Why do US Navy ships keep colliding?

[Latinbear]

Aircraft are my thing but having been born and lived in Portsmouth until I was ten I do have a bit of a soft spot for warships.

 

I thought the article below might make for some interesting reading. 

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-22/why-do-u-s-navy-ships-keep-crashing

 

[Paul E]

Very interesting and thank you for sharing.

 

In my view, blaming the lack of ships and too many tasks in the article is a red herring. Whilst the Royal Navy are not perfect, they have managed to sustain operations with fewer ships and simultaneously combine at sea training. I feel the issue lies in the training and culture within the ship and maybe the US Pacific Fleet and blaming the lack of ships is a political dodge to avoid culpability.

 

Fundamentally the ship should have been running a radar watch (particularly in congested waters) and the radar watch should be reporting near contacts to the Officer of the Watch (OOW) on the Bridge, detailing CPA (closest point of approach) so the OOW can make informed decisions to avoid collision, including contacting the Captain. The ship has all tools to enable this. So the problem lies with either failure to identify and report radar tracks by the radar watch (if there was one), failure by the bridge watch keepers to keep adequate visual lookout and the Officer of the Watch for not acting on radar and visual lookout information and not taking action to avoid collision which should include the immediate informing of the Captain of the situation. This isn't a failure a single individual but a collective failure.

 

The Captain will carry the can anyway as he responsible for safety and conduct of his ship. But I get the distinct feeling that there is a cultural problem here. It could be a situation where junior officers are too afraid to report issues to their seniors, or there was a relaxation of process without clear protocols of what to do under certain situations. Neither are uncommon and both are fixable.

 

In the Royal Navy training is conducted at individual and team level and ships regularly undergo Operational Sea Training courses of 6 or 4 weeks in Plymouth and have to undertake a further course prior to deployment. These courses are run by FOST and they pull no punches. If a ship is inadequate they'll know about it.

 

I do wonder whether these failure are as a result of the standard of training being eroded by the increased use of Computer Based Training programmes and what does this mean about the war fighting ability of the USN as a whole.

 

However you look at this, it was an avoidable tragedy in which sailors have needlessly lost their lives and I feel for their families crew mates. There are lessons to be learned here not just by the USN but by all Navies, let us hope that some meaning can come from these sailors sacrifice. 

[rio]

Latest is US Navy is looking into hacking of the ships as most of the bridge controls are computer run. 

 

Rio

[davepb]

We Must not forget that there were two ships involved in this collision. As both were reportedly on passage to Singapore, they would presumably be on similar headings. The USS John McCain was presumably overtaking the tanker, correctly leaving her to port, and possibly turned in too early. Another possibility is that the tanker was not properly manned on the bridge and failed to see the warship as she, the tanker,  turned to starboard. 

There are many recorded instances of unmanned bridges, with ships underway, even in the Channel separation zones. I can remember HMS Intrepid being at anchor off East Pakistan following the 1970 Cyclone (Operation Burberry) and having a vessel almost collide with us as it failed to alter course even when we tried to warn her with searchlights and firing blank rounds. No sign of life on the bridge, while we were closing all water-tight doors!

 

Cela Va Sans Dire

[bootneck]

As before, my concern is that if they cannot avoid a large tanker or container ship doing 15-20mph; how can they expect to detect and avoid small and fast hostile craft that are intent on ramming/attacking them?

[Paul E]

43 minutes ago, rio said:

Latest is US Navy is looking into hacking of the ships as most of the bridge controls are computer run. 

 

Rio

I hazard a guess that was written by a journalist who has no understanding of such systems. The US Navy will however be analysing the Black Box recordings of the Integrated Bridge and Integrated Platform Management Systems, as well as the recordings of the voice communications circuits and background conversations on the bridge.  

 

Anyway even if the "bridge controls" were disabled then the ship is still required to be operable without it, there are several fall back modes especially on a DDG. And besides there are still a number of humans fitted with Mk1 eyeballs standing on the bridge who are immune to being hacked who should have been totally aware of the immediate surroundings of the ship. 

 

Dave, you are correct in your assertion, there was another party in this incident, but as it states in COLREGS vessels are to take action avoid collision even if they have right of way and I know what you mean about commercial ships running illegally with out personnel on the bridge. But now IMO regulations require BNWAS (Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System) to be fitted which is supposed to prevent that from happening. You are of course correct that the tanker could have turned to starboard into the side of the DDG. But even so the OOW should have been aware enough to take some form of action, as you know these things evolve over minutes in a ship unlike a car where it only takes a seconds inattention.

2 minutes ago, bootneck said:

As before, my concern is that if they cannot avoid a large tanker or container ship doing 15-20mph; how can they expect to detect and avoid small and fast hostile craft that are intent on ramming/attacking them?

How true!

[LaurieS]

Was there fog ?

 

If not a tanker is slow how would a destroyer with its speed not be able to see that a problem is happening ?

 

Only one person on watch needs eyes and a tongue to give the alert.  How were they so close ?

Were they all a sleep. They are large objects.

 

Sounds like a monumental bog up.

 

Laurie

 

 

[Dave Swindell]

 

[davepb]

It is always possible that visibility was poor, as LaurieS has suggested. If so, it could be a similar collision to that between the SS Adrea Doria and SS Stockholm in 1956, often quoted as a "Radar assisted collision"!

Perhaps the watch was on the screens and not the water?

 

Thumb in bum, mind in neutral?

[LaurieS]

A tragic example of happened in Jersey Waters. I suspect that at times over confidence

and just fatigue at the constant having to do the same thing over and over day in day out.

Most of the time looking at sea. The mind turns off.

 

Dense fog and the Condor catamaran, which is huge takes 300 cars, on the way back from France to Jersey.

All mod cons etc. Can they have thought nobody will be out in this. Crew chatting fog horn turned off.

 

Doing 37 knots (ie about 42mph) they sliced a fishing boat in half killing the skipper. 37 knots in fog.

 

Having been caught out in fog in my motor cruiser 5 or 6 knots max. Wife and 4 kids on the look out.

Plus me on radar and look out. Difference, I was anxious as I had not been on boring duty and was 100% alert.

 

Laurie

 

 

 

[SleeperService]

My knowledge of shipping procedures was zero. This has been a most interesting chance read. However I'm confused by one bit. If the destroyer was passing the other vessel wouldn't they be able to make contact with the bridge crew by sight at least?

[stever219]

One of the USN ships, the Fitzgerald, was hit on the starboard side, suggesting that she was crossing the container ship's path from port to starboard.  In this situation the container ship had right of way so the Fitzgerald's bridge officers and lookouts must have a degree of culpability.  This doesn't exonerate the container ship's bridge crew either, assuming she had one.  Had they observed the Fitzgerald standing into danger they should have alerted her to the fact and attempted to take their own avoiding action if at all possible: I know that in busy shipping lanes (I used to live in Dover)  it isn't always possible to manoeuvre and it takes time and distance to turn or stop a ship of 60,000 tons deadweight or more.

 

i can still remember a visit to the bridge of Pride of Free Enterprise in the early eighties.  One of her officers demonstrated some of the facilities of her then state-of-the-art radar system which included the ability to track a number of selected targets, predict their positions relative to the ship over a given time period and alert the bridge crew to any which posed a risk of imminent collision.  I'm willing to bet that American Grey Funnel Line boats have kit that makes POFE's look like a Sony Walkman, so was anyone using it effectively in the time leading up to the collision?  What exactly were the lookouts (on both ships) looking at?  Did their respective captains have a "Don't **** with me I'm bigger/have the right of way/ the US Navy attitude?  Hopefully there will be proper investigations of all of these accidents with full and complete disclosure so that others can learn from them and avoid needless repetition, although given the American military's "not our fault/it's a state secret/it's a defence secret/no we're not providing witnesses" attitude in the past I'm not very hopeful, but I'd love to be proved wrong on that score.

[Killingholme]

How modern is the kit on the bridge of these naval vessels? You can track civilian ships with a free iphone apps nowadays!

[chuckb1]

Ok imagine this,

Bridge Plot

Bridge

Sir, new track, track 1234 bearing 220 range 4 miles speed 10 knots

Bridge rgr watch

Rgr watch sir...

Bridge Plot contact 1234 now bearing 200 range 3 miles closing, Speed 10 knots

Bridge Rgr

Second officer of the watch CPA?

CPA should be 1.5 miles drawing North..

Captain Sir, Officer of the watch.

Captain Sir I have a surface contact bearing 200 3 nautical miles, closing

OOW Captain

OOW Sir?

Rgr keep an eye on him, if he closes to 1.5 miles call him on the 1202 and ask his intetions

OOW Rgr sir

Plot Bridge report again if closing to 1.5 nautical miles report speed

Plot Rgr sir, Still bearing 200 range 3 miles speed 10 knots 

Bridge Plot,

Bridge!

OOW Sir track 1234 now closing to 1 nautical mile, bearing 210 degrees speed 11 drawing right sir

Bridge Rgr

Captain Sir, OOW

Captain... 

Sir Track 1234 believed to be large merchant vessel bearing 210, speed 11 is now drawing right

OOW Captain

OOW sir

OOW Captain, set levers 90 for 15 knots alter course to starboard to 020 degrees, Im on my way UP.

OOW Rgr QM Ship in hand

QM Ship in hand sir

OOW set levers 90 for 15 knots altering course to starboard to the true course of 020 degrees

QM OOW, set levers 90 for 15 knots altering course to starboard to the true course of 020 degrees

QM Sir, set levers 90, for 15 knots course to steer 020

OOW sir, passing North course now 020, 15 knots sir.

OOW MIDSHIPS 

QM Midships sir course 020

CAPTAIN ON THE BRIDGE

OOW Whats the contact doing?

Ops Bridge what is she doing

OOW sir, contact now drawing left course 350 cpa now 2.5 miles, moving away speed 11 knots sir

OOW VERY GOOD! Watch

Plot Rgr Watch sir

OOW, Captain

Sir?

Im happy, going below. If she closes again let me know, set speed 10 knots resume previous base course and brief the Morning watch of the tanker, keep an eye on.

OOW Rgr sir.

QM OOW, come left to 350... etc (commences to bring the ship back to her base course and night steaming speed to make good her RV or Box the compass for the night)

Thud, Thud Thud.. the old man leaves the bridge.

OOW, Bosuns mate, signal man. Keep an eye on... if she closes let me know, see if we can beat the plot!

Jointly RGR Sir... 

Bosuns mate, Wet of tea sir>

 

Now, I remembered that from over 25 years ago, pretty much what should have happened. There is no excuse, the Destroyer should have kept and eye on the PV Track, if she closed take action and call the skipper, Destroyers what is it they say "Greyhounds of the fleet?"

 

My take, poor bridge watch keeping, poor Surface plot, no communication. All in all poor seamanship. There is no way a Destroyer should get bumped by a FBS!!

Swords and medals and a court martial for the Bridge team. I would say inexperience. 

 

My 50p worth.. Any Ex RN/RM people agree to agree or disagree

 

Elmers.. All the gear no idea

 

 

 

 

 

[LaurieS]

 

Well this class of destroyer can virtually turn in its own length. Also does 30knts about 34mph.

 

This clip below illustrates how manoeuvrable this destroyer is.

 

The Tanker Alnic MC has a cruiser speed of 11k max 17.6k.

 

This is the tracked movement of the Alnic. I assume it hit the McCain at near the end of the clip where it stops turns and departs back to Singapore. Certainly a weird course it took makes you think did it have a problem. Look at all the traffic as well. Assume that the plot does not show Naval Boats to keep the whereabouts of the McCain covert. The Alnic found her.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlrA36GzHNs

 

This below is the same class destroyer.

 

Laurie

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited August 22, 2017 by LaurieS

[Paul J]

I recall there was an incident back in 1976 involving U.S.S. Belknap and U.S.S J.F.K carrier in exercise either North Atlantic or North Sea.  Also an F-14 went over the side.

[Paul E]

11 hours ago, Killingholme said:

How modern is the kit on the bridge of these naval vessels? You can track civilian ships with a free iphone apps nowadays!

The USN are in the progress of updating their older ships with modern bridge systems. The bridge system supplier is Sperry Marine,

http://www.electrotech.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/product-brochure1.pdf

The QE class carriers and Type 45s have Sperry bridge systems too. By the way these systems are not connected to the internet and are not easy to hack.

 

The tracking of civilian vessels on your mobile phone is through the AIS system which all ships over a certain tonnage are required to carry. This is a transponder system which reports the ship's unique IMO identifier, it's course and speed, using GPS and the Global Maritime Distress System (GMDSS). What you see on your mobile phone is from the IMO database and not directly from the ship. Warships also carry GMDSS and have a version of AIS which they can adjust to hide their identity or even switch off.  

[Paul E]

Laurie,

 

The ship's speed and manoeuvrability will be determined by the Engine states and limitations. DDGs have 4 Gas Turbines for propulsion which are configured as 2 for cruise speed and 2 to give boost to maximum speed. The likely hood at the time of the incident the 2 boost Gas Turbines would have been shutdown but available at 5 minutes notice. So although in theory the ship is capable of accelerating to over 30 knots that is only possible if all 4 Gas Turbines are on-line. I do not know what the cruise speed range is for a DDG but I don't think it would be much greater than the 17knots of the tanker.

 

 

[Panzer Vor!!!]

 

The bottom line is that the BRIDGE WATCH failed to SEE AVOID the other vessel/s

No matter how many radars/sensors you have at the end of the day their was a failing at the human end

Bridge watch should have seen OTHER VESSEL  asked radar for report/acted on radar reports

The bridge officer is rated capable to Command the ship/watch (if not a senior officer monitors him /her) and take action while waiting for Captain /officers join him

Basic watchkeeping ship command function has failed twice

 

[Paul E]

1 minute ago, Panzer Vor!!! said:

 

The bottom line is that the BRIDGE WATCH failed to SEE AVOID the other vessel/s

No matter how many radars/sensors you have at the end of the day their was a failing at the human end

Bridge watch should have seen OTHER VESSEL  asked radar for report/acted on radar reports

The bridge officer is rated capable to Command the ship/watch (if not a senior officer monitors him /her) and take action while waiting for Captain /officers join him

Basic watchkeeping ship command function has failed twice

 

Spot on assessment.

 

[LaurieS]

4 minutes ago, Paul E said:

Laurie,

 

The ship's speed and manoeuvrability will be determined by the Engine states and limitations. DDGs have 4 Gas Turbines for propulsion which are configured as 2 for cruise speed and 2 to give boost to maximum speed. The likely hood at the time of the incident the 2 boost Gas Turbines would have been shutdown but available at 5 minutes notice. So although in theory the ship is capable of accelerating to over 30 knots that is only possible if all 4 Gas Turbines are on-line. I do not know what the cruise speed range is for a DDG but I don't think it would be much greater than the 17knots of the tanker.

 

 

Paul,

 

From my own experience in a small cruiser, which I am sure is replicated on the size of the boat or ship, manoeuvrability is not dictated by speed

but by the configuration of the ship's hull plus the rudders and the effectiveness of the reversing of one prop.

 

Looking at the ship turning you notice that when it (she) has turned to 90 degrees (top of hair pin) she (it) lengthens the head of the hairpin due to her speed.

Slow down and the hair pin is sharp and the boat turns more quickly to complete that hair pin.

 

At speed she is shifting more water and is inclined on the starboard bringing the hull side on to the water giving drag. This also makes the port prop less effective.

Slower speed the hull is doing all the work and both props are at their most efficient

[LaurieS]

Latest from a US naval man.

 

That puts all our theories to the test ? But then do they not practice steerage with their props. Assume they have two. Do they have bow thrusters ?

 

The USS John McCain suffered a steering malfunction when it collided with an oil tanker near Singapore on Monday, according to a US Navy official who spoke to CNN.

The crew was unable to utilize the warship’s backup steering systems as it approached the Strait of Malacca, although steering was recovered after the collision, another Navy official told the network.

[Dave Swindell]

Judging by the track of the Alnic MC from LaurieS's post, and photo's of the damage to the USS John S. McCain, one distinct possibilty that hasn't been mentioned is the McCain was affected by wake interaction after overtaking the Alnic MC too close down the Alnic MC's starboard side.
If this was the case, Alnic MC had little room to manoeuvre to port without violating TSS rules (the purple section in the link is a no go "central reservation"), and no room to manoeuvre to Starboard due to the overtaking McCain. Alnic MC would be the stand on vessel, McCain should have kept well clear to starboard.

From:- http://www.splashmaritime.com.au/Marops/data/text/Manotex/Vesshantex.htm

Interaction between Vessels
The pressure fields of two vessels in close proximity on the same or opposite headings will Interact and require corrective action to maintain course. The large suction zone around the longer of the two vessels may be the dominating factor in Interaction between vessels of significantly different size. This may present a very dangerous situation for the smaller vessel, particularly if it is overtaking.

Factors that increase the risk of interaction are, high speed, large size vessel, narrow channel and shallow water. The pressure waves that create Interaction are proportional to the square of the vessel speed, thus the effects of all forms of interaction can be instantly reduced by reducing speed. In some cases consideration will have to be given to the loss of steering control associated with speed reduction.

 

And a rather dramatic video of the effects of this when a small cargo ship overtakes a large bulker, also in the Singapore straits.

 

[Paul E]

1 minute ago, LaurieS said:

Paul,

 

From my own experience in a small cruiser, which I am sure is replicated on the size of the boat or ship, manoeuvrability is not dictated by speed

but by the configuration of the ship's hull plus the rudders and the effectiveness of the reversing of one prop.

 

Looking at the ship turning you notice that when it (she) has turned to 90 degrees (top of hair pin) she (it) lengthens the head of the hairpin due to her speed.

Slow down and the hair pin is sharp and the boat turns more quickly to complete that hair pin.

 

At speed she is shifting more water and is inclined on the starboard bringing the hull side on to the water giving drag. This also makes the port prop less effective.

Slower speed the hull is doing all the work and both props are at their most efficient

Laurie,

 

I am aware of that fact, I am merely pointing out that there would have likely been limitations on the propulsion system at the time of the incident. By the way reversing a prop on a Gas Turbine ship is achieved by reversing the pitch of the propeller.

 

1 minute ago, Dave Swindell said:

Judging by the track of the Alnic MC from LaurieS's post, and photo's of the damage to the USS John S. McCain, one distinct possibilty that hasn't been mentioned is the McCain was affected by wake interaction after overtaking the Alnic MC too close down the Alnic MC's starboard side.
If this was the case, Alnic MC had little room to manoeuvre to port without violating TSS rules (the purple section in the link is a no go "central reservation"), and no room to manoeuvre to Starboard due to the overtaking McCain. Alnic MC would be the stand on vessel, McCain should have kept well clear to starboard.

From:- http://www.splashmaritime.com.au/Marops/data/text/Manotex/Vesshantex.htm

Interaction between Vessels
The pressure fields of two vessels in close proximity on the same or opposite headings will Interact and require corrective action to maintain course. The large suction zone around the longer of the two vessels may be the dominating factor in Interaction between vessels of significantly different size. This may present a very dangerous situation for the smaller vessel, particularly if it is overtaking.

Factors that increase the risk of interaction are, high speed, large size vessel, narrow channel and shallow water. The pressure waves that create Interaction are proportional to the square of the vessel speed, thus the effects of all forms of interaction can be instantly reduced by reducing speed. In some cases consideration will have to be given to the loss of steering control associated with speed reduction.

 

And a rather dramatic video of the effects of this when a small cargo ship overtakes a large bulker, also in the Singapore straits.

 

Dave, Your explanation seems more than plausible, but even so a bridge team which would have had experience of close ship interaction from RAS and OOW manoeuvres should have been aware of such risks.  

[Dave Swindell]

4 minutes ago, Paul E said:

Dave, Your explanation seems more than plausible, but even so a bridge team which would have had experience of close ship interaction from RAS and OOW manoeuvres should have been aware of such risks.

It should, Paul, but unfortunately it can also generate complacency/bravado - it's routine, or we know exactly what we're doing here. There's a difference between RASing on the open sea where both vessels have room to manoeuvre, and overtaking at close quarters in a  conjested TSS.

If the McCain was overtaking slower traffic  (Alnic MC was travelling at 9 knots) at a much faster speed, good seamanship would have put her in the much clearer northern part of the TSS lane, rather than dodging in and out of the slower traffic. There were several other ships overtaking the Alnic MC at circa 11 knots, McCain appears to have come between them and the Alnic MC.