Thinking around the Albemarle

[Graham Boak]

I've just got Tony Buttler's new Warpaint on the AW Albemarle, which is a good account of the aircraft's design, production and service.  If it lacks a little for the enthusiast modeller looking for interesting colour schemes and histories, that's not the author's fault.  It was at best an undistinguished, ordinary, aircraft, for which even the designer had little interest.  Which got me thinking about just what could have been done to it, given one more design iteration before configuration freeze.

 

The first thing to strike me, and which set me off on this track, was that the engines were in the wrong place.  As on the Halifax but not the Lancaster, they were vertically positioned mid-wing.  A prewar RAE study had demonstrated that for lowest drag, the engines had to be dropped below the wing centre-line.  Too late for HP, just in time for Avro, but surely in time for AW?  Dropping the engines would provide a deeper nacelle under the wing and hence tucking the wheels away properly.  Of course, this would mean the props digging up the runway, so the wing would have to be raised.  The aircraft would end up looking rather more like a corpulent Boston, but you'd get another 20-30mph which would make it superior to the Wellington and approach the "magic" 300mph.  Reduced drag would also improve the climb somewhat.

 

The bigger wing introduced to solve take-off problems doesn't really help - bigger flaps (or slotted, or Fowlers) would shorten that run and maybe go back to the original wing - though that wouldn't do anything good for the climb or ceiling.  Cropping the rudders and elevators solved the over-balanced problem but left the machine looking somewhat antiquated, which sort-of proves that no-one really cared about it or something better could have been tried  (but this is war, after all, so maybe not).  Returning to the original shapes by filling in the area with fixed surface fin/tailplane would improve the looks and help the stability.  (Not sure about the last bit but aesthetics are important.)

 

Doing more to it would be problematic.  TB discusses removing the ventral turret to solve the aircraft's handling difficulties due to its too-aft cg, but it seems that this would require hitting someone in the Ministry about the head, several times.  But it was done on other bombers.  So there's a bit less weight and (even when retracted) a bit less drag.  Presumably trim drag would be reduced too.  It occurs to me that by raising the wing you could actually reduce the depth of the fuselage.  This would require a longer nosewheel leg, and make the navigator/bombaimer's area rather less roomy, but this is war, chaps, and access to the bombbay is easier.  You could also get a narrower shallower rear fuselage at the risk of reducing directional stability, already a problem.  But you'd get that 300 mph.  You might even be able to fit a Boston/Hudson/Ventura type ventral gun.  A shallower fuselage would make the aircraft much less suitable for the transport role, but to be honest it would have been better all round had it been designed properly for that role in the first place - but that is too much to expect from the Air Staff at the time.

 

So am I going to approach the Valom kit with a large saw and lots of filler?  No.  But good luck to you.

 

 

Edited June 4, 2018 by Graham Boak

[stevehnz]

That sounds like yet another Warpaint issue I should have. I've long had a soft spot for the Albemarle, I'm a sucker for an under dog, but never understood why it wasn't better regarded. Got some reading up to do. Think I"ll stick to my kit with its D-day colour scheme OOB all the same though.

Steve

[dogsbody]

Something else to put on my want list.

 

 

Chris

[tempestfan]

There was a fairly in depth article in I think Wings (US) some 25 or so years ago. IIRC at least some of its problems came from using „non strategic“ steel with the associated weight penalty. I also admit I find it quite attractive ...

[MilneBay]

I must admit that I find the Albemarle to have been redundant. The use of non-strategic materials was an attractive idea but once it became clear that this was not a priority then what could it do that other medium bombers couldn't. From 1941 onwards it was clear that daylight bomber ops, unless in areas where there was little fighter opposition, were costly and basically suicidal given the RAF's standard bomber tactics, So therefore the Albemarle becomes just another bomber in a population of types that all had similar characteristics and accordingly set back the much needed move towards standardization to aid the war effort.

 

It is rather a question like did the RAF need three 4 engined heavies - not really. The Stirling was outdated while in the end the Halifax could have been dispensed with and its production facilities allocated to the Lancaster. I realise that will upset Halifax fans but in war there isn't room for sentiment.  Equally therefore did the RAF need another twin engined bomber. The Wellington was being phased out in favour of the four engined types; the Hampden was obsolete and the Mosquito could carry a decent bomb load at a fraction of the cost in crew and materials of both types.

 

And by the time the Albemarle came into service the supply of reasonable fast twin engine types like the Mitchell is assured, while the Boston was no slouch. The Albemarle's one decent feature was the tricycle undercarriage which was a pointer to the future but even as a transport or glider tug it offered far less than the far better C47 could provide. All round I think of it as a waste of resources at a time when they could have been better used on more useful types. Wasn't it said that the only reason the Russians took it was for the engines.

 

So as a what if scenario I suspect that to justify its use one would have to write a history of WW2 quite different to what actually occurred.   

[gingerbob]

Ha, I just popped into this thread for the second time, and again found myself with a picture of an Albacore in my head!  I'm afraid that the Albemarle strikes me as a type that looks like it was "designed by committee", with all that comes with it, but it is quite possible that my knowledge of its insignificance colours my perception of it.

[Aeronut]

Being somewhat obsessed with the U.K. Airborne Forces the Albermarle is a type firmly in my sights. It's also a type that was rapidly removed from existence following the end of the war with no complete example left and only the odd piece of fuselage tubing dug up from a dump being officially recognised as Albermarle. However, I think there may be another piece on display at the Tank museum Bovington of all places. In the remains of the Hamilcar fuselage  behind the Tetrarch is a wooden framework which isn't identified or labelled in anyway. The one thing I know for certain it isn't is any part of a Hamilcar. I spent a number of months studying the Hamilcar documents trying to identify and catalogue the remains of a Hamilcar donated to the Museum of Army Flying. So what do I think the Bovington item is? I think it is the retractable fairing that was forward of the Albermarle's upper turret.

[Graham Boak]

Thanks to those who commented.  I was more thinking how the Albemarle could have been better rather then dwell on its place in history.  I was trying to avoid hindsight although it seems that I may have stumbled at the first hurdle - the initial Albemarle design probably did precede the RAE report about engine positions.  Though it would be nice to have a date for the report to confirm that.

 

However, I do think that the Albemarle was an idea worth trying, and that the RAF's decision to ignore it was equally correct, largely for the key reasons stated above.  However there do seem to be a few misconceptions.  The whole point about it was that it was not a waste of resources, because it largely didn't use materials needed for other types and wasn't built in the same factories.  One largely unpraised feature  is how it was built almost entirely by subcontracting to firms outside the conventional industry, whilst being assembled in a dedicated factory away from the established manufacturers and their shadow firms, and yet it came together with surprisingly little problems.  You could argue that the Hercules engines and 4-gun BP turrets were important, but as it turned out they were hardly needed in significant numbers.

 

As for the Wellington being phased out from 1941 onwards, it didn't stop carrying out bombing missions in Europe until winter 1944/45, and about the same in the Far East.  In fairness to the Albemarle, it was criticised because it was no better than the Wellington, rather than worse.  There was also the promise of something rather better from Bristols  - successively the Beaubomber, Beaumont and Buckingham.  They didn't see service either, but that's another story.   Getting back to late 1941, there was no assured supply of Mitchells or even Bostons.  (That really is hindsight.)  There was no Lend-lease and Britain was approaching bankruptcy.  By 1942 the supply of US aircraft (and weapons of other kind) largely dried up because of the rapid expansion of the US Armed Forces, resulting in established orders being commandeered and even Reverse Lend-Lease taking place with the British supplying aircraft to the US.  The flood of aircraft in 1944 and 1945 was not representative of the years in which the Albemarle decisions were made.  The one US bomber type coming was the Ventura - which could perhaps make an interesting comparison.  Even as it stood, the Albemarle had twice the bomb load of the Mosquito, which was itself to be withdrawn from daylight operations over Western Europe because of excessive losses, and a healthy range.

 

I rather feel that the story about the Russians only wanting the Albemarle because of its engines is an example of British arrogance about their own products and ignorance about other people's.  Given that the Russians already had the ASh 82 in service at that time, and were flying prototypes of more powerful types, it's difficult so see just what would be so attractive about a handful of early Hercules.  Yes the sleeve valves were technically interesting, but I suspect that they could have had a couple of them for study had they asked.  The key technology was the sintering process, and no-one has ever suggested that this was passed on with the Albemarles.  It took far too long for that to be passed on to Napier for the Sabre, let alone to the USSR.

[leyreynolds]

22 hours ago, MilneBay said:

I must admit that I find the Albemarle to have been redundant. The use of non-strategic materials was an attractive idea but once it became clear that this was not a priority then what could it do that other medium bombers couldn't. From 1941 onwards it was clear that daylight bomber ops, unless in areas where there was little fighter opposition, were costly and basically suicidal given the RAF's standard bomber tactics, So therefore the Albemarle becomes just another bomber in a population of types that all had similar characteristics and accordingly set back the much needed move towards standardization to aid the war effort.

 

It is rather a question like did the RAF need three 4 engined heavies - not really. The Stirling was outdated while in the end the Halifax could have been dispensed with and its production facilities allocated to the Lancaster. I realise that will upset Halifax fans but in war there isn't room for sentiment.  Equally therefore did the RAF need another twin engined bomber. The Wellington was being phased out in favour of the four engined types; the Hampden was obsolete and the Mosquito could carry a decent bomb load at a fraction of the cost in crew and materials of both types.

 

And by the time the Albemarle came into service the supply of reasonable fast twin engine types like the Mitchell is assured, while the Boston was no slouch. The Albemarle's one decent feature was the tricycle undercarriage which was a pointer to the future but even as a transport or glider tug it offered far less than the far better C47 could provide. All round I think of it as a waste of resources at a time when they could have been better used on more useful types. Wasn't it said that the only reason the Russians took it was for the engines.

 

So as a what if scenario I suspect that to justify its use one would have to write a history of WW2 quite different to what actually occurred.   

The problem with phasing out the Halifax would have been needing another type for glider tug, SD and MR. The Lancaster and Bomber Command seems a bit like the Spitfire and BoB - a good story but not necessarily all that accurate.

[Ed Russell]

On 6/5/2018 at 4:08 PM, MilneBay said:

All round I think of it as a waste of resources at a time when they could have been better used on more useful types.

That's the clear vision through the retrospectroscope. In defence of the use of resources you have to see through the eyes of 1940.

Imagine how the Air Ministry and the aircraft industry would be castigated now if there had been a shortage of strategic materials in 1943 or 1944 and they had put no effort into thinking about how to cope with it. Every nation involved in WW2 put a fair effort into projects that turned out to not work, were inappropriate for their intended use or were (in retrospect) plain dumb. Luft '46 and many books wouldn't exist without them!

If it's not a myth and the Albemarle truly contributed to the facilitation of the building of Mosquitos I would say the Air Ministry got its money back with premium interest.

[Seahawk]

9 hours ago, Graham Boak said:

There was also the promise of something rather better from Bristols  - successively the Beaubomber, Beaumont and Buckingham.  They didn't see service either, but that's another story.  

Which could be argued to be a much worse waste of resources: by then the Mosquito had proved itself and the Boston/Mitchell supply situation was clearer so what niche were they supposed to fill?  Why this programme by a major manufacturer was allowed to meander on aimlessly beats me.  Most of the Buckinghams built only flew into storage.

 

And don't get me started on the Firebrand.

[Giorgio N]

This discussion on the Albemarle in a sense fits well with the resurrected thread in the real aviation forum on the worst aircraft... not because the Albemarle was a potential worst, it wasn't and at worse could be considered an undistinguished type. It fits because one of the point made in that thread was that there were periods when progress in aircraft design was fast and it wasn't easy to get all things right. The Albemarle suffered somewhat from this as while some design features were pretty advanced (the landing gear for example), others did not take advantage of the latest developments, like the engine position.

Overall my feeling is that the Air Ministry did the right thing in offering the type a chance, if only because of the use of non strategic materials. We now know this didn't ever become an issue, but it made sense back then to consider the risk and have a type capable of being produced in case of materials shortage.

Clearly in 1942 things started being very different and we may question if producing Albemarles was or not a good decision at that point, but the same could be said of other types. I remember reading an article in an Italian aviation magazine many years ago, an article that discussed the Allied "also rans". In the group were various types, the Albemarle may or not have been included, but the points made are valid regardless: some countries during WW2 could afford building types of relatively limited use and they did so. This allowed certain factories to maintain production in-between the production of more useful types and was not a problem as long as this didn't impact the need for more important types. In any case all these types could be used for something, be it training or secondary roles leaving frontline types to go to frontline units only as much as possible. Did the production of the Albemarle even had a negative impact on British wartime aircraft production ? Probably not, otherwise the type would have likely not been built

[Seahawk]

44 minutes ago, Giorgio N said:

 This allowed certain factories to maintain production in-between the production of more useful types and was not a problem as long as this didn't impact the need for more important types.

Which. now you mention it, comes into the Buckingham/Buckmaster saga: I dimly recall that they were largely built to keep the workforce busy pending the Brigand.

[Giorgio N]

1 hour ago, Seahawk said:

Which. now you mention it, comes into the Buckingham/Buckmaster saga: I dimly recall that they were largely built to keep the workforce busy pending the Brigand.

 

Don't know about Bristol in this case, but sure was something done more often than we may expect. Afterall military procurement contracts have to take into account much more than the matter of value and usefulness of a certain aircraft/tank/ship and the need for keeping factory active and workforce busy, so retaining expertise, can be very important in certain times. There is then the matter of the complications of contracts and subcontracts and the relevant penalties (that have sometime resulted in continued production of aircrafts that went straight into storage to be later broken up), there's sometime the need to introduce new production techniques even if the desired product is not ready yet, of course there are those situations when certain factories are too important from a political point of view to be left idle... and there sure are plenty other issues that don't come to my mind. All issues that even we enthusiasts often forget when discussing aircrafts. It would be so much simpler if it all boiled down to performance charts and armament configurations 😄

[Graham Boak]

It is definitely true about continued Buckingham production, but less so about the Buckmaster which was needed as a conversion type for the Brigand.

 

I'm uncertain about there being any other cases that are quite as clear cut, but when claiming that type A should have been replaced by type B it should be borne in mind that this would have been costly in itself and would have meant a significant loss in production during the changeover.  In the Bristol case, and no doubt in others, there would have been worries over the loss of skilled workers who would readily have found employment elsewhere and then not be available.  Given the fairly shambolic cases early in the war (e.g. Tornado) when under Air Ministry control, this is something that the Ministry of Aircraft Production would be well aware of.

 

[MilneBay]

In my remarks about waste of resources I am referring not just to material but to the more important factory management process and production workers, as well as the allocation of factory space resources because without all those the scarce materials will never get turned into aircraft.

 

Also we must consider that as a glider tug or conveyor of parachutists the Albemarle could do nothing that a C47 couldn't do better. This isn't the use of 20/20 rear vision it is recognition of what was apparent at the time when the Albemarle came into production and use, and these were factors that were becoming more visible as the panic year of 1940 receded.

 

A nice discussion of what it might have been with some aerodynamic changes as Graham surmised but even in 1942 the defects of the Albemarle from the point of view of strategic usefulness were known, 

Edited June 6, 2018 by MilneBay

[Dave Fleming]

Does Tony touch on the question of whether any aircraft actually went to Russia?

[Ed Russell]

Yes indeed. He notes 14 aircraft left for Russia but one was shot down by AA over Sweden and another went missing from unknown cause. They were operated within 1 Air Transport Division.

 was apparent at the time when the Albemarle came into production and use, and these were factors that were becoming more visible as the panic year of 1940 receded

I have to agree that the Dakota was a more useful transport and glider tug than the Albemarle - no question that you are right.

However Albemarle testing only began in late 1940 and the second prototype was not delivered until 1941.

Similarly Dakotas only began arriving in significant numbers late in 1943. 

I'm sure we can agree to disagree on the strategic questions as it requires analysis probably not possible at this remove in time.

[Graham Boak]

No point in saying that the C-47 would have been better as a transport.  We all know that, and so did the "powers that be" at the time.  But C-47s weren't available.  Dakotas didn't replace Albemarles on the vital Gibraltar run until March 1944, which gives an idea of how long it took to get them.  Vital US needs had to be satisfied first, and no General ever had enough.  There were four Airborne Forces Albemarle squadrons at D-Day, and two at Arnhem.  It's impossible to imagine those would have been retained had there been any large supply of Dakotas.  Even when these were finally converted they were not given Dakotas but Stirlings and  Halifaxes, more for the glider-tug role than paratrooping.  .