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Is there a good book on the conflict between Handley-Page and Arthur Harris?


Procopius

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I think it's reasonably common knowledge that Arthur Harris disliked both the Handley-Page Halifax and Sir Frederick Handley-Page, but I was wondering, has anyone written a book specifically on their disputes, or a biography of either man that covers it in a reasonably comprehensive and balanced way? Thanks in advance for your help!

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Harris had no time for anything but the Lancaster and, as a man accustomed to expressing himself in black and white rather than shades of grey, it seems that he probably felt much the same about both of the other two.  I have wondered whether some of the comments credited to him about the Halifax actually seemed to belong even more to the Stirling, and therefore had been misreported, but that could be my own biases showing.  

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9 hours ago, Procopius said:

I think it's reasonably common knowledge that Arthur Harris disliked both the Handley-Page Halifax and Sir Frederick Handley-Page, but I was wondering, has anyone written a book specifically on their disputes, or a biography of either man that covers it in a reasonably comprehensive and balanced way? Thanks in advance for your help!

A book you might find of related interest is Halifax, Second to None

https://www.amazon.com/Halifax-Second-Victor-F-Bingham/dp/0906393663

which as you can gather from the title, states the Halifax's case,  specifically it actually fulfilled the AM specification better than the Lancaster, which was a specialist bomb carrier,  which is basically correct.

I  think there is some of the Harris vs Fredrick HP conflict  as well. 

As what was needed for what Harris took as his job was a specialist bomb carrier, you can see why he disliked the more general types. 

One grim fact about Lancasters, they had low crew survival rated when hit, IIRC 11% in Lancasters, 35% in the Halifax,  

I'm now being tasked with reading the Moomin's so I'm not about to go data chasing,   I'm wondering now if i can pretend the book is the Moomins guide to  area bombing? 

 

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The Halifax main spar was equally obstructive, but the escape hatches were better placed.  Despite being an ex-HP employee, and preferring the Halifax to the Lancaster as a modelling subject, it has to be said that the Lancaster was not just a bomb truck.  It could have done the more varied work that the Halifax did, had it not been better at the bomb-carrying business. This is because it was an important part-generation later in design, particularly with regard to engine placement and cooling systems.  Also having a deeper bomb bay with a bigger wing.  The Halifax did the more varied jobs because it was there first and could be spared more easily.

 

To my taste Bingham over-eggs it. The best Halifax book is Ken Merrick's Halifax: From Hell to Victory and Beyond.  The second best is his earlier attempt at the subject.

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On 12/28/2018 at 3:54 PM, Ossington said:

I didn't know of any animosity regarding Halifaxes, other than failure to improve known issues quick enough but he certainly had no time for the Stirling, or Shorts.  

 

"[Sir Frederick Handley-Page is a]lways weeping crocodile tears in my house and office, smarming his unconvincing assurances all over me and leaving me with a mounting certainty that nothing whatever ponderable is being done to make his deplorable product worthy for war or fit to meet those jeopardies which confront our gallant crews. Nothing will be done until H.-P. and his gang are kicked out, lock, stock and barrel. Trivialities are all they are attempting at present, with the deliberate intent of postponing the main issue until we are irretrievably committed…Unless we can get these two vital factors [the Halifax and Stirling] of the heavy bomber programme put right, and with miraculous despatch, we are sunk. We cannot do this by polite negotiation with these crooks and incompetents. In Russia it would long ago have been arranged with a gun, and to that extent I am a fervid Communist!"

 

-- Arthur Harris to Archibald Sinclair, 30 December 1942 [In the same letter, he referred to one of the Short brothers as an incompetent drunk.]

 

"All past experiences with the Handley Page concern have long ago convinced me that none of their promises will ever materialise and that all their swans are ducks – or sparrows. But whatever improvements to be expected from the new tail [of the Halifax] the lack of ceiling of the aircraft is a fatal bar to its long continued use in the front line."

 

-- Arthur Harris to Wilfrid Freeman, 8 September 1943

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Shorts were nationalised during WW2  because of their poor management, so there's some justification in his comments there.  However HP weren't, so draw whatever conclusion you might from that. 

 

Harris liked to have what he wanted immediately (who doesn't?) but never seemed aware of the inertias involved in making major changes in designs once they had been set into mass production.  Given his tirades against diversions of even small numbers away from Bomber Commands, the cost in lost production of making the kind of improvements demanded by Harris would have inspired yet another tirade!

 

HP did offer changes that would go some way to improve the Halifax's drawbacks, such as the deeper bomb bay that became the belly pannier (rejected by the Air  Ministry) and  did some strengthening of the wing,  but any major change in the latter would have severely hit production and that suggestion was rejected too.  As was the B Mk.2 series ii with lowered nacelles and improved cooling with Merlin 22s, and the Mk. IV with high altitude Merlin 60s.  

 

Clearly HP put in a lot of effort to improve the HalIfax, unlike Shorts and the Stirling.  However the Stirling's problems were more deeply embedded in the early configuration, but that is another story.

 

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He wanted lots of things, some more reasonable than others, but in that particular case there was nothing the airframe manufacturers could do, for it wasn't in their hands.  The initial armament decision was long in the past, the 0.5 guns were not available in sufficient numbers until late (when they did start appearing in BC) and the problems of a twin 20mm turret were just too difficult for a rapid production solution.  Engineering problems take time, and setting up for production even more.  

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12 minutes ago, Ossington said:

I appreciate his frustration. He wanted turreted .5's or 20mm throughout his command but had to wait for the Lincoln and Shackleton to get them  

to be a smart bottom, at least a few Lancs got the Rose Rice tail turret fitted...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_turret

turretreplacement.jpg

 

from the Nightbombers film....   

https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0001GNJK6

 

Posted partly for the novelty of the colour photo,  though this is a still from the film linked...

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Other BC uses of the 0.5 include the Martin dorsal turret on Lancaster Mk.VIIs, the Preston Green ventral position on the Halifax, the FN20 and BP Type D tail turrets.  Also Coastal Command used them fire suppression when attacking U-boats on Halifaxes and Sunderlands.  But these are all late and add up to fairly small numbers of guns compared with the size of Bomber Command.

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Interesting comments on an interesting topic. This rather confirms my  pre-existing view of Harris as a rather unpleasant character of possibly limited intellect - but great determination of course. Also disappointingly limited in his understanding of engineering it seems - and evidently also of manufacturing limitations.

 

It has always amazed me that he was allowed to behave in such an imperial fashion; his reluctance and indeed quite deliberate obstructionism when it came to supplying any long range aircraft for Coastal Command was clearly bad for the overall war effort. Given the real risk of our losing the war due to the Atlantic losses to U-boats, I wonder why  Churchill didn't step in and lay down the law. Possibly his bloody mindedness meant too many people were afraid of him?

 

 

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  • 2 weeks later...
2 minutes ago, John B (Sc) said:

I don't think the CIGS felt Auchinleck had to go, but Churchill did.

"It is very exhausting, this continual protecting of Auchinleck, especially as I have not got the highest opinion of him!"

 

-- Alan Brooke, diary entry for 24 March 1941. 

 

Brooke initially felt Auchinleck was a good general, but came to believe he was so poor at selecting subordinates (Dorrien-Smith, Corbett, et al) that he was disqualified from the ranks of great captains. His greater fear was that Churchill would replace him with Lord Gort or some other officer he had even less confidence in. 

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  • 2 weeks later...

Thanks Procopius.  Re-reading 'The Alanbrooke War Diaries'  by Arthur Bryant was instructive, as was 'Auchinleck, the Lonely Soldier by Warner. - I had forgotten that. 

 

Auchinleck did seem to be rather unfortunate in his selection of subordinate commanders, though it seemed to me that Neil Ritchie was possibly the one who disappointed most. Auchinleck was however the general who first led the Eighth Army to victory, stopping Rommel at First Alamein

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On 30/12/2018 at 15:43, Procopius said:

Thanks PC very interesting article. This could be an expensive topic for me, already had the Merrick book but based on some of the recommendations above today I ordered a copy of Halifax: Second To None and a copy of Reap The Whirlwind. Must hide that package from SWIMBO especially as I picked up another two books from the same supplier!

Edited by Harley John
Trying to make my english make sense.
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On 1/26/2019 at 12:41 PM, John B (Sc) said:

Auchinleck was however the general who first led the Eighth Army to victory, stopping Rommel at First Alamein

"Ne ego si iterum eodem modo uicero, sine ullo milite Epirum reuertar." (I actually like The Auk a lot, though he had a rough war; Air Marshall Peirse eloping with his wife must have really taken the biscuit.)

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On 1/28/2019 at 10:48 PM, Procopius said:

"Ne ego si iterum eodem modo uicero, sine ullo milite Epirum reuertar." (I actually like The Auk a lot, though he had a rough war; Air Marshall Peirse eloping with his wife must have really taken the biscuit.)

 

Pyrrhic indeed, though I believe the Auk was quite philosophical about it.  He was unimpressed, shall we say, about Montgomery's twisting of the facts later, to Churchill and to the press.  (Montgomery was making nasty comments about the Auk when serving under him in 1940; I believe Alanbrooke commented about Montgomery's insubordinate attitude.  A self publicist from quite a while back.)

 

I also like the sound of the Auk a lot - an impressive and quite modest general.  His wife running off with that airman apparently struck him very hard indeed. Tsk - this is way off the topic of Sir Frederick and Harris. Shall desist.

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