Tom Cooper

A batch of 12 MiG-17Fs was delivered to Egypt a few days before the Suez Crisis, and six of them were assembled and operational with No.1 Sqn EAF as of 29 October. They were definitely flown in combat (by el-Hinnawy and several other pilots), starting with the following day (30 October). Generally, the EAF has had much more pilots than was usually assessed by foreigners at that time. It was really the aircraft that was their problem, especially in the wake of so many on-off British arms embargos during the early 1950s (which, together with a series of Israeli border incursions, eventually resulted with Egypt establishing ties with the USSR/Czechoslovakia and then ordering MiGs, first and foremost). Thus, the air force had no problem to take all the 80 MiG-15s from the Czech Arms Deal ('Operation 105') in period October 1955-September 1956, and then convert half of No.1 squadron to MiG-17s in a matter of few days.

Nope. Firstly, a combo of bombs, rockets AND drop tanks was impossible: bombs could have been installed instead of drop tanks only. So, the maximum load for MiG-15bis was 2x100kg bombs and 8 Sakrs, or 8 Sakrs and two (slipper-type) drop tanks. Secondly: except for scant shot of a MiG-21 armed with R-3S' (AA-2 Atoll), and few 'documentaries' about 1973 War (read: post-war semi-documentaries), there are never any 'action' photos of fully armed Arab aircraft, no matter from what war. Arabs were simply not taking such photos: pilots and ground personnel were photographing themselves, sometimes their aircraft, but never fully armed. There are only narratives (like from Shalaby el-Hinnawy, then the leading Egyptian MiG-pilot and later C-in-C Air Force) about attacks on Israeli paras in Mitla Defile, citing deployment of rockets and bombs during the same mission. But, there are really plenty of photos of EAF MiG-15s from the times immediately before the Suez Crisis. Especially so in Addenda-chapter of Volume 2, which contains some 15-20 photos never before seen in the West. The same volume also contains a photo of a Vampire with rails for Sakrs from graduation ceremony in May 1955, and of MiG-15s with such rails from testing undertaken immediately after their delivery (late 1955). Sometimes when I find more time, I'll check if REAF/EAF Meteors might have got similar rails too: it seems the Egyptians were installing them on quite a few types (including Yak-11 trainers).

Actually, EAF MiG-15bis' were used as fighter-bombers - armed with unguided rockets and bombs - already as of 1956. Remember those launch rails for (Oerlikon-designed) 'Sakr' unguided rockets calibre 88mm, usually 'famous' for their installation on Egyptian MiG-17s (especially so in the late 1960s and early 1970s)? Well, until the appearance of the book Arab MiGs Volume 1, and reaction from one of our readers in Egypt, it was unknown that the practice of attaching such launch rails on different types in service with the EAF was introduced already in the early 1950s - and at first on Egyptian Vampire FB.Mk 52s. Therefore, quite soon after MiG-15s began arriving in Egypt the EAF began installing such rails on this type as well. When the issue of range was not that important (like for missions against Israelis on the Mitla Defile, if flown from Fayid AB), then bombs could be carried additionally - instead of drop tanks (which, back then, were usually of 'slipper' type). That's why then a number of Egyptian pilots that flew combat sorties during the 1956 Suez War recalled flying missions armed 'with rockets and bombs'. At earlier times, that was extremely confusing and not few observers in the West put all such statements under a big question mark. Namely, it was so back then that MiG-15s simply couldn't be armed with both of these. That is: no MiG-15s - but Egyptian examples. For the full story and photos (including photos of a Vampire and MiG-15bis with launch rails for Sakr rockets), see Arab MiGs Volume 2, pages 36-37. Oh and BTW: much later we've learned from another Egyptian source, that it was indeed Egyptian MiG-15 and MiG-17 pilots that were flying those nocturnal interceptions that scared several RAF Canberra crews (and even caused some damage to two of these). Back then most of foreign observers believed that Soviets have flown such sorties, but this was not the case. To complete the irony: the Egyptians didn't trust their own pilots when these claimed to have intercepted high-flying Canberras by night, and reprimanded both of them for 'lying'. The situation was corrected only once Eden published his memoirs and 'confirmed' that two Canberras were damaged...

Just a second: I nowhere said that any kind of 'lessons learned' from Iran-Iraq War resulted in any kind of change of US air warfare doctrine. On the contrary, I simply listed the chronological order of specific air forces going 'up' (or 'down') in regards of their way of operating. But now that you mention this... yup, I do find it ironic (almost 'bordering on absurd') that the US-trained (and equipped) Iranians moved 'up' due to their own experiences with Iraqis, while the USAF and USN (which couldn't care less about Iranian experiences, despite the fact that a number of 'lessons learned' type of reports about these were forwarded down the chain of command during the mid-1980s), first moved down (and did so barely a year after Iranian decision to go up), before moving to altitudes at which they are operating today (years later). Perhaps they should have studied Iranian ops more closely..? ;-) This is something where I do feel I need to 'counterargument'. If there was a US service with a different focus and facing less heavily defended areas, then the USMC. Otherwise, the USN was gearing up through all of the 1970s and 1980s for fighting against massive, 'full array' and definitely '1st class' defences of Soviet 'bastions' (which ranged from Backfires and Bears to MiG-31s, Su-27s and SA-10/12s) - like those on the Kola Peninsula or Kamtchatka Peninsula (and in the Vladivostok area), Krimean Peninsula etc. Between others, one reason was to search and destroy Soviet SSBNs inside or near their bases, before these could reach firing positions in the Arctic. That's why the USN went through a similar process like the one you described for the USAF, including the relevant advances in technology, and precisely during the same period of time (see the introduction of the NTDS, Spruecan-class ASW-destroyers, Aegis-class cruisers, 688-class SSNs, F-14/AIM-54, S-3A and 'multi-role' carriers instead of dedicated ASW-carriers, etc., etc.). That all said, and although I agree that there was always something like 'preference for medium and high altitudes' within the USN, especially early ops over Iraq in 1991 have shown that there were significant doctrinal differences even between specific carrier air wings. Some of these operated in relatively compact strike packages (CVW-3), others not (CVW-17); some at low level, others at medium levels; there were CVWs where attack pilots didn't want any fighter escorts ('attracting too much attention'), and others wanted them 'all the time' etc. IMHO, the dispute about which solution was better was actually never 'won' by either side (i.e. neither by proponents of low-alt or high-alt ops) - at least not on the battlefield. It was rather so that the proponents of high-alt ops 'prevailed' - because rapid degeneration of Iraqi air defences resulted in a situation where a decision was taken to go high. All along the line 'why take more risk (and losses) than necessary...?' Thanks to such experiences and subsequent developments in technology, as well as US/NATO subsequently only fighting '3rd class' opponents when it comes to air warfare capabilities (Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan etc.), yes, ever since the deployment of air power is characterised by 'unromantic', high alt, stand-off ops. And resulting fighter-aircraft designs are killing the hobbies of people like poor Matthew. But, as mentioned above, experiences from Afghanistan and - even more so - Iraq, have shown that even in such, 'modern-day' & 'take care to minimalize losses' wars, there is not always some AH-64 around to do the strafing, and even Hellfire-equipped UCAVs are not always around... and then super-expensive 'top-notch' jets have to go 'down, low and dirty', time and again - and definitely more often than planned (of course: that's one of those standard problems with any wars; things seldom go the way they are planned to go). Anyway, yup, this is a topic that deserves a lot more debate - for which I'm simply lacking time (and this forum is also probably not the best place for all of it). Thus, let me end by coming back to my first post in this regards, and recommend Matthew to do something the USAF/USN should have done more often: forget the boring, 'grey-in-grey' 'NATO-style' jets, and go for 'exotic' places and their planes. There are much, much more (and, especially 'more interesting') things to find there.

Cheers, Bill - and sorry: I don't like Mexican food, so no wonder I mixed it up there. Regarding other questions: The research I did in this regards must be something like 15 or so years old (definitely undertaken before internet became more widespread). I did launch a number of related FOIA inquiries some 11-12 years ago, but the Pentagon was not particularly curious to release anything, and all of these were turned down. So, something like 8-9 years ago, I ended cross-examining the info provided in oral form from specific sources (primarily retired USAF personnel from 4025th and 6091st RS') with what can be found in books by Istvan Toperczer (about North Vietnamese AF in combat). Of course, this is anything but 'official'. Yet, my conclusion is that the North Vietnamese have lost around a dozen of MiGs while attempting to intercept various of AQM-34Ls (and downing around 8-9 of these). Especially problematic proved drones equipped with HATRAC-system, which could not only recognize a SAM-launch or airborne interception, but also steer the UAV ionto deception/evasive manoeuvring. In other cases it was little else but good/bad luck, including programming mistakes (a particularly famous op was a result of an AQM-34L being programmed to fly at 3 - instead of 300ft...). Five of losses mentioned by Toperczer (i.e. provided to him by official places in Hanoi) 'match' dates at which one, specific HATRAC-equipped AQM-34L was airborne over North Vietnam, and most of details about losses in question match recollections of USAF operators. Three of the 'kills' it scored were 'no-weapon-kills', and all were scored in 1970-1971 period. One of earliest resulted in a MiG-21-pilot from the 921st FR blotting out his wingman with a R-3S/K-13/AA-2 Atoll that was fired at the drone, and another from the AQM-34L 'dragging' a pursuing MiG-21 into cross-fire of North Vietnamese SAMs and flak... While not 'confirming' any of kills in question, I would say this photo did not come into being 'by accident': Well, perhaps the USAF didn't abandon medium level ops, but what happened when 'Americans' attempted that kind of ops in the 1980s, can be seen from results of USN's strike on Druze and Syrian positions off Beirut, in - was it October or November - 1983? Makes one wonder why the US Navy subsequently initiated the 'Strike' Weapons School (meanwhile a part of the Top Gun syllabus), the USAF followed the fashion - and both were more than happy to go low level when attacking Libya, in April 1986... Anyway, for 1st hand details on 'Iranians going high' please see one of these videos (not sure which episode it was, 1, 2 or 3, but it nicely explains encounters between IRIAF F-14s and IrAF Mirages, while protecting a division of F-4Es underway at something like 15,000-20,000ft over Iraq, in 1982): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sya-9XDpfiM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BJ1cdMHzKM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNmgR_zcTNI (And before anybody comes to complain about 'wrong' animations of Iraqi MiG-21s and 'MiG-25s' [the latter look very much MiG-31-nish to me]: sorry, that's neither the fault of interviewed IRIAF pilots, nor mine, and certainly not decreasing the importance of recollections in question.)

Gei... er... 'cool'.

Looking great, Arthur! Oh, and where can one see the other modells from the Suez theme?

Add to this the fact that nobody wants to fly (USAF) UAVs any more. Reason is rather 'obvious': there is no promotion for 'office job in 'Vegas' (read: for working 9-5 shifts inside an air-conditioned shelter at Nellis AFB). This affair alone is meanwhile more damaging than any kind of combat- (or other sorts of) 'attrition'... ...OK, but don't forget that one of major reasons for cancellation of the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II (aka 'Flying Burito'), was just another in an entire spate of USN's failures to field a serviceable and (financially) acceptable 'cutting edge aircraft design', in the 1970s and 1980s. The F-14A was 'great looking plane', but killed by its poor engines. And the USN and P&W did their best to spoil it (eventually, more money was spent for making TF-30s operational than if they would have been replaced by something 'made by GE'). The (original) F-14B was 'KIA' due to cost overruns and inflation already in the early 1970s (and definitely terminated by 'Iranian withdrawal' in 1979); the F-14C too... the F-14D was much too late (and then also too few, thanks to Channey). The A-6F and A-7F were both killed in order to save the F-14D, in 1986... and the F-14D then finally killed by preference for a 'minor upgrade' of the F/A-18, that resulted in an entirely new and far more expensive F/A-18E/F - which can do less than even an upgraded F-14D could (not to talk about 'Strike Tomcat')... So, at least to me, it seems the USN's '40 year history of developing cutting edge aircraft design' died already in the late 1960s (around the time the VFX = F-14A design was 'frozen'), and lasted rather something like 20 years... The following 20 years were spent with USN doing best to ruin that story. And if one thinks that the USAF is 'vice free' in this regards... well, sufficient to say that the latest AC-130Js come into being in following fashion: the Pentagon first pays some 400+ million to Lockheed to deliver a 'vanilla' C-130J, then pays it another 100 million (or more) to 're-build' that C-130J into an AC-130J... Whatever, the net result is: nobody should be surprised by 'preference for UAVs', and even less by all the cost overruns and failures of the F-35: especially the later are in 'best traditions' of the Pentagon in the last 40 years... That all said, I do hope people like Mike might still find some interest in 'modern jets', then the story of various air forces and air warfare in the last 60 years is really full of '1st class motifs'.

They only stretch them a bit, and call them 'UAVs'... ;-) ...an Iraqi MiG-25PDS(export) took out a (Stinger-armed) RQ-2 using a single R-40RD, back in December 2002... On the other hand, one of those USAF's 'Ryan drones' was the first ace of the Vietnam War (yup, with 5 confirmed MiG-kills at least a year before Cunningham/Driscoll managed that feat). There is quite a lots of argument (pro and contra) in this regards. After all the recent experiences from A-stan and Iraq, the USAF very much has such intentions. That's why the F-35 (sillently) underwent testing of its capability to survive hits from hand-held firearms, few months ago. To surprise of not few, it failed, and miserably at it: a single simulated 7.62mm hit in the area of intake ducting proved 'sufficient' to bring it down. It is for such reasons that already the IRIAF (yes, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) moved towards medium-alt ops back in 1982, the IrAF (Iraqi Air Force) moved in same direction from around 1986 or so; the USAF followed that fashion in 1991, the RAF too, rest of the NATO over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, then the IASF over Lebanon in 2006, the RSAF over Yemen, in 2009-2010, and all the possible NATO-allied air forces over Libya in 2011 too... Except there is urgent requirement to strafe some target with the cannon (which, as mentioned above, actually ocurs quite often in such conflicts like in A-stan and Iraq), hardly anybody is flying below 15,000ft when in combat, nowadays. But that's also why there is ever more use of UAVs, and types like AT-6 and A-29 are now very much 'en vogue' (even though completely ignored by the USAF).

Ken, one question about this photo: is that first MiG in the row wearing North Korean markings (and Chinese 'dedication')?

Dave, I see one problem with your serial numbers: those in Arabic ('our') characters, read '3-6020'. But those in Persian characters, read '3-6021'. Very sorry mate, but they do not fit...(especially '3-6021' does not fit to BuAerNo 160318).

That's right. This antenna has to be shortened/decreased in size. They were all delivered without IFR doors in their place. Initially, this was 'dictated' by delivery flights being undertaken with help of USAF's KC-135s, which were using 'Iron Maiden' IFR-baskets (instead of 'soft' ones, used by USN). These baskets often caused problems with IFR-doors, which - if broken - would be sucted into engine, causing massive damage. BTW, all the 79 doors were delivered - together with 79 F-14s delivered to Iran. They were last seen floating in one of cavernous depots of TFB.8. (Just for comparison: certain character named Dick Channey took care to destroy anything that was related to production of F-14s, already back in 1991.) ;-) Actually, it was Iran that was financing the TCS (just like Iran was about to finance re-engining of its second batch of 75 F-14As - ordered in 1978 - with GE engines), but the R+D of the same was incomplete by 1979, and thus none were delivered. Available photographs recently taken at a certain fair in Tehran show very small, solid-state components for AWG-9, locally developed to replace specific parts of the radar and fire-control system.For four examples (out of some 30), see here: http://gallery.military.ir/albums/userpics/10110/IMG_1.jpg There are similar photos of other parts of AWG-9 and avionics, new combustion chambers, new parts of hydraulic system, gear etc. - all of that locally manufactured.

Except for different ejection seats (painted azure blue) and a pointy nose on Luftwaffe's AJs, there was also difference in regards of the cannon: German Alpha Jets were light strikers, no training aircraft actually. Thus, they've had a Mauser cannon (with a big cannon-brake) installed in a very streamlined gondola (slightly longer than the one with DEFA-cannon as installed on Egyptian AJ MS2s, for example), attached under the centreline.

You're welcome, Bosse. BTW, I can help you with some artworks and even few photos, no problem about that. Problem is: one can't post any illustrations 'directly' here on the forum, and all referneces I've got online are posted on ACIG.info forum, where one needs registratin to see them... The SyAAF used to be (and still is) the core of the Assadist regime. Keep in mind that Assad rose to power while commanding the SyAAF, back in the 1960s. The SyAAF Intel Agency remains the most powerful of all Syrian intelligence- and security agencies, and is keeping the entire military (that is: what is left of the same) under a very tight control. Anyway, there are photos of Syrian MIG-21s - regardless what variant, from F-13s, via FLs, PFMs to MFs and bis'. I've got even one showing an extremely rare Syrian MiG-21PFS (they couldn't have got more but perhaps 10-12 of these). They are few, no doubt, and many are of rather poor quality. And, one really must dig very deep to get any, but they are available. I must admit I'm not happy to share them easily on the internet, especially because they are so rare. Sorry, must correct here a little bit. In spring 1972, after the failure to establish a 'new' United Arab republic (uniting Egypt, Libya and Syria), the EAF introduced the pan-Arabic flag (red, white, black) but with 'Eagle of Salahaddin' on the white field. The SyAAF followed in fashion, but only for few years: after Sadat made peace with Israel, in 1977, it introduced the flag that is used until today, and including two green stars on the white field (in similar fashion, the LAAF - Libyan Arab Air Force - which used the pan-Arabic tricolore from 1969 until 1977, changed this to 'Islamic green' insignia, in 1977). Sorry, that's really not truth. The IDF/AF credited its own pilots with a total of 89 kills scored in period 1979 - 1985. So, it can't be the SyAAF has lost 200+ MiG-21s in 1982 alone. On the contrary, official Damascus admitted a loss of around 50 aircraft over Lebanon in 1982. Actually, there were - and there still are. The SyAAF MiG-21-force was rebuilt after that war by deliveries from the USSR and LIbya, no problem about that. Some 40 are still in service. Although even the usually reported numbers of MiG-21s delivered to Syria are much exaggerated, the numbers of MiG-23s delivered to Syria were never even nearly similar. It didn't exist - as a Syrian MiG-21. But, it did exist, as a PDRYAF MIG-21bis serial number 202 - and camo colours were different (beige, light green and blue-green; see book African MiGs Vols. 1 and 2 for details). That is an Egyptian MiG-21MF (recently overhauled in the Ukraine) - absolutely not related to defection of that Syrian MiG-21bis to Jordan. Jordanians did not release any photos of the aircraft in question. You can find some excellent photos of SyAAF MiG-21MFs (and MiG-21UMs) on ACIG forum: they are not in service any more. All the MiG-21s still flown by the SyAAF are bis, and they've got some quite characteristic modifications, not seen anywhere else.

Just a note for those searching for British nukes: I think it was last year (or the year before it?), at IPMS/Nationals, that I saw a British manufcturer offering resin modells of most of nukes used by the RAF and RN in the 1960s and 1970s. And I think to recall they've had them in at least two scales (1:72 and 1:48, if my memory is still of any use).

Bosse, PLEASE, don't do it. First of all, I'm to blame for that artwork, which is simply wrong. Wrong in sense of wrong references being used for it. For this, I offer my apology, up front. This artwork came into being in 'pre-historic times' of research about modern Arab air forces. It was only years later (actually, only some 5-6 years ago), that we've found out that this artwork was based on a photo showing one of MiG-21bis' delivered to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Air Force (former South Yemen) in the mid-1980s. The photo was b/w, and overall of very bad quality. This, as well as lack of knowledge about the SyAAF (Syrian Arab Air Force) led to a number of wrong conclusions... and thus, anybody being 'sceptic' about it, or the colours, is perfectly right. Please, forget about it. (That is: except you want to build one of MiG-21bis flown by air forces of Guinea, Mozambique, Congo-Brazzaville and similar air forces... or a PDRYAF example, of course. Though, in such case, you ought to use entirely different colours and a completely different set of markings and national insignia.) *********** Anyway, generally, top sides of MiG-21bis' delivered to other Arab air forces - that is: Iraq and Syria (but not South Yemen) - in the 1970s and 1980s were usually painted in two ways (with note that all the colours used by Soviets were their equivalents for British Standard - 'BS - colours; yup, the Soviets orientated on the Brits for this), either: - a.) early camo (say, delivery date up to around 1981): beige (BS381C/388) or camouflage beige (BS381C/389) and green (BS381C/283) or olive drab (BS381C/437) - b.) late camo (say, delivery date from around 1981-1982): light stone (also known as yellow sand; BS381C/361) and either green-blue (i.e. deep brunswick green BS381C/227) or a rather bluish version of deep chrome green (BS381C/267). Depending on availability, the colours used on bottom surfaces ranged from light admiralty grey (BS381C/697) to the light blue shade I call 'russian light blue', which is equivalent to the pale roundel blue (BS381C/172). (Should there be any doubts about this: I can support all of this with photos of two different aircraft, taken by the same (digital) camera, at the same place, at nearly the same time (difference of some 15-20 minutes) and under same weather and light conditions, and also a piece of one of MiGs in question.) Top-side camo colours were usually applied along pattern I tend to call 'horns'. This was characterised by three or four, seldom two, 'horns' applied along the centre fuselage, above the wing (and 'mirrored' on the top wing surface); a 'strip' down the front part of the fin; a lenghty and broad strip on the top of the front fuselage, spreading around the cockpit etc. The pattern was 'standard', but its application not: it actually depended on inspiration of 'duty painter' at the factory in the USSR. Indeed, some of them have developed their 'own handwriting/style', so that even today one can recognize what plane was painted by what painter. Sufficient to say: many aircraft wore 'similar' camo patterns, but no two the same. Oh yes: and serials were applied in black, in four digits on the front fuselage, and repeated (all four) on the top of the fin. *********** Another characteristic of Syrian MiG-21s - and this regardless what version, from MiG-21F-13s of 1964, to MiG-21bis' as in service in present-day - was: they never, never, never had any roundels applied on their fuselage. Whoever tells you something else, has no clue (just like I had no clue back in 2001-2002, when Dr David Nicolle and me were working on the book 'Arab MiG-19 & MiG-21 Units in Combat', from which your scan comes). Instead, roundels are always applied 'only' on top and bottom surfaces of both wings. *********** Finally, another 'warning': if you want to build a Syrian MiG-21 'from 1982' - do NOT use any of their latest photos or videos as reference. The 60 examples that were still in service as of 2010 have meanwhile been overhauled and completely re-painted at 'The Factory' (SyAAF's Main Overhaul Facility at Nayrab AB/Aleppo IAP). That means: their modern-day camo is an entirely different story from that in 1982.

Glad to be of help, Phil. Regarding weapons: basically, the Israelis used whatever was available on their Skyhawks. Surely, primary armament consisted foremost of various combinations of Mk.82s (usually with Mk.15 Snakeye retarding fins), and they can be seen on most of photos. But, especially during the 1973 War, Mk.7 Rockeyes, French-made SAMP 100s, BLU-27 napalm canisters, pods for 2.71in unguided rockets, and AIM-9B and AIM-9D Sidewinders were as often. AFAIK, although available since 1971 and deployed in combat by Israeli F-4Es during the same year, AGM-45s and AGM-62s were deployed by Skyhawks only during later stages of the October 1973 War. The only thing I do not remember to have seen hanging from any of Israeli Skyhawks on photos from that period are US-made M-117 GP-bombs and little known CBU-55s (which at the same time were used - and then in huge numbers - by other US allies around the world, like South Vietnam, Ethiopia, Iran etc.). Perhaps M-117s were 'reserved' for F-4Es, and CBU-55s not even delivered to Israel, no idea here.

Perhaps they didn't care to add all the details they would have added on 'real' Tomcat 21 (if it ever entered production) to the model? Anyway, your description, Giorgio, makes me curious. As a declared Tomcat-fanatic, think I have to do whatever is possible to get a decent linedrawing of '21' and see all the details.

Gorgeous work, and the cockpit colour is all OK. Any idea about camo and markings for your P?

Talking about these early F-15As... anybody ever built one painted in Kit Ferris' scheme from AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1976?

Roland, can you be more specific regarding what Sea Fury would you like to build? With Iraqi Sea Furies, it's easy: their camo pattern always remained the same (Dark Earth over Mid Stone and Azure Blue), no matter where were they deployed, or to whom were they donated. Namely, some of Sea Furies sold to Iraq, have been deployed in Syria, few donated to Egypt, in late 1948, and subsequently some were donated to the Royal Moroccan Air Force. From the photos I've got meanwhile (most of these can be found in books Arab MiGs Volume 1, 2, 3, and - in about a month from now - Volume 4) show that their camo remained the same throughout all these times. Indeed, it remained the same even when the Iraqi AF kept them in service as COIN aircraft until they were replaced by Su-7s, in late 1960s. Though, and at the danger of being a lil bit 'enigmatic': prior to that, the Fury Demonstrator was impounded by Egypt, and then rushed to service during the 1948-1949 War with Israel. If I'm to ask, that's the Fury to build (especially in 1:32), then it has got some... 'fascinating'... personal insignia.

Haven't seen any ever built, nor even any linedrawings, but this book has a set of six high-rez photos of a Tomcat 21 model, very useful as reference. IMHO, only outside major differences to F-14A/B/D are: - frameless windshield - bigger glove vanes and - a set of LANTRIN-like sensors (that is: their turrets) installed into the front portion of underfuselage Phoenix-pallets.

Ahem... (regarding 'surplus')... A-4Es were delivered as 'reward' for Israel accepting a cease-fire that ended the 'War of Attrition' against Egypt, in August 1970 - instead of provoking Soviets even more. Now, it's truth that all the A-4Es in question have previously served with the USN, but that with 'surplus' is a matter of standpoint. The fact was that they were withdrawn from service because of being replaced by A-7 Corsairs. Prior to their delivery to Israel, all were overhauled and upgraded to 'Rugby D' standard, and they arrived not only wired for AIM-9 Sidewinders (unusual for USN), but together with plentifull supply of AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-62 Walleye PGMs. From modell-builder's point of view, this all means: no need for humps or anything else. Just check your IDF/AF A-4E to have proper RWR aerial and parachute housing below the exhaust pipe. Starting in August 1971, the IDF/AF initiated a programme to upgrade all of its A-4E/Hs to A-4N standard (sometimes called 'Skyhawk II', but foremost known as 'Crystal' standard in the IDF/AF). This primarily saw the introduction of the hump (necessary for additional avionics), HUD and DEFA cannons calibre 30mm in place of Colts calibre 20mm. Some say that larger intakes (necessary for higher-rated engines) and larger cockpit hood were added, but I'm not sure if this was really the case. First proto of an A-4H Crystal was completed in 1972, and priority for corresponding upgrades was initially given to older A-4Hs (delivered to Israel in 1968). That's why the IDF/AF still operated two squadrons equipped with 'vanilla' A-4Es, during October 1973 War. Additional A-4Es were delivered during the October 1973 War. The tail-pipe extension was added only in reaction to experiences from the October 1973 War, and stood in no direct relation to Skyhawk II/Crystal upgrade. Correspondingly, a number of A-4Es did receive such extensions while otherwise remaining in their original form (no hump, small intakes, small cockpit canopies), during the mid-1970s. Most of them appear to have been operated by No. 149 Smashing Parrot Squadron. Known serials of 'extended-tail-pipe/humpless' A-4Es are 611 and 866 (ex-266), for example.

Few tips (or 'pleas', if you prefer)... Please, do not hang all of this stuff, not even a mix of it, on the plane 'at once'. On Iraqi Su-22s, it was either 'KKR + SPS-141MVG + drop tanks', or 'Kh-28 + Myetel + drop tanks', or 'Kh-29 + SPS-141MVG + drop tanks' or 'Kh-25 + drop tanks' (over Kuwait in August 1990 only), or 'different loads of bombs, but usually 4-6 FAB-500M62s + drop tanks' - but never a mix including two different types of weapons (not even a mix of two different calibres of bombs). If you add the SPS-141MVG (usually on the left inboard underwing pylon), don't add the Myetel pod: they were jamming each other. And take care to remove all the antennas pointing in rear directions (as delivered to Iraq, the SPS-141MVG was operating 'in front aspect only'). Instead, add a UV-16-57 as 'counterweight' on the other side of the plane (that was indeed necessary). Re. gun-pods... sorry, but a strict 'no-no' on Iraqi Su-22s. (And thanks in advance for at least considering anything of this...)

One note here: the 'early' Mirage IIICJs were powered by SNECMA Atar 09B engine. This has had no usual afterburner 'feathers' like most of the engines have nowadays, but two 'petals', one on the upper and the other on the lower side, with that '<'-cut in between. From around 1969-1970 (as soon as France started delivering Mirage 5Js, which were powered by SNECMA Atar 09C engines), Israel began re-engining its Mirage IIICJs with 'surplus' Atar 09Cs. These had the 'usual' afterburner feathers.