tiger engagement dance in "Fury" is all wrong.

 

The 2nd most effective AT gun the Allies had behind the 17 pdr was the 6pdr with APDS.  Hence why a proportion of 6pdr Cromwells and Churchills served in NWE.  But the most effective tank destroyer, East and West, was copious tactical air.  20 and 23mm cannon and various rockets.  The British 3" rocket weighed in at 60lbs - the weight of a 5 - 6" artillery shell - and was supersonic when fired from a fast-diving aircraft.  At the least well protected part of a tank.  Despite claims to the contrary by 2 tank units, Wittman may have been taken out by Typhoons: or his disabled tank was attacked from the air later.

 

The Russian tank/tank destroyer mentioned above was probably the T-34/76 and the SU-85.  When the T-34/85 appeared the SU-85 was replaced by the SU-100.  When 100mm-armed tanks appeared with T-54 (post war) the SU-122 appeared.

 

The Sherman could have been significantly improved and there were many experiments along those lines, but it would have meant a significant production hiatus and so only incremental development was done.  Stalin personally forbade any changes to T-34 that would slow production, until the 85mm version appeared in 1944.  During the move of production East of the Urals in 1942, some 5000 or so individual parts were deleted from the design to simplify production.

 

British tank design and production was stymied by our outdated production capabilities and a reliance on face-hardened rather than rolled homogeneous armour (RHA).  Upgrading production capability would have virtually halted production and even Churchill acknowledged that a bad tank was better than no tank.  That situation was not improved until Centurion came along.  Sloped, fully-welded RHA hull no longer built on a frame, cast turret, powerful engine, improved suspension with wide tracks, good gun.  A very much better balance between lethality, survivability and mobility.  Previously we'd had to prioritise one over the others.  The availability of the 600+ BHP Meteor engine changed all that.

[vppelt68]

6 hours ago, Das Abteilung said:

Such vehicles are less useful in an attack because of the limited traverse but can provide an overwatch fire support capability.  They are suited to the defensive battle operating from prepared positions but must be careful of being outflanked and engaged from beyond their arc of fire.

I find this "defect" in assault guns often overestimated. True, when you´re in a narrow sunken lane with a fixed gun pointing forward, you have a -1 modifier, so to speak. But on more open areas, a StuG III would spin on its tracks quicker than a turret would traverse same amount of degrees. It was a short track base (?) chassis and its suspension was sturdy enough to take the punishment. Of course that needed more crew co-operation than a independent turret rotation by the gunner, but even in those the driver could ruin the gunners´ aim by turning the tank at the wrong moment. What I´ve read about Finnish StuG III crews, the co-operation was easy as all were sitting very close to each other, just like in a Ju 88 cockpit. V-P 

[vppelt68]

Well, speaking of "assault guns" and TSYWWTGTWW, you nearly can´t beat this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BT-42! "The BT-42s were used again during the major Soviet offensive in 1944. They were deployed in the defence of Vyborg. In one encounter, a Finnish BT-42 hit a Soviet T-34 18 times, failing even to immobilize the enemy vehicle, as this vehicle's fuses failed to work correctly." A steel coffin, that´s what it was. V-P

P.S. has anyone mentioned the Fairey Battle yet?

[Giorgio N]

15 hours ago, Churchill said:

What does surprise me is how little the opposing sides copied each other's weapons. It's said that at one point Goering, frustrated at the lack of a heavy bomber, threatened to force the German aircraft manufacturers to build Lancasters if they didn't come up with their own design soon - but why didn't he just do it? And why didn't we just build Panzer IV's and Tigers? Was it just national pride? 

 

 

Reverse engineering is something that can work but takes time. The Soviet did so with the B-29, from which they derived the Tu-4 but still took them 2 years from the start of the project to the first flight. This was done mostly in peacetime with a massive deployment of resources under heavy pressure from Stalin himself.

Imagine say Britain doing the same to copy a German tank: of course the complexity would not have been the same as copying a B-29 (that was a very complex aircraft for its days) but what effect would have this had on the overall production ? Would copying the Tiger have been more effective than continuing the development of the existing types ? IMHO this is debatable

Then there's the matter that a certain weapon is designed to fit within a certain doctrine and system. Building a Lancaster copy is good, but what would be the effectiveness of a Lancaster copy if used differently from the way this aircraft was degined to be used ? Had the Luftwaffe decided to reverse-engineer the Lancaster they could have started no earlier than late 1942, supposing they had a lot of resources to throw in the project they'd had protoypes flying sometime in Spring 1944... and then what ? Did Germany have the capability of building thousands of the types and use them in very large formations over Britain in mid 1944 ? Very doubtful. If not employed for massive raids, what advantage would have a Lancaster copy have over say the Ju-88 ?

Italy had no need to copy the Lancaster as they had the Piaggio P-108, an aircraft that while affected by a few problems had good performance and bomb load. A few were used to attack Gibraltar but the results were scarce for one simple reason: sending 4 or 5 heavy bombers in those days had little impact. Sending 4 or 500 was a different story !

In a total war keeping production levels high takes precedence over anything, that also means that the combatants may well decide to send their men to war with inferior weapons since a bad weapon available now is better than a superior weapon maybe available tomorrow. @Das Abteilung great post mentions several instances of this.

The same post also well explains how things were more complicated than may sound and a similar discussion could be made regarding aircraft production.

Said all that, there were a few reverse-engineering programs during WW2 in less strategic areas, for example personal weapons: Japan had a similar program for the US Garand rifle, they built around 250 guns that probed troublesome and were never issued to any unit. In Germany a derivative of the Sten was produced at the end of the war as MP.3008 and around 10,000 were produced.

Speaking of personal weapons, the story of these during WW2 would provide a lot of potential subjects for this GB, but since I can't think of any kit of WW2 guns I doubt that these would have an impact on the GB

 

 

[Peter Lloyd]

I'd like to add to all this without writing a very long post... I'll try!

 

1: On tank-infantry co-operation. The British were hampered by their brigading system so the infantry and tanks remained psychologically divided, whereas in the Panzer Division there was a greater sense of unity.  But still in Normandy infantry battalions that had trained for months with tanks were 'pulled' and replaced with new units (sorry I can't quite remember the example(s), unfamiliar with how to work this way.  The desert fighting was full of examples, it drove Auchinlek nuts that his subordinates seemed helpless to even analyse their failures.  Tank responsibilities being foisted on cavalry regiments immediately before the war, which didn't help, as they'd spent the entire post 1918 period trying to hold back the Tank Corps and maintain the importantance  of the horse.  Rommel's famous quote to a prisoner at Gazala about being handed British regiments one at a time shows what I'm talking about, and that co-operation still wasn't nailed down in mid 1944 is truly amazing.

 

2: On British tank quality. I can forgive Britain's early issues: pacifism (not a bad attribute I reckon) meant there was no real tank engine and all tanks were being designed for economy first and foremost by just one or two designers.  In June 1940 they had to maintain production of obsolete designs.  BUT, in Britain the industrialists were far too powerful (see earlier comments by Harris on Handley-Page), got paid for units produced, and had no incentives to improve either quality or basic design.  The British were far too ready to compromise weapons' effectiveness to meet limiting factors such as railway widths, hangar sizes, runway lengths, and established production techniques (still riveting Cromwell turrets in 1944!).  Churchill was far too friendly toward many of these upper class 'establishment' figures, too reluctant to listen to intelligent front-line soldiers (unless they were proposing some zany scheme to go behind enemy lines).  Complaints about everything from 303 guns in Lancasters to the 2-pdr being useless were wilfully ignored.

 

3: Bad tank and planes are better than no tanks or planes. The oft-heard argument that rubbish had to be built because there was no time to interrupt production (you can often almost hear 'case dismissed!' after this argument is used) has some truth, but very often manufacturers lacked foresight and made much more money by churning out junk in massive amounts.  In the West, industry leaders were far closer to the politicians than were the poor bloody infantry.  In the USSR and Germany, they were imprisoned and threatened with the firing squad.  Take a look at the production periods of things from Wellingtons to Valentines... they were being pumped out long after they were utterly obsolete. We very often find not a grim acceptance that this bad material was a necessary compromise, but rather those on high immersed in the delusion that this stuff was as good as anything on the battlefield.  This is to say nothing of Hawker Henleys, Blackburn Bothas, Bristol Buckinghams, A-W Albermarles... all were wastefully produced in serious numbers. 

 

4. Reverse engineering.  This is a case of the fallacy of hindsight.  Any nation considering reverse engineering an enemy weapon will of course want to produce their own and think they can do this in a timely manner.  It's only with the failure of a major scheme the situation occurs where, in hindsight, it looks like a good idea.  Perhaps the closest major example was the T-34, which was seriously considered for imitation in Germany (they couldn't build the engine though, apparently).  The Daimler entrant for the Panther design competition was very T-34-like, and was smaller and cheaper than the successful design. (I note here the Germans went from a standing start in autumn 1941 to have Panthers available in some numbers by mid-late 1943... by which time the British had managed to get a 6pdr in the Crusader!).  One thing that really should have been reverse engineered was the Japanese Zero!

 

Dammit, that's a long post.

[vppelt68]

Wasn´t British tank design back then cemented on load gauge and weight restrictions of the rail system?