TSR2 in service?

[Giorgio N]

Really I can't see how much more advanced the TSR.2 was when compared to existing US designed types. The F-111 was actually from many points of view more advanced in its aerodynamic design. We should also not forget that the A12, an even more sophisticated aircraft in terms of aerodynamic design, had already been flying for two years when the TSR.2 made its first flight.

This is not to say that the TSR.2 wasn't a state of the art aircraft, it was but didn't employ much that had not been used before. The electronic equipment of the TSR.2 was supposed to be very advanced however it never got to work so it's hard to tell if it could have been a true revolution or not. According to several sources, the system would have required many more years of development before becoming mission capable. I'd suggest Damien Burke's book on the type, looks into the TSR.2 in a very objective way and debunks a few myths.

All the times when US industries bitched about foreign products it was only because they wanted to have their own bought instead, no more and no less. The Airbus tanker or the EH-101 are not a technological threat to the US industry, they are only commercial threats. Same for the SST, the US industry was well capable of building an SST, when the Concorde was launched however no US aircraft was ready and many feared that this would have put them at a commercial disadvantage. The 1973 oil crisis sorted the situation.

Regarding a possible competition between the F-111 and the TSR.2, the American type was advertised as a multirole aircraft, most countries to which it was presented were told how well this type could have done everything, something that we now know was not really possible. The TSR.2 was always presented as a single mission type and in this guise was presented to Australia, the only potential customer.

Australia did not replace the TSR.2 with the F-111, the British type was never a leading contender because the Australian selection committee did not believe it would have been suitable and already had doubts about the future of the type. The promised delivery schedule was also unsatisfactory, although the British government offered the loan of a number of V-bombers as a stop-gap solution and the offer was made public just after the F-111 was selected.

The Vigilante was among the types evaluated and surprisingly was rated very highly so much that the RAAF mission to the US recommended this type. The problem with the North American aircraft was its lack of operational flexibility and wasn't really in the competition. The same would have probably affected the Mirage IV (another type evaluated).

The Vigilante and the TSR.2 are indeed very similar aircrafts, apart from the size. Both were designed for the same role and this resulted in similar technical choices. Both were requested to combine high maximum speeds and good handling at very low speed (the Vigilante to operate from a carrier, the TSR.2 because it was meant to have short takeoff capabilities). The Vigilante wing ended up being a compromise that was probably not good for any flight regime while BAC preferred to use a wing designed specifically for low level/high speed regimes and relied on other means to achieve the low speed requirements.

Regarding other possible customers for the TSR.2, France was already well ahead in the development of the Mirage IV, they were not looking for a similar aircraft. Ironically Dassault offered an anglicised variant of this type to the UK a few years later. Germany is sometimes mentioned and so is Italy but this is really only because they later joined the Tornado program. Both countries used the F-104G as a nuclear strike type, they had no interest in those years in something like the TSR.2. Both air forces looked at a replacement before considering the Tornado but had this not gone ahead, the solution was the Phantom. The Luftwaffe looked a lot into the use of the Phantom as a striker while the Italian Air Force tried in every way in the early '70s to lay their hands on the Phantom but was never happened for budget reasons. The Tornado was a different story as was partly built in the country so this went ahead

[Truro Model Builder]

I'm not saying technology for the TSR.2 was more advanced either, or for the Concorde, the Airbus or the AW101, but to varying degrees they all threatened to take sales from the USA's aerospace industry. Protectionism, plain and simple; look how well the US have got technical support for the F-35 wrapped up.

And I am well aware that France was never considered as a customer for the TSR.2, with its development of the Mirage IV. Indeed, in its 'Mirage IVK' form with Spey engines it would have been very well suited to Strike Command's requirements.

The requirement that the TSR.2, F-111A and Mirage IV were designed to meet was a very specific requirement that only a handful of countries had. Most NATO nations were tactical in their approach to the equipment they bought for their air forces, largely due to the short distances they had to fly, and outside of Europe perhaps only Australia, Canada and South Africa had a true geographical requirement for aircraft in that class. We can argue until the cows come home about whether Australia would have opted or not for the TSR.2, but as they were the only export customer for the F-111 -and didn't that turn into a saga?- I do not think that the UK would have had any export success with the TSR.2.

[feifeitim]

Ah, the good old TSR2 debate! Like you Georgio, I have a number of books about this superb machine. To say that the Americans were not concerned about its capabilities and it's possible export success is a little short of the full story. Similarly, you've slightly glossed over the significant problems the F-111 had on its entry to service, it's embarrassing first appearances in Vietnam which led to it's rapid withdrawal from the campaign until much later, the inability of GD to produce the F-111K, which was the TSR2's replacement for the RAF. Moreover, it's huge delay into RAAF service, so much so that F-4Es were leased for 3 years before the machine finally arrived, speak volumes of what the Americans were playing at.

The BAe Hawk has been the last fully developed aircraft the United Kingdom has produced by itself. Retention of the TSR2 would have likely ensured the the technological capabilities to design, build and mass produce a range of aircraft types would have remained intact and more importantly, some competition existed for the world's markets. It would have meant that many countries, who are being fleeced by Boeing for their fat F-35, might have had a choice.

TSR2 was a remarkable aircraft and whilst it is unlikely to have been still flying had it entered service, son of TSR2, a British developed tactical bomber would be, and grandson would be just entering service. The UK lost far more than an aircraft type that fateful April day in 1965, it lost its independent capability to produce such a complex aircraft again.

[JohnT]

I have said it before but if the US were wholly unconcerned about TSR2 entering production and service why have both the late Roy Jenkins and Dennis Healey (the UK Defense Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer) said on record that the US made it clear without coming out directly that the UK getting its much needed IMF bail out was conditional on TSR2 going.

Might explain the destruction of the manufacturing jigs etc with indecent haste or at least been one of a number of reasons for that.

TSR2 expired for a number of reasons and in fairness to the US not just their desire to push their industry and products

The Government of the day was not enamoured of the aircraft industry and perhaps with some reason

The MOD allowed costs to run way over to silly money territory and industry were equally at fault for milking it

Poor project management

Hostility from the RN who saw a budget saving from cancellation securing their carriers - if ever here was case of not reading the runes that was one!

Little to no export potential - same as F-111 in that respect. Our Aussie friends the only buyer and hardly in bulk!

As for the kit not working well my uncle worked on it at Ferranti and they were able to use much of what they had done later for the Tornado gear

[Giorgio N]

Ah, the good old TSR2 debate! Like you Georgio, I have a number of books about this superb machine. To say that the Americans were not concerned about its capabilities and it's possible export success is a little short of the full story. Similarly, you've slightly glossed over the significant problems the F-111 had on its entry to service, it's embarrassing first appearances in Vietnam which led to it's rapid withdrawal from the campaign until much later, the inability of GD to produce the F-111K, which was the TSR2's replacement for the RAF. Moreover, it's huge delay into RAAF service, so much so that F-4Es were leased for 3 years before the machine finally arrived, speak volumes of what the Americans were playing at.

Actually if you read my post I made absolutely no mention of the operational career of the F-111 so any accusation of me glossing over the problems encountered by the type is totally false.

I am well aware of the problems (particularly of structural nature) that beleagued the early F-111s and the delays that resulted while GD worked to solve these. The delay in RAAF service was a result of this work. If you read my post you'll also notice as I made no comment on the validity or not of the F-111 choice for Australia but I only dealt with the selection phase for which good information can be found in Stewart Wilson's book on the Lincoln, Canberra and F-111 service in Australia.

Regarding the "embarassing" appearance in Vietnam, the only embarassing thing was the loss for no known reason of a number of aircrafts while the performance and results were praised at every level. We now know that the loss of those aircrafts was due to structural problems, once these were cured the type returned to Vietnam with good success. Speaking of losses, the total number lost in Vietnam was a staggering 6 with the lowest mission/loss ratio of any type serving in that war. Mind, I don't personally rate the F-111 as a great success and I believe that its development was constrained by too specifications that were unrealistic. The type still managed to do well as shown by the long service in the USAF and RAAF and most importantly by the success enjoyed in combat.

GD inability to produce the F-111K ???? The only inability was that of Britain to pay for the F-111K ! GD was ready to build these aircrafts and 2 were already on the production line (although they were not to full K standard), it was the British government that in the meantime had reviewed its defence commitments because of financial problems and therefore decided to save money and scrap the deal altogether.

The BAe Hawk has been the last fully developed aircraft the United Kingdom has produced by itself. Retention of the TSR2 would have likely ensured the the technological capabilities to design, build and mass produce a range of aircraft types would have remained intact and more importantly, some competition existed for the world's markets. It would have meant that many countries, who are being fleeced by Boeing for their fat F-35, might have had a choice.

TSR2 was a remarkable aircraft and whilst it is unlikely to have been still flying had it entered service, son of TSR2, a British developed tactical bomber would be, and grandson would be just entering service. The UK lost far more than an aircraft type that fateful April day in 1965, it lost its independent capability to produce such a complex aircraft again.

Sorry but I totally disagree with the idea that the end of the TSR.2 had such an effect on British aerospace industry capability. Britain never lost any design capability and this was showed by the fact that the local industry took part in a number of other projects with success, the Concorde being one of them, the Tornado and the Typhoon being two others and the F-35 being only the latest example.

The Tornado in particular can be considered pretty much a British design with a little help from some others (including countries that in the end left Panavia like Holland and even some US contribution). Britain could have easily built the Tornado without any partner, the choice to go with a multinational program was simply a financial one. Britain never lost the capability of designing a combat type, what was lost was the position in world economy to be able to afford it !

Considering that for the F-35 program even the US built a consortium where partners share the financial risk, how in heaven could have Britain alone be able to develop today a simlar aircraft ?

I have said it before but if the US were wholly unconcerned about TSR2 entering production and service why have both the late Roy Jenkins and Dennis Healey (the UK Defense Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer) said on record that the US made it clear without coming out directly that the UK getting its much needed IMF bail out was conditional on TSR2 going.

Where did they state this ? I'd be interested to know because it would be quite a good example of politicians mixing a few things up. Something that of course happens not infrequently

Healey was indeed a key in that much needed IMF loan and he was of course involved in the TSR.2. The problem is that the loan was requested when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Callaghan government in the '70s while the TSR.2 was cancelled 10 years before when he was minister for defence in the Wilson goverment.... so we have 10 years in between, different governments in the UK (and a conservative government between the two), different administrations in the US. Something does not fit.. The reality is that it's only a coincidence that Healey was involved in both and this has generated another urban legend.

Might explain the destruction of the manufacturing jigs etc with indecent haste or at least been one of a number of reasons for that.

Or maybe the main reason for the destruction was a simpler one: the storage of jigs etc is expensive and generally these are stored at the customer's expense... had the production equipment been kept in storage, the government would have been held financially responsible for this by the contractor. The existence of jigs etc is also always a lever that contractors can use to request the reinstatement of the contracts. The same fate of the TSR.2 occurred to a large number of types simply because governments prefer to choose the cheapest option when it's clear that a type will no longer be ordered.

TSR2 expired for a number of reasons and in fairness to the US not just their desire to push their industry and products

The Government of the day was not enamoured of the aircraft industry and perhaps with some reason

The MOD allowed costs to run way over to silly money territory and industry were equally at fault for milking it

Poor project management

Hostility from the RN who saw a budget saving from cancellation securing their carriers - if ever here was case of not reading the runes that was one!

Little to no export potential - same as F-111 in that respect. Our Aussie friends the only buyer and hardly in bulk!

Agree, clearly project management was bad in the TSR.2 case. The meddling of politics and industry did't help and I should add that the RAF had its fair share of responsibility too as the specifications were trying to achieve goals too different for a single airframe. Such a complicated program should have been managed in ways that were not part of the British way of working in those days (the often cited Empire of the Clouds book tells a lot about the way aerospace industry worked). The fact that similar programs in the US and elsewhere in the '60s suffered from similar issues also means that everyone everywhere was still learning how to deal with programs of such magnitude.

As for the kit not working well my uncle worked on it at Ferranti and they were able to use much of what they had done later for the Tornado gear

The two things don't clash: the comment made on the TSR.2 systems was that they would have required time to get to work and this would have required money and delayed the entry into service of the aircraft or at least its achievement of a full combat capability. By the time the Tornado enterted service, Ferranti had several years to work on the required elements.

[JohnT]

Giorgio

If that is correct then the time scale I was thinking of does not fit and I must see if I can resolve that. It was quite a long time ago but I recall seeing a television program with the two politicians being interviewed. It would have been late 1980 early 1990's on the BBC or ITV as other channels were still some way off if I recall correctly which I probably dont! What I do recall was my jaw dropping when they said it as up until then we had been told there was no pressure at all. They were careful to concede that the US had never come out and baldly stated cancel "TSR2 or you dont get the loan" but that they got the message over subtly but clearly. No smoking gun left lying about. Given the admission though it certainly stuck in my mind. Perhaps over time I am confusing some other financial deal with the later IMF payment?

Having said that, given the parlous state of UK finances in the mid to late 1960's there is the very reasonable question as to whether the UK was living way above its means and something had to give. Remember there was not just the loan but also a devaluation of the pound etc.

I think the TSR2 was a good aircraft however it was also an unlucky one. It was in the wrong place at the wrong time. The whole nature and economics of the industry was changing and I am not sure that this was fully appreciated at the time. Certainly the UK could not manage to pay for a dozen fragmented manufacturers and all doing mutli projects at the edge of the technology of the time.

Arguably Concorde should have been axed too heresy though that might seem. Brilliant design, wonderful lines and very limited market. Again perhaps the right plane at the wrong time?

What of the P1154 or the HS transport gone at about the same time?

Again from my uncle he said that he was told that if working on another project and overtime stick it down on the work sheets as TSR2 as that contract was cost plus. In other words the Government was paying whatever it cost to get the product plus profit on top. No wonder costs were out of control!

On the matter of the jigs I always had the impression from accounts at least that their destruction was carried out very quickly in comparison to the norm and on instructions to do so. Once the jigs are gone there goes the project once and all for good. It is only circumstantial evidence but given the antipathy towards the industry and the TSR2 in particular it sure made certain she was never going to be called the phoenix in service!

I wholly agree that the economics of designing a modern combat aircraft from scratch that is also cutting edge is affordable only at continental level these days. Smaller nation states might be able to afford to build something "conventional" at a push but not cutting edge.

[Truro Model Builder]

Is this the documentary you mean?

[PhantomBigStu]

Anyone here got some pics of the stbd side of the official camo pattern? only found images of the top and port views?

[Truro Model Builder]

Anyone here got some pics of the stbd side of the official camo pattern? only found images of the top and port views?

This is a copy of BAC Drawing no.57900, dated 24 November 1964, reproduced in and scanned from TSR2: Lost Tomorrows of an Eagle (Paul Lucas, SAM 2009)

TSR2 camo 001 by Martin Schofield, on Flickr

Hope it is of use.

Edited April 5, 2016 by T7 Models

[PhantomBigStu]

Thanks you t7 exactly what I need

[XV107]

The Wilson government of 1964-70 did go to the IMF, but the nature and timing of the approach (to handle the £800m balance of payments deficit, which in 1964 was an almost unimaginable sum for a balance of payments deficit) were such that any US pressure to can TSR2 in favour of the F-111 was purely incidental.

By that point:

1. ACM Elworthy (the CAS) had already recommended cancellation

2. Healey and others had made clear that they thought the TSR2 should go because it was so expensive; they moderated their remarks in the run up to the 1964 election, leading to a situation where the workers at Warton felt betrayed by the local MP

3. There is no evidence bar the quotes in the documentary to support the notion; the cabinet meeting which saw the TSR2 being cancelled nearly voted to retain it. No minister - and a couple of them were notoriously indiscreet in their memoirs - makes any reference to Wilson, or Callaghan or Healey dropping the 'and if we keep it, the US will block the IMF loan' bombshell.

This is an important point - the payments crisis meant that (in general terms) the Wilson administration had three choices - devalue the pound; allow the markets to set its value against the dollar, rather than meeting the requirement to defend the exchange rate as per the Bretton Woods system; or defend it.

Devaluation was politically unpalatable since the Pound:Dollar exchange rate of £1 = $2.80 was seen as 'a symbol of national virility' and the devaluation of the pound in 1949 under the previous Labour administration (they lost the 1951 election and were out of office for 13 years) had huge political significance - Wilson was not alone in fearing that it would destroy his government's credibility if they devalued, and with a majority of four (swiftly reduced to three after an unwise attempt to bounce the voters of Leyton into returning (via a by-election) Patrick Gordon Walker who'd been appointed foreign secretary even though he had lost his seat in the election back-fired with Gordon Walker losing), he feared that this would lead to another election in a matter of weeks, and that having 'proved' the Conservative claim that Labour was a party of devaluation, etc, etc, he'd lose it.

Letting the pound float was bound to upset the US and a number of close trading partners, and this left defending it (which failed and ended in the 1967 devaluation). That, in turn, meant that attempting to manage the economy was the only option.

Standby credits were negotiated with the IMF, but in November 1964, i.e. before TSR2 was cancelled and thus the interpolation of the IMF deal and the cancellation doesn't work.

Putting it in the context of a growing awareness that Britain's defence spending had to be cut to meet the challenge of managing the economy and delivering on the administration's policies, though, the role of the American pressure becomes significant, but not in the way the 'America killed the TSR2!' argument goes.

Let me quote Glen O'Hara, '‘Dynamic, Exciting, Thrilling Change’: the Wilson Government's Economic Policies, 1964–70', Journal of Contemporary British History, Volume 20 Issue 3 (2006), p.394

In December 1965 Wilson told the Americans that the British would probably leave Singapore, Aden and – once Britain’s counter-insurgency operations were concluded – Malaysia. Northern Australia, he thought, might be a better base for any rapid intervention in the Far East.

The Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, seems to have concluded that the British should withdraw from the whole region as early as the summer of 1965, since otherwise there was little chance of hitting the £2bn target. [George] Brown [the Foreign Secretary], more enthusiastic about Europe than the world role, was similarly sceptical, and such ideas became increasingly widespread.

The LBJ administration, of course, was horrified at the thought of the UK withdrawing from East of Suez, a horror which grew as the US commitment to Vietnam tied American forces down there and added to the cost of attempting to defend SE Asia grew enormously - the idea that the UK would throw everything up into the air was something which the US administration was not keen upon.

Thus, American pressure, one can argue (and people have) was such that Wilson and Healey were determined that having a means of providing a credible force 'East of Suez' was essential - and that meant keeping the TSR2 or binning it and then buying something else - the obvious answer being the F-111 (not least since that, as Damian Burke and the late Tim McLelland [gentlemen who rarely agreed on anything] have demonstrated in their books on the TSR2, this was what the RAF was recommending even before Wilson came to power).

US pressure was such that until reality bit very, very hard with growing financial crises and finally devaluation in 1967, having the means of placing a highly credible combat aircraft East of Suez was the get-out 'look, Lyndon - we're putting TSR2/F-111 into Singapore and can rapidly reinforce with more from Cyprus and the UK in a crisis,' something which the basing plans for both the TSR2 and the F-111 very strongly point towards.

So what? Well, I'd argue that the context means:

1. The US did not - whatever Jenkins may have said in a documentary - force the UK to cancel TSR2 because of an IMF loan. Yes, there was a deal reached with the IMF, but the timing fails to work.

2. The RAF had already begun advocating a look at the F-111 and cancellation of TSR2 before Wilson took office and before Callaghan realised what a mess Reggie Maudling had made of things.

3. Even if the timing had worked for the supposed loan, there is no evidence that a 'if we do not cancel TSR2 the Americans will ensure we will not get an IMF loan' card was ever played in the debate over cancellation; had it been, the vote to cancel would almost certainly not have been so contentious amongst the cabinet - two cabinet meetings were needed - or as close, particularly since the F-111 was on offer and could be sold to the public (as, indeed, it was) as a much cheaper option offering no real diminution in capability (whether that was true or not is neither here nor there in terms of presentational terms).

Finally, the possible consequences of what would've been seen as American bullying by the Labour party - the idea that the entire cabinet of 1964 would've maintained a trappist-like vow of silence for 50 minutes, never mind 50 years stretches the imagination somewhat - would've been unpredictable. You'd likely have seen one or more of:

a/ The cabinet saying 'stuff him!' and going ahead with TSR2, daring him to risk the UK allowing the pound to float and destroying the Bretton Woods system upon which international finance was then based.

b/ The cabinet saying 'stuff him!' and cancelling TSR2 as part of eye-watering defence cuts which were not in the US's national interest and not buying F-111

c/ Someone in the cabinet leaking this, re-awakening anti-American sentiment less than 10 years after Suez saw shopkeepers hanging up signs saying 'Americans not served here' and creating a huge crisis within NATO - a crisis which would've killed LBJ's hopes of even raising the idea of British troops in Vietnam.

And, on top of that, there is firm anecdotal evidence that key players in the US administration were astounded that TSR2 was under threat (they hadn't exposure to the cost implications or the RAF's reservations) and the smoothing of the path for the F-111 (including generous offsets) was because of the concern to ensure that the RAF had a capable strike aircraft; the idea of what the US saw as its most important and potent NATO ally of the time entering the 1970s in a reduced form without something like TSR2 was simply not (they felt) in their national interest.

The evidence as a whole points to the recollection of Jenkins being flawed and the likelihood that even if his comments are correct they were of marginal importance in the final decision to cancel the aircraft.

Apologies for the length of the post, but I thought that it might be useful to offer a counter-balancing point to suggest the idea that the Americans killed the TSR2, first mooted (IIRC) in Stephen Hastings' Murder of the TSR2, is more and more difficult to sustain through an examination of the broader contextual evidence, particularly when the inclusion of the nature of the Wilson administration and the attitude of key members towards the US is considered alongside the fact that TSR2 was of minor importance in the grand scheme of things. One has to assume a weeding of documents so efficient and a conspiracy of silence so wide-ranging to hide the evidence that it becomes more likely that Jenkins 'mis-spoke' in that awful modern phrase, or simply got muddled.

[Victor K2]

I thought that it was the Sandys report that spelled the end of the of the TSR2 and that the Tories had already cancelled the project before the Labour government had taken office and that they only endorsed it to balance the books. Something this government has history of ( Nimrod/Harrier ). The world was changing fast in the 50's and the U.K. was still paying for the victory of WW2 and British commerce was taking advantage of the rich get richer and sod the workers.

[XV107]

What's forgotten about Sandys is his observation in the debate on the White Paper (Hansard, HC Debates 16 April 1957 vol 568 cc1763-1764)

I should like to say a word about the future of the Royal Air Force. We are unquestionably moving towards a time when fighter aircraft will be increasingly replaced by guided missiles and V-bombers by ballistic rockets, but all that will not happen overnight. The introduction of these new weapons will be a gradual process, extending over a good number of years, and even then there will still remain a very wide variety of roles for which manned aircraft will continue to be needed.

Thus Sandys did not really lay the ground work for the end of the TSR2; the timing in fact was such that since TSR2 would never 'balance the books'; it made more sense in terms of accounting to cancel it and to order advanced derivatives of the Buccaneer, or to invite the RAF to decide whether it would like a US design which would then be built under licence. GOR.339 in fact gave Sandys some of the means to pressurize the aircraft industry into rationalisation.

If Sandys and the government of which he was part had in effect already cancelled the project, then this would've been a relief to ACM Elworthy, whose recommendation to cancel was not accepted by his minister. It is pretty likely that had Sir Alec Douglas Home won the 1964 election (and, as I think I've said before on here, had 150 members of the electorate, spread across 5 constituencies, either stayed at home or voted Liberal or Conservative instead of Labour, then Home would've won (he'd have had a majority of one and it'd have been chaos, but it shows how close to winning he was) his government would've been forced to cancel the programme on cost grounds.

Whether the F-111 would've been the choice of the 1964 Home government is another, what-if question...

[Devilfish]

Also. the Sandys white paper was published almost ten years before the TSR2 was cancelled.

I can recommend to anyone who wants to know the truth, to read Damien Burkes book. It's a real eye opener.

TSR2 has always been my favourite aircraft, but I no longer look at it through rose tinted specs.

It was vastly over budget, very badly managed and unfortunately, asked to do too much, too soon, with insufficient technology (at the time)

Compromises were made all the way through the program, and, as has been said here, in the end, even the RAF, who had written such a ridiculous spec, didn't want it anymore.