Geoffrey Sinclair

There is a good chance the front turret on the Lancaster II was a big part of the extra drag versus the Halifax III arrangement, which would help even performance. I assume someone has a good idea when the square fins were made the production standard for the different lines, Handley Page, London Aircraft Production, English Electric, Rootes Speke, and Fairey. Thanks Ray for finding the report, agreed it is an omission the unspecified design problem is not mentioned, only that it could not be found or corrected at the time, so it is not things like the tail and other control surfaces. It is also odd the exhaust shrouds on Halifax Merlins were reported less effective than those on Lancasters, clearly being more visible must have made interceptions easier and that is not strictly an aircraft performance issue, though the problems in taking evasive action clearly is. It is odd the report does not mention the clearly better performing Halifax VI, though of course it did not arrive until the second half of 1944. Reading between the lines it looks like the early mark III did not have the extended wing, and possibly problems with the engines, but that soon changed if the anecdotal evidence of climbing to 25,000 feet is correct, assuming it is not really a mark VI. Not sure what to make of the comments about Lancaster turret hydraulic lines being more vulnerable equals the Halifax being more robust, agreed the consensus is liquid cooled engines were more vulnerable to damage than air cooled ones As for the comment on the flak guns, The average for aircraft returning damaged by flak on night raids February to December 1942 was 6.5%. Before the RAF introduced window Bomber Command was recording that around 6 to 9% of returning aircraft on night missions had flak damage, March to July 1943. This dropped to 2.85% in August making the average for all of 1943 5.8%, damaged, rates averaged 2.3% for all of 1944 and 1.4% for 1945. Window remained effective against the fire control radars for the remainder of the war. For a few months in 1944 Bomber Command's statistics separated out the Halifax II and V from the III. Cat = Category, A = Enemy Action, N = Not Enemy Action. And of course the sortie figures for the Halifax all marks and Halifax II and V are small. Night bombing sorties only. Cut and paste into your spreadsheet of choice. The raw data, record ID number / Month / Aircraft / despatched sorties / effective sorties / Missing / Cat E A / Cat E N / Cat B A / Cat B N / Cat AC A / Cat AC N / % missing 1 / Jul-44 / Hali III / 2328 / 2189 / 46 / 1 / 8 / 2 / 1 / 15 / 7 / 2.10 2 / Jul-44 / Lanc / 5449 / 5023 / 220 / 5 / 8 / 5 / 4 / 67 / 13 / 4.38 3 / Jun-44 / Hali II/V / 152 / 119 / / / / 1 / / / / 0.00 4 / Jun-44 / Hali III / 4137 / 3855 / 100 / 4 / 9 / 4 / 1 / 19 / 11 / 2.59 5 / Jun-44 / Lanc / 7531 / 6845 / 205 / 6 / 4 / 6 / / 42 / 10 / 2.99 6 / May-44 / Hali II/V / 127 / 123 / 1 / / / / 1 / 1 / 1 / 0.81 7 / May-44 / Hali III / 2349 / 2219 / 50 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 4 / 9 / 8 / 2.25 8 / May-44 / Lanc / 6044 / 5407 / 197 / 4 / 6 / 5 / 7 / 53 / 14 / 3.64 9 / Apr-44 / Hali II/V / 404 / 393 / 6 / 1 / / 1 / / 2 / / 1.53 10 / Apr-44 / Hali III / 2198 / 2137 / 59 / 1 / 2 / 1 / 8 / 13 / 9 / 2.76 11 / Apr-44 / Lanc / 4836 / 4645 / 120 / 6 / 10 / 3 / 4 / 49 / 33 / 2.58 12 / Mar-44 / Hali II/V / 850 / 758 / 5 / / 3 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 0.66 13 / Mar-44 / Hali III / 1868 / 1657 / 93 / 2 / 11 / 4 / 1 / 15 / 13 / 5.61 14 / Mar-44 / Lanc / 4319 / 4080 / 180 / 3 / 10 / 7 / 3 / 71 / 32 / 4.41 15 / Feb-44 / Hali II/V / 269 / 231 / 30 / / 1 / / 1 / 8 / 3 / 12.99 16 / Feb-44 / Hali III / 720 / 609 / 37 / / 5 / / 1 / 2 / 11 / 6.08 17 / Feb-44 / Lanc / 2642 / 2472 / 117 / / 15 / 4 / / 27 / 13 / 4.73 18 / Jan-44 / Hali / 865 / 742 / 86 / 3 / 13 / 2 / 7 / 15 / 4 / 11.59 19 / Jan-44 / Lanc / 3954 / 3712 / 228 / 3 / 5 / 7 / 3 / 48 / 21 / 6.14 20 / Dec-43 / Hali / 754 / 660 / 52 / / 3 / 3 / 2 / 9 / 3 / 7.88 21 / Dec-43 / Lanc / 2507 / 2299 / 113 / 1 / 37 / 14 / 7 / 40 / 11 / 4.92 The overall totals say Halifax 9.84% missing rate, with around 19% of aircraft missing or known to have been hit by enemy fire returning to Britain, Halifax II and V 4.12% missing and 23%, Halifax III 3.04% and 20.3%, Lancaster 4% and 25.6%. Note the missing trend though as the year progresses Halifax III versus Lancaster. Of course the loss rate declined from April 1944 onwards and the Halifax II and V were deliberately sent to less dangerous targets from late February. Having said that it is interesting that a higher percentage of combat damaged Lancasters made it back to Britain, which says it was more robust though again the trend was for the Halifax III to match or exceed the Lancaster later in 1944. Having reserve power is usually a good thing when coping with combat damage. According to Bomber Command it had 32 Halifax III on strength on 1 January 1944 versus 258 mark II/V, the Halifax force becomes half mark III in the first week of February and mark II/V still make up around a quarter of the strength in early April 1944, down to 10% around mid May, gone from front line service in mid July. I have no idea when the larger wing became the majority of the mark III. The rest is from AVIA 46/112 Halifax Type Biography. Sir Henry Tizard, 29 June 1942, based on the performance of the Halifax, Stirling and Manchester losses and bombs dropped June 1941 to May 1942, "there is no case for the fading out of the Stirling, but I think there may well be a case for the fading out of the Halifax as the Lancaster comes into full production." Other quotes from the file. "Everything but the barest necessities was eliminated from the first prototype; it was only required to fly; and fly it must at the earliest possible moment, in order to pin down and eradicate those inevitable aerodynamic teething troubles which best the path of every type, however carefully designed." The prototype arrived at Boscombe Down without bomb doors, they were fitted there. Self sealing tanks and armour plating were not in the original specification, trials were done using the first prototype. The second prototype had gun turrets, items like fuel jettison gear, de icing etc., components delivered to Radlett for assembly on 31 July 1940, to A&AEE 11 September 1940, accepted 24 February 1941. Two months delay to the prototype's first flight date was caused by the decision to disassemble it and transfer it from Handley Page to the bigger airfield at Bicester. Aerodynamic troubles with the first prototype were not cured until July 1940. By the time war broke out the decision was "Ultimately to concentrate on the the production of the Halifax as the standard aircraft for the bomber force" The 4 gun mid upper turret, trial ordered in November 1941, decision to put it into production in May 1942, first fitted on Handley page line February 1943. H2S work began in January 1942, final form production at Handley page and London Aircraft Production in September and October 1943 After complaints in April 1942 new bomb bay doors were designed and tested, they could close around an 8,000 pound bomb but were thicker, encroaching on the bomb bay and seriously cut down the stowage available for small bombs. Smaller doors were designed that could enclose a 4,000 pound but not 8,000 pound bombs, flight testing revealed interference with H2S, as a result the design was dropped in December 1943. Halifax I as first produced, Merlin X, 55,000 pounds maximum weight, 13,000 pounds bomb load, twin nose turret, quadruple tail turret, two manually operated guns on each beam, during production fuel increased from 1,552 to 1,636 gallons, a carrier fitted to carry 2x4,000 pound or 1x8,000 pound bombs, undercarriage strengthened to bring allowed all up weight to 60,000 pounds. While the first 100 Halifaxes were to have Merlin X the change over was after the 87th machine. Halifax II, Merlin XX replace Merlin X, then after "about the first 20" the Hudson type upper turret replaced the beam guns and an extra fuel tank was added in each wing. Halifax II Series IA, a response to the performance complaints made in August 1942, front turret removed, replaced by fairing and ultimately the perspex nose, a 4 gun mid upper turret set lower in the fuselage, astrodome lowered, better low drag flame dampeners, "a number of drag producing excresences were removed or modified", "These changes were eventually associated with the designation Halifax II series IA, though in point of fact this really applied to a change of radiator with took place at about the same time." First production delivered February 1943, some fitted with H2S. Halifax II Series II, engine nacelles lowered relative to the wing which was expected to increase performance, engines to be Merlin 61 which were later fitted, one prototype built and tested April/May 1943 showing a worthwhile improvement in performance, not proceeded with as in February 1943 the decision had been made to change over to Hercules engines due to the uncertainty of Merlin production. Halifax III, in July 1941 the decision was taken to try the Hercules engine but at a low priority, prototype flew in October 1942. In February 1943 the following improvements associated with the mark IV version were proposed and were "accordingly introduced" into the mark III, span increased to 104 feet, retractable tail wheel, fuel capacity increased by the addition of two 90 gallon tanks which could be fitted in two of the wing bomb cells giving the cell space the option of fuel or bombs. All up weight to 63,000 pounds, which required more wing strength particularly in the longer span version, in March 1944 further strengthening was introduced to enable maximum weight of 65,000 pounds but this weight was not cleared until July 1944. A redesigned bomb bay was dropped in favour of carrying H2S. So the query is if the longer wing was a modification, when was it introduced to each of the 5 production lines? In July 1943 the RAF made an urgent demand for a gun with a field of fire vertically downwards to something below dead astern. A single hand operated 0.5 inch gun was tried out in the under turret hole and by January 1944 it was in production on aircraft not fitted with H2S. The gun was later displaced by fitting H2S on all aircraft. Halifax IV proposal, Merlin 60, 104 foot wing span, redesigned bomb bay enabling carriage of 4,000 pound bombs with the doors closed and 8,000 pound bombs with the doors nearly closed. Contract issued in September 1942 but abandoned in February 1943 due to the uncertainty of Merlin production and the decision to go with Hercules. Halifax V, as per mark II with different undercarriage. Halifax VI, Hercules 100 fitted to mark III plus rearranged and simplified fuel system enabling more fuel (150 gallon tanks replacing the 90 gallon ones fitted in the mark III) but reducing maximum bomb load by 1,000 pounds, all up weight to 65,000 pounds with more wing strengthening. In November 1944 the RAF made an urgent request to clear it at greater weights due to increases in tare weight reducing bomb load to less than the mark III. In February 1945 the weight was raised to 68,000 pounds, this was also done for the mark VII. Halifax VII, Hercules XVI fitted to mark VI airframes. The Halifax II Series IA bomb load for a raid on Berlin is put at 2,000 pounds, the VI 9,000 pounds. The file also has a Halifax versus Lancaster section, the inferior ceiling, bomb load and range, lower altitudes increased vulnerability and also "made their use impossible on many nights owing to inability to get above the clouds." The shorter range reduced evasive routing and forced the Lancasters to conform. Provision for doing glider towing had been built in almost from the start, but not used for years. In June 1941 there was a trial requested for use in dropping paratroopers, the hole provided for the under turret was used and fittings for the role were incorporated in production aircraft from November 1942. In October 1941 the urgent operational need for a paratroop version meant 3 mark II were converted (nose and mid upper turret removed, two extra 80 gallon fuel tanks added, other non essential drag producing equipment removed, and had "certain special features". The fuel tanks had been designed in June 1941 to meet a Bomber Command request for a quick way of increasing the range of early versions that did not have the extra wing tanks. Two SOE squadrons eventually equipped with this type, maximum weight 61,700 pounds. January 1943 Coastal Command long range reconnaissance mark II, nose turret removed and replaced by a firing with two hand operated guns mounted on it, mid upper turret removed, two 80 gallon fuel tanks added, ASV fitted instead of H2S. In July 1943 Meteorological Reconnaissance mark V were added, with similar modifications. All up weight 61,700 pounds. March 1943 trials with rocket projectiles, installation not entirely satisfactory, but no further action done from October 1943 as the requirement had been dropped. The Halifax A.III and A.VII, nose gun and mid upper turret removed, H2S, which covered the jumping hole removed, paratroop and glider towing equipment permanently fitted, Rebecca fitted. Later a large jumping hole fitted along with changes to the fuselage floor, twin 0.5 inch tail turret, "These aircraft were basically a mark VI" now called A.X. Transport version design began in December 1943, scheme A was simple conversion removing items like the armament and other unnecessary equipment, making the C.III, C,VI and C.VII. Scheme B was the production version, the C.VIII, armament removed, provision for bulky freight, a deep pannier slung in the bomb bay. "Of the first 300 Halifaxes built hardly any two were similar and the series of production drawings was not sealed until 26 September 1941." Interview with Mr. L.F. Fox of R.D.L.2 20 March 1943, "the first 300 Halifaxes off the line were all different and largely hand made, before the aeroplane was standardised." After that most of the modifications were equipment but also a different undercarriage, tropical cooling, different engines, turrets etc.

Spitfire price from 1938 with pre war profit margins and assumptions about limited production runs, so plenty of hand made, including the engine. Agreed, as usual, the prices need explanation or definition of what exactly they cover. The 5,000 pounds to Supermarine/Vickers seems to be the fee to build the airframe and fit the engine etc. Tare weight of a Typhoon was about 8,800 pounds, versus 5,800 for the Spitfire IX so the Typhoon has a bias to being more expensive, but twice the price is a big stretch. Given the amount of subcontracting involved there is the complication of whether these were paid direct or via Supermarine/Vickers or Hawkers, and so on.

So the references do not give dates and in the Spitfire's case mark number? I hit Google's welcome to our warm and cuddly tracking system message and stopped without trying to look at the Typhoon book.

Are you sure about the wing fitted to the mark III, since every reference I have seen says it had the bigger wing? Including the performance report I used. When was the wing introduced onto the production line? So when it comes to the Halifax II and V specials, the mid upper/dorsal turret was not factory fitted at the start of production but was by the end, plus field modifications, possibly both ways? Merlin 20 ceased production in May 1944, Merlin 22 in October (but after 227 were built in August, the next two monthly totals were 3 and 5) The Merlin 24 and 25 were the ones in production. Unfortunately the graph labels are not clear enough, but Merlin output versus altitude, http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin-lovesey.pdf For Merlin XX 1,175 HP at 20,000 feet. https://www.456fis.org/SPITFIRE_ENGINES.htm For Merlin XX 1,175 HP at 17,500 feet. https://en.wikipedia-on-ipfs.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_Merlin.html meantime the Halifax II performance chart decides it is 1,120 HP at 18,250 feet. Overall it is holding its power output better than the Hercules VI/XVI. It is clear the Hercules gave more power for take off and initial climb. In late 1943 the Hercules XVI engines were becoming surplus due to the winding down of Stirling production and the move of the Beaufighter (and other types) to the XVII and XVIII marks etc.. Albemarles would continue their low level production rates through to May 1945, Wellington X production also kept going into 1945. The Hercules VI effectively ended production in June 1943, the XVI began in September 1942, hit something like a pause button in November, (4 built December 1942 to February 1943) then resumed in March. When I look at the performance charts the Halifax II struggled at altitude compared with other marks and Lancasters, while when it comes to cruising the Merlins and Hercules do not seem to have made a big difference at 20,000 feet, they did make a difference to range and bomb loads. The altitude improvement in the Halifax III seems to be mainly wing or as others noted wing plus changes to the engine installation, the improved range due to more internal fuel.

xx The short answer is no. The longer answer follows. Where do the 13,000 pound Spitfire and 11,000 pound Typhoon prices come from? The Spitfires sold to Turkey cost 11,700 pounds sterling, which would include a profit margin higher than charged to the RAF. Pre war a Spitfire sold to France, plus a spare engine, cost 16,500 pounds Sterling, giving an indication of the cost of a Merlin engine. Welcome to the fun idea you an accurately determine the cost of a military aircraft in wartime, or anytime. Start with how to factor in depreciation of the factory, how to allocate costs of senior management and others not directly involved in assembling the aircraft. As an example a detailed break down of Australian Beaufort costs, per aircraft in Australian pounds and note it does not account for spares, which were a significant percentage of total production. Tooling 1,895, preliminary expenses 532, Improvements and extensions to properties 893 (Railways 554, Holden 186, other contractors 10, stores, flight field and plants 143), Plant, machinery and equipment 1,136, office furniture 168, which gives a total of 4,623 of establishment costs per aircraft. Newport Workshop 1,477 (Labor 622, overhead 693, sub contract 162), Chullora Workshop 2,019 (Labor 734, overhead 1,155, sub contract 130), Islington Workshop 1,342 (Labor 516, overhead 745, sub contract 81), Assembly Workshops Mascot/Fishermans Bend 2,510 (Labor 1,038, overhead 1,472), Holden production cost per aircraft set 2,321, Richards Industries production cost per aircraft set 292, freight 350, central office overhead 3,224, Materials (including sub contractors' costs other than Holden or Richards Industries) Holden 821 (746 plus 75 for ten percent allowance), Richards Industries 44 (40 plus 4 for ten percent allowance), Newport (795 plus 79 for ten percent allowance), Chullora (2,780 plus 278 for ten percent allowance), Islington 1,407 (1,279 plus 128 for ten percent allowance), Assembly (4,446 plus 445 for ten percent allowance). Appendix A equipment including gun turret 2,627 (Which gives the airframe cost as 27,257), Engines and Propellers (Overseas costs, Wasp engines and Curtiss propellers) 12,546 (Which gives total aircraft cost of 39,803) So 39,803 plus 4,623 gives total costs per completed aircraft as 44,426 pounds. BUYING AIRCRAFT: MATERIEL PROCUREMENT FOR THE ARMY AIR FORCES by Irving Brinton Holley, jr. is an official US history of the process. Lots of details. When the US looked into efficiency it seems productivity followed a curve that said it took 16 to 18 man hours per pound of aircraft for the first production example, dropping to around 7 man hours per pound by aircraft 10, 3 by aircraft 100, 1.2 by aircraft 1000 and 0.52 by aircraft 10,000. Essentially saying in the quality versus quantity debate do runs of 100 to 1,000 aircraft at least. Note the US system of modification centres was set up to minimise changes to production lines. USAAF estimated costs as of 28 February 1943. GFE = Government Furnished Equipment. Model / Airframe / Engines(s) / Propeller(s) / GFE / Ordnance / Communications / Total / % airframe / Notes B-29 / $362,347 / $101,685 / $10,328 / $125,341 / $4,836 / $34,738 / $639,275 / 56.68 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts B-32 / $522,613 / $101,685 / $23,310 / $68,947 / $3,247 / $34,150 / $753,952 / 69.32 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts B-17 / $111,443 / $34,287 / $3,400 / $45,606 / $4,595 / $9,040 / $208,371 / 53.48 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts B-24 / $115,338 / $32,659 / $4,220 / $49,781 / $3,205 / $8,474 / $213,677 / 53.98 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts B-25 / $59,358 / $29,131 / $3,071 / $19,805 / $4,147 / $8,337 / $123,849 / 47.93 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts B-26 / $106,677 / $43,171 / $14,110 / $21,647 / $3,547 / $7,749 / $196,901 / 54.18 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts A-20 / $44,366 / $30,795 / $4,428 / $18,364 / $2,345 / $3,813 / $104,111 / 42.61 / Costs based on final production contract A-26 / $106,807 / $33,466 / $3,700 / $29,277 / $14,067 / $3,948 / $191,265 / 55.84 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts A-24 / $33,172 / $9,103 / $1,739 / $1,997 / $1,640 / $4,800 / $52,451 / 63.24 / Costs based on final production contract A-25 / $67,492 / $13,559 / $3,988 / $1,997 / $2,240 / $3,500 / $92,776 / 72.75 / Costs based on final production contract A-35 / $36,874 / $13,351 / $2,353 / $3,026 / $2,270 / $3,911 / $61,785 / 59.68 / Costs based on final production contract A-36 (P-51) / $36,706 / $12,000 / $3,680 / $2,670 / $2,632 / $2,516 / $60,204 / 60.97 / Costs based on final production contract P-38 / $74,536 / $18,866 / $5,270 / $5,293 / $2,405 / $3,631 / $110,001 / 67.76 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-59 / $157,295 / $75,000 / $- / $2,001 / $4,034 / $2,864 / $241,194 / 65.22 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-61 / $154,899 / $44,714 / $6,352 / $14,507 / $4,684 / $19,758 / $244,914 / 63.25 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-70 / $79,865 / $29,372 / $5,186 / $24,052 / $1,341 / $3,260 / $143,076 / 55.82 / Costs based on final production contract P-82 / $86,540 / $36,000 / $7,471 / $3,967 / $1,870 / $1,545 / $137,393 / 62.99 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-39 / $24,866 / $12,545 / $3,256 / $2,673 / $4,712 / $2,633 / $50,685 / 49.06 / Costs based on final production contract P-40 / $26,709 / $7,714 / $2,635 / $2,068 / $2,646 / $2,904 / $44,676 / 59.78 / Costs based on final production contract P-43 / $54,907 / $12,635 / $4,500 / $5,231 / $2,490 / $3,160 / $82,923 / 66.21 / Costs based on final production contract P-47 / $47,796 / $22,608 / $5,975 / $5,651 / $2,527 / $3,295 / $87,852 / 54.41 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-51 / $23,583 / $17,558 / $3,740 / $2,649 / $1,905 / $2,780 / $52,215 / 45.17 / Merlin Versions. Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts P-63 / $28,049 / $13,183 / $3,540 / $3,693 / $4,296 / $2,640 / $55,401 / 50.63 / Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts The USAAF Statistical Digest has a table of aircraft costs by year, and it shows a steady decrease in unit costs 1939/41 to 1945. Ford at Willow Run invested more in tooling, including for difficult assemblies other Liberator factories did by hand, the result was Willow Run had great output per worker and usually the highest price, as the tooling costs had to be recovered from a much smaller (versus automobiles) production run which had far more changes. That remained the problem when it came to tooling or even types of tooling versus hand made. Think of all those US Block Numbers and RAF modification orders. Figures from Buying Aircraft by Halley, Time and dollar costs encountered while making 73 modifications to a group of 1,000 P-38, P-38F-5, 10,450 engineering hours, 6,200 tooling hours, $4,650 P-38G-1, 23,250 engineering hours, 23,760 tooling hours, $18,000 P-38G-3 to 5, 5,000 engineering hours, 4,000 tooling hours, $3,000 P-38G-10, 19,200 engineering hours, 18,480 tooling hours, $13,800 B-25 direct engineering hours to give an idea on how often design change actually was 1940 - 329,415 hours, 1941 - 419,060 hours, 1942 - 695,488 hours, 1943 - 461,213 hours, 1944 - 200,321 hours Now when it comes to costs people say the Hurricane was easier to build than the Spitfire, which of course does not extend to the engine, armament, electronics etc., it means the airframe, which comes to something like half the total cost using the US figures above. In January 1940 the British estimated the work force was building near twice the weight of Hurricane airframe per man hour than Spitfire, 240 versus 135 pounds per unit time worked. Yet as of 22 December 1941 a Hurricane IId was costed at 19,560 man hours, while at 23 April 1942 a Spitfire Vc was 19,086 man hours. A preliminary estimate on 26 January 1942 for the Typhoon was 28,756 man hours, down to 22,349 man hours assuming "full advantage us taken of the best available manufacturing methods". Oh yes, man hour cost estimates, 201st aircraft, Stirling I (Short Swindon) 129,944, Lancaster I (Avro) 74,319, Halifax II (Handley Page) 98,246. The name the Spitfire had a long production run, but not the individual versions. Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging and tooling I / 339,400 / 800,000 II / 9,267 / unknown III / 91,120 / 75,000 V / 90,000 / 105,000 VI 14,340 / 50,000 IX 43,830 / 30,000 XII / 27,210 / 16,000 VII / 86,150 / 150,000 VIII / 24,970 / 250,000 XIV / 26,120 / 17,000 21 / 168,500 / unknown PR XI / 12,415 / unknown Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000 Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000 Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000 Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000 Figures as of September 1943 for Supermarine works in Southampton. Even what looks like trivial design changes imposed delays and loss of production. The UK official history lists four Spitfire airframe types, A, Merlin II, III, XII so marks I, II and IV (PR), it was stretched to do the marks V, VI, PR VII, PR XIII, and Seafire I. B, Mark VC, based on the mark III fighter prototype, stretched to do the mark IX and XII C, Mark VII and VIII, and the two stage Griffon variants to the mark XIX. D, F.21 and later. The airframe was successively strengthened, so A was stronger than B, C was stronger than B and D was stronger than C. The mark III fighter had a strengthened fuselage and engine mounting, clipped wings and a strengthened undercarriage. The changes were enough that the mark V was preferred. Two prototypes were built and they went on to serve as prototypes for the mark VII and IX. From an April/May 1941 UK aircraft production budget, 4 Hurricanes "absorbed from Dominion orders" 8,500 pounds each, while a proposed order for Spitfires said 10,123 pounds each, Typhoons 16,700 pounds each, Tornado at 14,400 pounds each including spare engines allowance (that is the cost of 1 spare engine per X new aircraft, NOT the price of the engine), not sure whether this allowance is in the Hurricane price. But do not despair that these might be the answer, a hand written note has the Spitfire V and VI at 9,500 pounds each, with another 450 pounds spare engine allowance, the planned mark IV Griffon engined version 10,500 pounds plus 600 pounds engine allowance, while a Lancaster from Avro is 41,400 pounds, but 43,600 from Metropolitan Vickers, a Sunderland from Shorts 52,100 pounds, from Short Harland 60,100 pounds. So assuming we can compare like with like in early 1941 a Spitfire cost 1,000 pounds more than a Hurricane, then assuming half the cost is airframe, a Hurricane airframe cost something around 4,000 pounds, a Spitfire 4,750 pounds. That can compare with the report most of the initial order for 300 Spitfire mark I were costed at around 5,700 pounds payment to Supermarine, which would include fees for installing the engine etc. I do not have the price for a Sabre or Griffon, but join the crowd that the extended development, low production and problems means the Sabre was the more expensive, by end November 1945 there were 5,756 production Griffons built to 2,905 Centaurus to 4,967 Sabre, despite the Sabre starting production at the end of 1940, the Centaurus end 1942 and the Griffon mid 1942. In April 1938 the British presented Australia with a total cost of ownership of warships, that is running cost, replacement and modernisation cost over lifetimes of 20 to 25 years, and showed it as an annual cost, Battleship 706,800 pounds (Nelson class), large cruiser 323,600 pounds, small cruiser 225,400 pounds, Aircraft carrier with 36 aircraft, 894,000 pounds, with 15 aircraft 514,500 pounds, destroyer 66,000 pounds, 1,000 ton submarine 65,500 pounds. They were pushing the idea of an RAN battleship, annual cost of an aircraft set at 11,500 pounds. For any battleships versus bombers comparisons.

All of the performance figures are for specific configurations, but unless you can obtain a full report you do not have all the details and are left with the published "typical" reports. According to Harry Holmes the Lancaster I of January 1942 was tare weight 33,700 pounds, gross weight 60,000 pounds, take off power 5,120 HP, as of May 1944 tare weight 36,811 pounds, gross weight 65,000 pounds, take off power 6,440 HP, so you are left with which Lancaster I performance figures are being used in the references? Add things like H2S, the paddle blade propellers, the reports 4 bladed propellers added 1,000 feet to the service ceiling of the Halifax, I think in the Coastal Command Weather Reconnaissance units and so on. I did not say discussion of the changes to the Halifax were irrelevant. The discussion I was joining was about Lancaster changes, if it is to be made into Halifax changes as well, plus comparisons, then please start with something other than a form of "it is not being addressed" as part of a "required response". We know from things like the removal of armament that the Halifax II had performance issues as far as Bomber Command was concerned and these were solved by the mark III, in terms of loss rates when attacking targets in Germany. The Lancastrian is to a first approximation an aerodynamic as possible Lancaster, but includes weight reductions like non self sealing fuel tanks, it gained 10% speed and range versus the standard Lancaster. Using the Merlin 22 Lancaster figures versus the Halifax mark II shows how essentially with the same engines the Lancaster had 10% or so better performance, rather like the Hurricane I versus Spitfire I. It also shows up in fuel loads for 1,500 track miles, Lancaster I/III 1,780 gallons, Halifax II 2,010 We can start with the airfoils in use https://m-selig.ae.illinois.edu/ads/aircraft.html Aircraft, Wing Root Airfoil, Wing Tip Airfoil Avro 683 Lancaster, NACA 23018, NACA 23012 Handley Page HP.56 Halifax, NACA 23021 ?, NACA 23007 ? I note most sites go with this Halifax airfoil designation. So the Halifax has a higher thickness to chord ratio at the root but much less near the tip. The Lancaster's aspect ratio was 8, the Halifax II was 7.8, the III 8.5, a rather nice increase and so giving a reduction in induced drag and yes, it is paid for elsewhere. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Halifax/Halifax.html mark II 1a maximum weight 60,000 pounds, at mean weight of 50,000 pounds, 253 mph, service ceiling 21,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 205 or 210 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 43.5 minutes, but the aircraft will not cruise at 20,000 feet until weight is reduced to about 56,000 pounds. mark III maximum weight 65,000 pounds, at mean weight of 54,400 pounds, 282 mph, service ceiling 20,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 215 or 228 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 50 minutes mark VI maximum weight 68,000 pounds, at mean weight of 56,200 pounds, 312 mph, service ceiling 20,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 218 or 260 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 50 minutes mark VII maximum weight 65,000 pounds, at mean weight of 54,500 pounds, 282 mph, service ceiling 20,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 215 or 228 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 50 minutes Ignoring the mark VI there is a good increase in top speed between the II and III and some increase in cruise speed and clearly some improvement in altitude performance, the aircraft gained new engines and 2% more wing area. Halifax II range with maximum bomb load is 830 miles, with maximum fuel 1,660 miles with 5,250 pounds of bombs, the III is 1,150 miles, and maximum fuel 1,985 miles with 7,000 pounds of bombs, thanks to being able to carry an extra 104 gallons of fuel internally, this is a big performance increase. The VI adds another 204 gallons. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Lancaster/Lancaster.html mark I/III Merlin 24/224 maximum weight 68,000 pounds, at mean weight of 55,000 pounds, 287 mph, service ceiling 20,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 215 or 227 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 41.6 minutes mark I/III Merlin 22/28/38 maximum weight 68,000 pounds, at mean weight of 55,000 pounds, 281 mph, service ceiling 20,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 216 or 227 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 41.6 minutes mark II maximum weight 65,000 pounds, at mean weight of 53,500 pounds, 273 mph, service ceiling 21,000 feet at max weight, cruising at 210 or 222 mph at 20,000 feet, time to 20,000 feet, maximum weight, 45.5 minutes So looking at these figures you do not see a big performance hit in terms of speeds and cruising. Then comes range with bombs, the I and III range with maximum bombs is 1,660 miles, with maximum fuel 2,250 miles with 10,000 pounds of bombs, the II is 860 miles, and maximum fuel 2,070 miles with 6,000 pounds of bombs. Halifax III 1,986 gallons enabled 1,985 miles with 7,000 pounds of bombs, the VI 2,190 gallons, 2,160 miles with 7,400 pounds of bombs, Lancaster I/III 2,150 gallons, 2,250 miles with 10,000 pounds, so again that performance advantage. The interest is the Lancaster mark II with 2,150 gallons can do 2,070 miles with 6,000 pounds of bombs which is actually slightly worse in miles per gallon than the Hercules Halifaxes. In summary in operational terms the Hercules engines mainly hurt the load carrying ability of the Lancaster, the upgrade done from Halifax II to III, the extra wing area, fuel tanks and new engines closed the performance gap with the Lancaster, including raising top speed and that cut loss rates. The Halifax III range with bombs was about equivalent to the Lancaster II, It does raise the interesting question of what would have happened if the Merlins had been retained in the Halifax III. I note the ideas about how underslung engines were better and the Hercules thrust line was lower than the Merlin on the Halifax but have no idea how much this could affect performance but I note the wing changes did help. Did all the Halifax II/V series 1 (sp) have a mid upper turret, or some? What exactly is the time out when composing a reply? Thereby requiring a new log in to post an item?

Lancaster II users, 3 Group, 115 Sqn from March 1943 to May 1944, 514 Sqn from September 1943 to July 1944. 5 Group, 61 Sqn January to March 1943 6 Group, 408 Sqn October 1943 to September 1944, 426 Sqn July 1943 to May 1944, 432 Sqn October 1943 to February 1944. Climb speeds were about 5 mph faster for the Merlin versus the Hercules engined Lancasters, the Hercules version notes 155 mph IAS for maximum climb, 175 mph IAS for comfortable climb. The Merlin Lancasters flew about 50 miles and burnt 110 gallons of fuel to climb to 10,000 feet, 130 miles and 255 gallons to 20,000 feet. The topic was Lancaster II versus I/III, which is what I addressed, not Halifax II/V versus III/VII. My understanding of I/II/V Halifax, version (sp = special), front guns, mid guns, rear guns (all 0.303, blank means none), engines (M = Merlin), fin type (Triangular or rectangular), The difference between the mark 2 and mark V was the undercarriage. Mark 1 series 1 / 2 / / 4 / M X / Tri Mark 1 series 2 / 2 / / 4 / M X / Tri Mark 1 series 3 / 2 / / 4 / M 20 / Tri Mark 2 series 1 / 2 / 2 / 4 / M 20 / Tri Mark 5 series 1 / 2 / 2 / 4 / M 20 / Tri Mark 2 series 1 (sp) / / / 4 / M 20 / Tri Mark 5 series 1 (sp) / / / 4 / M 20 / Tri Mark 2 series 1a / 1 / 4 / 4 / M 22 / Tri/Rec Mark 5 series 1a / 1 / 4 / 4 / M 22 / Tri/Rec So the series 1a had the same fuselages as the mark III with the specials having less weight and drag with the removal of the mid upper turret. The general conclusion is the upgrade in performance for the Hercules Halifax was a combination of the bigger wing and the engines. The improvement in Halifax III performance brought it back up to Lancaster type altitudes, since firstly the lower flying Stirlings had to be withdrawn from raids on Germany, then the lower flying Halifaxes, they were the easier intercepts. So Lancaster and Halifax loss rates became comparable again, that is what Bomber Command was measuring, later the Hercules 100 gave the Halifax VI a real performance boost at altitude.

The main reasons I have for the difference between Lancaster I/III and II performance is engine weight, supercharging and fuel consumption. Lancaster Mark I production, began October 1941, suspended from some time in April to some time in September 1943, apart from 5 in June, then resumed. Mark II production August 1942 to March 1944, as people have noted, an insurance policy against shortages of Merlins. Mark III production from December 1942. Total Engine Weights, early Merlins 10,720 pounds, later 11,610 pounds, Hercules 12,335 pounds. Fuel consumption, Merlin 22 or 24 weak mixture 7 pounds boost, 2,650 RPM, 260 gallons per hour, 2,300 RPM 225 g/hr, at plus 2 pounds boost 212 and 188 g/hr respectively. The Merlin 28 and 38 cut consumption, so 196 g/hr at +2, 2,650 RPM Hercules weak mixture 2 pounds boost 2,400 RPM 236 g/hr, 220 at 2,200 RPM Or to put it another way, weak mixtures the Merlin options range from -4 to +7 boost, 1,800 to 2,650 RPM, consumption from 96 to 260 gallons per hour. The Hercules from -4 to +2, 1,800 to 2,400 RPM, 136 to 236 gallons per hour. Rich mixture Merlins from +7 to +14 boost, 2,650 to 3,000 RPM, 320 to 500 g/hr, Hercules +6/2,400 RPM/478 g/hr or +8.25/2,800 RPM/640 g/hr. The Merlin notes indicate outbound fuel consumption of slightly under 1.15 miles per gallon, 145 to 170 mph IAS, homeward from around 1.20 miles per gallon at 140 to 165 mph, down to 1.13 mpg at 185 mph IAS. The Halifax III graphs just make 1.1 miles per gallon at up to 160 MPH IAS, the Halifax II and V homeward is 1.2 at 160 MPH IAS. A comparison between the Halifax II and II in terms of fuel loads required, including a 200 gallon reserve, shows the III needed about 50 or more gallons extra fuel for the same distances, it was 65 gallons for 1,500 track miles, or pushing an extra 500 pounds. The Lancaster I/III fuel load for 1,800 track miles was 2,095 gallons, the Halifax III 2,452. Lancaster recommended Indicated Air Speeds, Merlin, Outbound for up to 15,000 feet 170 mph, 20,000 feet S gear 160 mph, return 160 mph, Hercules 165 mph, (Over 18,000 feet reduce as necessary to a minimum of 150 mph), return 160 mph. Supercharging. Hercules VI and XVI are reported as having maximum power altitudes of 4,500 and 12,000 feet, the Hercules 100 9,000 and 19,500 feet. Merlin 22 6,000 and 12,250 feet, Merlin 24 2,000 and 9,500 feet. The Halifax III and VII had the Hercules XVI, but the mark VI used the Hercules 100 with its much better supercharging. The III was in production August 1943 to April 1945, the VI July 1944 to November 1945, the VII May to September 1944 and January to March 1945 . If you were in a mark VI you definitely had an altitude advantage. I do note exactly fully believe the following performance figures, from the RAAF official history, but for comparison, Lancaster I/II/X maximum speed 287 mph at 11,500 feet, service ceiling 24,500 feet, 1,660 miles with 14,000 pounds of bombs, mark II 275 mph at 14,000 feet, service ceiling 21,000 feet 1,000 miles with 14,000 pounds of bombs Halifax III 282 mph at 13,500 feet, service ceiling 20,000 feet, 1,030 miles with 13,000 pounds of bombs, mark VI 312 mph at 22,000 feet, service ceiling 23,500 feet 1,260 miles with 14,000 pounds of bombs, so be in a VI and wave at the low flying Lancasters. The Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes notes the Lancaster I and III service ceiling was 23,000 feet, absolute ceiling 24,500 feet for example, it agrees about top speeds and says the range with 7,000 pounds of bombs was 2,530 miles, or 50 miles less than the RAAF figures.

One item forgotten from the markings notes. From RAAF Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance Report week ending 1 September 1943 A Director of Technical Services special instruction has been issued authorising the introduction of American type aircraft into the RAAF with American type camouflage unchanged.

The RAF delivery logs, RAF Museum, ex MF-5. So it seems JN769 was originally classified as E, then B and the anomaly is it is unlikely it was shooting down V-1 post 23 June.

Without an exact bomb load reference there is plenty of choice given the variation in loads between aircraft. Bomber Command was out of the 250 pound HE bomb dropping business for most of 1944, resuming in December. Night of 24/25 April 1944, two raids, to Karlsruhe and Munich, Lancaster statistics, 619 despatched, 589 credited with bombing the primary targets, another 11 with bombing secondary targets, 21 missing, 3 Category E (2 enemy action), 1 Category B, 12 Category AC (8 enemy action), 13 personnel killed, 141 missing. HE bombs, 15X8000 HC, 3X4000 GP, 142x4000 HC, 120x4000 M2, 356x2000 MC, 180x1000 MC, 72x500 MC, 16x500 GP Incendiaries, 7,868x30 J (562 clusters), 36x250 Spot fire, 112x250 TI, 36,784x30, 25,581x4 "X", 444,581x4

No confirmation, just an anomaly, the Delivery Logs say Taken On Charge 23 March 1944, Category E 23 June, Brought Back On Charge 30 June. https://steemit.com/history/@len.george/hawker-siddeley-tempest-mk-v-486-nz-squadron-1944-to-1945-part-1 agrees about the loss date.

Serial, mark, exported to. KX171 IId Russia KX172 IIc Russia KX173 IId Russia KX174 IId ACSEA KX175 IId Russia KX176 IId KX177 IId Russia KX178 IV MAC KX179 IV KX305 IId Russia What is the possibility later IId received the protection upgrades based on combat experience? The BP serials were being built in April 1942, the KX in December.

The majority of theses and scientific papers for that matter are dry and not widely read. I would expand the unprepared comment to everyone. Underestimating a non European country along with the major military power shifts in the late 1930's to 1941. If the German attack in May 1940 had stalled or been held what chances of Italy becoming involved, therefore what chances of Japan given the majority of the RN and French navies would be available for Far East Duties and Japan would be starting from North of the Philippines, not Indo China. The thesis decides so much was predictable the RAAF should and could have had several hundred modern fighters and dive bombers in places like Darwin in early 1942 and so spends plenty of time on how predictable and not much on why the shifts happened.

Block 8 as defined is 1,200 aircraft, excluding the Sea Hurricanes NF668 - NF703 (36) and NF716 - NF739 (24). There was no deletion of anything from block 8 for these aircraft, as Ray Sturtivant points out they were built under contract Acft/2719, a completely separate order. Francis Mason in the serial listings of his Hawker Hurricane book states a number of KW serial Hurricanes were converted to NF serial Sea Hurricanes, which is not correct. An example is the claim KW804 was converted to NF674. So we note KW804 was a mark IV, Taken on Charge 23 May 1943, to the Mediterranean 27 September 1945, Struck Off Charge 29 August 1946, meantime NF674 was Taken on Charge at Donibristle on 14 December 1942, various deployments including on carriers, back at Donibristle in October 1944. KW868 is supposed to become NF687, KW868 IIc taken on charge 1 December 1942 but apparently converted to or delivered as IIb on 20 March 1943, to the Middle East 27 August 1943, struck off charge 29 March 1945. NF687 taken on charge 14 December 1942, collided with a Hurricane near Bellochantuy, Kintyre, during a mock dog fight on 1 September 1943, killing the pilot. In any case what is called block 8 is a subset of 1,500 serials between KW696 and LA144, which to me says the block/order should be 1,500. This is followed by 1,961 serials between LB542 and LF774, and 39 serials MW335 to 373, which makes a nice even 2,000, then the 150 serials between PG425 and PG610 and the 112 serials between PZ730 and PZ865. I would really like to see a layout of the later Hurricane contracts with Hawker

This is the data I have on Hawker production blocks 8 to 10 and Austin 1/A Block 8, 1,200 aircraft of which 192 were mark IV, the rest mark II. Sea Hurricane IIC were ordered and built as such, in two batches, 36 in November and December 1942, 24 March to May 1943, not part of block 8 as such. Block 9, 1,205 aircraft of which 186 were mark IV. Block 10, 1,357 aircraft of which 144 were mark IV. Serial range excludes Sea Hurricane IIC NF668 - NF703 and NF716 - NF739 and mark V prototype NL255. Block 1/A Austin AP849 to AP858 and AP880 onwards India and/or Middle East, with possibly one or two retained in Britain. Austin started production in February 1941, with 15 built by end August 1941, 75 by end 1941, the remaining 225 built January to October 1942. All mark IIb. Everyone agrees Hurricane mark II were fitted with Merlin XX. Hurricane mark IV are often quoted as having Merlin 24 or 27 engines, however production of each engine began well after that of the Hurricane IV. The accident report for KX190 (the 28th mark IV in serial number terms) and the loss report for KZ607 (189th) both state the engine was a Merlin XX. In addition the RAF Museum reports the final fifteen Hurricane IV produced all had Merlin XX engines. The engine production report notes sixteen Merlin 24 built to end July 1943, versus three hundred and thirteen mark IV, of which one hundred and fifty two were issued to units, sent overseas or were in transit or had been lost. The Merlin 24 were for Lancaster mark I, production of which resumed in September 1943. The one hundred and forty one Merlin 27 began production in November 1943, after four hundred and twelve of the five hundred and twenty four mark IV had been produced of which two hundred and seventy were issued to units, sent overseas or were in transit or had been lost. Rolls Royce reports all Merlin 27 were converted to Merlin 25 for use in Mosquitoes and that it is unlikely any Merlin 24 or 27 was installed in a Hurricane except for some trials, while Francis Mason in his book the Hawker Hurricane notes one of the mark IV converted to a mark V prototype was tested using a Merlin 27 in July 1943. The conclusion is the mark IV used Merlin XX, like the mark II. The Merlin 27 were meant for the Hurricane mark V, orders for which, according to the RAF aircraft census, totalled three hundred and eighty four as of end June 1943 with another 200 ordered in August, but all orders were cancelled in January 1944, and Merlin 27 production effectively ended in January as well. One of the mark IV converted to mark V standard trialled the Merlin 32 engine and this seems to be a source of claims the mark V was to use a Merlin 32. Finally a question, anyone have a definitive list of Hurricane IId serials? The RAF and Ministry of Aircraft production say 296 (with the RAF saying 2 were converted to other versions), I have 293 plus ambiguities.

To add some dates to Carl's Bermuda data. FF568 Taken on Strength 6 January 1943, "at Suffield 1943" became instructional airframe A380 3 March 1944, Struck off Strength 9 November 1946 FF718 Taken on Strength 18 June 1943, "3 TC T&D Flt" became instructional airframe A381 3 March 1944, Struck off Strength 30 March 1946 FF732 Taken on Strength 18 June 1943, "3 TC T&D Flt" became instructional airframe A382 3 March 1944, Struck off Strength 9 May 1946 To add a little mystery, FF472 (Taken on RAF Charge 12 November 1942) has Canada in its delivery log entry and Air Arsenal North America says it crashed in Canada.

The figures below are from the 1945 Bomber Command War Room Manual, the Mosquito figures *should* exclude the 100 group operations (sorties, losses and bombs dropped on those operations). However as is well known bomb tonnages have a degree of uncertainty, for example the 1944 War Room manual says in 1944 Mosquitoes dropped 0.4 tons more by day and 1.2 by night. Abort figures need to take into account the number of Oboe Mosquito sorties and also their greater use as pathfinders. 1944 Mosquito, 5,120 4,000 pound bombs dropped bomb raid day 2,348 despatched (2,056 Oboe), 1,641 attacking 971.7 tons of bombs dropped, 4 aircraft missing bomb raid night 13,944 despatched (4,752 Oboe), 12,361 attacking 14,095.8 tons of bombs dropped, 64 aircraft missing 1945 Mosquito, 3,257 4,000 pound bombs dropped bomb raid day 568 despatched, 268 attacking 174.3 tons of bombs dropped, 2 aircraft missing bomb raid night 8,828 despatched, 8,240 attacking 9,530.1 tons of bombs dropped, 27 aircraft missing 1944 Lancaster bomb raid day 26,551 despatched, 23,242 attacking 125,065.9 tons of bombs dropped, 179 aircraft missing bomb raid night 56,259 despatched, 51,851 attacking 235,939.7 tons of bombs dropped, 1,604 aircraft missing 1945 Lancaster bomb raid day 13,325 despatched, 11,568 attacking 56,084.3 tons of bombs dropped, 69 aircraft missing bomb raid night 20,051 despatched, 19,071 attacking 79,637.3 tons of bombs dropped, 311 aircraft missing The problem of comparing 2 Group Mosquito operations to Mitchell and Boston is the Mosquitoes mainly flew by night, the other types by day, so in 1944 Mosquito day/night 1,723/8,877, Mitchell and Boston 14,148/1,243 When it comes to aircraft costs the thing to remember is to separate out the costs of the airframe versus that of the fittings, plus whether the type is just coming into, in full, or ending production. US costings as of 28 February 1943. GFE = Government Furnished Equipment, Record Group 18 Entry 10 Box 68. Model / Airframe / Engines(s) / Propeller(s) / GFE / Ordnance / Communications / Total / % airframe A-20 / $44,366 / $30,795 / $4,428 / $18,364 / $2,345 / $3,813 / $104,111 / 42.61 B-25 / $59,358 / $29,131 / $3,071 / $19,805 / $4,147 / $8,337 / $123,849 / 47.93 B-26 / $106,677 / $43,171 / $14,110 / $21,647 / $3,547 / $7,749 / $196,901 / 54.18 B-17 / $111,443 / $34,287 / $3,400 / $45,606 / $4,595 / $9,040 / $208,371 / 53.48 B-24 / $115,338 / $32,659 / $4,220 / $49,781 / $3,205 / $8,474 / $213,677 / 53.98 P-39 / $24,866 / $12,545 / $3,256 / $2,673 / $4,712 / $2,633 / $50,685 / 49.06 P-40 / $26,709 / $7,714 / $2,635 / $2,068 / $2,646 / $2,904 / $44,676 / 59.78 B-29 / $362,347 / $101,685 / $10,328 / $125,341 / $4,836 / $34,738 / $639,275 / 56.68 In November 1944 the B-25 was priced at $155,999, the B-26 at $201,965. So using the US figures airframe is about half the total cost, an airframe that cost twice as much would raise the overall price by a third. I think a reasonably valid 1941 price comparison was Hurricane 8,500 pounds, Spitfire 10,123 pounds, prices probably include spares. Heading to the USAAF Statistical digest the costs are given as for 1943 and 1944, flyaway complete, excluding modification centre work, B-25 / $151,894 / $142,194 B-26 / $212,932 / $192,427 A-20 / $110,342 / $100,800 While in Australia, detailed break down of Beaufort costs, per aircraft in Australian pounds. From MP450/1 109 Tooling 1,895, preliminary expenses 532, Improvements and extensions to properties 893 (Railways 554, Holden 186, other contractors 10, stores, flight field and plants 143), Plant, machinery and equipment 1,136, office furniture 168, which gives a total of 4,623 of establishment costs per aircraft. Newport Workshop 1,477 (Labor 622, overhead 693, sub contract 162), Chullora Workshop 2,019 (Labor 734, overhead 1,155, sub contract 130), Islington Workshop 1,342 (Labor 516, overhead 745, sub contract 81), Assembly Workshops Mascot/Fishermans Bend 2,510 (Labor 1,038, overhead 1,472), Holden production cost per aircraft set 2,321, Richards Industries production cost per aircraft set 292, freight 350, central office overhead 3,224, Materials (including sub contractors' costs other than Holden or Richards Industries) Holden 821 (746 plus 75 for ten percent allowance), Richards Industries 44 (40 plus 4 for ten percent allowance), Newport (795 plus 79 for ten percent allowance), Chullora (2,780 plus 278 for ten percent allowance), Islington 1,407 (1,279 plus 128 for ten percent allowance), Assembly (4,446 plus 445 for ten percent allowance). Appendix A equipment including gun turret 2,627 (Which gives the airframe cost as 27,257), Engines and Propellers (Overseas costs, Wasp engines and Curtiss propellers) 12,546 (Which gives total aircraft cost of 39,803) So 39,803 plus 4,623 gives total costs per completed aircraft as 44,426 pounds. Any wonder the correct answer to what the aircraft cost is, "it depends"?

Canadian Military Aircraft, Serials and Photographs 1920-1968, J.A. Griffen. Airspeed Horsa mark II TL334, TL349, TL401 all listed as Taken on Strength 20 December 1948, Taken off Strength 25 July 1950, "Received from Canadian Army". The RAF says they were built by Harris Lebus, contract card dates, 11, 11 and 14 June 1945 respectively. No information on where they were June 1945 to December 1948.

I decided to report the photograph caption to the Imperial War Museum, pointing out that it had the biography of Lancaster KB741, not Mosquito KB471, a real human replied. "Thank you for contacting the IWM Customers Services Team. Thank you also for identifying this error in our online records. I've forwarded it to the appropriate curatorial team to investigate and correct. It seems that information from the original donor source many years ago was wrong, and with such a nassive archive, it is simply not possible for us to check retrospectively every record. We are, therefore hugely grateful to people such as yourself to highlight these errors to us. With kind regards, Debbie Customer Services Executive"

Looking at the British National Archives, Catalogue description Air Ministry orders 1931 E This record is held by British Library: Asian and African Studies Reference: IOR/L/MIL/17/10/325 Title: Air Ministry orders 1931 E Date: 1931 Held by: British Library: Asian and African Studies, not available at The National Archives Which leads to, British Library: Asian and African Studies 96 Euston Road London England NW1 2DB Telephone: 020 7412 7873 Fax: 020 7412 7641 Email: apac-enquiries@bl.uk Open: Monday 10-5; Tuesday-Saturday 9.30-5 Closed: Sundays, bank holidays Wheelchair access Readers ticket required Previously called the "Oriental and India Office Library" and "The British Library: Asia, Pacific and African Collections (APAC)" ARCHON code: 59 Or are you working at the British Library?

Remembering the initial conversions to carry the 4,000 pound bombs had stability issues. Apart from the mark 25 mentioned earlier, the listings in Mosquito by Sharpe and Bowyer say the following mark IV were converted to carry a 4,000 pound bomb and delivered in 1944. By de Havilland DZ594 (Prototype), DZ534 By Vickers Armstrong (Weybridge) and Marshalls (Cambridge), DZ599, DZ606, DZ608, DZ611, DZ630 to DZ634, DZ636 to DZ644, DZ646, DZ650 By Vickers and de Havilland DZ647 Total 23. Sorry for the duplication. DZ534 618/627/692/627 Ditched 12m E of Cherbourg 27.7.44 DZ594 AAEE/627 SOC 28.6.45 DZ599 692/627 Missing from target marking over Elbe 28.3.45 DZ606 692/627/1655MTU/627/109 U/c collapsed while taxying Woodhall Spa 17.10.45 DZ608 692/169 Dived into ground Gayton Norfolk 10.6.44 DZ611 692/627/109 Swung on landing Woodhall Spa 9.10.45 not repaired DZ630 692/1655MTU/EANS SOC 11.10.46 DZ631 692/139/692/109/692/627 Damaged on ground 12.4.45 NFD DZ632 692/627/139/1655MTU Dived into ground Lound Suffolk 8.11.44 DZ633 693/627 SOC 30.5.45 DZ634 692/627/109 SOC 31.7.47 DZ636 692 Missing (Givors) 27.7.44 DZ637 627/692/627 Missing (Siegen) 2.2.45 DZ638 692 Missing from mining Kiel Canal 13.5.44 DZ639 618 SOC 5.4.46 DZ640 692/627 Missing (Walcheren) 30.10.44 believed target indicator exploded in bomb bay DZ641 692/627/109 SOC 19.1.46 DZ642 692/627 Flew into hill nr Sumburgh 22.11.44 DZ643 692/627/109 SOC 2.1.47 DZ644 627/139 Missing (Homberg) 1.7.44 DZ646 692/627/139 Crashed in circuit Bourn returning from Ludwigshafen 5.5.44 DZ647 627/692 Missing (Frankfurt) 19.3.44 DZ650 692/627 Swung on take-off and u/c collapsed Woodhall Spa 29.12.44 DZ534 was taken on charge 13 March 1943, DZ650 on 10 July 1943, most aircraft delivery dates are in rough serial number order. So they clearly served as standard mark IV before conversion. Taking more from a file on the web DZ534 AZ H 627 Squadron http://www.rafinfo.org.uk/BCWW2Losses/1944.htm DZ534 P3 M 692 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ594 AZ X 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ599 AZ F 627 Squadron Chorley via Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website DZ606 AZ H 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ606 AZ M 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ606 XD M 139 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 7/8 May 1944. DZ608 XD D 139 Squadron Mosquito Thunder DZ608 P3 F 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged in heavy landing on 3/4 May 1944. DZ611 AZ G 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ631 XD A 139 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 22/23 May 1944. DZ632 AZ C 627 Squadron http://www.627squadron.co.uk/album.html DZ632 XD G 139 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 23/24 May 1944. DZ633 AZ D 627 Squadron SAM Combat Colours DZ633 P3 O 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 15/16 June 1944. DZ636 AZ N 627 Squadron Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website DZ636 P3 R 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 7/8 June 1944. Air Britain does not list this aircraft as having been on 692 Squadron. DZ637 AZ X 627 Squadron Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website Used by 617 Squadron, coded O 617 OBB DZ637 P3 C 692 Squadron SAM Combat Colours DZ637 AZ O 627 Squadron 617 OBB Used by 617 Squadron, coded O DZ637 AZ X 627 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 31 December 1944 (Oslo). DZ638 P3 C 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 4/5 May 1944. DZ639 P 618 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ640 AZ U 627 Squadron Chorley via Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website DZ640 P3 A 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 3/4 May 1944. DZ641 AZ C 627 Squadron http://www.627squadron.co.uk/album.html DZ641 P3 E 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 18/19 March 1944. DZ642 AZ H 627 Squadron http://www.627squadron.co.uk/Crash-Sumburgh.htm DZ642 AZ O 627 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 30 October 1944. DZ642 P3 N 692 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When damaged by flak on 7/8 June 1944. Air Britain does not list this aircraft as having been on 692 Squadron. DZ643 AZ O 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ643 AZ P 627 Squadron Mosquito Squadrons of the RAF DZ644 XD V 139 Squadron Chorley via Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website DZ646 XD A 139 Squadron AIR 14/3460 When lost in a landing accident on 4/5 May 1944. DZ647 P3 B 692 Squadron http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:De_Havilland_Mosquito#23.2F24_February_1944 DZ650 AZ Q 627 Squadron Chorley's Bomber Command Losses via Lost Bombers website DZ650 P3 L 692 Squadron Mosquito

By the comments in the follow up post I assume these are known, http://www.aircrewremembered.com/clarson-jeff.html http://www.aircrewremembered.com/mcpherson-gerald.html 186 Squadron existed for a time post WWI, reformed at Drem on 27 April 1943, to Ayr on 3 August, Tain on 7 January 1944, Lympne 1 March 1944, renumbered 130 squadron on 5 April. No aircraft on strength until Hurricane IV arrived in August 1943, they were removed in January 1944, Typhoons arrived in November 1943, removed in February 1944, replaced by Spitfire V. 186 Squadron reformed 1 October 1944 at Tuddenham, nucleus from C flight 90 Squadron, moved to Stradishall 17 December 1944, disbanded 17 July 1945, code letters XY used by A and B flights, AP by C flight. Equipped with Lancaster I and III. NG354 Lancaster mark I, built by Armstrong Whitworth, Taken on Charge 25 November 1944, most of the production run fitted with Merlin 24, to 186 Squadron November 1944, 626 Squadron July 1945, 46 MU October 1945, Struck Off Charge 14 December 1946. As Troy noted the engines decide the mark, UK built were mark I, US built mark III, with the US engines apparently coming with their own tool kit as standard. There are reports of some Lancasters flying with a mix of UK and US built engines. Band(s) on tail is a leader marking for G-H (or Gee-H) a bomb aiming aid used mostly by 3 Group in Bomber Command, leaders were fitted with the set, the rest of the formation bombed when the leader did. Page 105 of Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes has a graphic of the tail codes employed but misses 186 squadron. If it is like 15, 75, 90, 149, 195, 218 and 622 squadrons it was a pair of horizontal yellow stripes. Grey was not used as a G-H marker paint, nor off white. There were a variety of markings including painting the entire vertical surface yellow (101 and 166 squadrons), Indian/Brick Red (106 squadron) or white (463 Squadron) No idea on the patch on the fuselage, given the state of some of the paintwork it may be a touch up in progress or gone wrong.

Information from http://www.airhistory.org.uk/dh/mosquito.html, plus delivery logs, and Bomber Command Losses books. All Mark 25, format is serial, squadron(s), details, note 627 squadron was renumbered 109 on 1 October 1945. KB409 608/627/109 SOC 18.3.48 (Delivery Log TOC 20.9.44, SOC 18.3.48) KB416 608/627 Stalled on asymmetric overshoot Woodhall Spa 3.7.45 (Delivery Log TOC 26.8.44, SOC 16.7.45) (Engine failed, unsure of undercarriage status it hit the runway too hard, 1 killed, 1 burnt, Corporal Stephen Cogger was given the George Medal for his efforts to save the crew) KB490 627/109 SOC 7.11.47 (Delivery Log TOC 28.10.44, SOC 7.11.47) KB561 627/109 Swung on landing and u/c collapsed Wickenby 25.10.45 (Delivery Log TOC 23.1.45, SOC 7.11.45) KB625 627 Swung on take-off and u/c collapsed Woodhall Spa 5.5.45 (Delivery Log TOC 7.12.44, SOC 2.7.45) (Pilot over corrected swing on take off, sheered off undercarriage) KB471 608/Upwood/AAEE SOC 10.1.47 (Delivery Log TOC 20.9.44, SOC 10.1.47) As for IWM photograph caption, the only record of a Bomber Command Mosquito loss on 14 or 15 February 1945 is mark XIX TA402, ran out of fuel, while 428, 431 and 434 squadrons were operating Lancaster X in 1945, and 434 Squadron lost Lancaster X KB741 that night, shot down by night fighter according to the Luftwaffe, , 6 killed 1 PoW. Closest loss match to KB471 is KB401 which was with 627 Squadron, lost on 19/20 February 1945, hit by flak, crew killed, mission to Bohlen, aircraft of the master bomber, borrowed by 54 Base for the mission, the web site says KB401 608/627 Missing (Berlin) 20.2.45 Mosquito Squadrons of the Royal Air Force by Chaz Bowyer says when with 627 squadron, KB416 letter was P, KB490 was Q

Chamberlain is mentioned 15 times, two of which are a repeated figure caption. Three from reference titles. No real assessment is given. Some notes on the pages where Chamberlain appears, Page 245 "so the declaration of war on Germany which failed to assist the Poles may have been a mistake. Even when the Germans did begin their offensive against Western Europe eighteen months later, there were not enough fighters in the RAF; the Air Staff estimating sixty fighter squadrons were needed for the defence of Britain when only thirty-nine were ready. " Lets see now, 1 September 1939 plus 18 months is 1 March 1941. Reference is CAB 65/13/7 13 May 1940. Which reads "The Secretary of State for Air thought that we would be taking a big risk if we sent any more fighters from this country. The Air Staff estimate that 60 fighter squadrons were required for the adequate defence of this country, whereas we only had 39." In fact there were another 10 squadrons in France, plus the fighter squadrons in Egypt etc., and total fighter squadrons in Britain and France came to 57, including 4 Blenheim fighter squadrons with Coastal Command, which were all part of the RAF, now if the thesis had said Fighter Command.... The thesis continues, "Any way and whatever the outcome’, Chamberlain wrote to one of his sisters, ‘it is clear as daylight that if we had to fight in 1938 the results would have been far worse ... I realised from the beginning our military weakness and did my best to postpone if I could not avert war’." A bit later comes the comment "Both Britain and France had bombers with range to attack German cities and industrial centres, in particular the Ruhr industrial area. But no such Armée d´Air or RAF missions eventuated. The Germans were left to occupy and carve up Poland with their Russian allies without being interrupted. Thus an ideal opportunity was lost through British politics with appeasement extended into the shooting war era" Page 247 "The Labour government under Chamberlain" Page 248 "the ‘phoney war’ period between the coalition and Germany with their leaflet raids seemed like Chamberlain’s last tilt at appeasement." Perhaps Roosevelt's 1 September 1939 speech had something to do with things? As for logic, "The resurgence of the RAAF in 1943–44 came too late to make any contribution to the shortening of the war" "Predictably, the RAAF’s size and strength was allowed to evaporate quickly after August 1945 " So the air force did little in the war, but should not be wound down as much in peace time. "Note 316 Three warplanes made in Australia were of British design. Of these only the Mosquito was outstanding. RAAF aircraft in largest numbers and which did the major work were the Kittyhawk, Hudson, Catalina, Boston, Mitchell, Vengeance and Liberator, all imported from the US under Lend Lease." Apparently the designs did major work as part of a lack of contribution to the shortening of the war. The first Catalina were cash purchases. In numeric order, RAAF aircraft imported and locally made to end August 1945 840 Kittyhawk, 700 Beaufort, 656 Spitfire, 210 Beaufighter import, 330 local production, total 550, 342 Vengeance (15 to end July 1942, rest from February 1943), 285 Liberator (First in February 44, second hand for training, first new ones in May), 262 Mustang imports, (First in April 1945), 16 local production, 250 Boomerang, 246 Hudson, 73 Mosquito imports, 116 local production, total 189, 166 Catalina, 69 Boston, 47 Mitchell (First in April 1944 but the RAAF had control of a Dutch Mitchell squadron from 1942) Vultee Vengeance dive bombers, they had a short combat career 12 Squadron, South Coast New Guinea 7 November 1943, withdrawn July 1944 and Vengeance removed 21 Squadron, New Guinea 18 January 1944, withdrawn 10 April 1944, Vengeance removed in September 1944. 23 Squadron, New Guinea 9 February 1944, Cape York area northern Queensland 22 March, withdrawn 17 June 1944 and Vengeance removed 24 Squadron, New Guinea 30 August 1943, withdrawn 8 March 1944 and Vengeance removed The single RAAF Boston squadron converted to Beaufighter in December 1944. See units of the RAAF Volume 2 Fighter Units, Units of the RAAF Volume 3 Bomber Units On page 61 the thesis stated all locally manufactured aircraft "entered service too late to make any worthwhile contribution to the defence of Australia or the defeat of Japan" First official local production, Mosquito March 1944, Mustang May 1945, Beaufighter in May 1944, Boomerang September 1942. Here the list omits British designs, but includes the Mustang, Liberator and Vengeance as designs which "did the major work" despite the dates of arrival. To throw in other quotes. "When World War I began in 1914, the German airship was probably the world’s best intercontinental bomber" "And only the Americans made a daytime intercontinental four-engined bomber of a warwinning design" "The Americans had forged ahead of everyone in heavy bomber development, the B-24 and B-17 being the only four-motored intercontinental bombers in service in any air force:" "World War II began with an aircraft attack, but not of the type predicted between the wars with heavy intercontinental bombers massacring city dwellers" "Until nations that were attacking each other's infrastructure developed a long-range escort fighter intercontinental fleets of bombers had to be flown without escort" "Hitler himself, speaking publicly at Danzig on 19 September, threatened the British with unspecified air attacks in what they called, his ‘… customary misstatements of fact’. In a wild and rambling speech broadcast by the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC), ... a statement that seemed to be hinting at atomic weapons" Maybe he had chatted to come of the British scientists at the BBC studio? Or as R.V. Jones found, the British mistranslated part of the speech. I prefer the Aramaic translations myself.