Geoffrey Sinclair

I am not sure if theses are actually printed any more. Making the work available to the public on the web site is technically publishing, plus a way to advertise the University. No doubt different universities would have different rules on how long things stay on the web site and I seem to be expecting better from the doctorate system than it actually normally delivers. I agree few people would have read the thesis, maybe as low as 4 in terms of the academic side, however it appears in web search results. Agreed people with even basic knowledge would be wary, the obvious mistakes, like Sweden being over run, the use of David Irving, but the thesis has been peer reviewed, by two independent examiners. And one point is it seems proper to let potential examiners know what sort of quality may come their way from the department. Not putting effort, I have put, the effort has been done, partly to double check what I had on the subject anyway, and the current plan is a simple enough rewrite of the line by line critique to make it more readable with the correct information put against the Creative Industries Creative Histories version. (Hide the Bismarck, add creative history and it becomes a third the size, much harder to spot, or go with the early night option (sunglasses malfunction?) or even the appearing a year earlier trick, though admittedly it gets sunk anyway). There seems little point in a formal writing approach. As for impact I am not after a great deal, my worst case scenario is it becomes high impact and so ammunition in the culture wars, given the treatment of the five Prime Ministers Churchill, Lyons, Menzies, Fadden and Curtin for example. Including statements like, for the middle three, "makes the episode border on criminal neglect". The thesis is very certain of its good and bad guys and so invites a similar response. I would like a web solution, so the critique appears in the search results when the thesis does, then it is an individual choice, starting with reading and/or believing neither. Thanks for the idea of Amazon or some other self publisher.

Agreed in the grand scheme of things the thesis does not matter, At the same time the standard you walk past is the one you accept. Agreed there are plenty of books that claim to be history and well researched but are not. The trouble for me is the thesis is being endorsed as a reliable reference by virtue of its position on the university web site plus the system of internal and external checks that were done. It announces the standards for all other doctorates from at least that department and possibly the university, to the probable detriment of other students. It also adds fodder to a current government push about university funding and academic standards. At the moment it seems putting a more readable version of the critique on a web site is the only option. Something I did not check, as I assumed the author was young, the alternative of a mature aged student. This book fits. Nor the Years Contemn: Air War on the Australian Front 1941-42. With a Foreword by Air Commodore R.N. Dalkin. RORRISON James D. Self published. Publication Date: 1992

Thanks for the wordpress suggestion. As for footnotes some at least do not line up, proof reading errors I suspect. Page 20 of the thesis "the direct purchase of ready-made American Lockheed Hudson maritime patrol bombers and Consolidated Catalina float-plane". First mention of Catalina Page 62 of the thesis, next mention of Catalina "Until then, the RAAF fought the Japanese with a dwindling number of Lockheed Hudson light maritime bombers which fortunately, along with some Catalina flying boats, were bought ready-to-fly from America in early 1941 as described". The Hudsons in Australia at the end of November 1941 were from the 1938 and 1939 orders, the 1940 order was given to the RAF (where their non RAF standard engines was an issue) the next order was placed in March/April 1941 and began arriving in December 1941 Page 124 of thesis "Unlike the British Sunderlands, the Catalinas, ordered in June 1940, were delivered 5 February 1941, just eight months later." The reference given Gillett, R. 1996, Australian Air Power, The Book Company International Pty Ltd, Sydney, NSW., page 77 The order was for 18 Catalina, the actual deliveries in Australia were date, number. 2/02/1941, 1, 27/02/1941, 1, 4/04/1941, 1, 1/05/1941, 1, 17/06/1941, 1, 5/07/1941, 1, 28/07/1941, 1, 25/08/1941, 1, 26/08/1941, 1, 13/09/1941, 2, 22/09/1941, 2, 8/10/1941, 3, 22/10/1941, 1, 23/10/1941, 1 The Gillett reference first makes its appearance on page 48 of the thesis, along with the statement "For weeks after Singapore’s loss, only Australian forces resisted the Japanese in the SWPA." (South West Pacific Area) So the efforts of the Dutch and US units present are ignored, like the ones that "within weeks" had the Darwin defences done. The RAAF spent much of the 1935 to 1942 period coping with unanticipated developments, from only a European enemy was dangerous, the RAAF would be stand alone with its own training and expeditionary forces, aircraft were available for order and timely delivery, Australia would suffer mostly raids on its shipping lanes, the major fighting would be in Europe or its immediate surroundings, and so on through to the actual situation end 1942. As far as I know the US had no problems with the Australian Army or Air Force units as a rule. When it comes to the RAAF there was the feud between the two senior RAAF commanders and its effects, including the US commanders knowing about it, the 1945 "mutiny of the aces" over operations being done. The idea of allied command structures runs into the personality of General MacArthur and can probably be best seen as follows 18-Apr-42 South West Pacific Area (SWPA) HQ area formed 20-Apr-42 Allied Air Forces HQ formed under SWPA, taking command of all USAAF units and Operational control of RAF combat areas/groups (that is not 1, 2, 4, 5 groups) RAAF HQ retained Administrative control of all RAAF units. Joint command. 3-Sep-42 5th Air Force HQ formed, under Allied Air Force HQ, General Kenny commanding both HQs. RAAF 9 Group (New Guinea) operational control moved from Allied Air Forces to 5th Air Force. 9-Sep-42 Forward Echelon RAAF HQ formed in Brisbane, parallel to Allied Air Force HQ. The Forward Echelon had administrative control over the new formed RAAF Coastal Command, which was under operational control Allied Air Forces HQ and had operational control of RAAF Areas in Australia. The Allied Air Forces HQ was now essentially American as RAAF officers moved from that HQ to Forward Echelon. At the end of 1941 RAAF was certainly not set up for sustained combat operations in and around Australia. The following excludes radar stations and Inland Aircraft Fuel Depot units, and of course an independent unit is an independent unit, not a sub unit or detachment, because the air force says so. Also some units can be temporarily under command etc. For the units fighting the Japanese and/or in Australia, including RAF units under command, 24 September 1941, the operational air force had 43 independent units (plus 3 squadrons and a station HQ in Singapore/Malaya), the training system 64 (but no operational training units) 1 December 1944, the operational air force had 284 independent units, the training system 88, the maintenance commands 43.

Agreed the hawks could have been mentioned but the Canberra were much closer in time plus were considered front line combat machines. Yes, and that needs to be scrutinised, could/should they have been pulled out or had plans developed to break off combat and retreat/withdraw to some pick up point. The idea about the US doing the defence seems to be based on the late April 1942 intercept, or the mid March arrival of a US fighter squadron at Darwin, so 3 to 5 months is redefined as a matter of weeks. The University has outsourced responsibility to the writer and examiners, so my initial ideas of the thesis being corrected or had a qualification added to its online presence about the problems is a non starter, hence the request here. The bulk of the notes as currently written are line by line, which makes for a dreary and linear read, as can be seen from the excerpt, though there is a general information section which has information on costs, production, orders etc. Turning the whole thing into a summary web page with the line by line as a separate link with an only if you dare tag might be an option. Assuming a suitable web site can be found.

Thanks for all the replies. The thesis was read by "two appropriately qualified, independent examiners", how they were appointed and by whom is not stated. As far as QUT is concerned they have done their best to contact James about the issue and it is up to him to make any call about thesis quality. James is reported to be ill and so may never respond. QUT know of no papers published from the thesis, which resulted in one comment to me "That is also a sign of poor work." Agreed the degree is about the effort put in by the student and how well they can operate at the required level. It is also a test of the supervisors and the department/faculty. The student should be expected to make regular presentations of their work to the supervisor, who should be checking things like references, given we all misread things, and have enough knowledge of the topic to spot errors and/or do independent checking if the student contradicts the supervisor's ideas. I would also expect the supervisor or someone in the area to be reading the thesis drafts and commenting on them. Finally the department should have regular events where the students make presentations of their work, since part of the training is being able to explain to others what you are doing and be able to answer (informed) questions about the work. I ended up probably making on average more than one note per page of the thesis from the trivial, the pocket battleship Bismarck sunk in 1940 after a night time Swordfish torpedo bomber strike (to amalgamate the various errors), the strike force composition on the Taranto raid, Ark Royal in service when Hitler came to power, "During the 1930s the Japanese commenced a major naval expansion culminating in the Kaga and the Akagi", "The Zero operating in China in 1938", to the maybe, maybe not the Zero was based on the Gloster F5/34 design, plans leaked to the IJN by Sempill, The Battle of Berlin was in 1944-45 the daylight battle between the 8th Air Force and Luftwaffe, correcting gross overstatements like "The Japanese raids on Chinese cities were of mammoth proportions, arguably greater than those inflicted on Poland or Britain by the Luftwaffe", that the Germans gained air supremacy over England at night, that in the 1920's and 1930's the IJN and USN "appeared to believe that although sea power would dictate the outcome of future warfare, it would be fought with air power at sea across the horizon" Yamato class anyone?, that Churchill (not the British/RAF this is a very personalised thesis) is stated to have only sent Hawker Hurricane fighters to Singapore after 23 January 1942 on page 119, while on page 140 it notes arrival of 51 Hurricanes on 13 January 1941, the year is assumed a typo of 1942. The thesis contradicts itself. To the thesis idea of Japanese Army and Navy relationships. The Hurricane cost maybe half the price of the Wirraway/Harvard/AT-6 as someone said it was easy to build so swap out a couple of hundred Australian built Wirraways and you have 400 Hurricanes as the idea. And unfortunately on and on. As for conclusions, the thesis makes quite a lot of them, including how the British were unreliable suppliers of inferior aircraft. If the final conclusions are meant to be pages 312 to 319, then I made the following notes. By the time I arrived at the section I was rather tired of having to repeat myself, so some of the comments can read as cryptic. [Items in square brackets are additional notes added here.] Page 312 "This thesis has been argumentative, chronological, descriptive and counter-factual" Definitely argumentative, not chronological, descriptive by the way newspaper articles are used rather than official documents and more counter to the facts than related to what has not happened or is not the case. I would add judgemental. "Only two military aircraft were in production in Australia when the Pacific War broke out and both proved inadequate for the roles they were supposed to perform." Wirraway second line fighter, army co-operation and trainer, failed in the first role. Beaufort, light and torpedo bomber and used as light bomber with success. "The first, the Wirraway, the North American Aviation’s AT-6 Harvard with light armament and anti-reflective paint added locally, was a designated advanced trainer." The Wirraway was not the AT-6 and the design came with armament, which the RAAF increased, including bombs. "The conservative government’s decision to equip RAAF fighter squadrons with Wirraways and send them to operational areas outraged all military sensibilities. The rationale behind such action cannot be made clear in any logical measure—the only possible explanation being that the decision-makers never expected the Japanese to reach Australian territory" The thesis repeatedly notes the Australians expected raids, the explanation is they did not expect attacks with the quality of attacking aircraft and aircrew that the Japanese could mount. "Later claims that this was a temporary deployment cannot be defended as no replacement planes were on order" This appears to be the first mention of this claim in the thesis, no reference is given. What replacement planes? Wirraways were still being produced in December 1941. [In actual fact there were over 200 US built dive bombers on order, Brewster Bermuda, first deliveries expected in June 1941] "The air defence challenge facing the new Labor government that inherited management of the RAAF in October 1941 the upgrading of the Wirraway air force, was not tacked with any gusto" The speeding up of the Beaufort, the arrival of the Hudsons on order, the Bermudas becoming Vengeances, the strengthening of the defences north of Australia, the building of relations with the Dutch, the time to actually be on top of the current situation after assuming office. The provision of radars, units to monitor Japanese radio traffic and decode it. What actions does the thesis want to enable the description with gusto? "with a wash of emotions that Australia was doomed unless large numbers of Kittyhawk and Hurricane fighters were sent by someone; an appeal ambiguous in itself as the Curtin government still kept a foot in both UK and US camp" Ambiguous or appealing to the only two sources of fighters available? What is the definition here of large numbers, given the thesis states ideas of 400 or so Hurricanes? "Even American newspaper editors knew that Australian governments had turned down opportunities to import the fighters now desperately demanded" This is the first time the thesis has made this claim. Which editors and when? "Not withdrawing the Wirraways from front-line service once the Japanese military juggernaut reached New Britain, a month after Pearl Harbor, proved that the new Curtin government’s political masters and their military advisers either failed to grasp the inadequacy of the AT-6s as warplanes or they were prepared to sacrifice them and their crews in a gruesome public demonstration of Australia’s defence desperation." Who are considered the political masters of the Curtin Government? RAAF Southern Area History Sheets, 21 January 1942 Wirraways not to be used as fighters, confined to dive bombing role. Given bombers like the B-25 required escorts to survive in contested airspace do the same sacrifice comments apply to the B-25 when its vulnerability was revealed? The A-20, B-17 etc.? Or do the orders suggest the Wirraway was able to operate with support, like other types? page 313 "The Bristol Beaufort, the light, second-rate British-designed bomber being assembled in government factories on a cottage industry basis, " Second rate compared with what (allied) type? What is the definition of cottage industry? Given the way aircraft were built at the time. See the note about Willow Run. [supplying the Willow Run B-24 plant were 965 subcontractors located in 287 cities in 38 states] "despite the optimism of the project’s introduction, was soon fraught with foreseeable problems given Britain’s military plight of ‘standing alone’" The project was initiated in the first half of 1939, France fell in the third week of June 1940, about a year later. So what exactly is foreseeable and when? "When it did go into action in June 1942, the Beaufort failed its design philosophy as a ship-sinking torpedo bomber and had to be converted to a basic gravity bomber flying night missions to survive Japanese defences due to the RAAF’s lack an escort fighter" The thesis considers failure as an inability for the thesis to find ships sunk by RAF or RAAF Beauforts, it then compounds this by ignoring the Beaufort day missions. "This thesis has shown that better and less expensive American light and medium bombers could have been purchased at a much lower price directly from eager US manufacturers seeking sales under the generous terms of the Lend-Lease scheme as was being done by many other nations" To make this claim the thesis has its own definition of better, incorrectly assumes prices or uses hearsay, produces no aircraft production figures for the period but assumes an addition RAAF order would result in more being built in the time frame and be delivered against objections that other locations were under greater threat, and uses the state of the US industry in 1938 as a guide to its reported spare capacity into 1941. The simple test for the final part of the claim is what Lend Lease aircraft order, that is from March 1941 or later was delivered in quantity to the overseas destination by at the latest end November 1941, with many delivered earlier to enable training and deployment in December 1941? "The quality of the bombing force was important, but if the warships had no fighter cover to combine with enough shipboard anti-aircraft artillery, then the outcome was inevitable. This conclusion suggests that the ruthless but canny Churchill, a shrinking player in a global war in which the survival of the English-speaking world was at stake, arguably decided any temporary sacrifice for victory was justified." As this reads it has Churchill sacrificing the ships. Is the thesis aware the aircraft carrier meant to be with the ships was damaged by hitting an uncharted reef while training and so was delayed? Is the thesis aware that air cover was available, kept in reserve until asked for, but the Admiral in charge of the ships did not call for it? Has the thesis noted what the loss of most of the world's rubber supply meant to the allies, the US synthetic rubber project was apparently bigger than the Manhattan project? page 314 "His policy was conveyed in action rather than words; the non-Spitfire reinforcement of Singapore to protect RN capital ships; his plea to Roosevelt to enter the war, his implausible promises to Menzies to rush forces from the Middle East to Australia in the event of a ‘serious’ threat and a comparison in the numbers of interceptors shipped to Russia and to South East Asia in 1941" The thesis notes the deployment of Buffalo to Malaya and has a section praising them, now it must be Spitfires, which would be of a type the thesis describes as obsolete. Is the failure to send Spitfires to support the capital ships of the Mediterranean fleet and Force H (Gibraltar) also an action that shows a willingness to abandon the area? The promise of support reported in the thesis was in November 1939 why is that promise implausible? And the thesis is using the reinforcement of an active war front, with attendant losses, versus an area still at peace and considered to be facing a much lower threat. "The thesis has described how Chinese strategists employed ‘asymmetric’ warfare; tactics and tools that allowed a weaker and smaller country (in terms of military might) to inflict huge damage on a bigger rival" The thesis has three mentions of asymmetric which basically define the term, not describe what China did or did not do. The fact China had around 400,000,000 people at the time making it very hard for an invader to control, the resources the Nationalists and Communists devoted to attacking or guarding against each other, the various warlords as well. "The Australian government did not need to match the Japanese defence budget pound for yen in order to achieve such a goal; it needed only to spend enough money on modern American warplanes to change the strategic balance over Australian territory." Fighter force, anti shipping force, including anti submarine, bomber force to hit hostile airbases at least, transport force to quickly move units around the country, serviceable, maintained airfields in appropriate numbers in appropriate locations with appropriate defences, medical, repair and supply units of appropriate capacity in appropriate locations, aircraft control systems, including radar, radio beacon and weather services in the appropriate locations. For a start. page 315 "In direct contrast, HMS Repulse, the 26 500 ton battlecruiser sent to the bottom of the sea near Singapore with the battleship Prince of Wales by land-based Japanese Navy bombers and single engined torpedo planes on 10 December 1941, four years before the RAAF attempted unsuccessfully to sink the Isuzu illustrated the superiority of the Japanese bombing over that of the Australians" Repulse displaced 32,000 tons standard. The strike on force Z was all twin engined Mitsubishi G3M (Nell) or G4M (Betty), total composition 9 reconnaissance, 34 bomber, 51 torpedo bomber, fully trained in naval strike, though not all sighted Force Z. The first torpedo hit was on Prince of Wales, right aft, causing a propeller shaft to break loose and tear a large hole deep into the interior of the ship. The thesis describes a similar hit on Bismarck that jammed the rudders as lucky. The RAAF strike in April 1945 was made with heavy bombers, known to be unlikely to hit and medium bombers that were not trained in attacking ships and so dropped bombs from similar altitudes as the heavy bombers, the reported two bomb hits by the RAAF heavies matches the reported two bomb hits on force Z ships. "The USN equipped its task forces with the Dauntless and the Wildcat—planes capable of destroying warships up to the size of carriers and fighters" They were changing over from the F3A Buffalo and biplane Helldiver during 1940/41 and into 1942. "These were both inexpensive single-engined monoplanes arguably cheaper to buy or make than the Wirraway-Beaufort combination" Again where are the prices? "American Catalina seaplanes and Hudson maritime patrol bombers were already in service with the RAAF by December 1941; bought from the Americans when Beaufort delivery times were constantly extended and the British decided not to fill the Australian order for reconnaissance flying boats." So the Beaufort delivery times were extended in 1938?, 1939? 1940? 1941? And by the British? By December 1941 it was the pre war order of 100 Hudsons that were in Australia, with the 1941 order beginning to arrive. The 1939 Sunderland order was retained in Britain to equip 10 RAAF squadron there, rather than around Australia, they were offered to the British after a request not unfilled by them. "Combined for a concerted reconnoitre and ambush of the Japanese fleet of four carriers and ancillary support vessels which arrived off Darwin on the morning of 19 February 1942, the RAAF could conceivably have sunk some of the carriers and damaged others had it been similarly equipped to the USN and its aircrews given American training in destroying ships and fighting Zeros" Essentially this is assuming everything goes correctly for the RAAF and includes months to years of lead time to equip and train and above all with a continent to defend assumes the force was in the right place at the right time. The Japanese invasion of Malaya would take significant losses with this sort of anti shipping force available there. Similar for the Philippines. The Catalinas sent to the RAAF if retained by the USN instead of might have been used to fill the search gap north of Oahu in the days before the Pearl Harbor attack under the might have been ideas. "Such a scenario was within the reach of the Australian defence budget." In round terms, a fly away P-40+A-25 Dauntless was $100,000, Australia buying 200 of each would be $20 million, or around 6.7 million pounds at a 3 to 1 exchange rate. The defence budget for all services in 1935/36 was 7 million pounds, by 1937/38 9.8 million. These 200 of each type could be expected to allow for around 100 of each type in the combat units of which most would be serviceable on any given day assuming the investment in spare parts and maintenance units given the training requirements, the periodic maintenance requirements and things like accidents. The units would therefore be required to know to be in Darwin some time before the IJN strike to be in a position to hit the carriers before the launch that day, assuming the IJN comes within Dauntless range. Assuming the British ship their F4F orders to Australia, the USN likewise for their first orders, then the RAAF requires almost all Wildcats built to end March 1941 to have 200 or them. Australia would have 200 out of the 426 production Wildcats built to end 1941. For the Dauntless if you can persuade all buyers of the 8A, the aircraft the Dauntless was developed from, to pass the order to the RAAF then again it is end March 1941 to have 200, if it is SBD Dauntless then it is end June 1941. "prevented only by ignorance of air power and a failure to believe the nation’s air force could equal the Japanese when they met over Rabaul and Darwin" Prevented by assumptions of the future and the realities of what was available. So how big a base structure would be invested in Rabaul, garrison, supplies, supply chain? To handle a couple of hundred aircraft. page 316 "There is little doubt behind the argument that if different, logical and rational decisions had been made up until the time the Menzies government placed its purchase order for British Beaufighters in March 1941 under the illusion it was buying interceptors, then Darwin and Broome could have been defended from Japanese aerial devastation in 1942" So the thesis now reports the Beaufighter order was in March 1941 versus May on page 205, and describes the order as "last minute" amongst other terms. How much devastation was done at Broome, a number of aircraft were lost, little damage to other items. As for different decisions that actually goes without saying, assuming those different decisions are what looking back says were needed. "The opportunities to attain first class American fighters were numerous but ignored." The definition of first class is? The opportunities were effectively non existent for the P-38, P-39, P-40 and F4F given when they came into production and the perceived needs of other areas. "The RAAF lost any autonomy it might have otherwise had when forced into the role of a USAAC satellite, but only up to the time that Americans had a use for it. With the RAAF under direct American control for the duration of the Pacific War which, with British approval, dictated the supply of aircraft the RAAF received via Lend-Lease, restricted its area of operation and even its target selection." With General MacArthur in charge and also in charge of approving aircraft orders from the US how exactly is the RAAF to retain autonomy, the US assigned the defence of Darwin to the RAAF, and moved almost all its units out of the area, and when the RAAF received B-24 moved the last USAAF heavy bomber unit out. The lack of RAAF fighters in 1942 had nothing to do with MacArthur's attitude to non US Army forces. On 1 July 1943 the RAAF had 1,344 combat types present, the USAAF 5th and 13th Air Forces combined on 30 June 1943 had 1,248. Fighters were 583 RAAF to 648 USAAF. The reality was the RAAF was committed to defending and patrolling much of Australia while the USAAF was concentrated in New Guinea and the Solomons, the area of allied attack. On 31 August 1944 the RAAF had 2,155 combat types, the Far East Air Forces 3,135. On 31 May 1945 2,401 RAAF to 3,113 USAAF. With no strategic air units, unlike Bomber Command, and little need for strategic defence post 1942, unlike Fighter Command, there were no reasons against all of the RAAF being under the allied HQ, the fact the Americans present chose to subvert the allied HQ structure, turning it into a US manned HQ, is a separate issue. "in time for a long predicted war against Japan" Until around 1922 Japan had a treaty with Britain, then it was broken at the insistence of the US. What does long predicted mean in terms of years? "The CAC and the DAP could recline comfortably on a domestic monopoly so long as the nation did not have to use the aircraft in combat that they were making." Monopoly or Duopoly? DAP had around 4 months between first production and Pacific War. De Havilland began manufacturing Tiger Moths in 1940, DH.84 transports in 1943 and Mosquitoes in March 1944 but the first flight of a locally produced Mosquito was 23 July 1943. "all high quality products but lacking in performance and fulfillment of purpose—the opposite of the USAAF warplanes that won the Pacific air war." So the thesis contends the Wirraway failed as a trainer? And the Beaufort elevator problem caused fatal accidents. The thesis notes the RAAF was relegated into a form of assistant role by the USAAF but does not seem to then connect this to the chance RAAF units had to attack shipping for example. "Thus included in this thesis was a comparison of the relative costs of making aircraft locally or buying war-winning designs ready-to-fly from the US." As noted before little real cost information is provided. "Not only were the Americans making better planes, they were being bought by the British themselves to replace or supplement many of their own designs including the Beaufort." As noted before better depends on mission and time. What American torpedo bomber replaced or supplemented the Beaufort in RAF service? The Beaufort was replaced by the torpedo carrying Beaufighter, something the RAAF was aware of and actually imported some mark X torpedo versions. "In December 1941 when the government was content to hand over defence to the Americans who quickly and systematically completed the job in a matter of weeks worked well enough" So the US provided the radars, the control rooms, the fighter controllers? How many weeks? "In a heavy raid of 25 April 1942, USAAC P-40 fighters defending Darwin scored a major victory over the JNAS" IJNAF. [Allied loses] 3 a/c (written off?), 1 killed 7 injured. North Western Area says high level attack at 1400 hours on Darwin station, 24 bombers with escort. Negligible material damage. US fighters reported as claiming 8 bombers and 3 fighters shot down. Air War Pacific says 7 and 8 Sqns, 49 Group, shot down 10 of 24 G3M and 2 A6M between 1430 and 1500 hours. Given the IJNAF carriers launched over 180 aircraft plus around 54 land based bombers hit Darwin in the February raid what is the description used for it, given the 25 April raid is considered heavy? The RAAF official history notes 9 raids 28 March to 27 April, 2 were not intercepted, with IJNAF losses given as 17 bombers (2 to AA fire) and 11 fighters for 8 P-40 lost in combat http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/archive/index.php?t-4949.html Reports 50 P-40, versus a raid of 24 G4M and 13 A6M, with 4 G4M and 1 A6M lost in the combat, 1 G4M ditched on the return flight, 1 G4M written off on return. It looks like the bombers were separated from the escorting fighters. page 317 "But by Curtin unflinchingly relinquishing the defence of the nation to the Americans, any direction the government might have held over its own military and political affairs such as that displayed by Finland and China was lost" How much foreign airpower was deployed to Finnish bases 1939 to 1944? How much control did China have over the USAAF 14th Air Force? The early 1942 fighter defence split was USAAF Darwin, RAAF Port Moresby then Milne Bay. When does the thesis consider Australia regained direction over it political and military affairs. The military was locked into MacArthur, how was the politics? "The resurgence of the RAAF in 1943–44 came too late to make any contribution to the shortening of the war and its position as the world’s fourth largest air force was stymied by the American political decisions to keep Australian forces south of the equator" So the thesis considers RAAF operations as part of the offensive to move from Port Moresby to the western end of the New Guinea island made no contribution. So what is therefore surprising about the US leaving it behind? Why not disband the RAAF and use the resources for something else? The RAAF claimed to be the world's 4th biggest air force by a quirk of timing in late 1945, the axis powers no longer had air forces, the RCAF had begun to disband with the end of the war in Europe, so that left the UK, USSR and USA ahead of the RAAF in numbers for a short time. "Predictably, the RAAF’s size and strength was allowed to evaporate quickly after August 1945 with demobilisation and the cold war yet to pose a new threat to world peace" Given the thesis conclusions about the war record of the RAAF this would be a reflection of its wartime achievements. Down to around 7,900 male personnel at the end of 1948 versus 3,500 on 3 September 1939. "a small string of ‘chain home’ radar stations across the northern approach to the continent linked directly to air bases staffed by modern fighters" What does the thesis consider a small string? Given the curvature of the earth means the further away the stations are from each other the bigger any gaps are. Darwin to Broome for example is by road over 1,700 km, do any of the areas in between rate air defence systems? "The Germans were never able to overcome Britain’s sophisticated air defence and were constantly surprised by the accuracy of RAF interceptions and ambushes." This applies to 1940, after which they did not try, and with the understanding of what radar could do were running night missions or daylight low level fighter bomber sorties. "But even nations with smaller, lesser systems such as Finland, Spain, China and Poland put up stiff fighter aerial opposition to those who aggressed against them in the air, in some cases for years" Spain was a civil war, Finland was attacked in 1939, then attacked in 1941, Poland lasted weeks, China fluctuated thereby at times catching the Japanese with their new air force, which was then lost given the training of Chinese aircrew versus those of Japan. Overall a big failure of Japan in the Pacific was the failure to increase training, the overall loss rates over China were assumed to continue against other opponents. The Chinese effectively ceded their air force to the US during WWII. "As argued, Australia seemed to be the one developed country that offered no interruption to Axis bombing during the open months of air war over its own territory." Opening months? A different type of attack was expected. "Thus it has been shown conclusively that the nation was defensible from the air by the timely purchase of a few hundred American-made fighters deployed intelligently and strategically around the top end" What is the definition of few hundred, of what type, when would they be made and arrive and be replaced as they were lost? And why should anyone defend Darwin ahead of Sydney in 1942? Another point is what if the IJN had won at Midway, there would have been the operations to sever the US Australia sealanes, with the IJN carrier fleet able to hit large sections of Australia. The thesis conclusion is essentially hindsight, the Japanese do the historical, the Australians do what is needed to counter this. page 319 "After victory in the Pacific, successive Australian post-war governments of both persuasions quickly went back to arming the nation’s air forces, both the RAAF and the RAN, with British aircraft until the Korean War experience of 1950–53" The RAAF went with Mustangs, Lincolns and Mosquitoes, all built in Australia and moving to locally built Vampires. Is the thesis aware the US was not building military aircraft for export post WWII, hence why the British did a major trade exporting Vampires and Meteors? "The British sold the Australian government straight-winged Gloster Meteor jets to replace No. 77 Squadron’s piston-engined Mustangs in Korea. But as RAAF pilots found out, the Meteor was obsolete." Twin engined jet fighter bomber, much more survivable than a single inline piston engined fighter bomber. "The sale of the Meteor to the Australian government seemed to be the last straw. Since then, no British warplanes have been bought or built for the RAAF" The thesis seems unaware of the English Electric Canberra, local production began in July 1953, built in the US as the Martin B-57.

As the subject says I am after advice what to do. The work in question is https://eprints.qut.edu.au/87976/6/James_Rorrison_Thesis.pdf "The political decisions and policy leading to the Royal Australian Air Force having no fighters or interceptors for the coming war against Japan." Creative Industries Faculty, Queensland University of Technology. I found the work to have so many problems I ended up generating around a 1.5 Mb text file of quotes from the thesis and notes about what was in the thesis. I sent it to the relevant academics and after an email exchange they propose to do nothing, as the thesis was externally examined. However before that comes the sign off by the supervisors that the thesis is worthy of examination and the examiners are therefore entitled to assume basic fact checking has been done. Two quotes from the correspondence, "as an Institution QUT has confidence in the quality and merit of the thesis." "you need to seek an alternative outlet for your work, perhaps an appropriate internet forum." It seems no papers were written based on the thesis, so the only public source is the QUT web site. Over and above the factual problems is the thesis needed more proof reading, to catch things like footnotes not matching, and dates, like Bismarck being sunk in 1940 and again in 1941. I am not including my full set of notes they make for tedious reading, given the repetitive and at time disjointed nature of the thesis (and my writing style). Trying to figure out what the time period being discussed can be quite hard. An example, "Halfway through the Beaufort program, the British terminated the supply of vital parts, reneging on their contract of exporting template numbers of Beauforts as examples for the DAP, failed to buy Beauforts from CAC, retained the Sunderlands ordered for the RAAF and disparaged the Wirraway without supplying an alternative such as the Hurricane being sent to Russia in large numbers." No date is given, the Australian Bristol Beaufort program half way point could be any time, from order to last aircraft, from order to half way aircraft, from start of production to etc. The order dates from mid 1939, production ended in August 1944. The British exported 1 pattern Beaufort, as agreed, it arrived in 1940. The Australian government took over the RAF order Beauforts in 1942, the RAAF retained the Sunderlands in Britain in 1939, the Wirraway comments date from 1938, the USSR shipments from the second half of 1941. The title only gives a part view of the material covered as the thesis comes to the conclusion there was enough obvious information and aircraft available early enough that the RAAF could, even should, have had at least a fighter force of a couple of hundred or more fighters able to match the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero in place as part of a proper air defence system at Darwin in mid February 1942, along with a viable counter attack force of Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers. The thesis makes use of David Irving as a source on Winston Churchill, here is an extract from the libel trial judgement from https://www.hdot.org/judge/ "The charges which I have found to be substantially true include the charges that Irving has for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence; that for the same reasons he has portrayed Hitler in an unwarrantedly favourable light, principally in relation to his attitude towards and responsibility for the treatment of the Jews; that he is an active Holocaust denier; that he is anti-semitic and racist and that he associates with right wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism." The thesis says WWII had intercontinental bombers. Phrases like "Japanese deployed their Army Zero-Zen as a naval fighter" The Japanese "traditionally they were not restricted by inter-services’ rivalry and obsolete thinking" which would overturn about a century of histories on the size of the Japanese Army versus Navy rivalries. Adolf Galland, Luftwaffe fighter pilot, is the thesis source for British radar and fighter defences. There is little information on what aircraft were historically available, in what quantities and when, despite this being a key factor in what could be done. The thesis uses the description of the US industry from the 1938 British mission to the US to note the industry was hungry for orders and so able to deliver the thesis concluded requirements at the thesis concluded time and this description apparently applies all the way to end 1941. The thesis considers the RAAF should have had dive bombers in 1941 and they were overlooked as a type but is unaware over 200 were on order from the US as offsets from an RAF order, initial deliveries promised for June 1941, but production was well behind schedule and in the end a different design had to be substituted, Brewster Bermuda to Vultee Vengeance. Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister, 1941 trip, depart Australia 24 January to Singapore, Middle East 2 February, England 20 February, stayed around 10 weeks, still there on 30 April, to Canada, 10 May in USA, home 26 May. The thesis notes when in the Middle East Menzies did not consult experienced RAAF personnel on air defence, using as an example Clive Caldwell, a man who did not arrive in the Middle East until April 1941 as a new trainee. As for RAAF experience, 3 Squadron RAAF, arrived Egypt in August 1940 initially equipped with Lysander Army co-operation, gained Gladiator and Gauntlet biplane fighters in September, the Gauntlets were removed in December, the Lysander in January 1941. Hurricanes added in late January, Gladiators removed in early February. First air combat on 19 November 1940. The Curtiss P-40 fighter, A to C models called Tomahawk, D and later models Kittyhawk, the thesis has it present in the Australian units Western Desert of North Africa in December 1940 as a fighter bomber, the Tomahawk versions were not fighter bombers and the only Australian squadron to be equipped with the Tomahawk was number 3, receiving the first of them on 17 May 1941. The first allied fighter bomber sorties in the western desert were on 20 November 1941 by Hurricanes. The thesis uses quotes from newspapers as sources, including wartime ones despite the inevitable censorship, rather than the relevant official documents. The thesis cannot find any evidence the Bristol Beaufort in RAAF service sank a ship, there is no consultation of the post war JANAC and USSBS Japanese shipping loss reports, but as the Beauforts did not sink a ship they therefore could not sink a ship. The first RAAF Beaufort combat sorties were at night, therefore the Beaufort only did night raids. Three data tables the thesis uses, from the British Cabinet, the RAAF official history and an RAAF publication are all misquoted. The various British Cabinet documents quoted are available to see on the British National Archives web site, if anyone feels like it they can check to see if they have the difficulties I had at times matching what the cabinet document says to what the thesis says is says. Lend Lease was passed on 11 March 1941, before that it was being able to generate US dollars to pay for the items, the backlog of orders meant Lend Lease material started significant deliveries from 1942 onwards. The thesis has Lend Lease available in 1940. The RAAF placed two orders for Short Sunderland flying boats, one in 1939, one 1943. The 1939 order stayed in Britain with the unit meant to operate them moving to join the aircraft, not the pre war plan of the other way around. The 1943 order were delivered in 1944. The thesis says one order and look how long it took to be filled. The thesis states the US was trialing its first line aircraft in China, from perhaps as early as 1932, or at least 1937 onwards. The P-40B was flown in China pre 7 December 1941 encountering Zeros, whereas the AVG did not go into action until post 7 December and did not meet Zeros. General Claire Chennault sent to China in 1937 "under orders from Roosevelt to organise and command the clandestine AVG, the Flying Tigers" By the looks of things, the thesis has when discussing the 1937 Japanese invasion of China and the Nanking massacre. "The US response, apart from the token AVG, was to continue making diplomatic protests but even after one of its patrol boats, the Panay, was sunk by Japanese divebombers, no retaliation was threatened" Panay in 1937, AVG in 1941. The thesis has Sweden ordering P-40 which became the AVG aircraft, they were ordered before Sweden was over run, presumably by neutrality. There was no Swedish P-40 order. And so on.

The Lancastrian production information I have is Mark I civil, mark II military = 6 night/9 day passenger version, mark III civil, mark IV military = 13 passenger version 2 military mark I VH737, VH742 (August and October 1945) 21 civil mark I, including prototype (February to October 1945) 33 mark II (VL967-981, VM701-704, VM725-738) (October 1945 to March 1946) 18 civil mark III (6 from December 1945 to February 1946, then 11 August to December 1946, and 1 in March 1947) 8 mark IV TX283-290 (February to April 1946) Civil mark I RAF serials allocated but not used, replaced by civil registrations, VB873 prototype, VD238, 241, 253, VF145-8, 152-6, 160-7, all VD/VF serials reported to have been originally ordered as PD serial Lancasters.

To throw some doubt into the situation. Firstly, http://www.rafcommands.com/database/serials/details.php?uniq=T3317 Delivery Logs, which given 21 June 1947 is an administrative SOC date, suggest T3307 or T3319 as candidates, rather than T3317. T3307 33 MU 27 April 1941, 272 Sqn 3 May 1941, SOC 21 June 1947. T3317 33 MU 13 May 1941, 272 Sqn 17 May 1941, Middle East May 1941, Malta July 1941, Middle East 18 August 1941, SOC 8 December 1941. T3318 33 MU 12 May 1941, 272 Sqn 15 May 1941, Middle East May 1941, SOC 19 July 1941. T3319 33 MU 13 May 1941, 272 Sqn 21 May 1941, SOC 21 June 1947. 272 squadron had 5 Beaufighters lost or damaged on 6 December 1941 and 1 more on the 7th. One reported shot down on the 6th was T3246, SOC on the 6th or 8th. S/L. Andrew William Fletcher was on an operation out of Malta on 28 July 1941 (Malta: The Hurricane years) 272 Sqn were given T3270, T3271, T3290 to T3297, T3299 to T3306 in April 1941, T3307 to T3310, T3312 to T3319 in May 1941. Not all left Britain.

Some RAF documents call Canadian Car and Foundry built mark I the mark X, the production documents say I (and II) only. As Canada did not make Merlins the mark I arrived in Britain without engines, as did most of the mark II, despite the US supplying Merlin 28 for them in two orders, 144 then another 141 (the latter possibly diverted from the Lancaster order). All the Merlin 28 sent to Britain fitted to Hurricanes or as a stand alone engine. Any Merlin 28 fitted to a Hurricane arriving in Britain, apart from a few test flights, were removed. CCF built Hurricane I airframes were fitted with Merlin III, mark II fitted with Merlin XX. BW835 to BW884, evidence indicates ordered as Sea Hurricane Ia, no information where the engines and propellers came from but they were meant for CAM ships. 49 of them taken on RCAF strength 9 December 1941 to 28 January 1942, then BW835 on 22 April 1942. BW841 sent to Britain "Air Ministry" last RCAF date 16 October 1942. BW855 also sent "BR Admiralty" last RCAF date 7 January 1944. The rest stayed in Canada. Canada received 480 Merlin 29 and 480 Hamilton 23E50 propellers for its 400 Hurricane order, RCAF 5376 to 5775, when 150 of the Hurricanes were sent to Britain (RAF PJ serials) they were as airframes or with a Merlin 28. The spare Merlin 29 and propellers were used to upgrade the survivors of RCAF 1351 to 1380, the 30 mark I airframes which had been fitted with Merlin III and propellers taken from Fairey Battles as well as BW835 to BW884. No Merlin 29 were exported from Canada. It appears CCF built a and b wings but plenty of mark II ended up with c wings after arrival in Britain. Apart from the CCF Sea Hurricanes, Hawker built 50 Sea IIc, 7 in November 1942, 29 in December, then 4, 10 and 10 March to May 1943. The rest of the Sea Hurricanes were conversions.

Try, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/naval-aviation-history/involvement-by-conflict/world-war-ii/location-of-us-naval-aircraft-world-war-ii.html Not indexed, in theory weekly summaries which should give an idea when TBF/M-1D began arriving in units.

Near Zero, starting at BA100 the delivery logs go from 15 to 100 per page so not a lot of room for notes, two examples of entire entries follow BE581 IIC TOC 26 October 1941, built in 26th month of the war, reduced to spares 7 November 1942 BE589 IIB TOC 26 October 1941, built in 26th month of the war, Far East 9 November 1941, Category E 25 January 1942

The Bureau of Aeronautics 12 October 1942 performance data for the PBO-1 uses 3 configurations, all with 644 gallons of fuel. 1) Patrol, 2) Patrol with Turret fitted, 3) AS patrol with 4x 325 pound depth bombs. 1 and 3 have two fixed and one flexible gun, option 2 two fixed and three flexible guns. Which implies there were tests with a turret but not meant to be used for anti submarine patrol. The difference between 1 and 2 is 18,837 to 19,210 pounds gross weight, 2 was about 5 to 6 mph slower, service ceiling 700 feet less and had 100 miles less range. Configuration 3 gross weight 20,203 pounds, the same speed to within 1 mph of configuration 1, service ceiling 1,300 feet less and had 140 miles less range. As part weight compensation, in configuration 3 the flexible machine gun had 1,000 rounds, versus 1,300 in configuration 1.

N2426 last fabric wing built (except for the batch in 1940) N2520 TOC 26 October 1939, Pilot date 1 December, delivered 3 December, 27 MU no date, 213 Sqn 29 March? 1940, Station Flight Northolt 31 May? 1940, 5? MU 10 June 1940, Station Flight Northolt 18 June 1940, Station Flight Sd? Carney? 19 December 1940, 3 SFTS 26 January 1941, Cat E 23 May 1944. 11 Group HQ was at Uxbridge N 51° 34' W 0° 28.5', Northolt Airfield N 51° 33' W 0° 23' for those who lack a detailed map of the London area and prefer target co-ordinates.

The contract cards and delivery logs both say P8533 was a IIb. To add a little to the already online aircraft history, 45MU 6-5-41, 610S 29-5-41, "38 MU 11 June 1941", CBAF 9-7-41, "38 MU 29 July 1941", 222S 18-8-41, 145S 30-8-41, 154S 8-12-41, 132S 11-3-42, 53OTU 14-4-42, "SOC 21 June 1947" which would be a post war administration tidy up date.

The R serials seem to have normally been delivered in serial number order. And a reminder the following are taken from hand written documents that have been microfilmed then scanned, it can be hard to be totally sure of some numbers. R2059, SD Flt 31 July 1940, FIU 1 September, Bristol 4MUB? 24 September, 30 MU 16 January 1941 R2066, 19 MU 8 August 1940, Tangmere AMDP 12 August, SD flt Christchurch 26 August, Farnborough AMDP 16 October R2069, 33 MU 13 August 1940, 25 Sqn 8 September, 43 Group DA 2 March 1941, 25 Sqn 19 May 1941 R2078, 19 MU 30 August 1940, 32 MU 3 September, 19 MU 6 September, AAEE AMDP 8 September, FIU 12 September, 43 Group DA 16 February 1941 R2125 19 MU (no date) AMDP 16 November 1940 R2146 18 MU 8 December 1940, FIU 18 December 1940, 43 Group DA 8 February 1941, FIU 6 March, 43 Group DA 12 May, FIU 16 May, 34 Group DA 25 August, FIU no date, 604 Sqn 23 October. R2186 19 MU 2 December 1940, FIU 23 December, SOC 11 January 1941? R2189 19 MU 13 December 1940, FTU (not FIU) Ford 12 February 1941, 43 Group DA 20 February 1941, 219 Sqn 19 March 1941, R2195 32 MU 11 December 1940, 19 MU 18? December, FIU 23 December, SD flt Christchurch 1 February 1941, FIU 17 February, 43 Group DA 3 March, FIU 21 March, SDF 27 May , 43 Group DA 27 August, SD flt (no date) TFU (no date) R2201 32 MU 23 December 1940, 19 U 2 January 1941, FTU Ford 14 February, 43 Group deposit account 21 February, FIU 11 May 1941

As built yes. At end of life, maybe, given wings could be replaced during repairs or overhauls. First order L1547-L2146 (600 a/c). Second order N2318-N2729 (300 a/c) (ignoring blackout blocks) Contract cards notes and individual entries, L1877 Metal Wings (Production aircraft number 331) AMDP at Hawkers, the trials aircraft. L1909 first Merlin III Engine fitting (Production aircraft number 363) L1980 first variable pitch propeller fitting (Production aircraft number 432) L2026 fitted with Rotol airscrew. AMDP at Hawkers, so another trials aircraft. (Production aircraft number 480) N2398 start of TR.1133 radio fits (Production aircraft number 669) N2426 last aircraft with fabric wings (Production aircraft number 685) 26 May 1939 Hawkers to select one aircraft for fitment of DH constant speed airscrew, if trials successful 3 others to be fitted for service trials. L2061, L2066, L2071, L2076 fitted with unanodised gravity fuel and oil tanks. No objection to mixing fabric covered and stressed skin wings in squadrons. Delivery Logs, fitted metal covered wings L2026-L2028, L2039, L2045-L2047, L2055, L2058, L2065-L2068, L2077-L2079 The contract cards show when the various changes were made and in theory from then on that was the new standard but there is certainly room for exceptions, like the P serial aircraft delivered with fabric wings, all the Hawkers P serials were reported fitted with Rotol airscrews as noted before. P3265 Rotol airscrew for de-icing trials P3720-P3734 originally meant for Iran, DH 2 pitch airscrews P3975 first aircraft of (200?) to be delivered with Jablo blades. (From Langley only?) V serials mark I contract card says Merlin III, airscrew Rotol type RX/52. (V7200-7862, ignoring blackout blocks, AS987-AS990)

Glosters, Interestingly the language used keeps referring to contract but there are two contract numbers and 1 requisition number. Contract 962371/38 requisition 195/38 500 mark I, completed 13 July 1940 (but the contract also includes 292 from Brooklands and 232 from Langley, so 524 Hawker, 500 Gloster, total 1,024 aircraft) Contract B19773/39 requisition 195/38 100 mark I, completed 9 August 1940, so all up 1,024 aircraft being covered. Engine Merlin III. Contract summary, original order 1,000 amended to 1,100 then 1,120 then 1,124. Ignoring blackout blocks the initial 1,000 serials are P2835-P3264 (500 a/c) Gloster, P3265-P3984 (500 a/c) Hawker The contract card marks P2682 as the first Gloster Hurricane fitted with Rotol airscrew, which is number 101 of the order. It does NOT say what the earlier production were fitted with. The general notes agree, while stating all aircraft from Hawkers off this contract have Rotol airscrews. The notes also state the first 100 (so to P2681) Gloster aircraft fitted for TR9D, remainder for TR1133 (which can also take TR9D) SB911 dd? 20 November 1939. Gloster officially built 100 Hurricanes to the end of February 1940 P3720-P3734 (Hawker Brooklands) are for Iran, aircraft to be replaced on contract. Memo from ? 4 May 1940. Cancelled, instead the 15 to be delivered to RAF completed to the same standard as the 35 (55? crossed out) Hurricanes modified by Hawkers to tropical standard at Maintenance Units. SB2202 ?13A add? 13 June 1940. Aircraft fitted DH 2 pitch airscrews, which is what the delivery logs also report. Additional 100 to be delivered by Glosters on B19773/39 (originally ordered as airframes equipped to column 8? of appendix A; amended? to aircraft ? dd 10 October 1939 from E1a to C23a, R4074-R4123, R4171-R4200, R4213-R4232 Additional 20 to be delivered by Hawkers on 962371/38, P8809-P8818, R2680-R2689. Additional 4 to be delivered by Hawkers on 962371/38, W6667-W6670 There is a note about delivery rate of 40 to 50 per week but not whether it applies to the entire order or one or other of Hawker or Gloster. Assuming both then 40 per week was attained in April 1940, 50 in May, pushing 80 in June. Agreed, how about instead we just set fire to it while you play? Under the everyone is sometimes an extreme critic rules. On a more somber note what is the time out for an edit session, before the system logs you out?

They are definitely counted as different for production purposes, the usual problem with such an extensive family is the judgement call of whether it is a new model or simply the (export) version of an existing one. Things like the differences between the BC-1A and the AT-6 is another, there seems little change in the aircraft, more the air force reclassifying it Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War by Francillon versus United States Military Aircraft since 1909, Swanborough and Bowers K10W1, 600 HP engine, wingspan 40 feet 6.375 inches, area 240 sq feet, length 29 feet, height 9 feet 6.625 inches, 3,254 pounds empty BT-9B, 400 HP engine, wingspan 42 feet, area 248 sq feet, length 27 feet 7 inches, height 13 feet 7 inches, 3,314 pounds empty The engine change BT-9B to BC-1 looks to have added around 200 pounds to obtain the extra power and you would expect a similar increase BT-9B to K10W, which would make the K10W structure around 10% lighter than the BT-9B without engine. BC-1, 600 HP engine, wingspan 43 feet, area 225 sq feet, length 27 feet 9 inches, height 14 feet, 4,050 pounds empty AT-6A, 600 HP engine, wingspan 42 feet, area 254 sq feet, length 29 feet, height 11 feet 9 inches, 3,900 pounds empty The internal structure change reports comes from the web pages, Francillon says "extensively modified" without stating exactly what changed. Does the Hagedorn book mention the K10W and, if so, why it was excluded? You do understand there are now children awaiting a rabbit to emerge from the hat? Chocolate from a pocket would be a suitable alternative.

Time to post the correction to the fabric winged 1940 Hurricanes. Comparison with British Military Aircraft Serials by Bruce Robertson. Agreements, P3714-P3717, P3737-P3739, P3757-P3761, P3767, P3768, P3770-P3774, P3858-P3869, P3872-P3875, P3882-P3889, P3897-P3903 (Only P3897 in my original list), P8809-P8810 (2 more I did not report earlier), P8816-P8818, R2680, R2681, V7200-V7209. (The delivery log entry remarks for V7200 read Fabric Wings (25 Aircraft)) V7221-V7235 according to Robertson, delivery logs exclude V7221 and V7223, but include V7276 and V7281. In addition the delivery logs have P3755, P3854 and P3890. So the delivery log list is P3714 to P3717, P3737 to P3739, P3755, P3757 to P3761, P3767, P3768, P3770 to P3774, P3854, P3858 to P3869, P3872 to P3875, P3882 to P3890, P3897 to P9303, P8809, P8810, P8816 to P8818, R2680, R2681, V7200 to V7209, V7222, V7224 to V7235, V7276, V7281. Total 85 aircraft. Delivery log details, P3714, 19 MU 4 June 1940, 253 Sqn 12 June 1940, 1 CRU?/4 MU 4? September 1940, 19 MU 9 October 1940, 501 Sqn 17 October 1940, 56 OTU 12 December 1940, later became mark II DR341, Russia P3715, 19 MU 3 June 1940, 238 Sqn 18 June 1940, 19 MU 20 Jun 1940, 242 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU 2 September 1940, 20?MU 8 December 1940, 247 Sqn 23 December 1940, 13MU repairs 6 January 1941, 22 MU 2 February 1941, SOC 30 Jun 1943 P3716, 19 MU 1 June 1940, 229 Sqn 4 June 1940, 15 MU 2 July 1940, 13 MU repairs 9 October 1940, 19 MU 19 November 1940, 79 Sqn 22 December 1940, 43 Group DA 12 January 1941, Airtrg SAS 21 January 1941, 27 MU 8 April 1941, SOC 1 Apr 1942 P3717, 19 MU 3 June 1940, 238 Sqn 18 June 1940, 19 MU 20 June 1940, 253 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU repairs? 31 August 1940, 48 MU 10 September 1940, 257 Sqn 17 September 1940, De Havilland ? 28 September 1940, 22 MU 28 October 1940, 43 Sqn 20 January 1941, later became mark II DR348, Russia P3737, 22 MU 6 June 1940, 605 Sqn 3 July 1940, SOC 1 November 1940 P3738, 22 MU 6 Jun 1940, RAF Station? ?llck 5 July 1940, 232 Sqn 21 July 1940, 13 MU 28 September 1940, SOC 22 Sep 1940 (Yes SOC then MU) P3739, 22 MU 2 June 1940, 5 MU 16 August 1940, 151 Sqn 20 August 1940, SOC 16 March 1942 P3755, 87 Sqn 25 June 1940, SOC 27 December 1940 P3757, 27 MU 6 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 26 June 1940, Rolls Royce/4MU 23 August 1940, 48 MU 8 September 1940, 18 MU 14 September 1940, 43 Sqn 2 October 1940, 43 Group DA ? February 1941, 13 MU repairs 17 March 1941 P3758, 27 MU 5 June 1940, 73 Sqn 21 June 1940, SOC 2 September 1940. P3759, 20 MU 8 June 1940, 245 Sqn 26 June 1940, 607 Sqn 20 July 1940, Rolls Royce SASB 9 October 1940, 27 MU 14 November 1940, 312 Sqn 1 December 1940, became mark II DR349, Russia. (18 October 1941) P3760, 20 MU 6 June 1940, CFF 11 June 1940, SOC 19 August 1940 P3761, 20 MU 8 June 1940, 245 Sqn 26 June 1940, 263 Sqn 15 July 1940, 258 Sqn 3 December 1940, 1 CRU SAS "B" 16 January 1941, SOC 29 December 1941 P3767, 20 MU 11 June 1940, 238 Sqn 11 July 1940, 263 Sqn 15 July 1940, 501 Sqn 8 October 1940, 13 MU repairs 16 October 1940, 48 MU 14 November 1940, 213 Sqn 4 February 1941, 1 RCAF Sqn 15 February 1941, 43 Group DA 26 March 1941, PSO, SOC 1 April 1941 P3768, 20 MU 8 June 1940, 47 MU 14 August 1940, 34 MU 29 August 1940, 1 CRU/4?MU 28? September 1940, 20 MU 20 October 1940, 47 MU 6 November 1940, Middle East, "Unknown Destination" 9 November 1940 P3770, 22 MU 11 June 1940, 3 Sqn 11 July 1940, 504 Sqn 16 August 1940, SOC 11 September 1940. P3771, 22 MU 12 June 1940, 3 Sqn 11 July 1940, Rolls Royce/4MU 20 July 1940, 10 MU 29? August 1940, 1 September 1940 79 Sqn, 43 Group DA 14 March 1941, 17? March? 1941, ? SAS, SOC 31 May 1943 P3772, 22 MU 11 June 1940, 3 Sqn 12 July 1940, 504 Sqn 14 September 1940, 232 Sqn 23 September 1940, SOC 27 May 1941 P3773, 22 MU 13 June 1940, 3 Sqn 11 July 1940, no further information P3774, 22 MU 12 June 1940, 3 Sqn 12 July 1940, 504 Sqn 14 September 1940, SOC 21 September 1940 P3854, 2 MU 13 June 1940, 7 OTU 17 June 1940, 13 MU 20 July? 1940, 5 MU 13 August 1940, 85 Sqn 18 September 1940, 257 Sqn 22 November 1940, 56 OTU 26 November 1940, SOC 22 May 1941 P3858, 27 MU 18 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 26 June 1940, SOC 18 September 1940 P3859, 27 MU 15 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 26 June 1940, SOC 19 September 1940 P3860, 27 MU 15 June 1940 607 Sqn 4 July 1940, SOC 8 October 1940 P3861, 27 MU 15 June 1940, 249 Sqn 13 July 1940, Cunliffe Owen 16 September 1940, 5 MU 5 December 1940, 9 SOTT? 12 February 1941, 9 FTS 13 February 1942, SOC 5 March 1945 P3862, 27 MU 18 June 1940, 249 Sqn 13 July 1940, 56 Sqn 24 June 1940, 52 OTU 25 February 1941, CAT E 30 May 1944 P3863, 27 MU 18 June 1940, 73 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU repairs 13 September 1940, SOC ? September 1940 cancelled, 20 MU 20 December? 1940, 247 Sqn 27 December 1940, 43 Group DA 3 March 1941, SOC June 1944 P3864, 27 MU 21 June 1940, 242 Sqn 13 July 1940, AMDP 19 August 1940, 242 Sqn 25 August 1940, 73 Sqn 7 September 1940, 54 MU 43 Group 2 October 1940, Rolls Royce/4MU 5 December 1940, 19 MU 3 January 1941, 52 OTU 9 March 1941, SOC 17 January 1941? (1944?) P3865, 27 MU 19 June 1940, 73 Sqn 13 July 1940, SOC 23 September 1940 P3866, 19 MU 19 June 1940, 249 Sqn 13 July 1940, 56 Sqn 24 September 1940, 13 MU 30 October 1940, 27 MU 4 December 1940, 257 Sqn 12 January 1941, SOC 12 May 1941 P3867, 27 MU 19 June 1940, 302 Sqn 27 July 1940, SOC 4 March 1941 P3868, 27 MU 20 June 1940, 249 Sqn 13 July 1940, 17? Sqn 20 September 1940, 52 OTU 13 March 1941, SOC 13 September 1942 P3869, 27 MU 21 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 22 July 1940, SOC 31 August 1940 P3872, 5 MU 22 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 30 June 1940, ? 1940 Hawkers 4 MU "B", 10 MU 10 October 1940, 302 Sqn 16 OCtober 1940, SOC 2 November 1940 P3873, 5 MU 21 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 30 July 1940, SOC 10 October 1940 P3874, 5 MU 22 June 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 30 July 1940, SOC 2 September 1940 P3875, 5 MU 22 June 1940, 111 Sqn 18 July 1940, SOC 2 September 1940 P3882, 5 MU 25 June 1940, 151 Sqn 2 July 1940, 43 Group 27 September 1940, SOC 30 September 1940 P3883, 5 MU 28 June 1940, 1 RACF Sqn 11 July 1940, 13 MU 3 September 1940, 1 Sqn 11 September 1940, SOC 19 November 1940 P3884, 10 MU 26 June 1940, 601 Sqn 12 July 1940, 1 CRU/4MU B 12 September 1940, 10 MU 13 November 1940, 71 Sqn 12 December 1940, 56 OTU 14 February 1941, SOC 4 May 1941 cancelled, to 4262M, SOC 31 December 1946 P3885, 10 MU 26 June 1940, 601 Sqn 12 July 1940, SOC 13 August 1940 P3886, 10 MU 24 June 1940, 601 Sqn 12 July 1940, 50 MU 43 Group 9 December 1940, ? SAS 11 December 1940, 15 MU 23 December 1940, 1 Sqn 2 February 1941, 59 OTU 19 March 1941, Arrive India 19 June 1943, SOC 28 September 1944 P3887, 10 MU 25? June 1940, 310 Sqn 19 July 1940, SOC 1 September 1940 P3888, 10 MU 26 June 1940, 310 Sqn 19 July 1940, 43 Group 54 MU 5 September 1940, De Havilland/4MU 5 September 1940, 18 MU 20 September 1940, 312 Sqn 11 October 1940, SOC 11 July 1942 (not in 1940 in previous list) P3889, 10 MU 28 June 1940, 310 Sqn 19 July 1940, 13 MU repair 1 September 1940, 48 MU 8 September 1940, 310 Sqn 12 September 1940, SOC 1 November 1940 P3890, 10 MU 25? June 1940, 257 Sqn 9 August 1940, 303 Sqn 10 August 1940, SOC 8 September 1940 P3897, 48 MU 30 June 1940, 1 Sqn 12 August 1940, SOC 11 September 1940 P3898, 48 MU 4 July 1940, 145 Sqn 12 August 1940, Rolls Royce/4MU 2 September 1940, 15 MU 20 September 1940, 229 Sqn 1 October 1940, ? SAS 8? November 1940, 10 MU 9 February 1941, CAT E 16 Nov 1944 P3899, 48 MU 6 July 1940, 145 Sqn 12 August 1940, Rlls Royce/4MU 29 August 1940, 18 MU 3 September 1940, 1 RCAF Sqn 14 September 1940, Hawkers/4? MU 29 September 1940, 19 MU 27? October 1940, 10 November 1940 Rolls Royce, SAS "B", 96 Sqn 19 December 1940, PSO 28 December 1940, SOC 28 December 1940 P3900, 48 MU 2 July 1940, 32 Sqn 14 August 1940, 13 MU 26 August 1940, 19 MU 15 October 1940, 87 Sqn 26 October 1940, 145 Sqn 8 November 1940, 17 Sqn 17 January 1941, 52 OTU(D) 3 March 1941, SOC 12 December 1941. P3901, 48 MU 2 July 1940, 615 Sqn 16? August 1940, 13 MU 23 August 1940, 15 MU 11 September 1940, 202 Sqn 17 September 1940, 253 Sqn 3 January 1941, SOC 28 April 1943 P3902, 48 MU 1 July 1940, 249 Sqn 20 August 1940, 56 MU 24? September 1940, 52 OTU 25 February 1941, SOC 17 March 1942 P3903, 48 MU 3 July 1940, 43 Sqn 14 August 1940, SOC 6 September 1940 P8809, 5 MU 15 July 1940, 310 Sqn 23 July 1940, SOC 12 December 1940 P8810, 5 MU 15 July 1940, 232 Sqn 7 August 1940, 43 Group DA 23 February 1941, ? SAS 4 March 1941, SCO 20 December (no year given) P8816, 5 MU 19 July 1940, 501 Sqn 7 August 1940, 49 MU 43 Group ? August 1940, AST? 4MU 16 September 1940, 20 MU 21 October 1940, 145 Sqn 28 October 1940, SOC 26 November 1940 P8817, 5 MU 19 July 1940, 52? MU 22 August 1940, sold to South Africa the same day. P8818, 5 MU 18 July 1940, 601 Sqn 25 July 1940, SOC 23 September 1940 R2680, 5 MU 19 July 1940, 238 Sqn 7 August 1940, 50? MU 43 Group 9 September 1940, ? 4 MU B 11 September 1940, 27 MU 13 October 1940 crossed out, 46 MU 21 October 1940, 56 OTU 14 February 1941, 71 Sqn no date, 56 OTU 2 March 1941, SOC 27 April 1943 R2681, 5 MU 20 July 1940, 238 Sqn 8 August 1940, 59 OTU 30 March 1941, CAT E 27 November 1944 V7200, 19 MU 3 July 1940, 79 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU 7 September 1940, 10 MU 28 October 1940, 312 Sqn 22 November 1940, 55 OTU 16 January 1941, SOC 14? September? 1941? V7201, 19 MU 2 July 1940, 46 Sqn 12 July 1940, 13 MU 10 September 1940, 27 MU 19 November 1940, 260 Sqn 9 December 1940, CAT E 27 May 1944 V7202, 19 MU 2 July 1940, 46 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU repairs 1 October 1940, SOC 31 December 1940 V7203, 19 MU 4 July 1940, 32? Sqn 13 JUly 1940 crossed out, 242 Sqn 13 July 1940, SOC 30 January 1941 V7204, 19 MU 4 July 1940, 87 Sqn 13 July 1940, SOC 4 January 1941 V7205, 19 MU 6 July 1940, 32 Sqn 24 July 1940, SOC 12 August 1940 V7206, 19 MU 8 July 1940, 43 Sqn 23 July 1940, 59 OTU 9 February 1941, SOC 27 November? 1941 V7207, 19 MU 4 July 1940, 87 Sqn 13 July 1940, 13 MU repairs 7 January 1941, 5 MU 23 February 1941, To FAA 19 March 1941, Cat E 13 October 1944 V7208, 19 MU 4 July 1940, 213 Sqn 23 July 1940, 1CRU SA?S 18 December 1940, 27 MU 13 February 1941, 5 MU Robin Sites? 8 April 1941 V7209, 19 MU 7 July 1940, 73 Sqn 23 July 1940, 501 Sqn 26? October 1940, 56 OTU 19 December 1940, 43 Group DA 13 March 1941, Hawkers SAS 18 March 1941, SOC 28 September 1944 V7222, 19 MU 8 July 1940, 111 Sqn 14 August 1940, 13 MU repairs 27 August 1940, 20 MU 24 September 1940, 151 Sqn 2 October 1940, 253 Sqn A 22 December? 1940,SOC 22 November 1942 V7224, 15 MU 10 July 1940, 213 Sqn 14 August 1940, De Havilland SAS B 9 October 1940, 5 MU 26 October 1940, 610 Sqn 29 November 1940, 248? Sqn A 14 March 1940, Arrive Port Sudan 3 February 1942, CAT E 30 September 1943 V7225, 15 MU 14? July 1940, 87 Sqn 14 August 1940, Rolls Royce SAS 28 December 1940, 15 MU 15 January 1941, 20 MU 21 February 1941, RAF A Mildenhall 25 March 1941, SOC 26 August 1941 V7226, 15 MU 9 July 1940, 87? Sqn 12 Aug 1940, 213 Sqn same day, 18? September? 1940 Hawkers 4 MU, SOC 30 September 1940 V7227, 15 MU 8 July 1940, 87 Sqn 13 August 1940, 213 Sqn 13 August 1940, SOC 22 August 1940 V7228, 15 MY 12 July 1940, 87 Sqn 13 August 1940, 213 Sqn same day, SOC August 1940 V7229, 10 MU 14 July 1940, 601 Sqn 9 July 1940, 49 MU 43 Group 15 August 1940, De Havilland 4 MU 17 August 1940, 5 MU 23 September 1940, 501 Sqn 28 September 1940, no loss date given V7230, 10 MU 18 JUly 1940, 501 Sqn 3 August 1940, Airtraining ? MU B 23 September 1940, 29 MU 18 October 1940, 145 Sqn 28 October 1940, SOC 4 January 1941 V7231, 10 MU 14 July 1940, 87 Sqn 29 July 1940, SOC 13 August 1940 V7232, 10 MU 13 July 1940, 46 Sqn 29 July 1940, SOC 11 Oct 1940 V7233, 10 MU 16 July 1940, 87 Sqn 29 July 1940, SOC 13 August 1940 V7234, 10 MY 17 July 1940, 501 Sqn 3 August 1940, 13 MU repairs 11 September 1940, 20 MU 30 September 1940, 151 Sqn 2 July 1940, 43 Group DA 6 March 1941, Rolls Royce SAS 14 March 1941, converted to Mark II DG617 V7235, 10 MU 18 July 1940, 267 Sqn 9 August 1940, 303 Sqn 10 August 1940, 253 Sqn 3 January 1941, SOC 31 May 1941 V7276, 5 MU 19 July 1940, 47 MU 3 August 1940, South Africa 20 August 1940 V7281, 5 MU 21 July 1940, 47 MU 7 August 1940, South Africa 20 August 1940

Forums like this are good because the ensure you double and triple check your data. My previous list missed P3898 to P3903, P8809, P8810 and I think my report of V7281 as Fabric Wings is more likely V7282. Overall when comparing with British Military Serials, the delivery logs have as extras P3755, P3854, P3890, V7226 and 7281 or 2, but exclude V7221 and V7223. The entry for V7200 says Fabric Wings (25 aircraft), with BMS saying they are V7200 to 7209 and V7221 to V7235, the delivery logs drop V7221 and V7223 but add V7276 and V7281 (or 2). And if I could figure out how to post a jpg from my local machine I would put up a couple of the relevant contract cards, assuming the security system does not lock me out until tomorrow sometime of course, it seems a little upset with me at the moment.

Sledge hammer ... check, claw hammer ... check, club hammer ... check, all other items hereby declared nails. To be clear I am quoting from Naval Aircraft Record of Acceptances 1935-1946, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department Washington DC, Navaer 15838. For 1947 to 1949 it is the similarly named reports for the relevant years plus the Naval Aircraft Production Program reports, with, both reports put out at the end of the year. Given the level of detail presented the chance for a small number of errors is there. Definitely including by me. Also extracts from the Airplane Serial Number Records, for "interesting" BuNos like those of the F4U-1C. To be pedantic, aircraft were accepted then delivered. http://www.adf-serials.com.au/nz-serials/nzcorsair.htm is probably the best online source for details of what the RNZAF received and when. From the production reports it is clear the RNZAF Corsairs were Lend-Lease, then comes what happened in theatre or as you note en route. The serial records for example have BuNos 57539 and 57949 marked as transferred to NZ in exchange for 50043 and 50433, I cannot properly make out the rest of the pencil hand written note about 10958 (? 14 Aug 44 in F4U-1 folder?). Thanks for the information the RNZAF were standard USN Corsairs, no RN equipment, makes sense given where they were operating, versus the idea they were Lend-Lease to RN/RAF standard. It also makes for easy exchange or borrowing between the various units and in theatre reallocations The USN Airplane Serial Number Records have the NZ aircraft listed under BuNos versus the BuNos for RN ones being blank except for a note to see relevant RN serials and then having entries on another page using the RN serial, so BuNos 57215 to 29 have "See D.A. JT670 thru JT684". Yes, there are plenty of examples of conversions being accepted after completion, for some reason this did not happen for a number of the Corsairs. The RN Corsair I and II, I can only assume there was an error and 2 acceptances were missed, the first raised seat Corsair was produced in August 1943, the RN had 94 out of 95 Corsair I accepted to end July, so that fits, assuming all RN 1A built before any 1D, that change would occur around April 1944 for the RN, which is 3 months after the USN production report says F4U-1D production started, that definitely does not fit. The split I used for NZAF Corsair was from the ADF-serials site, which has the designation F4U-1 and F4U-1D. Since I am unsure how official the F4U-1A designation was, they became I, when I should have written “I/II” and actually to be correct as you point out F4U-1 A or D, They are listed under F4U-1D in the USN report. Interesting about Goodyear production juggling. The FG for the RN, USN Production Report, KD161-259, KD265-561, total 395 serials, versus 392 acceptances against order 1871, 431 serials KD562 to KD992 are listed versus 306 acceptances in 1944 against order 1871 ammend. 2. In 1945 another 231 UK acceptances for the year, extra serials KD993 to 999 plus KE100 to 398 are listed, another 297 serials, but dropping in on Grumman has KE118 to 265 are Hellcats. In actual fact the relevant RN serials are KD993 to 999, KE100 to 117, KE310 to 429, so another 145 serials added to the 1944 list, totals 395+431+145 = 971 serials for 392+306+231 = 929 acceptances, difference 42, serials ahead. The memo stating 702 of 1944 production to RN, versus actual 698 acceptances, means a deficiency of 4. To make 852 to RN another 154 were required, of which 150 were to be in the first 6 months of 1945, versus 151 acceptances January to June, deficiency now 3. Goodyear seems to be doing well. By the looks of things there was a further allocation to the RN for the second half of 1945, with 80 acceptances July and August, probably not all the allocation was filled, not all the accepted aircraft delivered and not all the new allocation given RN serial numbers, the ones we know were allocated would have run out in July. It could be a mistake in the USN report or production running ahead of the paperwork, given the planned total was 1,272 to the RN. It would be good to see what the Sturtivant book says about RN Corsair numbers, what was the final delivery and how good the evidence is for it being the last. The USN production report has 6 F4U more to New Zealand than arrived, which are probably in theatre diversions, while missing 2 from the RN Corsair I/II order while to end 1944 Goodyear is 4 behind planned FG acceptances for the RN, mathematically speaking it matches, and the 1944 New Zealand order overlaps the British ones at Vought and Goodyear, so total Lend-Lease is correct to end 1944, to and from whom slightly in error, say a consequence of the KD260 to 264 / 14691 to 95 allocation to become XF2G-1. And yes there is a strong feeling the life jacket being reached for here is actually a large sized diver’s weight belt. The alternative is to use the Airplane Serial Number Records acceptance dates to construct the production report. Do you have the Corsair ones to end 1945? That is the way I extracted the F4U-1C from the 1D production, it is boring but not too time consuming, in any case here it would start with counting the Lend Lease orders, a smaller number of records. When you give the sequence of orders are you using Bureau Number order or acceptance dates? The records I have state BuNo 17516 was an XF4U-3, above it is 17510? I have seen messages in the US archives from the authority collecting production figures to factories saying your figures arrived too late, official figures already sent to decision makers,, adjust your records accordingly. Agreed production was often out of serial number order. The USN Bureau Number List only has 76450 as an FG-3, was that the crash? I have seen a report that 13 FG-1D were converted. Nothing on F4U-3. Thanks for a thoughtful and informative reply.

The Corsair production story according to the USN. I doubt the table will be readable without copying it to a spreadsheet or similar as there is 108 lines of 23 columns of data. A double delimiter character marks end of line. Chance Vought (Vought Sikorsky) Stratford, XF4U-1 Corsair, Contract/Letter of Intent 61544 30 June 1938, for 1 aircraft Bureau Number 1443, Engine P&W XR-2800-4, carrier and catapult fighter, officially accepted in September 1940 (First flight on 29 May 1940) Version \ Maker \ Contract or Letter of Intent \ Date \ Order \ Add \ Canx \ Total \ Jan \ Feb \ Mar \ April \ May \ June \ July \ Aug \ Sep \ Oct \ Nov \ Dec \ Bureau Numbers \ Engine \ Note \\ 1942 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ 82811 (NOa(s)-198) \ 30-Jun-41 \ 584 \ \ \ 584 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 2 \ 8 \ 13 \ 31 \ 55 \ 68 \ 02153-02738 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Production development of XF4U-1 (British Corsair I), serial 02157 converted to XF4U-3 on change order #0-12 Mar 1942 \\ XF4U-3 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ (02157, 17658) \ \ War Production Board Report says accepted in December 1944. USN says 02157 accepted on 15 Aug 42, crashed 31 Mar 43, 17658 accepted on 11 Aug 43. XF4U-3 accepted as F4U then modified. \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1943 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Long Island NY \ NOa(s)-172 \ 5-Mar-43 \ 260 \ \ \ 260 \ \ \ \ \ \ 2 \ 3 \ \ 8 \ 27 \ 28 \ 68 \ 04515-04774 (JS469-554) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Contract 90615 superceded by NOa(s)-172, from same spec as Mod. F4U-1 airplane. Production terminated at Brewster July 1944. \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Long Island NY \ (90615) \ \ 248 \ \ \ 248 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 08550-08797 (JS555-802) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Long Island NY \ \ \ 580 \ \ 353 \ 227 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 11067-11293 (JS803-829, 963-72) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ British serials actually JT963-72 \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Long Island NY \ \ \ 420 \ \ 420 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-198 \ 14-Dec-43 \ 584 \ \ \ 584 \ 39 \ 75 \ 77 \ 113 \ 95 \ 1 \ 4 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ 02153-02736 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Supercedes contract 82811. Production development of XF4U-1 (British Corsair I), serial 02157 converted to XF4U-3 on change order #0-12 Mar 1942 \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ (82811) \ 30-Jun-41 \ 40 \ \ \ 40 \ \ \ \ \ 17 \ 23 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 03802-03841 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 1500 \ \ \ 1500 \ \ \ \ \ \ 102 \ 118 \ 128 \ 151 \ 155 \ 176 \ 179 \ 17392-18191 (JT100-305) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Ser. No. 17516 diverted for XF4U-3. (Bu. No. 17647, first raised cockpit F4U, accepted 9 Aug 43.) \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 20 \ 25 \ 49 \ 46 \ 35 \ 40 \ 54 \ 56 \ 55784-56483 (JT306-424) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Production for non USN (British) orders (JT100-424) \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 1000 \ \ \ 1000 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 49660-50659 (JT495-564) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Ser No. 49664 diverted for XF4U-3. 49763, 50301 are XF4U-4. 200 are F4U-1C \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 900 \ \ \ 900 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 57084-57983 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 675 \ \ \ 675 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ XF4U-3 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ (02157, 17658) \ \ War Production Board Report says accepted in December 1944. USN says 02157 accepted on 15 Aug 42, crashed 31 Mar 43, 17658 accepted on 11 Aug 43 \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-1871 \ 16-Oct-44 \ 2000 \ \ 8 \ 1992 \ \ \ \ 1 \ 7 \ 16 \ 22 \ 30 \ 77 \ 63 \ 78 \ 80 \ 12992-14591, 14592-14690 (KD161-259), 14691-14695, \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Constructed from same spec. as F4U-1, Ser. 13111 static test, not used (76139 was its replacement). Ser. 12992, 13471-72, diverted for XF2G-1 \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 14696-14991 (KD265-560), 76139 (KD561) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ XF2G-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ 99529 \ 18-Jun-42 \ \ 8 \ \ 8 \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 2 \ (12992, 13471-72) \ \ XF2G-1 accepted as FG-1 then converted. (First flight 31 May 1944?) \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1944 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Johnsville \ NOa(s)-172 \ 5-Mar-43 \ 260 \ \ \ 260 \ 35 \ 2 \ \ 1 \ 15 \ 100 \ 16 \ \ \ \ \ \ 04515-04688, 04689-04774 (JS469-554) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ From same spec as Mod. F4U-1 airplane (Brit. Corsair III). Ser. 04517 and 04683 crashed. Production terminated at Brewster 1 July 1944. Hohnsville is the location given in the report. \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Johnsville \ \ \ 248 \ \ \ 248 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 08550-08797 (JS555-802) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Johnsville \ \ \ 580 \ \ 353 \ 227 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 11067-11162 (JS803-888, 963-72), 11163-11293 \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ British serials actually JT963-72 \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Johnsville \ \ \ 420 \ \ 420 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ \\ F3A-1 \ Brewster, Johnsville \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 26 \ 76 \ 100 \ 118 \ 107 \ 2 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Production for non USN orders, total 430. (British) JS469-888, JT963-972 \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-198 \ 14-Dec-43 \ 584 \ \ \ 584 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ 02153-02736 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Production development of XF4U-1 (British Corsair I and II), serial 02157 diverted to XF4U-3 \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ (82811 Ext.) \ 30-Jun-41 \ 40 \ \ \ 40 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 03802-03841 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ F4U-1 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 1500 \ \ \ 1500 \ 165 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 17392-18191 (JT100-305), 55784-56483 (JT306-424) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Ser. No. 17516 diverted for XF4U-3. \\ F4U-1C \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ (200 From F4U-1D order) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 18 \ 30 \ 56 \ 66 \ 28 \ \ P&W R-2800-8 \ "F4U-1C break down from USN Airplane Serial Number Record 1944 figures confirmed in RG 179 E 294B B 719. Bu. Nos. 57667 - 57669, 57777 - 57791, 57966 - 57983, 82178 - 82189, 82260 - 82289, 82370 - 82394, 82435 - 82459, 82540 - 82582, 82633 - 82639, 82740 - 82761 " \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 1000 \ \ \ 1000 \ \ 162 \ 129 \ 98 \ 126 \ 61 \ 270 \ 198 \ 180 \ 160 \ 131 \ 135 \ 49660-50659 (JT495-564) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ F4U-1 planes equipped with twin pylons for droppable wing tanks or 1,000 pound bombs. No integral wing tanks. Ser. No. 49644 diverted to XF4U-3. Ser. 49763 and 50301 diverted for XF4U-4, 49806 stricken. \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 900 \ \ \ 900 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 57084-57983 \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 675 \ \ \ 675 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 82178-82852 \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 59 \ 61 \ 61 \ 59 \ 60 \ 44 \ 23 \ 3 \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Production for New Zealand order, total 370, RNZAF received 377 (NZ5201-5577), including some theatre transfers. \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 66 \ 72 \ 68 \ 64 \ 7 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Production for British order, 1945 page changes UK serials from JT495-564 to JT495-704, which is 280 serials, versus 278 listed here as built for British. \\ XF4U-3 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ (49964) \ \ \\ XF4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-2720 \ 22-Sep-44 \ 5 \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ 3 \ \ 2 \ 80759-80763 (plus 49763, 50301) \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Similar to F4U-1 except engine and improved cockpit arrangement. \\ F4U-4/4C \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 25-Jan-44 \ 1414 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 3 \ 80764-82177 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Similar to F4U-1 except engine and improved cockpit arrangement. Serial 81778 crashed, completely demolished \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-1871 \ 16-Oct-44 \ 2000 \ \ \ 2000 \ 150 \ 147 \ 222 \ 220 \ 220 \ 160 \ 98 \ 2 \ 10 \ 1 \ \ \ 12992-14591, 14592-14690 (KD161-259) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Constructed from same spec. as F4U-1, Ser. 13111 static test, not used (76139 was its replacement). Ser. 12992, 13471-72, 14691-95, diverted for XF2G-1 \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 72 \ 166 \ 133 \ 15 \ 5 \ 1 \ 14696-14991 (KD265-560), 76139 (KD561) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ For British \\ XF2G-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 5 \ \ \ \ 14691-14695 \ \ All 5 aircraft have two acceptance dates, either 29 September or 24 October. Diversions, accepted as FG-1 then converted \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-1871, Amend. 2 \ \ 600 \ 666 \ \ 1266 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 8 \ 1 \ \ \ 76140-76148 (KD562-570) FG-1 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ For British \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ (NOa(s)-951) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 50 \ 130 \ 76149-76739 (KD571-867) FG-1D \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 29 \ 165 \ 90 \ 13 \ 87788-88453 (KD868-992) FG-1D \ P&W R-2800-8 \ For British \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1945 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-1/1C/1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-198 (82811 Ext.) \ 14-Dec-43 \ 4699 \ \ 5 \ 4694 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 02153-02736 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Production development of XF4U-1 (British Corsair I and II) \\ F4U-1/1C/1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 30-Jun-41 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 03802-03841 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ XF4U-3 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ 3 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 17392-18191 (JT100-305) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ Serials 02157, 17516, 49664 diverted to XF4U-3 \\ XF4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ 2 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 55784-56483 (JT306-424) \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Serials 49763 and 50301 diverted to XF4U-4 \\ F4U-1C \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ (200 From F4U-1D order) \ \ \ \ \ \ 2 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 49660-50659 (JT425-634) \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ F4U-1D \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 72 \ 2 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 57084-57983 (JT635-704), 82178-82852 \ P&W R-2800-8 \ \\ XF4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-2720 \ 12-Sep-44 \ 5 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 80759-80763 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ \\ F4U-4/4C \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 1414 \ \ \ \ 44 \ 150 \ 268 \ 279 \ 302 \ 300 \ 68 \ \ \ \ \ \ 80764-82177 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ F4U-4C same as F4U-4 except equipped with 20mm guns. Ser. 81778 crashed, completely demolished. \\ F4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 21-Sep-44 \ 780 \ \ 2 \ 778 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 235 \ 210 \ 41 \ 31 \ 21 \ 20 \ 96752-97531 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Production development of XF4U-4 \\ XF4U-5 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ 2 \ \ 2 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ (97296, 97364, 97435) \ P&W R-2800-32W \ Serial 97296 and 97415 diverted to XF4U-5, 97296 crashed 8 July 1946, replaced by 97364. (First flight 4 April 1946? All XF4U-5 probably converted after acceptance.) \\ F4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 21-Sep-44 \ 950 \ \ 793 \ 157 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 62915-63864 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Bu No 63072-63864 cancelled. Cancellations on V-J Day \\ F4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 6-Feb-45 \ 1700 \ \ 1700 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 105176-106875 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Cancellations on V-J Day \\ F4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 14-Feb-45 \ 1200 \ \ 1200 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 114529-115728 \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Cancellations on V-J Day \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-1871 \ 16-Oct-44 \ 2000 \ \ 8 \ 1992 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 12992-14591, 14592-14690 (KD161-259) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Constructed from same spec. as F4U-1, Ser. 13111 static test, not used (76139 was its replacement). Ser. 12992, 13471-72, 14691-95, diverted for XF2G-1 \\ FG-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ (NOs-99529) \ 18-Jun-42 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 14696-14991 (KD265-560), 76139 (KD561) \ \ \\ XF2G-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ 8 \ \ 8 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 12992, 13471-72, 14691-14695 \ \ \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-1871, Amend. 2 \ \ 600 \ 666 \ \ 2006 \ 94 \ 132 \ 194 \ 152 \ 169 \ 169 \ 138 \ 113 \ 68 \ \ \ \ 76140-76148 (KD562-570) (FG-1) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Same as F4U-1D \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ (NOa(s)-951) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 31 \ 45 \ 39 \ 26 \ 10 \ 42 \ 38 \ \ \ \ \ 76149-76739 (KD571-867) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ For British \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 8 \ 15 \ 23 \ 14 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 87788-88453 (KD868-992) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ For New Zealand \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ 695 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 97002-92701 (KD993-999, KE100-389) \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Ser. KD993-999 KE100-117, KE310-389 cancelled. \\ FG-1D \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ \ 200 \ 155 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 67055-67099 \ P&W R-2800-8/8W \ Serial 67100 - balance of contract (BuNo 67254) cancelled. Cancellations on V-J Day \\ F2G-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-2971 \ 22-Mar-44 \ 418 \ \ 413 \ 5 \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ 1 \ 1 \ 2 \ \ \ 88454-88463 \ P&W R-4360-4 \ Similar to FG-1 except engine and rearrangement of cockpit and cowling. Cancellations on V-J Day \\ F2G-2 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ 10 \ \ 5 \ 5 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ 2 \ \ P&W R-4360-4 \ Cancellations on V-J Day \\ FG-4 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOas-5486 \ 27-Jan-45 \ 1500 \ \ 1500 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 672555-67754, 106876-107875 \ P&W R-4360-4 \ Carrier version of F2G-1 with folding wings, catapult and arresting provisions. Cancellations on V-J Day \\ FG-4 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOas-6745 \ 1-Jun-45 \ 1000 \ \ 1000 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 115729-116728 \ P&W R-4360-4 \ Cancellations on V-J Day \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1946 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-4 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-2720 \ 12-Sep-44 \ 2058 \ \ \ 2058 \ 21 \ 21 \ 20 \ 17 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-18W \ Production development of XF4U-4 (Order total includes 5 XF4U-4) \\ XF4U-5 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ (Diverted to) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ (97296, 97364, 97435) \ P&W R-2800-32W \ XF4U-5 same as F4U-4 except for two stage engine. Serial 97296 and 97415 diverted to XF4U-5, 97296 crashed 8 July 1946, replaced by 97364. \\ F4U-4B \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ 11-Aug-45 \ 227 \ 60 \ \ 287 \ \ \ \ 4 \ 21 \ 21 \ 20 \ 21 \ 20 \ 18 \ 18 \ 18 \ \ P&W R-2800-18W/42W \ F4U-4B same as F4U-4 except equipped with 20mm guns \\ F4U-4N \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 60 \ \ 60 \ 0 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-4P \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 11 \ \ \ 11 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ \ P&W R-2800-42W \ F4U-4P same as F4U-4 except equipped for photographic reconnaissance. \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F2G-1 \ Goodyear, Akron \ NOa(s)-2971 \ 22-Mar-44 \ 418 \ \ 413 \ 5 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 88454-88458, 88459-88463 \ \ Directive No. CNO1846-44. Similar to FG-1 except engine and rearrangement of cockpit and cowling \\ F2G-2 \ Goodyear, Akron \ \ \ 10 \ \ 5 \ 5 \ 1 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ F2G-2 Carrier version of F2G-1 with folding wings, catapult and arresting provisions \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1947 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-4B \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-2720 \ 12-Sep-44 \ 287 \ \ \ 287 \ 11 \ 15 \ 29 \ 17 \ 18 \ 17 \ 11 \ 7 \ \ \ \ \ 62915-63071 (Including 11 F4U-4P) \ P&W R-2800-18W \ F4U-4 equipped with 20mm guns \\ XF4U-5 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 2 flying before 1 January, planned acceptance in February 1948, diverted from contract 2720, Account 31100, 46811, appropriations 17X1502.101, 1761502.4 \\ F4U-4P \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-2720 \ 12-Sep-44 \ 11 \ \ \ 11 \ 1 \ \ 1 \ 1 \ \ 1 \ \ 3 \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-18W \ F4U-4 equipped for photographic reconnaissance. \\ F4U-5 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-8133 \ 19-Jul-46 \ 248 \ \ \ 248 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 15 \ 56 \ 121793-122066, 122153-122206 (Inc. 50 -5N and 30 -5P) \ P&W R-2800-32W \ Improved version of F4U-4 with 32W engine and power operated trim controls. Delays in delivery of the automatic power control have necessitated holding accepted airplanes at the contractor's plant pending receipt of the unit. \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 50 \ \ \ 50 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-32W \ F4U-5N acceptances have been delayed by difficulties with night version installations. \\ F4U-5P \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ \ \ 30 \ \ \ 30 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ P&W R-2800-32W \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1948 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-5 \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-8133 \ 19-Jul-46 \ 245 \ 50 \ 72 \ 223 \ 15 \ 25 \ 25 \ 19 \ 17 \ 11 \ 14 \ 14 \ 11 \ \ 1 \ \ 121793-122066, 122153-122206 (Inc. 75 -5N and 30 -5P) \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2001-47 (245 A/C). EN11-2008-47 (+50 A/C). EN11-2013-47 (-17 A/C). EN11-2016-47 (-30 A/C). EN11-2019-48 (-25 A/C). Production development of the XF4U-5 except 2 stage engine with automatic supercharger controls. Ham. Std. Prop. Fiscal year 1947 funds. \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-8133 \ 19-Jul-46 \ 29 \ 46 \ \ 75 \ \ \ 16 \ 10 \ 1 \ 4 \ 4 \ 4 \ 4 \ 18 \ 10 \ 3 \ \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2001-47 (29 A/C). EN11-2008-47 (+4 A/C). EN11-2013-47 (+17 A/C). EN11-2019-48 (+25 A/C). Same as F4U-5 except equipped for night fighting. Fiscal year 1947 funds. \\ F4U-5P \ Chance Vought, Stratford \ NOa(s)-8133 \ 19-Jul-46 \ \ 30 \ \ 30 \ \ \ \ \ 3 \ 7 \ 4 \ 4 \ 7 \ 4 \ 1 \ \ \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2016-47 (30 A/C). Same as F4U-5 except equipped for photographic reconnaissance. Fiscal year 1947 funds. \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Dallas \ NOa(s)-9771 L.I. \ 22-Apr-48 \ 60 \ \ \ 60 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 123144-123203 \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2022-48 (60 A/C). Same as F4U-5 except equipped for night fighting. \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ 1949 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Dallas \ NOa(s)-8133 \ 19-Jul-46 \ 29 \ 46 \ \ 75 \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 121793-122066, 122153-122206 \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2001-47 (29 A/C). EN11-2008-47 (+4 A/C). EN11-2013-47 (+17 A/C). EN11-2019-48 (+25 A/C). Fiscal Year 1947 funds \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Dallas \ NOa(s)-9771 \ 12-May-48 \ \ \ \ 60 \ \ \ \ \ 1 \ 4 \ 8 \ 12 \ 12 \ 9 \ 8 \ 6 \ 123144-123203 (In report as 123023) \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-2022-48 (60 A/C). Fiscal Year 1948 funds \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Dallas \ 10484 L.I. \ 26-Sep-49 \ \ \ \ 60 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 124665-124724 \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-1003-50 (60 A/C). Fiscal Year 1950 funds. Procurement release 17 August 1949 \\ F4U-5N \ Chance Vought, Dallas \ 10302 \ 2-Feb-49 \ \ \ \ 120 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 124441-124560 \ P&W R-2800-32W \ EN11-1025-49 (120 A/C). Fiscal Year 1949 funds. Procurement release 14 January 1949 \\ Notes Vought F4U: Also known as the F3A the FG, the F2G, the AU and the Corsair. Bureau Number 13111 built by Goodyear was for static tests, it never flew and has been omitted from the production reports and here. The second order from Goodyear was for six hundred aircraft, but six hundred and one Bureau Numbers were allocated, with 76193 (RAF KD561) the replacement for 13111. The USAAF Statistical Digest reports one Goodyear naval fighter accepted in 1947, but this is not in the USN production report. Bureau Number 17647 was the first raised seat F4U, accepted 9 August 1943, a number of references call the raised seat version the F4U-1A but this designation does not appear in the USN documents, if used it would mean eight hundred and seventy nine F4U-1 (two of which were converted to XF4U-3) and one thousand two hundred and forty five F4U-1A. It is understood the three XF4U-3, two of the seven XF4U-4 (Bureau Numbers 49763 and 50301), the eight XF2G-1 and the three XF4U-5 were accepted as standard F4U or FG then converted, they are all listed under their X designation in the USN Bureau Number List except for XF4U-3 prototype Bureau Number 49664, listed as an F4U-1. They are given in the spreadsheet using acceptance dates. The book U.S. Experimental & Prototype Aircraft Projects: Fighters 1939-1945 by William Norton says of the three XF4U-3 prototypes Bureau Number 17516 first flew in its modified state on 26 March 1944, 49664 on 20 September 1944, while 02157 contributed little, the XF2G-1 13471 had its first flight 26 August 1944 and the third example went to USN on 27 November 1944. The production report main table only has two aircraft diverted to XF4U-5, 97296 and 97415, but adds in the notes that 97296 crashed on 8 July 1946, and was replaced by 97364, which makes for a total of three aircraft used in the XF4U-5 program. While the USN Bureau Number lists and Airplane Serial Records differentiate between the machine gun armed F4U-1D and the cannon armed F4U-1C they do not do so for the F4U-4 and F4U-4C. One difference, the serial records say the first three F4U-1C were Bureau Numbers 57667 to 57669, the Bureau Number List says 57657 to 57659. It is believed there were three hundred F4U-4C built as part of the first F4U-4 order, which was accepted between December 1944 and July 1945 inclusive. The official USN Bureau Number List reports Bureau Numbers 49660 to 50359 were F4U-1, they were actually F4U-1D as per the USN production report. With this change the production report total of two thousand one hundred and twenty four F4U-1 accepted, with two converted into XF4U-3, is comparable to the official Bureau Number List which has two XF4U-3 and so two less F4U-1. The production report F4U-1D total is two thousand three hundred and seventy five, with one converted to XF4U-3 and two to XF4U-4, the Bureau Number List has both XF4U-4, so two less F4U-1D. F4U-4 production report total is two thousand and fifty three F4U-4 (two converted to XF4U-5), two hundred and eighty seven F4U-4B (one converted to XF4U-5) and eleven F4U-4P. This is different to the Bureau Number List of two thousand one hundred and ninety one F4U-4 (3 converted to XF4U-5), one hundred and forty eight F4U-4B and nine F4U-4P. Both documents agree on the Bureau Numbers of the XF4U-5 prototypes. Using the USN Airplane Serial Records F4U-4B Bureau Number were, in build order, 97391 to 97531 (141) and 62915 to 63071 (157) except for the following accepted as F4U-4P 97487, 97507, 97527, 62930, 62950, 62990, 63010, 63011, 63050, 63069 and 63071, versus the Bureau Number List of 62930, 62950, 62970, 62990, 63010, 63030, 63050, 63070 and 63071. The production report has Bureau Numbers 12993 to 14991 as FG-1, less the eight diverted to XF2G-1, with 13111 for static tests, the Bureau Number List has them as FG-1D, less the eight diverted to XF2G-1, the production report has Bureau Numbers 76450 to 76739 as FG-1D, the Bureau Number List has 76450 as FG-3 and 76451 to 76739 as FG-1. Post 1949 F4U-5N production was fifteen in the first quarter of 1950, twenty nine in the second quarter, twenty nine again in the third and thirty four in the fourth quarter, then thirty one in the first quarter of 1951, twenty eight in the second and fourteen in the third quarter, for total production of three hundred and fifteen. Post 1949 AU-1 production was eighteen in the first quarter of 1952, fifty four in the second quarter and thirty nine in the third quarter. Post 1949 F4U-7 production was fifteen in the third quarter of 1952 and sixty four in the fourth quarter, then fifteen in the first quarter of 1953, for total production of ninety four. Grand total of twelve thousand five hundred and eighty.

Graham, could you please define a lot? My first sentence noted where the data was weakest, the pre war exports, things like the State Department reports tend to give monetary amounts, rather than aircraft numbers, so date information is needed. Sorting out Peru ($1.1 million category III (military aircraft) export licences November 1935 to December 1939) is a lot simpler than Argentina ($12.2 million) or China ($12.7million) The airvectors page has a list of which I did not have good enough production information on plus any others the web page has omitted, "NA-20", one evaluated by Honduras. "NA-27", one evaluated by the Netherlands. "NA-34", 29 obtained by Argentina. "NA-37", one evaluated by the Imperial Japanese Navy. (reported delivered in September 1937, which would relate to the $45,000 export licence for August, probably) "NA-41", 35 obtained by the Republic of China. "NA-42", two obtained by Honduras. "NA-44", one evaluated by the RCAF. Reported as company demonstrator, and so would be considered a US Civil not military aircraft for official production counts. The RCAF NA-26 is in the USAAF production report, accepted, delivered and exported in July 1940. The RCAF records NA-44 ex NX18981, RCAF 3344 arriving 6 August 1940 and NA-26 ex NX18990 (C/n 18990), RCAF 3345 arriving on 23 July 1940. "NA-45", 3 obtained by Honduras. "NA-46", 12 obtained by the Brazilian Navy. "NA-47", one evaluated by the Imperial Japanese Navy. (reported delivered in December 1937, which would relate to the $49,100 export licence for October, probably) "NA-48", 15 obtained by the Republic of China. Correct about the 7 NA-50 for Peru, in May 1939, my omission. The joys of such a closely related family means some references rate the NA-57 as the export version of the BT-9B for France, the NA-64 the export version BT-14. What do you mean by a bit more clarity in their production? I have a USAAF production repot for 1940 that includes acceptance, delivery and exports by order by month, which totally covers the 50 NA-16-4 for China and the 230 NA-64 for France (111 actually, rest to Britain) plus notes the final 4 exports of the NA-57 to France in January. The embargo in September 1939 stopped exports, which when the US was counting aircraft as built for export, so NA-57 were undoubtedly sitting in the US awaiting export but not officially counted. Unfortunately I do not have easy access to the Hagedorn book at the moment, interesting about the Kyushu K10W "Oak", given reports it had a very different internal structure. Japan did obtain manufacturing rights but the K10W did not appear until 1941, hence conclusions the North American aircraft were part of the design study and had influence, but the K10W was not part of the North American family.

Thanks, I have no problems with it being reproduced, as long as the information is accurate. Interesting given the obvious visual clues like canopy changes, rear fuselage skinning and wing tips, plus when the aircraft were produced, it does show how related the designs were despite all the designations. Agreed, hence the one line about names in my original message. You probably do not want to read further. They are of use, a much better summary of the changes between versions than I have or could put together. For what it is worth I am taking the opportunity to for a comparison to the web pages, data from the production reports, unfortunately the US does not track production for export until 1940, and officially counted such production when the aircraft was exported. Quite a few differences. NA-16-1, 6 for Brazil in May 1939, NA-16-4, 1 for Argentina in March 1939 BT-9, 42 July to December 1936 BT-9A, 40 August to September 1936 BT-9B, 117 June to December 1936 BT-9C, 66 June 1936 to May 1937 (but no production July and August) Y1BT-10, 1 in June 1937 (Not in my original list) NJ-1, 39 October 1937 to February 1938 and 1 in July 1938. BC-1, 177 May to December 1938 BC-2, 3 in April and May 1939 Harvard I, 400 for RAF, 30 for RCAF in 1938 and 1939. First arrival in Britain in December 1938, another 310 arrived January to November 1939. As far as I know the RCAF were the final ones built, delivered from July to December 1939 but there was an embargo for a time after war was declared. Wirraway I, 40 July 1939 to February 1940 Wirraway II, 580 February 1940 to June 1942 Wirraway III, 135 November 1943 to July 1946. CAC's idea, with the note it was a private company, not a government one (airvectors web site) Wirraway GP, CA-1, CAC Serial 1 to 40, RAAF A20-3 to 42, Mark I Wirraway GP, CA-3, CAC Serial 41 to 100, RAAF A20-43 to 102, Mark II Wirraway GP, CA-5, CAC Serial 103 to 134, RAAF A20-103 to 134, Mark II Wirraway GP, CA-7, CAC Serial 135 to 234, RAAF A20-153 to 234, Mark II Wirraway GP/Trainer, CA-8, CAC Serial 436 to 635, RAAF A20-235 to 434, Mark II Wirraway Dive Bomber, CA-9, CAC Serial 636 to 823, RAAF A20-435 to 622, Mark II Wirraway GP, CA-10 & 10A, Cancelled Wirraway Dive Bomber, CA-16, CAC Serial 1075 to 1224, RAAF A20-623 to 722, Mark III Wirraway Dive Bomber, CA-20 Cancelled SNJ-1, 1 in June 1939, 15 in November BC-1A, 83 January to March 1940 BC-1A, 12 for Chile probably in February 1941, counted as Harvard II in production reports, scrub previous remarks about final 12, I confused myself over the production reports confusion of whether they were built in 1940 or 1941. Harvard II, 1,275 June 1940 to January 1942 AT-6, 94 February to June 1940 NA-71, 3 in June 1940 NA-26, 1 in July 1940 SNJ-2, 36 April to July 1940 and 25 December 1940 to May 1941. The order for 36 was the last ordered direct by the USN, from then on they are reported under "Army for Navy". BT-14/Yale 230 for France in 1939, 226 exported that year, probably starting in February 251 January to October 1940 for US 50 April to September 1940 for China 230 February to August 1940 for France Up until now all US production at Inglewood AT-6A 517 at Inglewood September 1940 to August 1941, 1,032 at Dallas April 1941 to June 1942 SNJ-3 120 at Inglewood February to July 1941 AT-6A 1,032 at Dallas April 1941 to June 1942 SNJ-3 448 at Dallas July 1941 to June 1942 From now on all US wartime production at Dallas AT-6B, 400 January to May 1942 AT-6C/Harvard IIA, 2,970 February 1942 to July 1943 SNJ-4, 2,400 May 1942 to July 1943 AT-6D/Harvard III, 3,193 July 1943 to February 1945 SNJ-5, 1,568 July 1943 to January 1945 AT-6F, 545 February to August 1945 SNJ-6, 411 April to August 1945. The post war T-6G/SNJ-7 remanufactures, for USAF unless stated. No information in the 1951 FY USAF Statistical Digest The 1952 FY USAF Statistical digest, table 4 page 161 has 5 T-6G orders, all from North American, 824 from Cols., acceptances November 1951 to October 1952. 11 from Fresno, accepted August to October 1951 641 from Downey, 540 accepted prior to 1 July 1951, the remainder July to October 1951. 107 from Downey for MDAP, accepted September to December 1951 50 from Downey for ANG, 40 accepted prior to 1 July 1951, the remainder in July and August 1951 The 1953 FY Digest, table 107, page 186 onwards includes remainder of Cols. order plus, 11 From Fresno, accepted August to October 1952 110 from Fresno for ANG, 50 accepted December 1952 to April 1953. No information in the 1954 or 1955 digests. The above covers 1,754 aircraft, 1,704 acceptances, versus 1,743 serials reported issued. LT-6G, 59 from Downey, accepted October 1951 to January 1952. T6-J/Harvard IV from Can. Car, 285 accepted January 1953 to May 1954 (USAF Statistical Digest FY 1954, table 27, page 72 for FY 1954 production) No information on dates of RCAF production. Noorduyn, called AT-16 if the US paid for the aircraft, otherwise Harvard, total 2,800 built. Harvard IIB, 210 January 1941 to April 1942. AT-16, 1,500 April 1942 to January 1944 Harvard IIB, 990 January 1944 to October 1945 Harvard IIB TT, 100, 97 November and December 1944, 3 February and March 1945. A-27, 10 in August 1940 NA-44, 1 for Canada in July 1940, 20 for Brazil August to October 1940, 10 more in February 1941 P-64, 6 in November 1940 Boomerang 250 built September 1942 to January 1945 (CA-12 to June 1943, CA-13 June 1943 to May 1944, CA-19 June 1944 on) CAC's idea, Boomerang CA-12, serials 824 to 928, RAAF A46-1 to 105 Boomerang CA-13, serials 929 to 1023, RAAF A46-106 to 200 Boomerang (supercharger), CA-14/14A Serial 1073, RAAF A46-1001 (first flown in January 1943, to RAF in 16 April 1943, back to CAC for conversion to CA-14 in June, flying again in July) Boomerang CA-19, serials 1024 to 1072, RAAF A46-201 to 249 The final 49 Boomerangs were called CA-19 by the maker but only the last 31 are classified as mark II in the RAAF aircraft cards. The final 39 were built with F.24 cameras to be fighter reconnaissance.

No problems, I did not think the question required the full family tree as the design was tweaked over the years. The BT-9, 9A, 9B, 9C and NJ-1 from 1936 to 1938, along with the one NJ-1 converted to NJ-2. The BC-1 in 1938 and BC-2 in 1939, along with the Harvard I, Wirraway and SNJ-1 The BC-1A for Chile in 1940 (and 1941), the Harvard II, AT-6 (slightly modified BC-1A), SNJ-2, AT-6A/SNJ-3, BT-14/Yale (The USAAF production reports count the final 12 BC-1A as Harvard II) 1941 onwards, AT-6B, AT-6C/SNJ-4/Harvard IIA, the AT-6D/SNJ-5/Harvard III, AT-6F/SNJ-6. The AT-6E was a conversion to an inline engine. The post war T-6G/SNJ-7 remanufactures, LT-6G, T-6J, the cancelled SNJ-8. The Harvard IV Wartime Noorduyn were the AT-16/Harvard IIB. I do not think the T-16 designation was used. Not to mention the A-27 and P-64 (and Boomerang or is that a tweak too far?) or the way the Texan name is associated with the Dallas plant, which did not start manufacture until 1941, not sure when the name was officially adopted so probably no Texans until quite a while after AT-6 production began. Space after this line left intentionally blank and very very long for others to add even more to the family tree. Given various one offs like 3 NA-71 for Venezuela and 1 NA-26 for Canada in 1940. Really it is all just one big happy family, honest, just please ignore all the machines guns being carried.