Air to air refuelling options 'being explored' for QE Class

[PLC1966]

As T7 Models says, I believe the only option at the moment is likely to be land based support.  However, as there will be the requirement for support from other land based assets when the fleet puts to sea in nasty environments its probably a course of action that has been understood.

[PLC1966]

1 hour ago, Meatbox8 said:

I'm a firm believer in the Navy having a carrier capability.  But, as T7 suggests, it's the somewhat haphazard way that these projects are managed and the subsequent compromises that always seem to be required with defence procurement that I find so difficult to fathom. 

 

Project Management is one thing (but as far as the MoD is concerned, you pay peanuts...), but don't forget every project is a compromise between time, cost and performance, and whatever the outcome everybody will see the result differently (look at the way armour has developed, all tanks, but compare UK, US,  Soviet and German designs and fashions. 

[mhaselden]

Also bear in mind that big procurement projects last many years but defence budgets are fixed annually (ie cue recipe for scope change as budgets get cut).

[hairystick]

On 5/4/2017 at 3:27 AM, Vickers McFunbus said:

A carrier serves several purposes. As we saw in 1982 (without AAR for the embarked aircraft) it can react to a threat or attack, particularly in an area where no land based runways are available

The Libyan campaign would be a recent example where a carrier off the coast would have been more efficient than the Raf flying from Cyprus with tankers. Loads of logistics and fuel to simply drop a few bombs.

Which is much like the Black Buck missions. A massive waste of fuel to do something that the SHARs could have done multiple times from their closer (carrier) base/s. No AAR necessary either!

[Vickers McFunbus]

21 hours ago, hairystick said:

The Libyan campaign would be a recent example where a carrier off the coast would have been more efficient than the Raf flying from Cyprus with tankers. Loads of logistics and fuel to simply drop a few bombs.

Which is much like the Black Buck missions. A massive waste of fuel to do something that the SHARs could have done multiple times from their closer (carrier) base/s. No AAR necessary either!

 

Hairystick:

 

Cyprus? No. Combat ops over Libya, and tanker support, came from the infinitely more capable aircraft carrier, HMS Italy. It also allowed far more creative use of our assets.

 

(edit: to add context, Cyprus was used in the lead up, mainly for Sentry/Nimrod R1/VC10 ops)

 

As for Black Buck, I think you miss the point. Yep, BB1 dropped one single bomb on the runway at Stanley just as a Harrier could have done (and the later anti radar raids were far more useful), but conveniently it let the Argentines know that most of northern Argentina was in strategic bombing range of Ascension, nicely tying up Argentine assets oop north.

Edited May 5, 2017 by Vickers McFunbus
,

[junglierating]

Like to remind everybody the for the 30 years or so that harriers of all varieties operated off CVS decks ....they did not have an indiginous refueler.

So yes something will probably come along its a useful capability to have but like a lot of programmes you might have to have a capability gap... times are tough and drivers change constantly......having x number of assets looks great on paper until you realise that you need y to support it. So you have less ....of x .....look at the Posideon....9....not many but they will be capable

[Giorgio N]

Operations over Libya are not maybe the best example of the usefulness of a strong carrier force as that country was close to allied bases with no problem for land based aircrafts.

In this kind of operations carriers can sure contribute greatly, however they don't necessarily have an edge. True, land based aircrafts operating from Italy required support from tankers and the logistics involved were not trivial, but a carrier group requires moving not only the carrier but the escorts too and this has to be taken into account when considering the costs. Prolonged operations from a carrier also require refuelers and replenishment ships to operate, unless there are friendly ports close enough.

When operating from land bases, all the "escort" assets are already available and don't need to be moved in theatre, so are the logistics assets. The availability of land bases also allows the use of assets that may not be available on board a carrier, thinking for example of the various C3I tasked aircrafts.

The Falklands on the other hand are a true example of operations that would have not been feasible without a carrier force.

 

In general a lot would also depend on the kind of tasks that the carriers will have to perform and this is afterall a political decision. USN carrier groups are the "tip of the spear" of US foreign policy, as such they have to be able to operate independently everywhere in the world. These carrier groups can also find themselves operating for long periods in "blue waters" and must be as independent as possible from land based assets. For these reasons the US supercarriers carry aircrafts for almost every possible task, including IFR.

Would the RN carriers have to operate in a similar way ? Or would they only operate as part of combined forces ? Would they have to spend long time over oceans or would they mostly operate closer to shore ? Depending on the answers to these questions (and of course many others), it will be possible to understand if the RN will require certain type of aircrafts aboard their carriers.

Now I know that what I'm going to say may sound political... and it is in the broader sense of involving a discussion on political decisions, however it's not in the sense of discussing politicians or political parties. Anyway, personally I feel that it's very unlikely that Britain will in the near future in the position of mouting US style operations without any ally. For this reason, even if having an on-board IFR capability is sure a good thing, I can see the RN carriers being able to operate with no problem without.

 

One more comment: there may actually be a place today for some kind of "general purpose" carrier based platform, capable to be configured for missions like IFR, transport, AEW and maybe even ASW. With the demise of the Viking now only helicopters are tasked with ASW operations from carriers, both the USN and the French use the Hawkeye for AEW missions, the USN has the C-2 for transport and the Super Hornet with buddy packs for IFR. Maybe a variant of the C/E-2 could be designed to provide IFR support. If this could be operated from carriers without catapults though is another story...

[junglierating]

2 hours ago, Giorgio N said:

Operations over Libya are not maybe the best example of the usefulness of a strong carrier force as that country was close to allied bases with no problem for land based aircrafts.

In this kind of operations carriers can sure contribute greatly, however they don't necessarily have an edge. True, land based aircrafts operating from Italy required support from tankers and the logistics involved were not trivial, but a carrier group requires moving not only the carrier but the escorts too and this has to be taken into account when considering the costs. Prolonged operations from a carrier also require refuelers and replenishment ships to operate, unless there are friendly ports close enough.

When operating from land bases, all the "escort" assets are already available and don't need to be moved in theatre, so are the logistics assets. The availability of land bases also allows the use of assets that may not be available on board a carrier, thinking for example of the various C3I tasked aircrafts.

The Falklands on the other hand are a true example of operations that would have not been feasible without a carrier force.

 

In general a lot would also depend on the kind of tasks that the carriers will have to perform and this is afterall a political decision. USN carrier groups are the "tip of the spear" of US foreign policy, as such they have to be able to operate independently everywhere in the world. These carrier groups can also find themselves operating for long periods in "blue waters" and must be as independent as possible from land based assets. For these reasons the US supercarriers carry aircrafts for almost every possible task, including IFR.

Would the RN carriers have to operate in a similar way ? Or would they only operate as part of combined forces ? Would they have to spend long time over oceans or would they mostly operate closer to shore ? Depending on the answers to these questions (and of course many others), it will be possible to understand if the RN will require certain type of aircrafts aboard their carriers.

Now I know that what I'm going to say may sound political... and it is in the broader sense of involving a discussion on political decisions, however it's not in the sense of discussing politicians or political parties. Anyway, personally I feel that it's very unlikely that Britain will in the near future in the position of mouting US style operations without any ally. For this reason, even if having an on-board IFR capability is sure a good thing, I can see the RN carriers being able to operate with no problem without.

 

One more comment: there may actually be a place today for some kind of "general purpose" carrier based platform, capable to be configured for missions like IFR, transport, AEW and maybe even ASW. With the demise of the Viking now only helicopters are tasked with ASW operations from carriers, both the USN and the French use the Hawkeye for AEW missions, the USN has the C-2 for transport and the Super Hornet with buddy packs for IFR. Maybe a variant of the C/E-2 could be designed to provide IFR support. If this could be operated from carriers without catapults though is another story...

You forgot litteral ops.....or amphibious in old money:-D

Edited May 5, 2017 by junglierating

[Truro Model Builder]

The retirement of the S-3 Viking has always mystified me. As an ASW platform it had longer range than a helicopter and was much quieter than rotary wing platforms to its prey, while it was versatile for other roles as well, being almost the general purpose platform that Giorgio quite correctly advocates for. I would think its loss is felt keenly in US carrier air wings.

 

[Giorgio N]

3 hours ago, junglierating said:

You forgot litteral ops.....or amphibious in old money:-D

 

I was thinking about mentioning them directly, but then decided that in the end these don't require particularly different assets from those I mentioned, at least from the point of view of the carrier.

The only "recent" example of amphibious operation conducted with carrierborne air cover alone is probably the Falklands, the lack of IFR capabilities didn't really affect much the work of the Sea Harriers. Speaking of Falklands, other assets would have probably been way more useful, in particular an AEW platform, as immediately recognised by the FAA.

 

3 hours ago, T7 Models said:

The retirement of the S-3 Viking has always mystified me. As an ASW platform it had longer range than a helicopter and was much quieter than rotary wing platforms to its prey, while it was versatile for other roles as well, being almost the general purpose platform that Giorgio quite correctly advocates for. I would think its loss is felt keenly in US carrier air wings.

 

 

Agree, the Viking was IMHO one of the unsung heroes of naval aviation, did a great job for a long time and was used for a good number of different missions, even as a strike aircraft.

It should be said though that the ASW mission lost a lot of importance in the USN with the end of the Cold War, all S-3s lost most of their ASW fit and were used for different duties.

The USN planned to replace the Viking with the Common Support Aircraft concept, that would have also replaced the C/E-2, but nothing came of it. The E-2 was in the end replaced by newer E-2s and the type is still in production.

Thinking of it, the E-2 must now also rate as one of the most succesful carrier borne aircraft ever, 55 years in production is not something many types can boast...

Edited May 5, 2017 by Giorgio N

[John B (Sc)]

This does suggest a certain amount of overly simplistic thinking on the part of the MOD. They really don't seem to do strategic thinking well, or possibly they listen a little too readily to some of the more biased RAF opinions!

The RAF, bless it, has been claiming for many years that it can provide all the force projection required.  Way back in WW2 that was shown to be a stretch too far and it has repeatedly been shown to be untrue since.  It only works if there are adequate friendly airbases within range of any problem area, something only occasionally true.

 

The whole point of having  carriers is to provide air power independent of such land bases.  Hence the need for some form of integral refuelling capability. To presume that RAF land based aircraft could provide that is nonsensical.

 

It more and more sounds as if the plans for the F--35's use have not been properly, professionally thought through. Worrying, although it may mean we modellers can play some fun 'What-If'; games.

[PLC1966]

Some kind of integral refuelling would be nice for the Joint Force F-35's, but there are a lot of things the RN need more urgently, try sorting out RN manpower and accommodation, T26/31, MARS, ASW, organic UAS, LPD, C4ISR, SSN, MCM and successor SSBN.  Even just for the Carrier I would have thought some type of Organic COD would have been top of the list. But obviously that COD would need landside Airfields to operate from, probably the same airfields the Tankers would operate from !! 

 

But then the whole of defence needs a lot of things urgently, and they all need to to be done without a pot to pee in.  To pay for Osprey says something else need to be cut.

 

It has been, and will be, the Chancellor (of whatever hue) and the Treasury who will limit the Joint Force Capability and not the nasty crabs. 

[Dave Fleming]

RPV tankers

[John B (Sc)]

45 minutes ago, PLC1966 said:

It has been, and will be, the Chancellor (of whatever hue) and the Treasury who will limit the Joint Force Capability and not the nasty crabs. 

 

 

So true, sadly- and they have even less knowledge of what is needed for satisfactory naval operations of any sort than the 'crabs' you mention.  That's a fine bunch of acronyms you quoted - wow. that should keep me busy for a while, looking those up !

[PLC1966]

Just now, John B (Sc) said:

 

 

So true, sadly- and they have even less knowledge of what is needed for satisfactory naval operations of any sort than the 'crabs' you mention.  That's a fine bunch of acronyms you quoted - wow. that should keep me busy for a while, looking those up !

 

To be fair, I shamelessly blagged the TLA & FLA off of someone else, but the point was valid so I stole 'em !!

[junglierating]

59 minutes ago, Dave Fleming said:

RPV tankers

Wot? Does that mean

[XV107]

On 5/4/2017 at 11:51 PM, hairystick said:

 

Which is much like the Black Buck missions. A massive waste of fuel to do something that the SHARs could have done multiple times from their closer (carrier) base/s. No AAR necessary either!

 

The release of the files to Kew completely changes this view. The RN didn't want to use the SHARs, despite CAS suggesting that they should. The initial planning for responding to the invasion (which began before a single Argentine soldier/marine had set foot on the islands) involved sending a Vulcan to shut the runway at Stanley. This plan was drawn up by an RN officer. CAS pointed out a number of the problems involved in using Vulcans, but the rest of the Chiefs of Staff particularly the RN officers, wishing to reduce the risk to the SHAR force, wanted to use the Vulcan. There were also issues about the penetration of the runway from weapons delivered by the SHAR (and later GR3), and the fact that there was thought to be an enhanced risk of the bombs skipping and not even penetrating the runway surface. On top of that, it later transpired that because they were out of practice at this sort of thing/had never done it before, the RN deck crews failed to fuse bombs properly, so that they detonated on impact and simply scarred the runway surface rather than penetrating. It's a moot point, but there is a good chance that the runway would not have been damaged to the extent it was had SHAR/GR3 been called upon to do the job.

 

On top of that, there was  - as VMcFb notes - the expectation that it would force the Argentines to think about QRA. Despite a number of (naval, oddly enough) historians pooh-poohing this, the evidence that the Mirage III force did have to add QRA to its repertoire in a manner not really thought about beforehand is there (coming from the pilots and groundcrews who had a miserable time sitting on alert). It also - combined with the sinking of Belgrano - put paid to any ideas of extending the runway; the single bomb created sufficient damage so that although C-130s did land, they had to do so much less heavily loaded than would've been the case, thus increasing the number of sorties required to get supplies in to the garrison.

 

The SHAR didn't have an anti-radar weapon, so two of the five BB missions (2 more being canx) couldn't have been done without the Vulcan/Shrike combo, and the effort required was deemed worthwhile because of a desire to reduce the Argentine air defence threat. As with BB1 and BB2, there was a recognition that this was not ideal, but clearing the Vulcan for an ARM (and, for that matter, thinking about the Victor for the SEAD role with Martel) was thought to be an easier task likely to bring results earlier than waiting for Shrike integration on Harrier (which was cleared on the day the war ended).

 

That's a simplification of the contents of a number of files (from the FCO representative's minutes of Chiefs of Staff meetings and various AIR 20 and DEFE files at Kew) - all of them make clear that the most doubtful of the Chiefs of Staff was CAS, with CDS (Admiral Lewin) and 1SL (Admiral Leach) being particularly keen to use the Vulcan - not least since BB1 could be mounted in a bid to close the runway before the TF got within range of the island, thus a successful BB1 would dramatically increase the probability that the Task Force would operate at reduced risk from Argentine jets operating from Stanley (remember that using the airfield for recovery and refuelling prior to return to Argentina would've been useful). 

 

Sharkey Ward might have thought Black Buck a waste of fuel; Captain Middleton on Hermes might have agreed - but the Chiefs of Staff most definitely didn't, and it was the dark blue wearing officers who were most keen to do this, not CAS attempting to wedge the RAF into an offensive role (indeed, he was the least enthused at the thought of using Vulcans for the job).

[junglierating]

6 hours ago, XV107 said:

 

The release of the files to Kew completely changes this view. The RN didn't want to use the SHARs, despite CAS suggesting that they should. The initial planning for responding to the invasion (which began before a single Argentine soldier/marine had set foot on the islands) involved sending a Vulcan to shut the runway at Stanley. This plan was drawn up by an RN officer. CAS pointed out a number of the problems involved in using Vulcans, but the rest of the Chiefs of Staff particularly the RN officers, wishing to reduce the risk to the SHAR force, wanted to use the Vulcan. There were also issues about the penetration of the runway from weapons delivered by the SHAR (and later GR3), and the fact that there was thought to be an enhanced risk of the bombs skipping and not even penetrating the runway surface. On top of that, it later transpired that because they were out of practice at this sort of thing/had never done it before, the RN deck crews failed to fuse bombs properly, so that they detonated on impact and simply scarred the runway surface rather than penetrating. It's a moot point, but there is a good chance that the runway would not have been damaged to the extent it was had SHAR/GR3 been called upon to do the job.

 

On top of that, there was  - as VMcFb notes - the expectation that it would force the Argentines to think about QRA. Despite a number of (naval, oddly enough) historians pooh-poohing this, the evidence that the Mirage III force did have to add QRA to its repertoire in a manner not really thought about beforehand is there (coming from the pilots and groundcrews who had a miserable time sitting on alert). It also - combined with the sinking of Belgrano - put paid to any ideas of extending the runway; the single bomb created sufficient damage so that although C-130s did land, they had to do so much less heavily loaded than would've been the case, thus increasing the number of sorties required to get supplies in to the garrison.

 

The SHAR didn't have an anti-radar weapon, so two of the five BB missions (2 more being canx) couldn't have been done without the Vulcan/Shrike combo, and the effort required was deemed worthwhile because of a desire to reduce the Argentine air defence threat. As with BB1 and BB2, there was a recognition that this was not ideal, but clearing the Vulcan for an ARM (and, for that matter, thinking about the Victor for the SEAD role with Martel) was thought to be an easier task likely to bring results earlier than waiting for Shrike integration on Harrier (which was cleared on the day the war ended).

 

That's a simplification of the contents of a number of files (from the FCO representative's minutes of Chiefs of Staff meetings and various AIR 20 and DEFE files at Kew) - all of them make clear that the most doubtful of the Chiefs of Staff was CAS, with CDS (Admiral Lewin) and 1SL (Admiral Leach) being particularly keen to use the Vulcan - not least since BB1 could be mounted in a bid to close the runway before the TF got within range of the island, thus a successful BB1 would dramatically increase the probability that the Task Force would operate at reduced risk from Argentine jets operating from Stanley (remember that using the airfield for recovery and refuelling prior to return to Argentina would've been useful). 

 

Sharkey Ward might have thought Black Buck a waste of fuel; Captain Middleton on Hermes might have agreed - but the Chiefs of Staff most definitely didn't, and it was the dark blue wearing officers who were most keen to do this, not CAS attempting to wedge the RAF into an offensive role (indeed, he was the least enthused at the thought of using Vulcans for the job).

 

[Truro Model Builder]

A very interesting post, XV107, certainly with information I was not aware of. I have to admit, that Ward's thoughts of how the SHAR force could have made better use of the fuel did ignore the problem of getting it to the carriers, along with the munitions they could have used and how they would have manned all those missions.

 

[junglierating]

Hmm my post earlier didnt attach.

So regarding XV107 (considering changing my name to XZ457)...I am decidedly out as to my opinion of op black buck....whilst it was a fantastic example of fag packet and cuff it British get on with it attitude ...esp the logistics

The PR with the look what we can do from Lincolnshire attitude was a great example of theatre....i mean that in a nice way.Tactically it didnt really achieve much that said if you are at the end of 20K of HE even if it misses then it all counts.

Meanwhile if you ever slag of FAA bombheads again ....im going to hunt you down and give you a sound talking to .

Music....A is for armourer B is for armourer C is for..........

[Dave Fleming]

21 hours ago, junglierating said:

Wot? Does that mean

 

Drone tankers.

[junglierating]

15 minutes ago, Dave Fleming said:

 

Drone tankers.

Duh of course....remotely piloted vehicles ....how very forward thinking of you.Although i think the derigour is now RPAS....this week

[Meatbox8]

9 minutes ago, junglierating said:

Duh of course....remotely piloted vehicles ....how very forward thinking of you.Although i think the derigour is now RPAS....this week

And there was me thinking it was Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.  I can't keep up. 

[Meatbox8]

33 minutes ago, Dave Fleming said:

 

Drone tankers.

But how do you land the booggers?

[Dave Fleming]

2 hours ago, Meatbox8 said:

But how do you land the booggers?

 

Flown from land, no crew have a much longer loiter capability.