The End: no more jets for me

[jasman71]

I suspect, in terms of generation-x fighter design, that a lot of proposed new toys are all visually similar because of the nature of their designs, so you'll end up with a whole world-full of F-22/PAK-50/J-20 lookalikes, rather than anything designed by Rutan . Oh and yes, they will be grey. [headline.... New camo scheme for the bob-a-job uav squadron based at Scampton... Bright pink with lurid green patches .. The reasoning being that by the time the opposition has said "what the....", then gagged, then laughed, then taken a photo with his phone to show his mates , the flying track suit has shot it out of the sky]

I remember reading somewhere many years ago that modern aircraft designers put the requirements of a DC-3 into a computer design program, specifically for aviation airframe configuration, and the exact same ayout came out! I think you could say the same for cars too: how many of those look a similar design now? Oh yes, and all in silver-grey...

I don't think ALL future offensive aircraft will be unmanned, but I bet there will be large percentage that will be. I saw a conceptualisation a few years ago of the rumoured Lockheed tr-3b , flying in formation with F-117s as they bombed Iraq or Afghanistan or whoever it was hadn't sent the US Prez a Christmas card that year. The write up stated that future wars could utilise manned fighter aircraft working alongside, or controlling, the UAVs, certainly up to a semi-autonomous state. Completely autonomous is a possibility but I doubt a probability for same time yet (see Terminator movies for one reason why )

The future of aviation tech always fascinates me, and whilst I can appreciate (and even agree with) the oh no not another grey clone, you have to look at the technological advances over our more interestingly camouflaged machines from 30+ years ago. I, for one, look forward to the next decade or more for designs (even though they will be all the same!)

[kolja]

I'm definitely sympathetic with you all in regards to the F-35. I can't read an article about it without getting angry - that program's been such an abortion that it frankly makes me mad no one from Lockheed Martin or the Department of Defense are under criminal indictment.

So, safe to say, I don't see myself building one.

[-Neu-]

I suspect, in terms of generation-x fighter design, that a lot of proposed new toys are all visually similar because of the nature of their designs, so you'll end up with a whole world-full of F-22/PAK-50/J-20 lookalikes, rather than anything designed by Rutan . Oh and yes, they will be grey. [headline.... New camo scheme for the bob-a-job uav squadron based at Scampton... Bright pink with lurid green patches .. The reasoning being that by the time the opposition has said "what the....", then gagged, then laughed, then taken a photo with his phone to show his mates , the flying track suit has shot it out of the sky]

I remember reading somewhere many years ago that modern aircraft designers put the requirements of a DC-3 into a computer design program, specifically for aviation airframe configuration, and the exact same ayout came out! I think you could say the same for cars too: how many of those look a similar design now? Oh yes, and all in silver-grey...

Probably not. Aircraft are a product of their environment: requirements, technologies, production size, ect. all of those things change dramatically over the years.

One of the biggest advantages of the DC-3 is that they were cheap and plentiful in the post WWII era. Many DC-3s were modified in the 1950s to carry turboprops: clearly engine technology advanced and provided a better solution. Even now, they do still provide value, but that's if you can't get over the capital cost of purchasing a new aircraft. The DC-3's current replacement would be a modified ATR or a C-27J: faster more range, better carrying capacity (I'm just thinking of what some carriers do in northern Canada to carry people and cargo)

This reflects on what I was saying above; Understanding how an aircraft fits into its unique circumstances is what I really enjoy, even if it was a failure. I built this white whale a few years ago precisely because of that.

This aircraft basically ended the US Navy's 40 year history of developing cutting edge aircraft designs, and ushered in a period of major conservatism that resulted in the F/A-18E/F, then the JSF.It may have been a spectacular failure, but it really had a huge influence on military power. I think that's really interesting in its own way.

I'm definitely sympathetic with you all in regards to the F-35. I can't read an article about it without getting angry - that program's been such an abortion that it frankly makes me mad no one from Lockheed Martin or the Department of Defense are under criminal indictment.

So, safe to say, I don't see myself building one.

I don't want to make this a F-35 thread, but by most metrics the program is by no means a disaster... especially if you compare it to other major programs like the F-22. Alot of what has been spun out there is just plain disinformation, intended to create controversy where one does not really exist.

Edited September 28, 2013 by -Neu-

[cmatthewbacon]

Just to get back to the original rationale for my post -- I'm not saying that I'm not interested in the latest aviation technology; I'm not saying that I don't understand why the latest design techniques result in similar-looking aircraft (I spent five years of my journalistic career on an engineering magazine covering the latest materials technology for aviation in the 90s); I'm not saying that the latest manned aircraft couldn't whup any earlier generation.

All I'm saying is that, for me, the latest generation of aircraft have lost interest as a MODELLING SUBJECT. No more and no less. And I'm drawing a comparison with my teenage years when the latest, coolest jets were my primary interest. That's all.

I'm not expecting you all to feel the same. YMMV -- that's the point of the internet, isn't it...?

;-)

bestest,

M.

[Tom Cooper]

The next technology will bring "Egg Planes" to the fore,only joking
or am I?

They only stretch them a bit, and call them 'UAVs'... ;-)

Even a semi-competent air defence could take out a predator or global hawk, surely? The Vietnamese took down plenty of Ryan drones in the 60s, without manpads...

...an Iraqi MiG-25PDS(export) took out a (Stinger-armed) RQ-2 using a single R-40RD, back in December 2002...

On the other hand, one of those USAF's 'Ryan drones' was the first ace of the Vietnam War (yup, with 5 confirmed MiG-kills at least a year before Cunningham/Driscoll managed that feat).

The USAF has no intention of using the F-35 for low level attack in a high-threat area, or for low level work generally.

There is quite a lots of argument (pro and contra) in this regards. After all the recent experiences from A-stan and Iraq, the USAF very much has such intentions. That's why the F-35 (sillently) underwent testing of its capability to survive hits from hand-held firearms, few months ago. To surprise of not few, it failed, and miserably at it: a single simulated 7.62mm hit in the area of intake ducting proved 'sufficient' to bring it down.

It is for such reasons that already the IRIAF (yes, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) moved towards medium-alt ops back in 1982, the IrAF (Iraqi Air Force) moved in same direction from around 1986 or so; the USAF followed that fashion in 1991, the RAF too, rest of the NATO over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, then the IASF over Lebanon in 2006, the RSAF over Yemen, in 2009-2010, and all the possible NATO-allied air forces over Libya in 2011 too... Except there is urgent requirement to strafe some target with the cannon (which, as mentioned above, actually ocurs quite often in such conflicts like in A-stan and Iraq), hardly anybody is flying below 15,000ft when in combat, nowadays.

But that's also why there is ever more use of UAVs, and types like AT-6 and A-29 are now very much 'en vogue' (even though completely ignored by the USAF).

Edited October 2, 2013 by Tom Cooper

[Tom Cooper]

A human pilot going into harms way will be on alert & ready to react to any threat he/she encounters. Replace a pilot with a computer nerd, put him/her in a nice wee room miles away from danger and what happens? Well, it's human nature. When not under threat we relax. Attention lapses. Along comes an ancient manned MiG 21 which then blows the bejesus out of our brand new,expensive state of the art drone before our expensively trained nerd has time to wake up and react?

Add to this the fact that nobody wants to fly (USAF) UAVs any more.

Reason is rather 'obvious': there is no promotion for 'office job in 'Vegas' (read: for working 9-5 shifts inside an air-conditioned shelter at Nellis AFB).

This affair alone is meanwhile more damaging than any kind of combat- (or other sorts of) 'attrition'...

This aircraft basically ended the US Navy's 40 year history of developing cutting edge aircraft designs, and ushered in a period of major conservatism that resulted in the F/A-18E/F, then the JSF.It may have been a spectacular failure, but it really had a huge influence on military power. I think that's really interesting in its own way.

...OK, but don't forget that one of major reasons for cancellation of the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II (aka 'Flying Burito'), was just another in an entire spate of USN's failures to field a serviceable and (financially) acceptable 'cutting edge aircraft design', in the 1970s and 1980s.

The F-14A was 'great looking plane', but killed by its poor engines. And the USN and P&W did their best to spoil it (eventually, more money was spent for making TF-30s operational than if they would have been replaced by something 'made by GE'). The (original) F-14B was 'KIA' due to cost overruns and inflation already in the early 1970s (and definitely terminated by 'Iranian withdrawal' in 1979); the F-14C too... the F-14D was much too late (and then also too few, thanks to Channey).

The A-6F and A-7F were both killed in order to save the F-14D, in 1986... and the F-14D then finally killed by preference for a 'minor upgrade' of the F/A-18, that resulted in an entirely new and far more expensive F/A-18E/F - which can do less than even an upgraded F-14D could (not to talk about 'Strike Tomcat')...

So, at least to me, it seems the USN's '40 year history of developing cutting edge aircraft design' died already in the late 1960s (around the time the VFX = F-14A design was 'frozen'), and lasted rather something like 20 years... The following 20 years were spent with USN doing best to ruin that story.

And if one thinks that the USAF is 'vice free' in this regards... well, sufficient to say that the latest AC-130Js come into being in following fashion: the Pentagon first pays some 400+ million to Lockheed to deliver a 'vanilla' C-130J, then pays it another 100 million (or more) to 're-build' that C-130J into an AC-130J...

Whatever, the net result is: nobody should be surprised by 'preference for UAVs', and even less by all the cost overruns and failures of the F-35: especially the later are in 'best traditions' of the Pentagon in the last 40 years...

That all said, I do hope people like Mike might still find some interest in 'modern jets', then the story of various air forces and air warfare in the last 60 years is really full of '1st class motifs'.

Edited October 2, 2013 by Tom Cooper

[Navy Bird]

Hey Tom, the A-12 was dubbed the Flying Dorito, not Burrito. You know, like the tortilla chip.

Cheers,

Bill

[David H]

Hey Tom, the A-12 was dubbed the Flying Dorito, not Burrito. You know, like the tortilla chip.

Cheers,

Bill

Or as we referred to it as, "The Macho Nacho".

-d-

[XV107]

Is there any formal evidence of the UAV gaining ace' status in Vietnam, or dates details of the engagements? I only ask since there are two PhD theses underway (one close to being examined) that I know of looking at potential air-air use of UAVs (from different perspectives which is how there are two of them), and neither author has found evidence that supports the notion that any RPV (as they were at the time) carried out air-air engagements - they may have been looking in the wrong places - and it would be interesting to see what there is.

By the by, I can also point you to several individuals - but won't for PERSEC reasons - who have done a UAV job and gained promotion. Attitudes are changing regarding UAVs - slowly in some quarters, I'll grant you - but the prospect of operating a UAV in support of operations as opposed to doing a ground tour in (say) procurement has certain attractions that people are starting to buy into.

[XV107]

I have to disagree about the idea that the Iranians started the move to medium level - or more accurately, I think, clarify that point. There is open source USAF material from 1979 which talks about how various European NATO nations were horrified at the thought of the USAF not going in at low level on every occasion; one of the key issues here was the delivery profiles required for late-1970s and early-1980s era PGMs and getting out of the amount of fire that AAA could put up. The USAF did not, of course, abandon low level and nor, for that matter, did the RAF.

I'd suggest that where the Iranians can claim credit is in being the first - or amongst the first - to do medium level in actual conflict; the USAF had to wait until 1991 to put this approach into action (alongside some early LL operations and others at low altitudes where it was sensible to do so). Both the RAF and USAF discovered that if you are going to put all your platforms at medium level, it's a good idea to ensure that they have the means to deliver ordnance effectively from that altitude band.

And again, I'd dissent from the view that the USAF is planning to send its F-35s in at low level in a non-permissive environment or on a regular basis. Yes, there will be occasions when this makes sense - if you're replacing the A-10 and F-16 with the F-35, then the aircraft simply cannot be kept away from possible Afghanistan/Iraq type conflicts that the US may find it necessary to be involved in; that, in turn, means that the ability to operate safely at low(ish) level will be required - but it doesn't automatically translate to the use of low level as the standard profile by the F-35 at low level in high threat environments, or regular exploitation of low level unless circumstance demands.

[Navy Bird]

Or as we referred to it as, "The Macho Nacho".

-d-

Ha! I like that one too!

Cheers,

Bill

[John Thompson]

Hey Tom, the A-12 was dubbed the Flying Dorito, not Burrito. You know, like the tortilla chip.

Cheers,

Bill

He must have been flashing back to the Flying Burrito Brothers...

John

[Crossy]

In the end the aircraft will change manned or unmanned. But the grunt on the ground will still have his rifle and still be the one hugging the earth while the air force drops his bombs and come home back in time to watch top gun for the 20 millionth time with a nice cold coke and a warm pie

[Procopius]

War is hell. Sometimes it's a cold pie and a warm coke.

[Tom Cooper]

Hey Tom, the A-12 was dubbed the Flying Dorito, not Burrito. You know, like the tortilla chip.

Cheers,

Bill

Cheers, Bill - and sorry: I don't like Mexican food, so no wonder I mixed it up there.

Regarding other questions:

Is there any formal evidence of the UAV gaining ace' status in Vietnam, or dates details of the engagements?

The research I did in this regards must be something like 15 or so years old (definitely undertaken before internet became more widespread). I did launch a number of related FOIA inquiries some 11-12 years ago, but the Pentagon was not particularly curious to release anything, and all of these were turned down. So, something like 8-9 years ago, I ended cross-examining the info provided in oral form from specific sources (primarily retired USAF personnel from 4025th and 6091st RS') with what can be found in books by Istvan Toperczer (about North Vietnamese AF in combat).

Of course, this is anything but 'official'. Yet, my conclusion is that the North Vietnamese have lost around a dozen of MiGs while attempting to intercept various of AQM-34Ls (and downing around 8-9 of these). Especially problematic proved drones equipped with HATRAC-system, which could not only recognize a SAM-launch or airborne interception, but also steer the UAV ionto deception/evasive manoeuvring. In other cases it was little else but good/bad luck, including programming mistakes (a particularly famous op was a result of an AQM-34L being programmed to fly at 3 - instead of 300ft...).

Five of losses mentioned by Toperczer (i.e. provided to him by official places in Hanoi) 'match' dates at which one, specific HATRAC-equipped AQM-34L was airborne over North Vietnam, and most of details about losses in question match recollections of USAF operators. Three of the 'kills' it scored were 'no-weapon-kills', and all were scored in 1970-1971 period. One of earliest resulted in a MiG-21-pilot from the 921st FR blotting out his wingman with a R-3S/K-13/AA-2 Atoll that was fired at the drone, and another from the AQM-34L 'dragging' a pursuing MiG-21 into cross-fire of North Vietnamese SAMs and flak...

While not 'confirming' any of kills in question, I would say this photo did not come into being 'by accident':

I have to disagree about the idea that the Iranians started the move to medium level - or more accurately, I think, clarify that point. There is open source USAF material from 1979 which talks about how various European NATO nations were horrified at the thought of the USAF not going in at low level on every occasion; one of the key issues here was the delivery profiles required for late-1970s and early-1980s era PGMs and getting out of the amount of fire that AAA could put up. The USAF did not, of course, abandon low level and nor, for that matter, did the RAF.

Well, perhaps the USAF didn't abandon medium level ops, but what happened when 'Americans' attempted that kind of ops in the 1980s, can be seen from results of USN's strike on Druze and Syrian positions off Beirut, in - was it October or November - 1983?

Makes one wonder why the US Navy subsequently initiated the 'Strike' Weapons School (meanwhile a part of the Top Gun syllabus), the USAF followed the fashion - and both were more than happy to go low level when attacking Libya, in April 1986...

Anyway, for 1st hand details on 'Iranians going high' please see one of these videos (not sure which episode it was, 1, 2 or 3, but it nicely explains encounters between IRIAF F-14s and IrAF Mirages, while protecting a division of F-4Es underway at something like 15,000-20,000ft over Iraq, in 1982):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sya-9XDpfiM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BJ1cdMHzKM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNmgR_zcTNI

(And before anybody comes to complain about 'wrong' animations of Iraqi MiG-21s and 'MiG-25s' [the latter look very much MiG-31-nish to me]: sorry, that's neither the fault of interviewed IRIAF pilots, nor mine, and certainly not decreasing the importance of recollections in question.)

Edited October 3, 2013 by Tom Cooper

[-Neu-]

Anyway, for 1st hand details on 'Iranians going high' please see one of these videos (not sure which episode it was, 1, 2 or 3, but it nicely explains encounters between IRIAF F-14s and IrAF Mirages, while protecting a division of F-4Es underway at something like 15,000-20,000ft over Iraq, in 1982):

(And before anybody comes to complain about 'wrong' animations of Iraqi MiG-21s and 'MiG-25s' [the latter look very much MiG-31-nish to me]: sorry, that's neither the fault of interviewed IRIAF pilots, nor mine, and certainly not decreasing the importance of recollections in question.)

Thanks for posting that. In truth however I don't fully agree with your line of argumentation. First off, I just can't see how the U.S. military "learns" from the IRIAF forces.... I have never seen an expansive lessons learned exercise emanate from that conflict. Its certainly nothing like how the Yom Kippur War did have a major impact on the military's thinking.

Rather I can see several ways that the U.S. military's preference for mid altitude manifested itself in the 1980s and 1990s. Initially the low level tactics developed out of the lessons of Vietnam and Yom Kippur; where individuals thought that the increasing efficacy of Soviet AD meant that they needed to "get under" their effective altitude to survive. However this was an erroneous lesson; the USAF lost significantly more aircraft from AAA than SA-2/3.

Doctrinally, the there has always been a general prefrence for mid to high level strikes, particularly in the U.S. Navy. This was centered in particular around the "the raid" concept, with heavily armed strike packages that increasingly utilized PGMs to undertake strikes. Moreover I would argue that the Navy had a different focus than the Air Force: they likely thought they would be employed against fixed targets, in less heavily defended areas compared to the "show" in Europe (The Med, Persian Gulf, Kola Peninsula and WESTPAC.) Thus there was less of a need for low-level dash to avoid heavy AD concentrations, or close air support.

El Dorado canyon is an aberration, but I suspect that might be because of the heavy F-111 use during that conflict, which was entirely designed for low level ingress and egress. Its probably best understood through the lens of jamming aircraft. The U.S. Navy's primary jamming aircraft was the Prowler: it would escort large strike packages and defend them directly. The Air Force's was the EF-111, which was more intended to provide area denial than direct support.

Yet even in the late 1970s and 80s you saw a doctrinal shift away from low altitude penetration within the AF, championed by the commander of TAC, Gen. Bill Creech (1978 to 1984). He disagreed with the prevailing belief that low-level penetration was essential for survival, and pushes for more mid-to-high altitude aircraft. Creech implements several major projects, as part of the Airland Battle concept. The "deep battle" and night time operations become a major focus. He championed the development of new battlefield control systems like the Precision Location Strike System in the late 1970s (followed up by JSTARS in the mid 1980s), which would have basically allowed for more effective targeting than had been previously been available. This would have alleviated the need for low-level identification and strike of targets. Creech also championed the purchase of the F-15E to undertake deep battle, and the widespread purchase of new precision guided munitions to undertake high altitude strike. Creech's influence alone can be regarded as instrumental in obtaining the tools that enable mid-to-high altitude strike in the 1990s.

The second major factor was the experience of the Gulf War, and the political climate of the 1990s after Somalia. The Allied forces certainly utilized mid level strike packages much like U.S. Navy doctrine for much of their main strikes against targets deep inside Iraq, with remarkable effectiveness and low losses. However low level operations (CAS and strike) generally resulted in significant loss rates: the vast majority of losses occurred due to AAA or MANPADs. Then came Somalia and the deep aversion towards casualties of any kind. That results in a hard ceiling (15,000 feet or something like that) being placed on Balkan operations in order to prevent AAA and MANPADs losses. That likely facilitated the general preference for mid-to-high altitude operations.

Furthermore these conflicts saw a general shift in AF conflict thinking. CAS wasn't a major considerations. Rather the AF, Navy and DoD started considering how airpower can be a tool of its own to win a war. You saw the growth of thinking (Effects Based Operations, and OODA loop for national decision making) that are aimed at that outcome. Consequently, the military only looked at attacking fixed targets, in order to coerce opposing decision-makers to carry out their will. That can be done at mid-altitude, against larger, more fixed, targets.

The third was the advance in technology (which fits into the doctrinal developments). The increasing use of PGMs allowed for accurate weapons delivery at mid to high altitude, as I noted before. There is a realization even in the 1970s that guided weapons launched from mid altitude are significantly more accurate than low-level dumb bomb strikes. However you also had the development of better targeting devices (LANTIRN and Reapers), that allowed for more stand off weaponry to be employed. Finally stealth aircraft like the F-117 and B-2 really pushed the AF to move towards this area... low level really defeats their advantages, meaning that the military thinking increasingly moves towards their style of operations.

Sorry for the long-windedness. Its really a topic that requires some extended discussion.

Edited October 3, 2013 by -Neu-

[-Neu-]

There is quite a lots of argument (pro and contra) in this regards. After all the recent experiences from A-stan and Iraq, the USAF very much has such intentions. That's why the F-35 (sillently) underwent testing of its capability to survive hits from hand-held firearms, few months ago. To surprise of not few, it failed, and miserably at it: a single simulated 7.62mm hit in the area of intake ducting proved 'sufficient' to bring it down.

I think you're talking about the OUE evaluation, on the Block I aircraft. Wasn't particularly silent; it was widely reported. A large part of the problem is that the OBIGGS system is not functional (which is also why its not able to fly through lightning right now), and there were several weight reduction measure that have increased its vulnerability. In reality a lot of these will be addresed before the aircraft enters service.

XV107 hit the nail on the head; The USAF and USMC will employ the F-35 to do CAS at medium altitude, utilizing a new, and smaller generation of PGMs like SDB. While it may undertake strafing attacks from time to time, the general thought is that its DAS and EOTS systems, MADL and new, more precise weapons, will be how the military undertakes CAS in the future. Low level work will likely only be reserved for low risk situations, like in Afghanistan.

...OK, but don't forget that one of major reasons for cancellation of the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II (aka 'Flying Burito'), was just another in an entire spate of USN's failures to field a serviceable and (financially) acceptable 'cutting edge aircraft design', in the 1970s and 1980s.

The F-14A was 'great looking plane', but killed by its poor engines. And the USN and P&W did their best to spoil it (eventually, more money was spent for making TF-30s operational than if they would have been replaced by something 'made by GE'). The (original) F-14B was 'KIA' due to cost overruns and inflation already in the early 1970s (and definitely terminated by 'Iranian withdrawal' in 1979); the F-14C too... the F-14D was much too late (and then also too few, thanks to Channey).

The A-6F and A-7F were both killed in order to save the F-14D, in 1986... and the F-14D then finally killed by preference for a 'minor upgrade' of the F/A-18, that resulted in an entirely new and far more expensive F/A-18E/F - which can do less than even an upgraded F-14D could (not to talk about 'Strike Tomcat')...

That's not how I'd characterize it. The F-14 had a lot of serious problems. It was only more effective in terms of pure aerodynamic performance. However if you look at cost, sortie generation rates, and expected upgrade requirements, the F-14 was a huge millstone around the Navy's neck that they needed to get out of.

So, at least to me, it seems the USN's '40 year history of developing cutting edge aircraft design' died already in the late 1960s (around the time the VFX = F-14A design was 'frozen'), and lasted rather something like 20 years... The following 20 years were spent with USN doing best to ruin that story.

Despite its dismal record, money was still being poured into Navy research and development until 1990. The Navy gets itself its own light weight fighter program in the 1970s (F/A-18A), then a major upgrade of the A-6, F-14 and then a stealth bomber of its own (not to mention a whole whack of unique armament programs). Really the spigot only ends around 1990 with the A-12 program collapse. The USN then gets an upgraded hornet and vague promise of a new lightweight fighter (what would ultimately result in JAST and the F-35.) Its forced into a whole raft of joint programs that it might have not been before 1990. Now part of this was because of the end of the Reagan buildup and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However the USN really stops attempting to develop cutting edge material right after the end of the A-12 program.

Whatever, the net result is: nobody should be surprised by 'preference for UAVs', and even less by all the cost overruns and failures of the F-35: especially the later are in 'best traditions' of the Pentagon in the last 40 years...

Actually, UAVs are being sacrificed for the F-35. Looking at the future budget requests, and stated funding priorities, USAF has stated their three major systems are F-35, Next Generation Bomber and KC-X programs. Lt. General Jack Welsh's comments in the past month really emphasize that.

Edited October 3, 2013 by -Neu-

[Tom Cooper]

Thanks for posting that. In truth however I don't fully agree with your line of argumentation. First off, I just can't see how the U.S. military "learns" from the IRIAF forces.... I have never seen an expansive lessons learned exercise emanate from that conflict.

Just a second: I nowhere said that any kind of 'lessons learned' from Iran-Iraq War resulted in any kind of change of US air warfare doctrine.

On the contrary, I simply listed the chronological order of specific air forces going 'up' (or 'down') in regards of their way of operating.

But now that you mention this... yup, I do find it ironic (almost 'bordering on absurd') that the US-trained (and equipped) Iranians moved 'up' due to their own experiences with Iraqis, while the USAF and USN (which couldn't care less about Iranian experiences, despite the fact that a number of 'lessons learned' type of reports about these were forwarded down the chain of command during the mid-1980s), first moved down (and did so barely a year after Iranian decision to go up), before moving to altitudes at which they are operating today (years later).

Perhaps they should have studied Iranian ops more closely..? ;-)

Doctrinally, the there has always been a general prefrence for mid to high level strikes, particularly in the U.S. Navy. This was centered in particular around the "the raid" concept, with heavily armed strike packages that increasingly utilized PGMs to undertake strikes. Moreover I would argue that the Navy had a different focus than the Air Force: they likely thought they would be employed against fixed targets, in less heavily defended areas compared to the "show" in Europe (The Med, Persian Gulf, Kola Peninsula and WESTPAC.) Thus there was less of a need for low-level dash to avoid heavy AD concentrations, or close air support.

This is something where I do feel I need to 'counterargument'. If there was a US service with a different focus and facing less heavily defended areas, then the USMC. Otherwise, the USN was gearing up through all of the 1970s and 1980s for fighting against massive, 'full array' and definitely '1st class' defences of Soviet 'bastions' (which ranged from Backfires and Bears to MiG-31s, Su-27s and SA-10/12s) - like those on the Kola Peninsula or Kamtchatka Peninsula (and in the Vladivostok area), Krimean Peninsula etc. Between others, one reason was to search and destroy Soviet SSBNs inside or near their bases, before these could reach firing positions in the Arctic. That's why the USN went through a similar process like the one you described for the USAF, including the relevant advances in technology, and precisely during the same period of time (see the introduction of the NTDS, Spruecan-class ASW-destroyers, Aegis-class cruisers, 688-class SSNs, F-14/AIM-54, S-3A and 'multi-role' carriers instead of dedicated ASW-carriers, etc., etc.).

That all said, and although I agree that there was always something like 'preference for medium and high altitudes' within the USN, especially early ops over Iraq in 1991 have shown that there were significant doctrinal differences even between specific carrier air wings. Some of these operated in relatively compact strike packages (CVW-3), others not (CVW-17); some at low level, others at medium levels; there were CVWs where attack pilots didn't want any fighter escorts ('attracting too much attention'), and others wanted them 'all the time' etc.

IMHO, the dispute about which solution was better was actually never 'won' by either side (i.e. neither by proponents of low-alt or high-alt ops) - at least not on the battlefield. It was rather so that the proponents of high-alt ops 'prevailed' - because rapid degeneration of Iraqi air defences resulted in a situation where a decision was taken to go high. All along the line 'why take more risk (and losses) than necessary...?' Thanks to such experiences and subsequent developments in technology, as well as US/NATO subsequently only fighting '3rd class' opponents when it comes to air warfare capabilities (Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan etc.), yes, ever since the deployment of air power is characterised by 'unromantic', high alt, stand-off ops. And resulting fighter-aircraft designs are killing the hobbies of people like poor Matthew.

But, as mentioned above, experiences from Afghanistan and - even more so - Iraq, have shown that even in such, 'modern-day' & 'take care to minimalize losses' wars, there is not always some AH-64 around to do the strafing, and even Hellfire-equipped UCAVs are not always around... and then super-expensive 'top-notch' jets have to go 'down, low and dirty', time and again - and definitely more often than planned (of course: that's one of those standard problems with any wars; things seldom go the way they are planned to go).

Anyway, yup, this is a topic that deserves a lot more debate - for which I'm simply lacking time (and this forum is also probably not the best place for all of it).

Thus, let me end by coming back to my first post in this regards, and recommend Matthew to do something the USAF/USN should have done more often: forget the boring, 'grey-in-grey' 'NATO-style' jets, and go for 'exotic' places and their planes. There are much, much more (and, especially 'more interesting') things to find there.

Edited October 4, 2013 by Tom Cooper

[dambuster]

A couple of thoughts to put to the experts.

Delivery of munitions from medium level leaves a greater window of vulnerability for the ordnance which (currently) isn't able to deploy its own countermeasures. A cheap, mass-produced Phalanx system around key strategic targets could negate any effort to deliver on target - memories of T42s allegedly tracking and taking out Exocets during the Falklands conflict.

UCAVs overcome the biggest limitation IMHO of manned aircraft - cockpit real-estate. In the information-rich battle space, data fusion may not be the ideal solution when having to be presented on a couple of 12 inch AMLCDs and wide angle HUD. Wall to wall 46" plasma displays give the UCAV operator(s) a massive tactical advantage, a bit like having front, mid-upper, cheek, rear and belly gunners, all able to react,decide and operate independently, while the autopilot takes care if the stick pushing.

Peter

[Bobski]

A couple of thoughts to put to the experts.

Delivery of munitions from medium level leaves a greater window of vulnerability for the ordnance which (currently) isn't able to deploy its own countermeasures. A cheap, mass-produced Phalanx system around key strategic targets could negate any effort to deliver on target - memories of T42s allegedly tracking and taking out Exocets during the Falklands conflict.

UCAVs overcome the biggest limitation IMHO of manned aircraft - cockpit real-estate. In the information-rich battle space, data fusion may not be the ideal solution when having to be presented on a couple of 12 inch AMLCDs and wide angle HUD. Wall to wall 46" plasma displays give the UCAV operator(s) a massive tactical advantage, a bit like having front, mid-upper, cheek, rear and belly gunners, all able to react,decide and operate independently, while the autopilot takes care if the stick pushing.

Peter

Type 42 didn't have Phalanx during the Falklands and never took out any Exocets. The only interaction between Type 42s and Exocet involved the ships being hit by them.

A Phalanx-type system would not negate an air attack any more than ZSUs do. Knock them out with a HARM and then carry on as normal.