Germany wants access to C-130's

[Jamie @ Sovereign Hobbies]

My day job is management of complex engineering projects, but not military ones. We do however design for external customers who are the end user of the product.

Predicting how long it will take and how much it will cost to design and build something using proven technology is simple enough in theory, but many still get it wrong.

Predicting how long it will take and how much it will cost to design and build something which breaks now ground is much harder. Sure, one can come up with figures based upon what is known, but the devil is always in the detail and it is what is unknown which cannot be accounted for.

From the very beginning of engineering projects, things can go wrong. People who think they know more than they do can become fixated on conceptual ideas. These ideas may appear to be the best at the time, but as other attributes evolve as the project matures it can become clear that some underpinning decision is no longer appropriate.

Management of Change is written about in all management text books, and everyone prattles on about MOC. In theory it's very simple. In practise, it can be close to impossible to accurately determine how much of a complex design is affected by a proposed change to the functionality or performance requirements. It is a race against the clock to come up with an answer because anything carried out in the time between the change being announced and a new cost and schedule being agreed is liable to be abortive work which nobody ever feels like paying for. It is a circular problem. The cost and schedule impact of abortive work should in theory be accounted for in the change cost and schedule, but they are in themselves a function of how fast the decision can be made. As a result, despite efforts, there are often things which go unforeseen.

The later in any design exercise someone decides to change something (and to be fair, they usually have good reasons because their own end-user requirements are better understood), the more detrimental to the cost and completion date because more of the work must be recycled.

Fundamentally, new design requires talent only at the beginning to understand the brief, feed back the implications of said brief to the customer and help them refine their brief, and lay out the important/governing parts of the design to make a good stab at the cost and schedule to complete. If this is well funded, projects usually go quite well. If on the other hand significant investment decisions are made based upon incompetence (from any source - the design could be mince but equally the functional requirements and input data can be complete rot too) or flawed initial work, then projects usually run badly. Changing the project specification should be avoided if at all possible, which puts even more emphasis on spending the time getting the stakeholders to agree on the spec and resultant conceptual design to achieve that spec. I've never yet seen a project where details didn't change. This can be accommodated without significant damage. It's changing the input requirements which pull the rug out from under any design. Often it is difficult for a customer to have a clear idea themselves what they actually require, until they see what their product can do. By that I mean there are many requirements, but some of these are essential and others are preferential. If a requirement is essential, then it has to be catered for. If a preferential requirement is causing a design impasse, then it should be dropped but it's often difficult to get a well-judged but fast decision on whether a requirement is really a requirement or not.

The thing about very complex engineering projects which break new ground is that design maturity will reach brick walls at times and require back-tracking to find alternative solutions. To be blunt, only people who have worked in design development can accept that as an absolute certainty, and if lucky the problems will be easily resolved. Those who have never designed anything tend to regard it as incompetence.

[oggy4624]

I definitely remember photographing the FLA large scale model at Paris 87 and I have only been to two

[Calum]

My contact with the Blackhawk disaster is limited to working with guys who were there, both from 5 Avn & Perth. Not that it's a comparison, but that's enough contact with that incident for me. I just had to live (& plan) in the aftermath.

I misread the date in your earlier comment (by 9 yrs) .My reply was related to Post Nias 2005. I don't remember much change to the technical airworthiness system from the accident in 1996.

The MRH-90 & ARH issues are more than adequately covered by the multiple national audit office (ANAO) reports. More an insistence that the contractor delivered to the contracted standard, than conservatism. "Getting on with it"? Like the Germans reducing their NH90 order from 122 to 82, or Tiger order from 80 to 57 for example? Yep, everyone else seems to be stoked with both of the platforms.

I'm not saying the MRH or ARH don't have ongoing issues, or that the OEM support has been poor, far from it, clearly they aren't what the ADF wished they would be. In my experience support from French OEM's is far more difficult than it needs to be, and whats most annoying, is that this is the easiest thing to fix. But as you say these are well covered i the ANAO reports.

But the reduction in the orders from Germany etc for Tiger and NH-90 seems to be a reduction in numbers (capability) overall. It's not like they have reduced numbers NH-90/Tiger and replaced them with UH-60's/AH-64's...Now whether they have used the issues with the platforms as a reason to reduce the overall numbers, is another question (I'd say it's likely).

[Antoine]

Let's not forget that this is Airbus' first attempt at designing and building a military airlifter - lets cut them some slack.

I'm sure it will mature into a successful aircraft - just look at all the problems that Lockheed had with the C-130J

That was a company with dozens of years building a very mature design - yet the simple 'upgrade' created loads of issues that were only recently fixed.

As an aside - re the A-400M issues - a parachute instructor recently told us of a problem with the side parachute doors.

Apparently, when they are opened a slid upwards for paradrops, the operating handle becomes out of the reach of shorter dispatchers when trying to slide it back down again.

I'm sure a bit of rope attached would solve the problem - but it's an example of a minor niggle in the design.

Ken

Agree, Ken.

But as far as FAF is concerned, the biggest problem is not the side parachute doors, but the IFR ability for helicopters.

And the problem seems to be without a solution, no way to correct it, the only way being to buy 2 KC-130J....

This is, to me, the biggest fail in the program, as everybody expected the A400 to replace task for task both the Transall and the Hercules, and to get at last the capacity to refuel in flight the Caracal fleet.

[Albeback52]

Just a small point about parachute drops - the A400 has been certified for free fall single side door drops, and free fall drops from the rear ramp. In addition, static line automatic release from the ramp has also been certified. As I understand it, the biggest problem for AAR of helicopters is turbulence from those huge props making it very difficult to control the drogue line. One option currently being explored is a longer (120 - 150 ft) drogue to enable helicopters to refuel at a safer distance. This is surely a minor role however for the aircraft.

Allan

[Antoine]

Allan, not too sure, but I've heard it couldn't be corrected.

Minor role for the aircraft, ok, but then, what's the point to have IFR capable helos in our air force if we've not the capacity to refuel them in flight?

[Truro Model Builder]

The German defence ministry has been happy all through the A400M's design and development period with its size and the limit of its capabilities. That original FLA mock-up showed how much bigger than the C-130 and the C-160 it was going to be. Only now that they receive the first ones into service do they turn round and say, "Whoops. Looks like it can't do some of the jobs we've been using the Transall for." -despite the fact they had as much input into the design of the A400M as anyone else.

This is their cock-up, and if they want some C-130 capability they'll have to do what everyone else does, and buy some of their own. New or second hand, there are plenty available, Mrs. Merkel.

[daneel]

My day job is management of complex engineering projects, but not military ones. We do however design for external customers who are the end user of the product.

Predicting how long it will take and how much it will cost to design and build something using proven technology is simple enough in theory, but many still get it wrong.

Predicting how long it will take and how much it will cost to design and build something which breaks now ground is much harder. Sure, one can come up with figures based upon what is known, but the devil is always in the detail and it is what is unknown which cannot be accounted for.

From the very beginning of engineering projects, things can go wrong. People who think they know more than they do can become fixated on conceptual ideas. These ideas may appear to be the best at the time, but as other attributes evolve as the project matures it can become clear that some underpinning decision is no longer appropriate.

Management of Change is written about in all management text books, and everyone prattles on about MOC. In theory it's very simple. In practise, it can be close to impossible to accurately determine how much of a complex design is affected by a proposed change to the functionality or performance requirements. It is a race against the clock to come up with an answer because anything carried out in the time between the change being announced and a new cost and schedule being agreed is liable to be abortive work which nobody ever feels like paying for. It is a circular problem. The cost and schedule impact of abortive work should in theory be accounted for in the change cost and schedule, but they are in themselves a function of how fast the decision can be made. As a result, despite efforts, there are often things which go unforeseen.

The later in any design exercise someone decides to change something (and to be fair, they usually have good reasons because their own end-user requirements are better understood), the more detrimental to the cost and completion date because more of the work must be recycled.

Fundamentally, new design requires talent only at the beginning to understand the brief, feed back the implications of said brief to the customer and help them refine their brief, and lay out the important/governing parts of the design to make a good stab at the cost and schedule to complete. If this is well funded, projects usually go quite well. If on the other hand significant investment decisions are made based upon incompetence (from any source - the design could be mince but equally the functional requirements and input data can be complete rot too) or flawed initial work, then projects usually run badly. Changing the project specification should be avoided if at all possible, which puts even more emphasis on spending the time getting the stakeholders to agree on the spec and resultant conceptual design to achieve that spec. I've never yet seen a project where details didn't change. This can be accommodated without significant damage. It's changing the input requirements which pull the rug out from under any design. Often it is difficult for a customer to have a clear idea themselves what they actually require, until they see what their product can do. By that I mean there are many requirements, but some of these are essential and others are preferential. If a requirement is essential, then it has to be catered for. If a preferential requirement is causing a design impasse, then it should be dropped but it's often difficult to get a well-judged but fast decision on whether a requirement is really a requirement or not.

The thing about very complex engineering projects which break new ground is that design maturity will reach brick walls at times and require back-tracking to find alternative solutions. To be blunt, only people who have worked in design development can accept that as an absolute certainty, and if lucky the problems will be easily resolved. Those who have never designed anything tend to regard it as incompetence.

exactly! after reading this thread, I find this the best post in it. this point should be considered discussing other projects too. too often I see casual comments about different designer's "incompetence" while not at all considering the customers negligence in defining their own needs in the first place, or coming up late in the design phase with game-changing requests. as someone already pointed out, "multirole" is the new buzzword, and ever since mcnamara and his F-111 fiasco, defence contractors are struggling with designing craft that are jacks of all trades, but masters of none... sometimes they get it right, sometimes they don't, but before laying blame, anyone that is compelled to offer his or hers opinion on the matter should at least attempt to get the complete picture of the entire problem. it's not exactly new.

[Slater]

Within the context of it's design, I'd call the Herc a true "jack of all trades". Transport, gunship, electronic warfare, tanker, Special Ops, etc. I think the US even landed one on an aircraft carrier.

[tempestfan]

as someone already pointed out, "multirole" is the new buzzword, and ever since mcnamara and his F-111 fiasco, defence contractors are struggling with designing craft that are jacks of all trades, but masters of none... sometimes they get it right, sometimes they don't, ...

Don't forget the 111 was basically sunk by the USN who didn't want their B, and the engines...(Tommy Tomason's Ginter NF is highly illuminating) and then they went for the F-14, with about the same weight, and the same engines...The Multirole concept worked rather well with the F-4 IMO, and the F-111 eventually gave rather good service as a multiroler, as does the Tornado since 30 years plus. So sometimes it does work.

Anyway, agree that Sovereign Hobbies' post is the best so far.

[Truro Model Builder]

I think it's fair to say that some designs suit multi-role (Mosquito, F-4, F-18 etc), others don't (EE Lightning, A-10). And even then it depends on your definition of multi-role. The Panavia Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) of the early 1970s has been equally good at any number of air-ground missions -as defined in the multi-role specification set for it- but the development of an Air Defence Variant could be defined as stretching the muti-role concept perhaps a little too far. While (eventually) meeting the requirements it was set, the ADV has not met the popular definition of a fighter aircraft.

Enough digression. Back on topic!

[Seahawk]

I think it's fair to say that some designs suit multi-role (Mosquito, F-4, F-18 etc), others don't (EE Lightning, A-10). And even then it depends on your definition of multi-role. The Panavia Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) of the early 1970s has been equally good at any number of air-ground missions -as defined in the multi-role specification set for it- but the development of an Air Defence Variant could be defined as stretching the muti-role concept perhaps a little too far. While (eventually) meeting the requirements it was set, the ADV has not met the popular definition of a fighter aircraft.

Ah, but are you talking specification or "popular definition". The ADV was intended to tote a meaningful number of AAMs around the GIUK gap as a long-range bomber destroyer. Once they got the radar to work, I haven't heard its performance in that role criticised. The fact the ADV didn't correspond with the public's (or some fighter jocks') definition of a fighter is surely neither here nor there.

[Giorgio N]

The problem with the definition of multirole is how far into each role the type is supposed to be... The Phantom was a true multirole aircraft but, at least in its initial form, it was a very good interceptor but lacking manouverability compared to other fighters. At the same time was capable of dropping bombs and other A/G ordnance but lacked the kind of accuracy expected by true bombers. Things improved with later variants but the type was always a compromise... a very, very good compromise.

The F-111 was a superb bomber but no matter what the discussion on weight may be, the overall design made it ill suited to being a fighter. Could have been a Tornado ADV kind of fighter, but the Tomcat, with its superior aerodynamic design, would have still been a better fighter even at a higher weight.

The introduction of better weapons is in the end what has made possible the introduction of aircrafts that are true multirole and here the Phantom was the first true example. The aerodynamic design of every multirole aircraft will however always be steered toward one requirement more than the others.

[tempestfan]

The F-111Bs primary mission would have been Fleet Air Defence, loitering for an extended priod of time well out from the fleet and shoot down any bombers forming a potential threat. It was never intended to be a dogfighter (as far as I understand the original requirement). Its mission profile is not unlike that of the Tornado ADV.

[Truro Model Builder]

F-111B, F-14 and Tornado ADV were all built to meet a similar requirement. As Seahawk points out, the ADV met the requirement perfectly once the radar was sorted, and for the UK's needs it was entirely the right answer. I think the F-111B would have done the same job for the USN adequately but for whatever reason the USN turned against it and went for the F-14. But like the Tornado, I don't think that the F-14 would have been very comfortable in a close-in fight against a well flown Flanker or a Fulcrum, Top Gun training or not.

[Nigel Foster60]

Almost every new aircraft suffers the A400 from teething problems of some sort. Note the aircraft listed above.

The more the design is compromised by several requirements the more difficult it is.

Like most it will get sorted and probably make a fine strategic aircraft.

However It is unlikely to be happy in a tactical role given its size.

Nigel

[Ascoteer]

However It is unlikely to be happy in a tactical role given its size.

Which begs the question of why we are slashing (in fact have slashed) our Tactical AT fleet.

[Jamie @ Sovereign Hobbies]

Which begs the question of why we are slashing (in fact have slashed) our Tactical AT fleet.

I think that's what happens when decisions are made with a political agenda above all else, as many defence decisions seem to be when all the bull is stripped back.

[Slater]

Some have mentioned the Embraer KC-390. This aircraft evidently uses a pair of proven turbofans, so it would appear that Embraer has avoided most engine-related issues.

[bentwaters81tfw]

Ah, but are you talking specification or "popular definition". The ADV was intended to tote a meaningful number of AAMs around the GIUK gap as a long-range bomber destroyer. Once they got the radar to work, I haven't heard its performance in that role criticised. The fact the ADV didn't correspond with the public's (or some fighter jocks') definition of a fighter is surely neither here nor there.

We had a talk from a retired F-4 and ADV nav recently. He said once the radar was fixed, the ADV was unbeatable in it's role, even though it was not a dogfighter. He also mentioned the MiG 29 was lethal if it got in close. The helmet sight was a real jump forward. Went against them when Germany unified, and was impressed.

[Albeback52]

Allan, not too sure, but I've heard it couldn't be corrected.

Minor role for the aircraft, ok, but then, what's the point to have IFR capable helos in our air force if we've not the capacity to refuel them in flight?

A question probably best addressed to those who make the strategic planning decisions. Does the RAF actually have the capability to refuel its fleet of helicopters in flight anyway? I was not aware that the existing C-130 fleet was equipped for this task. If not, then how DO our helicopters refuel in flight?

Allan

[Ascoteer]

UK Helos are not probe fitted and can not carry out AAR.

C-130J has the capability for effectively a ro-ro HDU AAR fit. It was originally budgeted for upon purchase of the J Model, but the funding was spent on other things.

[Flankerman]

The Merlin was certainly trialled for IFR - scroll down here for a photo.

I can remember seeing and photographing an RAF Merlin at Fairford fitted with a probe - although the crew couldn't tell me from what they would be refuelled in flight!

Ken

[Jabba]

_{The probe option was dropped on the Chinook Mk3.}

Edited June 15, 2016 by Jabba

[Ascoteer]

The Merlin was certainly trialled for IFR - scroll down here for a photo.

Unfortunately a trial is not the same as possessing a capability.