New Airfix Hurricane Mk.1 Boxart

[dragonlanceHR]

Does it get any better than this?

If they repeat it in 1/48, then yes.

Vedran

[Edgar]

I was in no doubt about what you said, but thought the Airfix site was less clear and the windscreen armour would apply to 2-blade prop Hurricanes.

I've never been able to find out exactly when the armoured windscreen was fitted to Hurricanes (in fact the only solid evidence, for the Spitfire, is Stanford Tuck's Dunkirk reference to it, in his biography.)

[AirfixAndy]

111.................very nice.

Same here....should look good next to a Trembler F3 as a now and then build.

Andy

[cossack52]

did the belgians have 4x.5 brownings on their hurricanes?if so,why didn't we?!

[Test Graham]

We didn't because in earlier trials they had been proven to have no significant advantage, probably because this was true against fabric-covered aircraft with no defensive armour (as was normal at the time of the trials). Once the decision had been made then we were committed for several years, and we had later committed to the 20mm cannon as a follow-on weapon. It would take a major effort to change to a different weapon at a time when maximum production was more important than marginal differences in performance, with an even better gun on its way.

[Beard]

According to 'The Hawker Hurricane' by Francis K. Mason, it was intended that the Belgian Hurricanes have .50 Brownings but only two had been completed by Avoins Fairey by the time the Germans invaded.

[Ed Russell]

It might (should) be in the instructions, but the Hurricane, with 2-blade prop, couldn't have armour fitted (one of the reasons for the rush to change to the 3-blader.)

Edgar

frankly the kit hasn't been released yet and some folks are already waiting to pull it (to) bits?

Well I have looked through the whole thread and I can't see anyone "waiting to pull it to bits" Perhaps you might clarify what you mean.

The Belgian marking were available as an ABT decal and maybe others. Good choice.

x

Edited August 22, 2013 by Ed Russell

[XV107]

The Belgian Brownings (FN had the licence) were 13.2mm in calibre, and that small difference in size meant that you could do some interesting things with the round. We looked at taking the 13.2mm weapon (as opposed to the US 12.7mm, the issues with which Graham has outlined) and developing AP and HE & HE-T rounds for it, with development of the aforementioned loads for the Hotchkiss round (that used in the 13.2mm Browning) taking place between 1938 and 1940.

GF Wallace [if I recall the name correctly] in his book on weapons for the RAF mentions that there was a plan to take the 13.2mm Brownings into service as well as using the 20mm, but the fall of Belgium occurred before anything could really happen - we certainly went as far as seeking to procure (or possibly even procuring) dummy 13.2mm rounds to assist in the development of the feed mechanism for installation in RAF fighters.

Again from memory, the FN 13.2mm Browning was a couple of kilos (no more than 5, but more than 1) lighter than the US M2 50-cal as well as having a higher rate of fire.

Edit: I should add that I'm not suggesting that it would've been easy to get the 13.2mm into the Spitfire and Hurricane so that some of the complaints about the hitting power of the .303 that came up during the Battle of Britain would've been solved - issues such as weight, the design of the whole armament installation (just how many 13.2mm Brownings would you have got into the Spitfire's wing? And with how much ammo?), getting rounds on target (see the Gyro gunsight's benefits and - I think Edgar will have the detail on this - IIRC, there was some connection between the installation of this sight onto Spitfires and the adoption of the 0.5in for the 'E'-wing), the establishment of production facilities and so on would all have been issues; my point is simply that there was work conducted on the 13.2mm Browning with the notion that it might be of use to the RAF.

Edited August 22, 2013 by XV107

[Edgar]

Experiments found that the .5" was no better than the .303" at penetrating German armour, hence the decision to stay with a battery of 8 of the smaller guns, so that, in a deflection shot, some would penetrate the cockpit and disable the crew. The plan foundered because the average pilot couldn't master the art of deflection shooting, and this state of affairs remained until the arrival of the gyro gunsight, which did the majority of the work for the pilot; this made him more likely to hit what he was aiming at, so the .5" finally came into its own.

It was this problem which saw the rise of the Defiant, since its combat plan was to fly alongside, under, or in front of an enemy bomber, and pour fire into the un-protected (from those angles) cockpit. Nobody had envisaged bombers, over the U.K., being escorted by fighters.

When talking about fitting heavier guns into the fighters of 1940, remember that the ammunition had to be as close to the CoG as possible, so that its use had as minimal an effect, on the trim, as possible; apart from what the extra weight (the .5" was 35-46lbs heavier) would do to the wing structure, the .5" barrel was 18" longer, with most of it having to stick out in front, causing drag (the outermost .303", on the Spitfire, already needed a small bulge, in the upper cover, to get it in.)

[Enzo the Magnificent]

Now, all I want for Christmas is some 1/72 scale WWII RAF twins from Airfix...Blenheims, Beaufighters,

Beaufighter? Are you sure?

I'm sick and tired of telling people there's no demand for it...

[JasonC]

Experiments found that the .5" was no better than the .303" at penetrating German armour, hence the decision to stay with a battery of 8 of the smaller guns, so that, in a deflection shot, some would penetrate the cockpit and disable the crew. The plan foundered because the average pilot couldn't master the art of deflection shooting, and this state of affairs remained until the arrival of the gyro gunsight, which did the majority of the work for the pilot; this made him more likely to hit what he was aiming at, so the .5" finally came into its own.

I'm a little surprised that the 0.5" was found to be no better for armour penetration; simple physics would suggest that larger calibre rounds will get through more armour than smaller ones.

Very interesting point as well about deflection shooting. While I don't think it was impossible for the 'average' pilot to master deflection shooting, it was certainly expensive in terms of training hours. As a bit of an aside, the US Navy managed to consistently train its pilots in the art of deflection shooting. One of the appendices to Lundstrom's excellent 'The First Team' covers the topic in some depth:

Given the fast-paced, unpredictable nature of aerial combat, it often was impossible for the pilot to choose the type of attack or counterattack he would make. Perhaps he lacked the initial altitude advantage or speed that would have vouchsafed him such latitude. The Navy’s gunnery training with its emphasis on deflection shooting equipped its pilots to make successful attacks from almost any position relative to the target. Once the pilot began his run, he could base his estimate of target speed and deflection on his previous experience in making the four standard approaches. Because of this training, the target presented to him a recognizable aspect in his sights, and he could adjust his lead accordingly. Given Zeros and other nimble enemy aircraft, the naval pilot most often had only a snap burst, full-deflection shot. He had to score with his first bullets or he might not have a second chance to shoot. Thus it was matter of “shooting from the hip,” where skill in deflection shooting made most of the difference.

The pilots of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting. With the partial exception of the Imperial Japanese Navy, no other air forces during World War 2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots. For the U.S. Army Air Forces, the Royal Air Force, the Luftwaffe, the Red Air Force, and all the rest, stern and head-on approaches with their minimal deflection angles comprised the primary attacks. Only a tiny minority of their pilots realized the potential of deflection shooting and taught themselves the techniques, usually after extensive combat experience.

Aside from lack of knowledge of the proper ways to make deflection shots, tangible reasons existed why other air forces had trouble emulating the U.S. Navy. The most important was visibility over the nose of the attacking fighter. When executing overhead and side runs from a full deflection angle (60 to 90 degrees). the attacker had to place his point of aim well ahead of the target, the distance depending on the target’s speed. To shoot accurately and obviate risk of collision, ideally the fighter pilot had to see both the target and where his tracers were going; thus both the target and the aiming point should appear in his gunsight. This required excellent visibility over the nose of the attacker’s aircraft. Otherwise when allotting sufficient lead for full deflection, the pilot would lose sight of his target when it disappeared under the nose of his own plane.

Among its other qualities, the Grumman F4F Wildcat with its radial engine under a sloping cowling and cockpit installed high over a mid-wing fuselage had the necessary visibility over the nose, a down angle of 6½ degrees required for full deflection shooting. This quality of good vision forward and below evolved also in connection with carrier landings. Thus naval fighter pilots came to expect that attribute as necessary for good shooting and good carrier landings. Land-based fighters often sacrificed visibility for streamlining. Their pilots sat so low and so far back in the aircraft that visibility over the nose was very poor, making deflection shooting extremely difficult even if the pilots knew how to do it.

regards,

Jason

[Test Graham]

When the comparative gun trials were made, no-one was thinking of defensive armour. The predominant cause of aircraft loss would be damage to the pilot, engine, or cooling system. There might be some lucky shot that damaged an aircraft structurally, but this was expected to be rare in the days of fabric-covered aircraft. The difference between the two machine guns was slight. One on one the 0.5 would do more damage, but you could have two 0.303 for the same weight and this doubled the chance of hitting something important. It has been pointed out that the large stocks of 0.303 ammunition left over from WW2 could have influenced the decision, but the Army would have had adequate use for the same.

The war was fought, however, with structurally stronger aircraft generally with at least minimal armour. It is unavoidably true that, all other things being the same, 0.5 will penetrate more armour than 0.303, simple physics confirms that. It also offers greater range. The practical question is just where does this becomes important compared to the amount of armour (=weight) capable of being carried without excessive damage to the performance and handling of the aircraft, bearing in mind the ranges at which most combats took place. There's no simple trade-off.

[dragonlanceHR]

IIRC I remember reading somewhere (Len Deighton - Fighter?) that there were simply insufficient stocks of .50 ammunition in UK, and don't forget, this was before Lend-Lease time, so ammunition had to be purchased overseas.

And Air Ministry was enamored with the De Wilde bullet.

[Selwyn]

I'm a little surprised that the 0.5" was found to be no better for armour penetration; simple physics would suggest that larger calibre rounds will get through more armour than smaller ones.

Very interesting point as well about deflection shooting. While I don't think it was impossible for the 'average' pilot to master deflection shooting, it was certainly expensive in terms of training hours. As a bit of an aside, the US Navy managed to consistently train its pilots in the art of deflection shooting. One of the appendices to Lundstrom's excellent 'The First Team' covers the topic in some depth:

regards,

Jason

What you haven't considered was time.

The RAF at the time of the BoB needed pilots fast to replace chaps lost in in the battle of France and the early stages of the BoB. You hear in many accounts of that time that new pilots arrived on squadrons with as little as 8 to 10 hours on spitfires, hardly enough time to learn even the rudiments of air gunnery let alone deflection shooting.

The US navy had time to digest the lessons learnt in air combat in Europe, and time to develop training methods to teach the gunnery skills its pilots would require before Pearl Harbour happened.

Selwyn

[Meatbox8]

Wow. Great box art. Looking forward to having an early Mk1. Airfix are playing a blinder at the mo.

[Meatbox8]

Beaufighter? Are you sure?

I'm sick and tired of telling people there's no demand for it...

Oh, I agree, I only want at least ten.

[crobinsonh]

Well the Germans did very well for not being taught deflection shooting when you look at the number of kills their aces scored.

[Paolo6691]

Belgian decals!

I will grab one as soon as I see it around

[JasonC]

What you haven't considered was time.

The RAF at the time of the BoB needed pilots fast to replace chaps lost in in the battle of France and the early stages of the BoB. You hear in many accounts of that time that new pilots arrived on squadrons with as little as 8 to 10 hours on spitfires, hardly enough time to learn even the rudiments of air gunnery let alone deflection shooting.

The US navy had time to digest the lessons learnt in air combat in Europe, and time to develop training methods to teach the gunnery skills its pilots would require before Pearl Harbour happened.

I wasn't really speculating as to the reasons, more just noting the facts on the ground, as it were. It's an interesting point, though Lundstrom notes that the USN began training its pilots in deflection gunnery in the 1920's, so it wasn't a late reaction to war experience. As you observe, by the time you start to run short of pilots it's a little late to increase their training requirements.

The RAF had just as much time pre-war to spend on training, it's just that it chose to concentrate fighter training arounds things like formation flying and the Fighting Area attacks. Which might have seemed like a good idea at the time, but once the Luftwaffe acquired Channel bases...

Regards,

Jason

Edited August 24, 2013 by JasonC

[Max Headroom]

Looks nice and would need two for each of the choices. Any idea what the starter set would have?

Now then Airfix, upscale that to 1/48 pleeease.

Trevor the happy

[Edgar]

The RAF had just as much time pre-war to spend on training, it's just that it chose to concentrate fighter training arounds things like formation flying and the Fighting Area attacks. Which might have seemed like a good idea at the time, but once the Luftwaffe acquired Channel bases...

Unfortunately, you're falling into the old faithful "20:20 hindsight" trap; if the RAF/Air Ministry had known that their major ally, France, was going to be defeated and overrun, in a matter of weeks, their strategy might well have been different.

When you're expecting (and planning for) bombers, possibly with relatively slow twin-engine escorts, all capable of carrying heavier armour than a single-engine fighter, concentrating on the 20mm cannon, plus faster-firing small machine-guns with a larger load of ammunition, starts to make sense.

When Dowding asked for seat armour, Sholto-Douglas was against it, for the Spitfire, because he said that there was nothing in the air as fast as the Spitfire, so only an incompetent pilot would allow an enemy to get behind him; that changed when the 109s appeared in France.

Edgar

[JasonC]

As I think I said, I'm sure it seemed like a good idea at the time.

The Fighting Area method was a particular solution to a particular problem, and unfortunately inflexible when circumstances changed. Teaching basics such as deflection shooting I think gave the people at the sharp end the tools that they could use to adapt to the situation in which they found themselves.

[Adam Maas]

Well the Germans did very well for not being taught deflection shooting when you look at the number of kills their aces scored.

The German Experten ran up their massive kill counts by being in combat for 3-6 years, much longer than Allied pilots who typically would rotate out of combat roles quickly in comparison, and those kill counts were run up primarily in the East, where they often were flying against poorly-trained Soviet pilots (the Soviets ended up with a lot of good pilots, but their training methods were fairly darwinian, pretty much show them the basics and see if they survive to learn how to do it right. This made them relatively easy prey for the Experten). The average German pilots were probably a little worse trained than the average Allied pilot by mid-war.

[Test Graham]

I think your views of Soviet training methods are influenced by the mid-war period of severe shortages and the need to replace heavy losses - resulting in more heavy losses, of course. They did pass thorough this stage, with late-war Soviet aircrew being rated more highly by their opponents. Who were of course passing through the reduced training/rapid replacement stage themselves by then. As indeed did the Japanese, and to some extent the RAF, where the rapid expansion of late 1940/41 lead to a considerable dilution of skills in the frontline.

It would however be interesting to learn a little more about late Soviet training, a subject which is little covered in most nations histories - I think the British side is perhaps better covered than any other.

[Adam Maas]

I think your views of Soviet training methods are influenced by the mid-war period of severe shortages and the need to replace heavy losses - resulting in more heavy losses, of course.

Indeed that's the period I'm primarily referring to, as it's also when the Experten acquired the bulk of their kills.